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Prologue
We started writing this book in 1974, and completed a first draft in 1980. Then
the manuscript sat on my desk for three years, where it was likely to stay
forever, holding up my clock, and blocking the view out of my window. The
book was finally resurrected and brought into print, primarily because of the
constant urging of Hugh Miser, who took an early interest in the book while
he was head of publications at the International Institute of Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA), and whose encouragement never weakened, even after he
left that position. Finally he used the one argument no author could possibly
resist-he said that the book was too important to the field to remain
unpublished. Whether or not that was true, the strategy worked. I did one
more editing, added a final chapter, and the book is now off my desk and in
your hands.
I should probably explain the long incubation process, the near-
abandonment of the manuscript, and why I finally convinced myself that a
book on the state of an art should be published, even though its examples
come from the art of ten years ago. While we were writing the book Jenny
Robinson and I were more involved in teaching and doing systems analysis
than in surveying the state of the art. Except for the first year, when we were
gathering data and reading descriptions of dozens of models, the book was a
part-time and uncompensated activity for both of us. I was also farming,
teaching at Dartmouth, doing my own policy-oriented systems studies, and
working for the end of world hunger. Jenny was earning an M.S. in
agricultural economics, working on the Global 2000 study, making models at
IIASA, and finally returning for her Ph.D. in geography at Santa Barbara.
Somewhere in there she also designed and built her own house.
When the book was put on the shelf, we were finished with everything
except a few parts we were most stuck on. We were frustrated trying to trace
down the effects of the example models in the real world. We were not sure
how to end the book. We were tired of the whole enterprise and deeply
involved in starting new ventures. The parts of the book I liked best had
already been published separately in various places. Since I have never
believed in publishing simply to keep from perishing, but only in publishing
when I have something I really want to communicate, I let the book fade in
my attention.
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Coming back to it now after three years, I am surprised and somewhat
appalled at how much of it is still relevant. There are now more recent
economic-demographic models we could include, but they are not
significantly different in concept, method, content, or implementation
effectiveness from the models described here. The list of complaints and
suggestions for improvement from practitioners in the field has changed not
at all over the years, and it is still true that virtually no one is following any of
the suggestions. As far as I can tell, there are no exciting new methods, no
more wisdom in matching method to problem, no more imagination in
depicting society, and certainly no better standards of documentation. So the
examples, literature references, and conclusions we cite here are, I believe,
still representative. Adding more recent examples would neither contradict
nor make more clear any of the points of the book.
There are, however, a few hints of change detectable now that we could not
see during the 1970s. One is that social-system modeling seems to have
become less visible. It is still going on, but at a slower pace, with much less
fanfare and less ambitious expectations. Very few people are still worried that
computer modelers are about to usurp political power. Some of this
slowdown can be traced to the stagnant world economy and to new political
regimes in several Western countries that are decidedly anti-analytical. But I
think much of the eclipse of computer modeling comes from disillusionment
on the part of both modelers and clients with what modeling can accomplish.
Much of that disillusionment is appropriate, as this book demonstrates. The
initial heyday and the exaggerated claims are gone; I hope that means that
everyone is settling down to more professional practice, rather than no
practice at all.
A second change now visible is the sudden presence of microcomputers in
the lives of ordinary people. I think that familiarity with these computers will
have a liberating effect on social-system modeling. There will be sufficient
public understanding of the computer to disperse the remaining traces both of
distrust and of unthinking acceptance of any advice coming from a computer.
Computer models will be questioned more intelligently, modelers will be less
able to hide behind jargon. It is also possible that Widespread use of small
computers will force the construction of simple models, which would be a
good thing. Unfortunately, however, since more computing capacity is being
packaged in smaller and cheaper compartments, reasonable constraints on
the size of models may be too much to hope for.
The third change is one we mention in the epilogue. At the same time that
users are becoming disillusioned with modeling, the field of modeling is
reforming itself. There is more humility and humanity now in the way many
modelers do their work. There is less hype and more wisdom, less mystery,
more communication. The field is certainly a long way from the paradigm
shift we call for in the last chapter, but the shift is visible within many
individuals in the modeling community.
The reader may detect some inconsistencies in tone and emphasis between
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the early and late chapters of the book. We ourselves were undergoing a
paradigm shift over the years we were compiling the book, similar to that
described in Chapter 16. Having made the transition ourselves, we are
confident of the ability of our colleagues to make it as well. We look forward
to the exciting revelations awaiting them and us and the field as a whole, as
more practitioners come to see the world from a different, and what looks to
us like a more constructive, place.
We need to express our appreciation to the many people who helped us
with this book, beginning with Gerald Barney, who suggested it, provided the
funding to begin it, and was almost as insistent as Hugh Miser in keeping us at
it. The makers of the models described in the book have been very patient
with our requests for documentation, our blunt questions, and our delay in
publication. Helpful reviewers of the book at various times have included Jay
Forrester, John Richardson, Edward Quade, and Nino Majone. Dennis
Meadows has tolerated the manuscript cluttering up his household for years,
and he has also provided searching criticism of the text. Many of those just
listed will find that we have not always followed their suggestions. We would
like to assure them that we did hear and appreciate their advice, but that
finally we had to say what we had to say.
DONELLA H. MEADOWS
Plainfield, New Hampshire
December 29, 1983

PART I
Introduction
You may very appropriately want to ask me how we are going to resolve the
ever-acceleratingly dangerous impasse of world-opposed politicians and ideologi-
cal dogmas. I answer, it will be resolved by the computer. Man has ever-increasing
confidence in the computer; witness his unconcerned landings as air transport
passengers ... in the combined invisibility of fog and night. While no politician or
political system can ever afford to yield to their adversaries and opposers, all
politicians can and will yield enthusiastically to the computer's safe flight-controll-
ing capabilities in bringing all of humanity in for a happy landing.
R. Buckminster Fuller
I can't understand it. I can't even understand the people who can understand it.
Queen Juliana of the Netherlands,
watching a demonstration of an electronic computer at Amsterdam
One of the most enduring problems of the human race is that each person must
continually take actions that require knowledge of the future. A general
decides whether to attack, a farmer chooses which crops to plant, a student
selects a course of study and a career, a nation stockpiles grain or bombs. These
decisions must be made under a discomforting ignorance of what the future will
be like or how one's current decisions may affect it. Whatever one suspects
about the future can only be derived from accumulated observations and
generalizations from the past. And no one knows the past very well either.
Human understanding of any event, even one witnessed directly, is obscured,
warped, tainted by all sorts of unrecognized conceptual and perceptual biases.
Hence the dilemma: one needs to foresee the future in order to make wise
decisions, but one cannot even be very certain about the past or the present.
Decision makers have devised ingenious methods over the centuries to
bridge the gap between imperfect knowledge of the past and necessary
decisions about the future. At the Delphic oracle of ancient Greece a priestess
2delivered futuristic pronouncements from a trance induced by breathing
sulfurous fumes. Royal courts in many countries and over many centuries
maintained a corps of soothsayers, astrologers, Merlins, and Rasputins.
Forecasting techniques in the Middle Ages included divination by the Bible
(bibliomancy), by the entrails of sacrificed animals (hieromancy), by dots
made at random on paper (geomancy), and by dropping melted wax into water
(ceromancy). Human legend and history are filled with crystal balls,
Cassandras, prophets and omens.
All these magical techniques are based on essentially two sources of
information. One is chance; the working out of some complex process like the
fall of dice or the swirling of tea leaves according to the laws of the gods, or as
we would say nowadays, the laws of science. Even the chance-based methods
of forecasting, however, depend also on the second source of information-hu-
man interpretation. Whether the human mind is used to read the tea leaves,
decipher the messages of the stars, or deliver a straight prophecy without
props, mental images and analogies, quirks and visions are and always will be
the ultimate basis for human statements about the future.
This book is about models, by which we will mean any set of generalizations
or assumptions about reality. Models are the tools-the only tools-that
human beings use to link the prop to the prophecy; the past to the future. The
most common models are in people's heads; we will call them mental models.
Mental models are nebulous and imprecise, the unexpressed observations,
abstractions, and intuitions that make up each person's image ofthe world. The
human brain can store an amazing number and variety of observations, and
combine them into extremely sophisticated generalizations. Mental models are
not numerically exact, but they contain an immensely rich collection of
information, much of it derived from direct experience. The vast majority of
human decisions are based on individual, unverbalized, shifting mental
models. These decisions seem to allow most people to function reasonably
well, most of the time, in a complex and variable world.'
Organizational decision makers, whether they are heads of families, firms,
or nations, deal with decisions so complex and far-reaching that the intuitions
and experiences of a single person are clearly insufficient for the task.
Therefore they seek expert advice, conduct opinion polls, read the literature
on a subject, form a study committee, put the matter to a vote, or consult
whatever sort of oracle is available. All these activities involve assessing several
models and either choosing the single 'best' one or combining the assumptions
and conclusions of several into a model that is intended to be more
comprehensive, correct, or acceptable than any single person's could be.
Such joint decisions require communication of mental models. But models
are not directly transferable from one mind to another. Their transmission can
take place only through symbols, usually spoken or written words. Communi-
cation of a mental model through symbols is terribly difficult. One is usually
only vaguely aware of one's own intuitions and assumptions. Mental models
shift from moment to moment. They do not fit the linear, sequential format
3required by language. And words are inherently ambiguous, as are the images,
thoughts, and hunches the words describe. Because of all these difficulties,
verbal expression more often takes the form of advocating what one thinks
should be done than of detailing all the semi-conscious urges that determine
why one thinks it should be done.
Even in the modern age of science and industrialization social policy
decisions are based on incompletely-communicated mental models. The
assumptions and reasoning behind a decision are not really examinable, even
to the decider. The logic, if there is any, leading to a social policy is unclear to
most people affected by the policy. As far as the general public and even many
policymakers themselves are concerned, today's vital decisions are about as
understandable and accessible as if they had been handed down by a Delphic
oracle.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. For some varied and detailed discussions of the development, strengths and
weaknesses of mental models, see R. E. Ornstein, The Psychology of Conscious-
ness. San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1972; and J. W. Forrester. 'Counterintuitive
Behavior of Social Systems', Technology Review 73, (3), January 1971.

CHAPTER 1
The Electronic Oracle
A. COMPUTER MODELS: THE NEW ORACLES
Just as mental models can be partially, approximately, expressed in words, they
can also be partially, approximately, expressed in mathematical symbols.
Mathematical symbols are much more precise and unambiguous, though less
rich and varied, than words. Until this century the expression of models
through mathematical equations was limited almost entirely to the physical
sciences, where the relationships to be described were usually simple and
precise enough to be fitted easily to mathematical notation. However, in the
last few decades a new symbol-processing tool, the computer, has allowed
mathematical symbols of all sorts to be stored and manipulated in quantities
and at speeds orders of magnitude greater than were possible before.
Computer models are nothing but mathematical models translated into the
special, usually digital, languages that computers can read. Computer models
of social as well as physical systems are increasing in number, complexity, and
size as computers become cheaper and more widely accessible.
A 1974 study identified 650 mathematical models made for the U.S.
non-defense federal agencies alone. l Virtually all of these were complex
enough to be computerized. Computer models are used to decide how much
pollution a new factory should be allowed to put into a river, whether aerosol
cans should be banned, and what the price of natural gas should be.
Computer-generated conclusions have been entered as evidence in court cases.
Computer programs routinely churn out ordering decisions to manage
inventories, work through the implications of alternate investment schemes,
and tell the business community what rate of economic growth to expect. In
federal governments computer models forecast future taxes and budget
balances, decide on agricultural pricing schemes and, in centrally-planned
economies, lay-out the details of the next five years' production. The Delphic
oracle is gone, but the need for pronouncements about the future persists. Now
there is a very sophisticated new way to meet that need.
5
6Promoters of the computer as a forecasting tool claim that mathematical
models contribute greatly to the effectiveness, utility and equity of social
decision making. They claim that computer models have several potential
advantages over even the best mental models:
1. Rigor. The assumptions in computer models must be specified explicitly,
completely, and precisely; no ambiguities are possible. Every variable must
be defined, and assumptions must be mutually consistent. Computer
modelers often mention that the discipline required to formulate a
mathematical model is helpful in organizing and clarifying their own mental
models, even before any computer analysis takes place.
2. Comprehensiveness. A computer can manipulate more information than
the human mind and can keep track of many more interrelationships at
one time. It can combine observations from many mental models into
a more comprehensive picture than could ever be contained in a single
human head.
3. Logic. If programmed correctly, the computer can process even a very
complicated set of assumptions to draw logical, error-free conclusions.
The human mind is quite likely to make errors in logic, especially if the
logical chain is complex. Different people may agree completely about a
set of assumptions and still disagree about the conclusion to be drawn
from them. A computer model should always reach the same conclusion
from a single set of assumptions.
4. Accessibility. Because all the assumptions must be explicit, precise, and
unambiguous in order to communicate them to the computer, critics can
examine, assess, and alter computer models, whereas mental models are
virtually unexaminable and uncriticizable.
5. Flexibility. Computer models can easily test a wide variety of different
conditions and policies, providing a form of social experimentation that
is much less costly and time-consuming than tests within the real social
system.
Given these advantages, one would expect computer models to be welcomed
and widely used. But in practice computer models have clarified and improved
social decisions only in limited areas. They have been readily adopted to help
make short-term, clearly-definable, operational decisions, such as how to
allocate mail trucks among various delivery routes, how many beds a new
hospital should have, or what the prime interest rate should be. When it comes
to large-scale, far-reaching social decisions, where mental models may be
weakest and computer models uniquely helpful, decisions about such things as
energy policy, international trade, or design of new institutions, computer
models are regularly viewed with suspicion. Millions of dollars and thousands
of person-years of effort have been invested in such models, but they have
yielded only a small return in terms of any recognizable impact on actual social
7decisions. Computer models of large, complex social systems are more often
made than used, more often criticized than praised.2
Professional modelers are concerned by the mixed record of rapid growth and
slow implementation of their efforts. Surveys and studies are appearing,
assessing the state of the art and attempting to explain and promote the practice
of computer modeling to the non-modeling world, especially to the policy-
maker. 3 Conferences and training sessions are held to bring modelers and
policymakers together, to 'bridge the gap' between the world of analysis and the
world of action.
The gap remains unbridged. Over and over in writing and in person, the
modelers keep asking: 'Why don't you use our models?' The policymakers
respond: 'Why don't you make models we can use?'
B. A COMPARATIVE MODEL SURVEY
In this book we attempt to answer these questions: Are computer models of
large-scale social systems useful? Do they expand or enhance mental models and
provide some help in managing human affairs in a complex world? If not, why
not? And if so, why are computer models so seldom used as input to important
decisions? Our goal is constructive; we would like to live in a society where
decisions are based on the most accurate possible image of both the past and the
future. Therefore, we would hope that any means to increase understanding of
complicated, interconnected social systems would be encouraged and used.
When we began the work described here, we intended to demonstrate that:
1. Complex models based on dissimilar methods can be discussed within a
common format, so that a non-technical audience can compare and evaluate
them.
2. These models are capable of generating new insights into difficult current
socioeconomic problems.
3. A few straightforward alterations of the process of model construction, the
interaction with clients, and the reporting of results could strengthen the
inherent advantages of computer models and allow policymakers to make
more informed choices among the many policy options available to them.
It will become clear as we proceed that our message ended up being more
complicated than that. We found that some computer models are so incongruent
with either mental models or real-world processes that we despaired of finding
ways to communicate them. Some very complicated models generate no insights
beyond elaborate translations of the modelers' original assumptions. Others
produce messages so antithetical to established thinking that they are rejected
out of hand even though they may be correct. And the necessary changes in the
practice of computer modelling may be major, not minor, and personal, not
technical. But before we discuss these conclusions further, let us describe the
process that led us to them.
8We approached our task by taking as examples several major computer
models that have been formulated as inputs to social policy. The stories of these
models provide a number of useful lessons about the problems and potentials
of modeling in social decision-making. The models all address a roughly similar
set of broad and long-term issues-the formulation of national policy to deal
with interacting processes of population growth, agricultural production, and
economic development. We chose studies of both industrialized and non-in-
dustrialized nations, to assess the similarities and differences of models of
various stages of the industrialization process. The models were constructed by
different groups for different sponsors, using a number of different modeling
techniques. The models, their formulators, sponsors, and study areas are
summarized in Table 1.1.
We chose our sample according to the following criteria:
1. Each model should be sufficiently mature and documented to permit
technical examination of its assumptions and conclusions. (This criterion
alone eliminated many possible models from our survey.)
2. A wide variety of techniques and countries of application should be
included to illustrate the scope of analytical possibilities.
3. The models should address development/food/population policy at the
national, not the global or local, level, so that they deal with comparable
problems and policy questions.
4. The models should be good examples of the current state of the modeling
art, highly regarded by those familiar with the field. Each one was suggested
to us as especially interesting or useful by its sponsor and/or by other
modelers in the field.
5. The models should have been developed in consultation with or at the
request of national policymakers. They should be concrete policy models
rather than academic exercises.
We started with a large sample and gradually eliminated all but nine models.
Each of the nine meets most of our original criteria.
We assembled the available documents for each model and in most cases
directly interviewed the modelers and sponsors concerning unclear points or
unfinished work. We prepared a verbal summary of each model and several
diagrams of its boundaries and primary assumptions. Our summary of each
model was reviewed by the modelling group and/or sponsor to correct
misunderstandings or inaccuracies.
Although we are modelers ourselves, we are not expert at all the technical
methods used, nor were we familiar with the details of any of these models
before we began our study. We tried to approach the various models as a
technically educated, concerned citizen or policymaker would, one who has no
particular knowledge of any branch of modeling, but who wants to undepstand
what the models say about the process of industrialization and the conse-
quences of national policies. We tried to ask questions such a person might ask
9Table 1.1 Models included in the survey
Model name
(principal modelers) Region of
Modeling institution Sponsor Client Application
1. SAHEL United States Agen- USAIDand Sahel
(Picardi) cy for International Sahel national
Massachusetts Insti- Development, governments
tute of Technology Africa Bureau
2. No model name Commission on United States USA
(Ridker) Population Growth Government
Resources for the and the American
Future (RfF) Future
3. sos United States En- National or re- USA or regional
(House and Wil- vi ronmental Protec- gional govern-
Iiams) tion Agency and ments
United States En- modelers' private
vironmental Protec- resources
tion Agency
4. TEMPO II United States Agen- National govern- Peru, Venezuela,
(Enke) cy for International ments Chile, many others
General Electric Development,
Tempo Office of Popu-
lation
S. LTSM United Nations National govern- Egypt, Pakistan,
(Martos, Lin) Fund for Population ments non-industrialized
United Nations Activities countries with labor
Food and Agricul- surplus
ture Organization
6. BACHUE United Nations National govern- Philippines, Brazil,
(Rodgers, Wery, Fund for Population ments Kenya and others
and Hopkins) Activities
United Nations In-
ternational Labor
Organization
7. KASM United States Agen- Korean Ministry South Korea
(Johnson, Rossmil- cy for International of Agriculture
ler, Abkin, Carroll, Development, Tech- and Fisheries
de Haen) nical Assistance
Michigan State Uni- Bureau
versity
8. MEXICOV Mexican private Mexican private Mexico
(Beltran del Rio) businesses businesses and
Wharton Economic government
Forecasting Associ-
ates
9. CHAC World Bank, Bank World Bank, Mexico
(Duloy, Norton) of Mexico, Mexi- Mexican govern-
World Bank can government ment
10
about a model, questions focused on content, utility, and real-world
relationships rather than mathematical elegance or computer technicalities.
As we worked, it became obvious that two factors beyond the available data
and theory on development were significant in determining the final messages
of the models. One was the underlying and usualIy unexpressed methodologi-
cal assumptions of each different school of modeling. The other was the
organizational situation of the model: the interrelationships, forms of
communication, pressures, deadlines, and motivations that characterized each
set of modelers and policymakers. Methodological assumptions and institu-
tional settings were rarely described in the model documentation, but we found
them so important that we had to delve fairly deeply into them before we could
understand how the models came to be and why they took the forms they did. A
large part of this report, therefore, is devoted to the modeling methods and the
institutional settings within which modelers work.
C. THE OUTLINE OF THIS BOOK
Each school of modeling is based on a set of operational assumptions about
what the world is like, what a model should be, what makes it valid, and what
questions should be asked about it. To make sense of the modeling field, and
especialIy to sort out the claims and counterclaims of the various schools, one
must understand the method-based assumptions that shape the worlds of
different kinds of modelers. In Part II we summarize the primary conceptual
predispositions underlying each modeling method represented in this study.
Part III contains descriptions of each of the nine models in our survey. The
institutional setting of each model and the results of its implementation, if any,
are discussed, as well as its primary assumptions and conclusions. This Part is
long and heavy for those not intrinsicalIy interested in the gory and contorted
innards of the models; it can be skipped by all but the most technicalIy
dedicated readers. Others can pick up the essence of the nine models in what
we consider the heart of the book-Parts IV and V.
Part IV raises the evaluative questions. From these nine models, what can we
conclude about the state of the modeling art? Are the models scientificalIy
useful? Do they telI us anything about the world, especialIy about the process
of development, we did not already know? We look at what the models have
contributed to understanding of such aspects of the industrialization process as
population growth, technical change, and use of natural resources. We
consider how the models demonstrate the theoretical advantages of computer
modeling and where they falI short. We also ask questions about implementa-
tion. Are computer models used? Have they in any sense changed the world?
We review the implementation histories of some of the models, which indicate
that the modeling process has obvious impact on the world, but not often the
impact that was intended.
Finally, in Part V we turn from evaluation to prescription. We collect from
the modelers themselves a list of suggestions for improvement, and we
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conclude with our own deeper list of improvements that we believe will lead both
to more frequent implementation of models and to models that are more
accessible and useful as inputs to public policy.
D. SOME DEFINITIONS AND CONVENTIONS
Some fairly common words and symbols have come to have subtly different
meanings in the policy world and in the modeling world, and sometimes semantic
misunderstandings even arise among different kinds of modelers. Since this
report is intended to span those several worlds, we need to define carefully some
of the basic terms and representational conventions we will use.
A model is any setofgeneralizations or assumptions about the world. A mental
model is the set ofassumptions in a single person's head; aformalmodel is written
down, either in words, or in the case of the models in this book, in mathematical
equations and computer language.
A system is any set of interrelated elements. Thus a system is composed of two
kinds of entities; elements, which are generally visible or measurable objects or
flows, and relationships, which are connections that are postulated to exist
between these elements. Forexample a model might contain two elements, food
per capita and death rate, and a postulated relationship indicating how different
values of the element food per capita affect the element death rate.
A relationship will be defined as causalif it is necessarily sequential in time and
incorporates some hypothesis about the mechanisms whereby one element
directly influences another. Food per capita may influence death rate through
the known biochemical effects of malnutrition on human health; this
relationship is causal. We will represent causal relationships with a single-
headed arrow pointing from the causal element to the affected element. A + sign
near the arrow indicates that the first element causes the second to vary in the
same direction; an increase in one causes an increase in the other, a decrease
causes a decrease. A - sign indicates variation in the opposite direction Thus as
food per capita increases, death rate decreases; as food per capita goes down,
death rate goes up.
food per capita ~ death rate
Causal relationships between two elements may go both directions; for
example, a higher death rate will decrease population (all else equal), which will
increase food per capita (as always when just one relationship in a system is being
discussed, all else equal).
-food p., ~\:: _ dj" ,,"
population
A closed chain of causal relations like this is called a feedback loop.
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A relationship wiII be called correlational if a direct causation is not
hypothesized but the two elements are presumed to vary together. Forexample,
a correlational relationship might link food per capita and health services per
capita. Neither of these elements is assumed to influence the other directly and
causally, but for the purposes of a model they may be assumed to change
simultaneously. Correlational relationships will be shown with a double-headed
arrow. The sign on this arrow indicates whether the two elements are directly (+)
orinversely (- ) correlated. The notation below indicates that an increase in food
per capita is assumed to be accompanied by, but not necessarily caused by, an
increase in health services per capita.
food per capita .4 health services per capita
We wiII distinguish between the structure of a model and its parameters. The
structure is the general pattern of elements and interrelationships, the
qualitative hypotheses about what is connected to what. The parameters are the
exact numbers used to define the strengths of the connections. Thusin the simple
causal model
food per capita -=+ death rate
the structural assumption is that food percapita negatively influences death rate.
If the relationship is made precise by the equation:
death rate = 0.08 - 0.001 (food per capita)
the numbers 0.08 and 0.001 are parameters that quantify that structural
assumption.
Other model-related words we shall be using frequently and with special care
are:
Accuracy--correctness, conformity to the real world, absence oferror; does not
necessarily imply precision or correctness to many significant digits. 'About
2' is an accurate (not precise) estimate of a real-world value of 2.00563.
Precision-exactness, expression to many significant digits, not necessarily
accuracy. '2.97351' is a precise (not accurate) estimate of a real-world value
of 2.00563.
Exogenous-determined outside the system, an independently-specified input
to the model. An exogenous factor influences the model system but is not
influenced by it. For example, solar energy is exogenous to the earth's
ecosystem.
Endogenous-determined by the system, an output of the model. An
endogenous factor is calculated from other factors in the model system. For
example, the amount of industrial production per year is assumed to be
endogenous in most of the models in our survey, varying with such factors as
capital, labor, or consumer demand.
In addition to the terms we will use to describe models, elements, and
relationships, we need a few definitions to clarify the environment within which
policy-oriented models are made. We wiII refer to the individual or organization
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that contracted and paid for a model as the model's sponsor. The term client
will be used to designate the individual or organization in the appropriate
policymaking position to use the model conclusions in formulating actual
programs or decisions. For some of our nine sample models, the modeling,
sponsor, and client institutions are the same; more typically, all three are
different. We will define the word implementation as any use of the model,
direct or indirect, that changes the way policies or decisions are made.
E. A PERSONAL STATEMENT
This book is about the controversial interface between two controversial
fields, computer modeling and politics. There is no neutral position from
which to view this subject. Even supposedly objective modeling techniques
and scientific disciplines endow their practitioners with subjective preferences
and prejudices about how science should be carried out and how policy
should be made. Like anyone who writes about these matters, we have biases.
We feel that we should make them as clear as possible.
We are both Americans, steeped in the Western traditions of democracy,
individuality, and scientific rationality. We are white, female and middle-
class. Both of us were formally trained in the sciences, particularly biology and
chemistry. The only sort of computer modeling we have personally practiced
is system dynamics, and in the next chapter we take particular care to define
the preconceptions that technique has given us. They are among the most
important preconceptions that color this book. We have worked closely with
people using other modeling methods, sometimes in joint projects. Some of
our best friends are econometricians.
We have no direct experience in the world of policy; only the indirect
experience of working with policymakers in the construction of our own
models. Our political preferences are not easily defined along the traditional
conservative/liberal spectrum; we sympathize with some important beliefs
from each end of the spectrum and reject others. We have both lived in Asian
countries and have found much to admire in the people, philosophies, and
cultures we met there. We both have direct, dirty-hands experience in
agriculture.
One of us was involved in the Limits to Growth4 and the other in the Global
20005 modeling study, both of which caused controversy because they were
accused of being biased by a pessimistic, Malthusian point of view. We are
not personally pessimistic-in fact we are idealistic. We think both of these
studies questioned current mental models, particularly models of the possible
paths and goals of material progress, not in order to deny those paths and
goals, but to point out even better ones.
As modelers we are, of course, pro-modeling. However, one of our main
reasons for writing this book is a deep concern that the modeling profession is
acquiring some attributes that will prevent it from contributing as much to
social decision making as we believe it can contribute. The attributes we like
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and dislike will be apparent from our comments throughout the book. We
value simplicity, transparency, and enduring general insights, and we are
repelled by complexity, jargon, secrecy, and elitism.
We take quite seriously the criticisms commonly directed at our field. We
worry that supercomplex computer models might be less open to critical
evaluation than are mental models. That marvelous tools for error-free
calculation might be worthless if they contain undetected errors in program-
ming and typing. That people who work with computers create around them a
mystical wall that excludes the uninitiated. If these criticisms are correct, we
believe that the social decision maker will find all models-mental, verbal, and
computer-unexaminable black boxes, differentiated primarily by the per-
sonal persuasiveness of the modelers. In that case, there is no more reason to
rely on computer models than on mental models, unless the technocratic
mystique of computers happens to appeal. And if a computer model comes to
be accepted on the basis of personal persuasiveness and mystique instead of
understanding, we feel that it can really claim no advantage over a crystal ball
or Delphic oracle.
The political acceptance of black-box models, if it ever did happen, would be
a strange, technocratic coup d'etat in which modelers have gained the power
to shape assumptions, perceptions, and conclusions of decision-makers in a
way the decision-makers themselves do not quite understand.
Previously, it seems to me, we have had two groups of persons in secret
government: the circle of scientists who are knowledgeable about what is
happening and which decisions must be made, and the larger circle of administra-
tors and politicians to whom the scientists' findings have to be translated. My worry
is that the introduction of the computer is going to lead to a smaller circle still ... we
shall have a tiny circle of computer boys, a larger circle of scientists who are not
familiar with the decision rules and are not versed in the new computer art, and
then, again, the large circle of politicians and administrators ... I suspect that the
chap standing next to the machine, who really knows how it makes decisons, and
who has the machine under his command, is going to be in an excessively influential
position. 6
We conducted this study and wrote this book in order to confirm and
communicate two very strong convictions that sound contradictory. First, we
were, and are still, worried about 'excessively influential computer boys' (and
even 'computer persons'). We would not like to live in a society run by an
unaccountable elite of computer experts, even if these experts did really
understand the society they were controlling. We are even more worried after
conducting the study, because it has persuaded us that the computer persons,
like everyone else, in fact understand very little. If there is anything more to be
feared than technocratic rule, it is rule by technocrats who do not know what
they are doing.
However, at the same time we believe that computer models can tell us
things we need to know about the causes and cures of important social
problems. We have personally learned useful lessons from our own models and
from the ones described here, lessons that are far from total understanding but
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that are nevertheless worth learning and that could not be learned from mental
models alone. And we know there are many more lessons still to be learned.
We believe these lessons can be expressed in language any citizen can
understand. Computer models could be tools of democracy instead of
autocracy, and the people who make them could be valuable, sharing, inspiring
partners in social evolution instead of remote, inaccessible authorities.
So the biases that underlie this book are the opposite poles of a duality, and
we will often swing wildly from one side to the other. On the one hand,
computer modeling is a dangerous technology likely to be misused as a source
of unjustified power by people who look like they know what they are doing but
actually do not. On the other hand, computer modeling is a wondrous new tool
that is already producing exciting results and that should be more respected and
accepted than it now is. Our job here is to maintain a balance between these
two positions.
Computer modelers are human beings with human strengths and failures. To
the extent that their work can be structured to bring out their strengths and
correct for their failures, they can contribute immensely to human understand-
ing of how the world works, to social decision-making, and to the shaping of the
uncertain future.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. G. Fromm, W. L. Hamilton, and D. E. Hamilton, Federally Supported Mathemati-
cal Models: Survey and Analysis, RANN Division of Social Systems and Human
Resources, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 3.
2. For criticisms of computer modeling, see D. Lee, 'Requiem for Large-Scale Models',
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, May 1973; G. Brewer, Politicians,
Bureaucrats, and the Consultant, New York, Basic Books, 1973; I. R. Hoos, Systems
Analysis in Public Policy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972; D.
Berlinski, On Systems Analysis, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1976; B. Mar,
'Problems Encountered in Multidisciplinary Resources and Environmental Simula-
tion Models Development', Journal of Environmental Management, 2, 83,1974; R.
L. Ackoff, 'The Future of Operational Research is Past', Journal of the Operational
Research Society, 30, (2), 93-104,1979.
3. See, for example, S. Cole, 'World Models, their Progress and Applicability',
Futures, p. 201, June 1974; N. Carter, 'Population, Environment, and Natural
Resources: a Critical Review of Recent Models', IBRD Working Paper No. 174,
April 1974; M. Shubik and G. Brewer, Models, Simulations and Games-a Survey,
Rand R-1060- ARPA/RC, May 1972; Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation and the Environment, Computer Simulation Methods to aid National
Growth Policy, Serial no. 95b, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974;
M. Greenberger, M. A. Crenson, and B. L. Crissey, Models in the Policy Process,
New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1976; K. F. Watt, 'Why Won't Anyone Believe
Us?', Simulation, p. 1, January 1977.
4. D. H. Meadows, D. L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. L. Behrens, The Limits to
Growth, New York, Universe Books, 1972.
5. G. O. Barney (ed.), The Global 2000 Report to the President, Washington, D.C.,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.
6. C. P. Snow, in Martin Greenberger (ed.) Management and the Computer of the
Future, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, pp. 10-11,1962.

PART II
Modeling Paradigms
A man saw Nasrudin searching for something on the ground. 'What have you lost,
MuHa?' he asked.
'My key,' said the Mulla.
'So the man went down on his knees too, and they both looked for it. After a
time the other man asked, 'Where exactly did you drop it?'
'In my own house.'
'Then why are you looking here?'
'There is more light here than inside my own house.'
Ancient Sufi teaching story,
retold by Idries Shah
Although the field of computer modeling has only existed for a few
decades, a number of distinct modeling methods have already appeared.
They include linear programming, input-output analysis, econometrics,
stochastic simulation, and system dynamics. These modeling schools share a
number of common concepts about the properties of systems, the process of
modeling, the use of the computer, and the role of models in decision making.
In addition to these shared concepts, each methodological school also
employs its own set of theories, mathematical techniques, languages, and
accepted procedures for constructing and testing models. Every modeling
discipline depends on unique underlying assumptions; that is, each modeling
method is itself based on a model of how modeling should be done.
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CHAPTER 2
Models of Modeling
A. THE CONCEPT OF A PARADIGM
Deep, implicit operating assumptions at the foundation of each modeling
method are crucial to the practice and products of modeling. These assump-
tions are seldom stated or critically examined. Practitioners of each method
absorb its operating assumptions indirectly, by imitation and experimentation,
and thereafter they reflect on these assumptions only occasionally. Typically,
the assumptions of each modeling school are part of the subconscious rather
than conscious reasoning that goes into the making of models. Just as physicists
rarely rethink the laws of algebra or the second law of thermodynamics as they
work, practicing econometricians seldom question the use of statistics to
measure model validity, and system dynamicists regularly use the principle of
feedback control without stopping to wonder whether it is applicable to the
problem at hand.
Such time-tested, constantly-used, and rarely-examined pre-conceptions
seem to fit the concept of a paradigm as defined by Thomas S. Kuhn:
Scientists work from models acquired through education and through subsequent
exposure to the literature often without quite knowing or needing to know what
characteristics have given these models the status of community paradigms .,.
Paradigms may be prior to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules
for research that could be unequivocally abstracted from them ... (Paradigms) are
the source of the methods, problem-field, and standards of solution accepted by
any mature scientific community at any time ... In learning a paradigm the scientist
acquired theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable
mixture. Therefore, when paradigms change, there are usually significant shifts in
the criteria determining the legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions
... Paradigm changes ... cause scientists to see the world of their research-engage-
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ment differently. In so far as their only recourse to that world is through what thEy
see and do, we may want to say that after a (paradigm) revolution scientists are
responding to a different world. I
Different modeling paradigms cause their practitioners to define different
problems, follow different procedures, and use different criteria to evaluate
the result. Paradigms deeply bias the way modelers see the world and thus
influence the contents and shapes of models. As Abraham Maslow says: 'If the
only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat everything as if it were a
nail'.2
The selective blindness induced by any operational paradigm has both
unfortunate and fortunate results. Unfortunately, it constrains thinking, and it
often leads to sterile arguments across paradigms, each school criticizing the
problems, assumptions, and standards of the other from the biased perspective
of its own problems, assumptions, and standards. On the fortunate side,
paradigms create a framework for discipline, coherence, and rigor. Paradigm-
directed research seems to be not only psychologically necessary but
exceptionally fruitful.
Within those areas to which the paradigm directs the attention of the group, normal
science leads to a detail of information and to a precision of the observation-theory
match that could be achieved in no other way. 3
Because of the pervasive effect of methodological paradigms on modelers'
thoughts and perceptions, this comparison of models begins with a description
of the underlying paradigms within which the models were made. In this
chapter we summarize, insofar as it is possible to verbalize them, the paradigms
of the four primary methods represented in our study: system dynamics,
econometrics, input-output analysis, and optimization (linear programming).
We will also discuss composite models, in which two or more of these methods
are combined. Several other methods, such as stochastic simulation, are
omitted here, not because they are unimportant, but because they were not
used in any of the nine models in our survey. We conclude the chapter with an
example of paradigm conflict, contrasting the world views inherent in system
dynamics and econometrics, and illustrating why the twain shall probably
never meet.
Before examining specific modeling schools, however, we should have an
overview of the modeling field as a whole, the scientific paradigm shared by all
modelers, the different ways of classifying models, and the various purposes for
which models are intended to be used.
B. PRECONCEPTIONS AND PURPOSES OF MODELING
Although modelers may disagree vehemently about their specific methods or
models, they are unified by some very basic assumptions that define the whole
modeling approach to problem solving. First of all, social system modelers
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generally come from or were educated in a Western culture, where the
rational, logical, scientific mode of thought is valued and emphasized. They
believe that whatever happens is not totally senseless or random or
unknowable; events have causes that can be understood and probably altered.
One presumably can discover those causes through careful measurement,
clever experimentation, and logical deduction. The source of understanding is
observation and thinking, not intuition or meditating.
Furthermore, modelers share a basically managerial world view. Problems
can be and should be actively confronted, not passively endured. One does not
ride along with the process of social evolution, one strives to direct that
evolution. The world is not only knowable but controllable. This managerial
world view is generally shared not only by modelers, but by most engineers,
businessmen, scientists, and politicians. It is not always shared by artists,
theologians, other humanists, or by those educated in traditional Eastern
cultures:
By one Chinese view oftime, the future is behind you, where you cannot see it. The
past is before you, below you, where you can examine it. Man's position in time is
that of a person sitting beside a river, facing always downstream as he watches the
water flow past ...
In America and other Western countries, the commonest view of abstract time
seems to be the opposite of the old Chinese one. In this, man faces in the other
direction, with his back to the past, which is sinking behind him, and his face is
turned upward to the future, which is floating down upon him. Nor can this man be
static: by our ambitious Western convention, he is supposed to be rising into the
future under his own power, perhaps by his own direction. He is more like a man in
a plane than a sitter by a river. 4
Although computer modelers use historic observations to form their hypoth-
eses, their faces are primarily turned upstream, toward the future.
Computer modelers differ from other managerial types primarily in their
willingness to make entire organizational systems the subject of their analysis.
Computer modelers use the computer as a tool not just for accounting, but for
representing the complex of interactions among human decision-makers. They
assume that human actions and purposes as well as the operations of the
physical universe can be categorized, quantified, and represented by mathema-
tical equations. This postulate does not necessarily imply, as many non-model-
ers believe it does, a belief that human beings or the systems they create are
totally predictable. It does require a belief that they are predictable in the
aggregate and on the average, however. As E. F. Schumacher says:
In principle, everything which is immune to the intrusion of human freedom like
the movements of the stars, is predictable, and everything subject to this intrusion
is unpredictable. Does that mean that all human actions are unpredictable? No,
because most people, most of the time, make no use of their freedom and act purely
mechanically. Experience shows that when we are dealing with large numbers of
people, many aspects of their behaviour are indeed predictable; for out of a large
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number, at anyone time, only a tiny minority are using their power of freedom, and
they often do not significantly affect the total outcome.s
Most computer modelers, when confronted with the task of learning about a
complex phenomenon such as the human body, the interdependent species
living in a coral reef, or an industrial economy, supplement the reductionist
approach of taking it apart and examining each of its pieces with the systems
approach, focusing on the whole and on the pattern of interrelationships
among the pieces. They are attuned to the ways that whole systems may exhibit
properties that cannot be derived simply from the sum of their parts.
Systems analysts tend to see analogies between systems with different
elements but similar relationships, analogies that would be missed by those
who concentrate on elements alone. For example, an introductory systems
textbook points out that the same simple first-order differential equation can
be used to describe the depreciation of industrial capital, the decay of
radioactive materials, the inventory-ordering policy of a beer distributor, or
the cooling of a cup of hot coffee.6
Because they are concerned with the interconnections among real world
entities, modelers tend to include a wide spectrum of indirectly-related
elements in their explanations of events. They cross the boundaries of
traditional disciplines regularly and with relative ease. Because they see
complex interrelationships in the world, they need the computer to represent,
to keep track of, and to help untangle their theories.
Upon the rock of these basic assumptions about rationality, the scientific
method, the computer, and the systems approach, a number of different
modeling schools (it is hard to resist the word 'churches' here) have been
erected. Each was originally developed in response to a specific social need,
each has evolved its own methods and languages, and each shapes the
procedures and perceptions of its adherents in a distinct way.
The different kinds of modeling can be classified along a number of
dimensions, some of which are partially overlapping and some of which are
totally incommensurable. For example, modeling paradigms may be disting-
uished by their information bases. Some are designed to pull meaning from
social statistics, some are derived from laboratory experiments, others depend
on economic theory or ecological observations. Some modeling schools are
eclectic and accommodate information from any source, including hunches or
guesses or intuition.
Modeling paradigms also differ in the mathematical procedures they
employ. Some express their assumptions in differential equations, which are
then solved by the techniques of calculus to obtain an analytical expression for
the behavior of the modeled system at any moment in time. Others use
difference equations that step a system forward in time moment by moment in
imitation of the real system's evolution. Other modelers habitually use
simultaneous equation solution techniques to find a system's equilibrium or
optimum points.
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Modelers also distinguish their work by the nature of the model relationships
they employ. For example, relationships may be:
Stochastic (elements are related by probabilistic statements) If A = 2, then
there is a 20% chance that B = 3, a 60% chance that B = 4, and a 20%
chance that B = 5, or
deterministic (elements are related by absolute statements) If A = 2, B = 4.
Continuous (the relationship contains no sudden steps, jumps, or breaks; it can
be graphically represented by a smooth, unbroken line) A = 3.6 + 8.7B or A
= B2 , or
discrete (the relationship is described by threshholds, discontinuities, or
individual points rather than smooth curves) If A < 2, then B = 10; if A ~
2, then B = 100.
Linear (the relationship can be graphed as a straight line; the marginal change
in B in response to a given marginal change in A is constant) A = 2B + 6, or
non-linear (the relationship can be graphed as any sort of curved line;
non-linear is usually also interpreted to mean continuous) A = B2 or A =
23 + 56eB - sin B3 + (331nB)1B5.
Simultaneous (elements respond to each other fully within a time period so
short as to be insignificant for purposes of the model) A = 2B, or
lagged (elements respond to each other only after some specified delay time).
A (this year) = 1.3 + 7.2B (last year) + 0.5B (two years ago) or A (this
year) = A (last year) + B (over the interval from last year to this year)
These properties of models are combined in practice into a limited number of
consistent sets. For example, engineering models of physical systems tend to be
based on information from controlled laboratory experiments, to be solved
analytically, and to consist of linear, deterministic, continuous relationships.
Econometric models are based on statistical data, they typically contain a
mixture of simultaneous and lagged relationships, they are predominantly
linear, and they are solved by iterative simultaneous equation techniques.
Complex dynamic models with non-linear and lagged equations necessarily
must be solved by simulation techniques (difference equations) because they
are too mathematically complex to be solved analytically. Information base,
disciplinary preconceptions, and mathematical necessity interact to form the
philosophical view and the procedural rules that characterize each modeling
paradigm.
The following discussion could be organized around anyone of the
properties of models listed above, but instead we shall choose as the primary
point of distinction another property that is not very often mentioned in model
classifications. That is the use to which the model is to be put. We are
concerned here only with models that contribute to the understanding and
management of social systems. Therefore, we shall classify models according to
the stage of social decision-making at which they are most applicable.
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When a social problem is first identified, there may be a need for general
understanding. Things are happening that make no sense; old theories and old
social structures are called into question. Important data may be missing,
interconnections that had been considered absent or unimportant may
suddenly appear significant, or new and unexpected behavior may need to be
explained. Why has the grain price, which was stable for decades, started to
fluctuate? If the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere goes on increasing,
what will happen to the climate? How can there be high inflation and high
unemployment simultaneously?
This is typically the point where learned study commissions are established
or research projects are funded. Current models, mental or otherwise, may
need revision, updating, or complete overhaul before the problem can be
tackled. Whole institutions or social systems may need to be designed or
redesigned. Most global problem areas are still at the general-understanding
stage today, including international monetary relations, energy, environmen-
tal degradation, economic development, and especially the interactions among
all of these.
Models that can contribute to improved general understanding must allow
the organization and communication of ideas and hypotheses. They must be
easily understood. The path by which their assumptions lead to their
conclusions should be clear, and they should provide structural insights about
the working of some real-world system. Quantitative precision and excessive
detail are unnecessary and probably unattainable at this point; it is difficult
enough to decide what system elements are even qualitatively important and
how they are related. Because no one is sure what the sources or consequences
of the problem being addressed might be, the model must have very broad
boundaries, usually crossing many disciplines. General-understanding mod-
eling tends to be more process-oriented than product-oriented; that is, the very
process of making the model, asking questions systematically, and defining
new concepts may be more important than the calculations done with the final
model. By the time a general-understanding computer model is completed, its
concepts and conclusions may have been integrated into the mental models of
both modelers and clients, so that the model itself looks obvious and is taken
for granted.
If there is some agreement about the cause of the problem or the nature of
the system generating it, then the second phase, which we will call policy
design, begins. If a theory about the cause of the problem is accepted,
suggestions about the general directions in which a cure might be found will
follow naturally. Several broad policy choices are usually apparent, which must
be evaluated and integrated to identify possible trade-offs or synergies. The
questions to be answered by a model are still imprecise and generic at this
stage, but the examination can be limited to those points in the system that have
been identified as potential policy foci. Given that foreign aid will be sent to
nation X, should the aid package emphasize family planning, health care, or
armaments? Given a basic free-market theory of the agricultural system, what
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would happen if government control of domestic grain prices were imposed?
Policy-design models produce conditional, imprecise information: if this
general policy is followed, what will be the general results?
A model that can help in policy design should be able to reproduce the real
system's behavior, at least roughly, under all the conditions and policies under
consideration. It should be easily alterable to test a number of hypotheses and
policies, and should also clarify why different policies lead to different results.
Quantitative precision is more important here than at the level of general
understanding, but the emphasis is still primarily qualitative and process-
oriented.
When a basic policy direction has been formulated, a whole host of new
questions arises concerning the detailed implementation required to carry out
that policy. A decision to promote family planning engenders numerous
further decisions about budgets, personnel training, geographic distribution,
and educational techniques. A policy to stabilize grain prices by creating a
buffer stock will require the creation of new organizations to establish and
maintain the stock, a precise set of rules for buying and selling, and a plan
linking markets, warehouses, transportation systems, and final consumers, so
that the greatest stabilization can be realized at the least cost.
As these detailed-implementation decisions become complex and require
the organization and processing of many pieces of information, computer
models become very useful. These models must be detailed and aCl:urate, but
each one need represent only one basic policy direction so its boundary can be
narrow. Detailed-implementation modeling schools are usually product-
oriented. The process of constructing such models is often quite difficult and
tedious, so the modelers aim to produce a model that can be used again and
again to transform new input data into specific predictions or operating
instructions. Once a model of an oil refinery and distribution system has been
made, it need only be updated with recent figures for, say, this month's orders,
stock levels, and prices, in order to turn out detailed instructions for least-cost
operation. Product-oriented modelers rarely need to involve the client in the
modeling process or try to make clear all the model's assumptions, since most
of the assumptions are routine and uncontroversial. Most computer models
now being made are directed to this stage of detailed decision making.
In short, different people sit at the various stages of the policy process,
asking different sorts of questions requiring different kinds of models. Each of
the methodological paradigms described in this chapter can be regarded as one
useful tool in a tool box. Knowledge of all their properties is essential in
deciding which is the best tool for a given specific purpose. It is possible to use
each of these methods for several different purposes, and even by stretching
things a bit, for all purposes. A saw could be used to pound in a nail, if
necessary. But a hammer would do the job better and faster, and so an essential
aspect of wisdom in making, sponsoring, criticizing, or using models is knowing
when to put down the saw and pick up the hammer. Since modeling schools are
more than tools, however, since they are also at least partially world views, a
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better metaphor might be picking up the microscope and putting down the
telescope. Doing that usually means finding an appropriate group of modelers,
rather than asking telescope experts to learn to see the world as if they were
microscope experts. In order to match the tool to the policy question, one
therefore must define the question carefully and must know something about
the nature of the tools available.
C. THE PARADIGMS
Four modeling schools are described here. beginning with those best suited for
the general-understanding phase of problem solving, and ending with those
used mostly at the detailed-implementation stage. After a brief summary of the
historical development of each field, a very basic sample model will be
described as an example. Each sample model is, of necessity, extremely simple;
it will illustrate the basic form and general techniques of the method but will not
do justice to the subtleties or complexities that can be included in actual
working models. The sample models are included primarily for those interested
in the mathematical tools of the modeling schools and can be skipped by
readers who are uninterested in technical details.
Following the sample model, the most important characteristics and
assumptions of each modeling paradigm are discussed. Examples of actual
policy applications of the technique are given. Finally, the most common
pitfalls and limitations of the method as encountered in practice are described.
These pitfalls are not necessarily present in all models within each method; in
fact, the best models are often recognized as good because they have managed
to avoid them. Nevertheless, every method has its characteristic traps, which
students often fall into and which advanced modelers must continually guard
against. Understanding these inherent limitations as well as the strengths of the
various modeling paradigms may be one of the most effective steps toward
better use of models.
Nearly every modeler who has reviewed this chapter has taken exception to
the way his or her modeling school is represented, but has been satisfied with
our depiction of the other schools. From this we can only conclude that
modelers think of their own paradigms in ideal form, as described in the
textbooks, but think of the other paradigms as they are actually experienced in
practice. Since the textbooks already exist and can be referred to by anyone,
practice is what we emphasize here.
Finally, we should re-emphasize that these methods can be contrasted and
compared, their strengths and weaknesses can be discussed, but they cannot be
ranked or evaluated according to any absolute standard of 'best' or 'worst'.
Any such standard implies some sort of unidimensional criterion by which
modeling methods might be measured. But since problem-solving required a
broad range of models, addressed to many different kinds of questions and
purposes, no such single dimension exists. It would be wrong to dismiss a
general-understanding method for its lack of quantitative precision, and
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equally wrong to complain about a detailed-implementation method because
of its narrow boundary. Different scientific approaches, like different tools,
should not be promoted or castigated in themselves, without reference to the
task they are to accomplish.
We repeat this warning as a reminder to ourselves as well as the reader. As
modelers, our preference for one of the modeling schools should not blind us to
the merits of the others. We are system dynamicists, and we will describe that
method first, both because it is useful in the general-understanding phase of
policy-making, and because we want to begin by alerting the reader to our own
methodological biases.
1. System dynamics
We find that people perceive correctly their immediate environment. They know
what they are trying to accomplish. They know the crises that will force certain
actions. They are sensitive to the power structure of the organization, to traditions,
and to their own personal goals and welfare. In general, ... people can usually state
what they are doing and can give rational reasons for their actions ... People are
usually trying in good conscience and to the best of their abilities to solve the major
difficulties ... One can combine these policies into a computer model to show the
consequences of how the policies interact with one another. In many instances it
then emerges that the known policies describe a system that actually causes the
troubles. In other words, the known and intended practices of the organization are
fully sufficient to create the difficulty. 7
a. Origin ofsystem dynamics
System dynamics was developed at M.LT. during the 1950s, primarily by Jay
W. Forrester, who is by training an engineer and computer scientist. He
brought together ideas from three fields that were then relatively new----(;ontrol
engineering (the concepts of feedback and system self-regulation), cybernetics
(the nature of information and its role in control systems), and organizational
theory (the structure of human organizations and the mechanisms of human
decision-making). From these basic ideas Forrester developed a guiding
philosophy and a set of representational techniques for simulating complex,
non-linear, multi loop feedback systems. These techniques were originally
applied to the management of industrial firms. The first system dynamics
models addressed such common problems as inventory fluctuations, instability
of labor force, and falling market share. 8
The methods worked out by Forrester and his group have since been applied
to a wide variety of social systems including cities, regions, and the entire
world. 9 From the beginning the field has been dominated by engineers,
industrial managers, and physical scientists. The literature of system dynamics
is almost entirely pragmatic; it contains many more descriptions of actual
models addressed to policy questions than theoretical discussions about
modeling techniques.
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System dynamics is a subset of the larger field of simulation modeling.
Simulation modelers attempt to represent a real system by mimicking with the
computer the actual (but simplified) forces, motivations, and influences that
they believe make the system work. Simulation models are causal. They are
made up of general rules describing how each element in the system will change
in response to conceivable combinations of the other elements. When the
model is run, each element is set at some specific initial value, and then the
computer works out the response of each to each, according to the prespecified
rules, moving forward through simulated time until the program tells it to stop.
For example, a very simple simulation model of population growth might
consist of two equations. One could be a general rule stating that the
population always increases by 10% of its current value each year.
population change each year = 0.1 * population
The second would simply update the model to the next year by adding the
amount of annual population change to the current population.
population this year = population last year + population change last year
If the initial value of the population were set at 1000, the model would generate
output as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
Year
o
1
2
3
and so forth
Population
1000
1100
1210
1331
Population change
100
110
121
133.1
Simulation modeling is widely practiced in many traditional disciplines such
as engineering, economics, and ecology. Since the formulation of differential
equations to simulate the progression of systems through time is nearly a
free-form exercise, with very few paradigmatic constraints, simulation
modeling is usually shaped by the paradigm of discipline more than by the
modeling technique. The concept of simulating a system is too general and
unstructured to be in itself a paradigm that helps one organize questions and
observations about the world.
System dynamics, however, includes not only the basic idea of simulation,
but also a set of concepts, representational techniques, and beliefs that make it
into a definite modeling paradigm. It shapes the world view of its practitioners
in ways that will become clearer after we describe a sample model and the
major characteristics of the system dynamics technique.
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Figure 2.1 Causal diagram for simple system
dynamics model
b. Sample system dynamics model
A very simple system dynamics model of a generic market system for a single
economic commodity is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The relationships are causal
and thus represented by single arrows. * Here the supply of the commodity on
the market is represented by the current inventory of goods, which is increased
by a flow of goods from production and decreased by purchases (sales). The
decision process by which producers alter prices is modeled explicitly. It is
assumed that producers are concerned with controlling the coverage time of
their inventory-the amount of time the inventory on hand would supply the
current purchase rate. If coverage is too high, there will be unacceptable
storage or carrying costs. If it is too low, there are likely to be stockout
costs-lost sales due to insufficient inventory.
Producers are assumed to ad just their actual coverage to achieve some
desired coverage by changing the price, which then alters both the production
and purchase rates. Higher prices are assumed to spur increased production
and also to discourage purchases to some extent; lower prices do the reverse.
The system dynamics computer model that represents this hypothesis is
shown in Figure 2.2a. It consists of twelve equations in the computer
language DYNAMO, which reduce to six rather simple algebraic statements,
as follows:
inventory, = inventorYt_l + production'_l->' - purchases,_I->,
The inventory at any time (t) equals the inventory at the previous time (t - 1)
plus the amount of production that took place in the interval (t - 1~ t) and
minus the number of purchases over the same interval. The DYNAMO
• See the discussion of causality and its representation in Chapter 1.
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(a)
L INV.K=INV.J+(DT) (PROD.JK-PURCH.JK)
N INV=500
R PROD.KL=TABLE(PRODT,PRICE.K,O, 10,2)
T PRODT=0/0/30170/90/100
R PURCH.KL=TABLE(PURCHT,PRICE.K,0,l0,2)
T PURCHT= 100/90170/30/10/0
A COV.K=INV.KlPURCH.JK
C DCOV=lO
R PCR.KL=PRICE.K*TABLE(PCRT,COV.K/DCOV,0,2,.4)
T PCRT=.8/.4/.1/- .1/- .4/-.8
L PRICE.K=PRICE.J+(DT) (PCR.JK)
N PRICE=2
C DT=.l
C LENGTH=20
PLOT INV=I/PRICE=$/PURCH=D,PROD=S
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Figure 2.2 Simple system dynamics model of market system
(a) Dynamo equations.
(b) Response of supply to price.
(c) Response of demand to price.
(d) Response of price to supply/demand balance
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equation labeled N simply gives the inventory an initial value of 500 cases to
begin the simulation.
productionH ,+ I = [(price,)
The quantity produced over any time interval is a non-linear function of the
price at the beginning of that interval. This relationship is analogous to a
short-term supply curve in economic theory. The non-linear function
hypothesized for this particular model is shown in Figure 2.2b. Production
capacity is limited to 100 cases per week, even at very high price. and
production becomes so unprofitable at prices lower than $2 per case that no
production takes place. Points from the graph in Figure 2.2b are read directly
into the DYNAMO equations, to generate a piecewise-linear approximation
to a continuous non-linear curve. This procedure allows a very simple and
quick representation even of complex non-linear relationships.
purchasesHl+1 = f'(price,)
The quantity purchased is also a non-linear function of price. as in the
demand curve of classical economic theory. The assumed relationship is shown
in Figure 2.2c. Consumers cannot use more than 100 cases per week, even if
the commodity is given away, and at the other extreme, no goods will be bought
if the price exceeds $10 per case.
coverage, = inventory/purchases,_,~,
This equation defines the coverage as the ratio between inventory and
purchase rate. It is assumed that producers aim to maintain a ten-week supply
of the commodity, and that this goal does not vary over time (the actual number
of cases necessary to meet this goal will vary with the purchase rate).
price change rateH ,+ I = price,*f"(coverage/desired coverage)
The response of producers to inventories that are higher or lower than the
desired level is summarized in this non-linear table function (illustrated in
Figure 2.2d). If actual coverage is just equal to desired coverage (COYI
DCOY= I), the price will not be changed. If actual coverage is higher than that
desired (COYIDCOY> 1). inventory is in excess and price will be decreased
by a percentage that becomes larger as the situation deviates further from the
ideal. If coverage is too low (COYIDCOY<I), price will be increased.
pricer = pricer_I + price change rater-I~r
The price at any time is equal to the price at the previous interval, plus (or
minus since the price change rate can be negative) the change in price that took
place over that interval. This formulation implies that price changes are
continuous and incremental, that producers are reluctant to change price
suddenly except under extreme conditions, and therefore that price does not
immediately adjust to its equilibrium value. The initial value of the price at the
beginning of the simulation is set at $2 per case.
32
The remainIng equations in Figure 2.2a are simply instructions to the
computer about the length of time the simulation should be run, the length of
the incremental calculation period, and the form of output desired.
Three output graphs from this model are shown in Figure 2.3. The first
(Figure 2.3a) illustrates the movement of price, supply, and demand over a
20-week period with the model parameters set as in Figure 2.2a. The system
adjusts from an initial disequilibrium position to the equilibrium price, with a
slight overshoot of price and a dip and then recovery of inventory. The second
simulation, Figure 2.3b, shows the recovery from the same disequilibrium
position when the elasticities of supply and demand are decreased-that is,
when the responses of producers and consumers to price as illustrated in
Figures 2.2b and 2.2c, become less sensitive. Under these conditions the
system takes longer to settle into equilibrium and the variations in price and
inventory are greater. The third simulation, Figure 2.3c, indicates the path
toward equilibrium followed when elasticities are low, the desired coverage is
changed from 10 weeks to four weeks, and the initial inventory is decreased
from 500 units to 200. The lower inventory makes the system still more
unstable, there are several oscillations on the approach to equilibrium. Note
that these three different results, all of which are variations on a basic
oscillatory behavior, are obtained by changing the parameters (specific
numbers) in the model, not by changing its causal structure.
The model takes statements about the general behavior, decisions, and goals
of the producers, consumers, and inventory-holders in the system, as well as
simple physical statements (such as a produced good goes into inventory and
stays there until it is sold), and generates the changes in the system element
over time. The output indicates both the equilibrium point of the system and
the dynamic approach to that point. Typically the model would be run from
many different starting points and with many different sets of parameters, to
produce an understanding of the dynamic characteristics of the system, such as
the role of inventory as a stabilizing buffer, and the relationship between
elasticities and time required to reach equlilibrium. For purposes of system
design the model would be run with different formulations for the price-setting
policy, until a policy is found that damps oscillations and keeps inventory
within a desirable range.
A more rigorous system dynamics model of this system would contain more
detailed representations of response mechanisms linking supply, demand, and
price. Supply might be broken down into factory, distributor, and retailer
inventories. Demand might be represented as a gap between consumers' actual
stock of goods and their desired stock. Consumers' desired stock of goods
might be influenced by changes in income and in advertising expenditures. The
distinction between short-term and long-term supply would be included by an
explicit level of production capacity, with account taken of the delays in
acquiring new capacity. The pricing decision would include cost considera-
tions. 1O
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ple system dynamics market model.
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c. Characteristics ofsystem dynamics
As its name implies, system dynamics is concerned with questions about the
dynamic tendencies of complex systems-what kinds of behavioral patterns they
generate over time. System dynamicists are not primarily concerned with
forecasting specific values of system variables in specific years. They are much
more interested in general dynamic tendencies; under what conditions the
system as a whole is stable or unstable, oscillating, growing, declining,
self-correcting, or in equilibrium. To explore these dynamic tendencies they
include in their models the concepts from any discipline or field of thought, with
special emphasis on the physical and biological sciences and some tendency to
discount (or rediscover and rename) theories from the social sciences.
The primary assumption of the system dynamics paradigm is that the
persistent dynamic tendencies of any complex social system arise from its
internal causal structure-from the pattern of physical constraints and social
goals, rewards, and pressures that cause people to behave the way they do and to
generate cumulatively the dominant dynamic tendencies of the total system. A
system dynamicist is likely to look for explanations of recurring long-term social
problems within this internal structure rather than in external disturbances,
small maladjustments, or random events. For example, a system dynamicist is
led by his paradigm to explain the U. S. energy problem in terms of reserve
depletion, internal pricing decisions, and rising material aspirations, rather than
OPEC oil embargoes or bad weather. He is likely to look for a solution to the
problem through changing the goals and the kinds of information that influence
decisions, not through small numerical adjustments in taxes, research
expenditures, environmental standards, or foreign policy. This basic assump-
tion does not necessarily imply that all problems originate from faulty system
structure; just that system dynamicists are more likely to see and become
interested in the ones that do.
The central concept that system dynamicists use to understand system
structure is the idea oftwo-way causation orfeedback. It is assumed that social or
individual decisions are made on the basis of information about the state of the
system or environment surrounding the decision-makers. The decisions lead to
actions that are intended to change (or maintain) the state of the system. New
information about the system state then produces further decisions and changes
(see Figure 2.4). Each such closed chain of causal relationships forms a
feedback loop. System dynamics models are made up of many such loops linked
together. They are basically closed-system representations; most of the
variables occur in feedback relationships and are endogenous. When some
factor is believed to influence the system from the outside without being
influenced itself, however, it is represented as an exogenous variable in the
model.
Feedback processes do not operate instantly; the timing of system behavior
depends on the presence of system elements that create inertia or delays. These
inertial elements are referred to as state variables or levels. Each level is an
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Figure 2.4 Examples of feedback loops. Arrows indicate causal influence. Positive
loops are designated by (+) and negative loops by (-). Levels are underlined with a
solid line (--) , rates with a dashed line (----). Elements not underlined are goals.
perceptions, or other information affecting rates
accumulation or stock of material or information. Typical levels are
population, capital stock, inventories, and perceptions.
System elements representing the decision, action, or change in a level
(often, but not always, induced by human decision-makers) is called a rate. A
rate is a flow of material or information to or from a level. Examples are birth
rate, death rate, investment rate, or rate of sales from inventory. Figure 2.4
illustrates several levels and rates and shows how they are causally linked into
feedback loops.
The representation of a system by means of feedback, levels, and rates
requires a careful distinction between stocks and flows of real physical
quantities and of information. In the system dynamics paradigm physical flows
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are constrained to obey physical laws such as conservation of mass and energy.
Information, on the other hand, need not be conserved, it may be at more than
one place at the same time, it cannot be acted upon at the same moment it is
being generated, and it may be systematically biased, delayed, amplified, or
attenuated.
Two kinds of feedback loops are distinguished. Positive loops tend to
amplify any disturbance and to produce exponential growth. Negative loops
tend to counteract any disturbance and to move the system toward an
equilibrium point or goal. Certain combinations of these two kinds of loops
recur frequently and allow system dynamicists to formulate a number of useful
generalizations or theorems relating the structure of a system (the pattern of
interlocking feedback loops) to the system's dynamic behavioral tendencies.
For example, an observation of exponential growth in the real system indicates
the presence of some dominant positive feedback loop.
time-
A tendency for a system to return to its original state after a disturbance
indicates the presence of at least one strong negative feedback loop.
Qoal ~+
'::A (-) B
-~
A single negative feedback loop with at least two levels in it can produce
oscillatory behavior.
+,;--..
A (-) B
\ ( time )~-
delay
Sigmoid or S-shaped growth results from linked positive and negative loops
that respond to each other non-linearly and with no significant time delays.
~~
A (+) B (-) C
+~"--.A+
time-
37
These and other structure-behavior theorems are the main intuitive guides
that help a system dynamicist interpret the observed dynamic behavior of a
real-world system, specify causal hypotheses about that behavior, and detect
structural insufficiencies in a model. They permit identification of isomorph-
isms in very different systems that can be expected to have similar behavioral
patterns. For example, to a system dynamicist, a population with birth and
death rates is structurally and behaviorally the same as an industrial capital
system with investment and depreciation rates. They look like this:
( time) (time)
+)1" delay "'\ /' delay'\.+
~i[)~! population ~e.!!t~!
~
( time) (time)+)1' delay "\ r delay ~+
investment capital depreciation
---~-~-----
and from their structure can be expected to grow exponentially, decline
exponentially, or oscillate, but not to exhibit sigmoid growth (because of time
delays).
As these examples illustrate, time delays can be crucial determinants of the
dynamic behavior of a system. System dynamics theory emphasizes the
characteristics and consequences of different types of delays, both in
information and in physical flows. System dynamicists expect and look for
lagged relationships in real systems, and represent such lags carefully in their
models.
Non-linearities are also considered important in explaining system beha-
vior. Non-linear relationships can cause feedback loops to vary in strength,
depending on the state of the rest of the system. Linked non-linear feedback
loops thus form patterns of shifting loop dominance-under some conditions
one part of the system is very active, and under other conditions another set
of relationships takes control and shifts the entire system behavior. A model
composed of several feedback loops linked non-linearly can produce a wide
variety of complex behavior patterns, and can represent an evolving or
adapting system structure. System dynamicists are trained to be very sensitive
to non-linearities and to expect that proper identification of them will help in
understanding how a system works.
Non-linear, lagged feedback relationships are notoriously difficult to
handle mathematically. Forrester and his associates developed a computer
simulation language called DYNAMOll that allows non-linearities and time
delays to be represented with great ease, even by persons with limited
mathematical training. DYNAMO is widely used by system dynamicists
because of its convenience, and therefore, it is often thought to be an
identifying characteristic of a system dynamics model. But any system
dynamics model can be written in a general-purpose language such as
FORTRAN, or BASIC and, conversely, DYNAMO can be used to program
linear, open-system models that are not philosophically system dynamics
models at all.
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A final distinguishing characteristic of the system dynamics paradigm is its
emphasis on underlying causal mechanisms, whether directly observable or
not, rather than on observed correlations. In social systems models, any
representation of causation must include human motivations. System dynami-
cists are trained to be aware of and to include explicitly such factors as desires,
expectations, perceptions, and goals. Information about these behavioral
factors is gained from social and psychological theory, from interviews with
decision-makers in the system being simulated, and from observation of the
actual decisions made under a variety of external circumstances.
System dynamics models are usually intended for use at the general-under-
standing or policy-design stages of decision-making. Therefore, they tend to be
process-oriented, fairly small, aggregated, and simple. * Most fall within the
range of 20-200 endogenous variables. The individual model relationships
are usually derived directly from mental models and thus are intuitive and
easily understandable. The paradigm requires that every element and
relationship in a model have a readily identifiable real-world counterpart;
nothing should be added for mathematical convenience or historical fit.
Thanks to the high standards initially set by Forrester, system dynamics models
are usually well-documented and easy to reproduce.
d. Typical uses ofsystem dynamics
The system dynamics paradigm assumes that the world is composed of closed,
feedback-dominated, non-linear, time-delayed systems and thus the method
must be most applicable to systems that do indeed possess these characteristics.
In general, such systems will be characterized by distinctive dynamic patterns,
long time horizons, and broad interdisciplinary boundaries.
For example, some questions that have been addressed with system
dynamics models include:
Why have most American cities experienced a 1OG-200 year life cycle of growth,
followed by stagnation and decat What urban policies can restore economic
vitality to stagnant urban centres? 2
How do primitive slash-and-burn agricultural societies control their populations
and their land use practices to ensure a stable pattern of life in an ecologically
fragile environment?13
What causes short- and long-term economic cycles, and what national policies
would ease the severity of economic downturns?
What has caused the decrease in the number of economically viable dairy farms in
Vermont, and what policies might halt that decrease?15
• There are some notable exceptions to this generalization, such as the National
Economic Model, constructed by Jay Forrester and his colleagues at M.LT., which
contains over 2,000 endogenous variables.
39
What policies will help the United States energy system make a smooth transition
from a petroleum base to other energy sources?16
All of these studies have a time horizon of 30 years or more, and all have
purposes of general understanding and/or policy design.
e. Problems and limitations ofsystem dynamics
The DYNAMO language associated with system dynamics is a mixed blessing.
No special knowledge of computer science is required to use it, nor is
knowledge of mathematics beyond algebra. The DYNAMO compiler
automatically arranges equations in logical order, moves the simulation
forward through time, generates output graphs, and detects common errors of
format and logic. The modeler must supply knowledge and judgement about
interconnections in the real-world system, but not extraordinary programming
skill.
This well-developed software package has obvious advantages, but it also
has several disadvantages. First, it makes modeling look so easy that beginners
who know the language but not the underlying paradigm are likely to become
overconfident about their skills and their models. Second, because alterations
are readily made and analyzed within minutes, beginners and advanced
modelers alike are tempted to play with endless model variations, rather than
analyze carefully the experiments they have tried and the lessons they have
learned. Finally, the mechanical simplicity of adding new elements and
relationships to a model enhances the natural tendency of all modelers to
create an overcomplex, opaque, incomprehensible structure.
The ease with which models can be overelaborated is a problem common to
many modeling schools, but it is especially troublesome in system dynamics.
Both the philosophy and the general-understanding purpose of the system
dynamics method require simplicity and transparency, so that the reasons for
the model's behavior can be understood. System dynamicists recognize the
problem of overcomplex models and greatly emphasize, both in training and in
publication, the necessity and difficulty of creating simple methods. System
dynamicists tend instinctively to criticize complex models and to admire simple
ones. But the pains that are taken to instill and reiterate the goal of model
simplicity reflect the very real difficulties in achieving it.
The emphasis on simplicity in system dynamics is consistent with the
purposes for which this technique is usually intended, but it has also limited its
range of application, so far at least, primarily to questions that involve the
behavior of aggregate quantities. Distribution of income, resources, opportun-
ity, pollution, or any other quantity among people or over geographical space is
represented in almost any modeling school by the 'brute force' method of dis-
aggregation. Each class, person, or area concerned are represented explicitly,
and the flows of goods and bads among them are accounted for. Disaggregation
into even a few classes or levels can complicate a model tremendously. A
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modeler striving for clarity and simplicity will try to avoid disaggregation as
much as possible, and thus may be likely to discount, avoid, or simply not
perceive questions of distribution. This does not mean that system dynamicists
are unable to deal with distribution questions, just that their paradigm gives
them a certain reluctance to disaggregate. This relative neglect of distributional
issues may disappear as the field grows and as the DYNAMO III compiler with
matrix capabilities decreases the labor of disaggregation.
Three problems that recur in all modeling techniques are estimation of
parameters, sensitivity testing, and assessment of model validity. Parameter
estimation is of less concern in system dynamics than in other modeling
schools, and statistical estimation procedures are used less, for several reasons.
First, most system dynamics models are not aimed at problems of detailed
implementation or precise prediction, but at problems of general understand-
ing that do not require highly precise numbers. Second, because of the
long-term nature of most system dynamics problem statements, parameters are
likely to exceed historic ranges, so estimation based on statis~ical analysis of
historic data is of limited usefulness. Third, the non-linear feedback structure
of system dynamics models renders them less sensitive than open-loop models
to precise refinements of parameter values. The presence of numerous
negative feedback loops, each acting to maintain a system variable within a
certain range of values, offsets small numerical changes or errors in anyone
loop by inducing opposing changes in other loops.
Thus feedback systems tend to be more numerically stable than open
systems. This property does not allow parameter values in a model to be totally
wrong or randomly chosen, but it does mean that the time and computer costs
of rigorous estimation techniques are often not worth the benefit in terms of
improved model utility. System dynamicists are often content to use
parameters that are simply 'in the right ballpark'. There is nothing inherent in
the method to prevent the use of statistical estimation methods, however, when
the data are of sufficiently high quality and when the model purpose requires
numerical precision. 17
The numerical insensitivity of system dynamics models is partly a result of
their feedback structure, but it is also partly due to the way sensitivity is defined
in the system dynamics paradigm. Model output is read not for quantitative
predictions of particular variables in particular years, but for qualitative
behavioral characteristics (growth, decline, oscillation, stability, instability). A
model is said to be sensitive to a given parameter only if a change in the
numerical value of the parameter changes the entire behaviour of the model
(from growth to decline, for example, or from damped oscillation to exploding
oscillation) or if a change in parameter leads to a reversal of a policy
conclusion. Sensitivity of this kind is rare, both in system dynamics models and
in social systems, but it does occur. In fact, detection of a particularly sensitive
parameter is an important result of the modeling process because it earmarks
that parameter as one that must be estimated carefully and one that might be an
effective site for inducing changes in the real system.
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System dynamics lacks rigorous theory or procedures for performing
sensitivity analysis, that is, for testing the full range of uncertain parameters to
see what effect the uncertainty might have on policy conclusions. The informal
structure-behavior theorems that characterize the paradigm sometimes do
permit an experienced dynamicist to locate possibly sensitive parameters by
inspection of the model structure and thus to eliminate the necessity of testing
every possible parameter in the system. This intuitive approach to sensitivity
testing is effective only for small models.
The system dynamics paradigm also handles the problem of model validity
qualitatively and informally. System dynamicists use no precise, quantitative
index to summarize the validity of a system dynamics model. Reference is
usually made not to absolute validity, but to model utility or to building
confidence-is the model sufficiently representative of the real system to
answer the question it was designed to answer, and is its structure convincing
enough to induce someone to act on its conclusions? It is assumed that every
model is by definition not totally valid, but a simplification. Furthermore,
statistical fit to historical data is so easy to achieve that it has little meaning.
A system dynamicist begins to have confidence in his model when it meets
several conditions:
1. Every element and relationship in the model has identifiable real-world
meaning and is consistent with whatever measurements or observations are
available.
2. When the model is used to simulate historical periods, every variable
exhibits the qualitative, and roughly quantitative, behavior that was
observed in the real system. In particular, the model clearly generates the
problem it was built to investigate.
3. When the model is simulated under extreme conditions, the model system's
operation is plausible (physical quantities do not become negative or exceed
feasible bounds, impossible behavior modes do not appear).
4. Parameters that are sensitive to numerical changes in the model are also
sensitive to similar changes in the real system.
These standards are imprecise and do not lend themselves to quick evaluation.
They are also quite difficult to achieve in practice. The issue of model validity is
an unresolved one in every modeling field. System dynamics approaches it by
admitting the indeterminancy of the very concept of validity and by
establishing performance standards that are qualitative but demanding.
The most difficult problems in system dynamics appear in the process of
modeler-client interaction. They may explain at least partially why this field is
associated with political controversy.
First, the system dynamics paradigm leads analysts to adopt long time-hor-
izons and wide boundaries, which are inconsistent with the very real
short-term pressures and constraints felt by decision-makers. The result is
often an impasse; the client cannot take the broad perspective of the modeler,
42
and the modeler is convinced that no other perspective will lead to a solution of
the client's problem.
If this problem is overcome, a worse one appears as the modeler works out
his conclusions. Since system dynamicists assume that most problems, like
most model elements, are endogenous to the system, they tend to look for, and
often find, internal policies as a major cause of problems. Investigating the
falling market share of a company, the modeler will concentrate on company
policies as well as the behavior of consumers or competitors. He will assume
that economic stagnation in a city is at least as likely to be caused by city policies
as by those imposed by state or federal governments. Thus a system dynamics
study is likely (but not certain) to lead to the conclusion that the problem is
caused, at least partially and usually inadvertently, by the client. The
recommended solution often requires structural change. This change may be as
simple as bringing new information to bear on a decision, but it may also
involve revision of goals, reward structures, or areas of authority. Needless to
say, these recommendations are often politically unacceptable. The problem is
intrinsic to the basic paradigm of system dynamics and the nature of public
decision making.
f. Summary
When system dynamicists look at the world, their attention is caught by
problems that can be expressed in terms of time trends or dynamic behavior
patterns. In exploring a new problem, they look for feedback loops, stocks and
flows, material and information. They expect that elements within any system
will respond to each other in a non-linear fashion and with time delays. The
principles they use to formulate a model include an awareness of the
relationships between the feedback structure of a system and the system's
behavior. And they are particularly interested in the decision points within a
system, in the kinds of information available to decision makers, and in the
constraints and motivations that cause decision-makers to transform informa-
tion about a system into actions that control or alter the system.
System dynamics models are most effectively used for purposes of general
understanding or broad policy-making and design for aggregate systems. They
tend to be comparatively simple to understand, undetailed, and well-documen-
ted. They are likely to represent the broad, long-term context surrounding a
problem and to suggest structural system changes as solutions.
2. Econometrics
Statistical models of the working of the economy are not proposed as magic
formulas which divulge all the secrets of the complex real world in a single
equation. The statistical models attempt to provide as much information about
future or other unknown phenomena as can be gleaned from the historical records
of observable and measurable facts. To the extent to which people maintain their
past behavior patterns in the future. the statistical models provide information
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about the quantitative properties of economic variables in the future .... The
non-statistical economist has only qualitative information from which to make
judgements. The statistical economist has this same qualitative information plus a
thorough knowledge of historically developed behavior patterns. 18
a. Origin ofeconometrics
Econometrics is the use of statistical methods to verify and quantify economic
theory. An econometric model is a set of theoretical relationships that has been
statistically quantified with historic data from a particular economic system.
The model can be used for structural analysis, for policy design, or for
forecasting.
The field of econometrics arose from the two older disciplines of economics
and statistics. Therefore it shares aspects of those two paradigms as well as
adding its own special perspectives to the world-view of its practitioners. The
application of statistics to economics developed in the 1930s as a result of a
rising interest in the quantitative behavior of national economic variables,
especially aggregate consumption, which was postulated to be a major cause of
the great depression. The journal Econometrica was begun in 1933. By the late
1930s Jan Tinbergen had constructed the first dynamic models of the Dutch,
United States, and British economies. 19 Much theoretical and practical work
had already been done by the 1950s, when the availability of the computer
permitted a great expansion in the scope and complexity of econometric
models.
Econometrics is now a widely-practiced modeling technique, with the
journals, university chairs, and textbooks that signify the maturity of a
scholarly discipline. 20 The greatest practical use of the technique has been in
generating short-term forecasts of the performance of national economies. 21
However, many other types of econometric models exist, on both micro and
macro scales, and for both academic and pragmatic purposes.
b. Sample econometric models
An econometnclan interested in a market system similar to the one we
illustrated in the system dynamics section might construct either a static or a
dynamic model. A simple static supply-demand model for an agricultural
commodity could consist of as few as three equations. 22 One would be a
demand equation:
D = 1310 + 1311P + 1312Y + E1
where D is the quantity demanded, P is the price, Y is the consumer's income,
and 1310, 13lh and 1312 are constants called structural coefficients. E 1 is an
expression of the variation in observed values of D not explained by the other
terms of the equation (partly due to unsystematic variation in the system, partly
to explanatory variables that have been omitted, and partly to measurement
errors). An error term of this sort is added to every behavioral equation, that is,
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every equation that represents human decisions or responses, which are
assumed to be partially uncertain and unpredictable.
The supply equation might be:
S = ~20 + ~21P + ~22Z + £2
where S is the quantity supplied, P is the price, Z is the amount of annual
rainfall, ~2()' ~21, and ~22 are structural coefficients, and £2 is another error
term.
The third equation is the assumption of supply-demand equilibrium: to clear
the market the quantity supplied must equal the quantity demanded. No error
term is needed in this equation since it is an identity; it must always hold true by
definition.
D=S=Q
Note that these equations are linear, and they are expressed in terms of directly
observable variables. The equations for supply and demand are indirectly
causal. They do not indicate explicitly the presumed underlying mechanisms
that cause demand to change with price and income or supply to change with
price and rainfall. But one can imagine what the hypothesized mechanisms
must be. And the equations are not reversible; one would not invert them to
determine income as a function of price and demand or to determine rainfall as
a function of price and supply. The third equation is not causal but definitional.
The amount sold must be equal to the amount bought.
This model is simple enough to solve analytically for the two endogenous
variables Q (quantity) and P (price) in terms of the two exogenous variables Y
(income) and Z (rainfall):
1
P = (~20 - ~IO + ~22Z - ~12Y + £2 - £,)
~ll - ~21
1Q = (~2()~11 - ~21~1O + ~22~I1Z - ~21~12Y
~11 - ~21 + ~11£2 - ~21£1)
The postulated system might be represented graphically as in Figure 2.5,
where the double-headed arrows stand for the assumed mutual and simultan-
eous dependency of S, D, and P.
+
D~S
/ demand supply
y ~p~
income price
+
~
Z
rainfall
Figure 2.5 Relationships in static econometric
market model
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Having postulated this model or one like it, an econometrician will compare it
to historical observations of P, Q, Z, and Y. A number of statistical techniques
are at his disposal for this process, which will give him estimated values for all the
structural coefficients (ps) in the model and indices of how well the estimated
values explain the actual observed values of the model variables. If a set of
structural coefficients can be found that bring the model into satisfactory
agreement with real-world observations, the model, now estimated, can be used
to give the equilibrium point of the market, given any specified rainfall and
income, or to predict next year's supply and price, given assumptions about next
year's rainfall and income. The individual structural coefficients can also
provide useful information. For example, the coefficient P12, which represents
the income elasticity of demand, indicates how much consumer demand would
change with an increase in income if price remained constant. Since the model is
static, it provides no information about the dynamic path by which the market
attains equilibrium.
A dynamic econometric model ofthe market for an agricultural product could
consist of the following three equations:23
Sr == P1 Pr-1 + £1
Supply at any time t is assumed to be a linear function of price in the previous
year. (The time interval t - 1 - t in an econometric model is typically one
accounting period, such as a year or a quarter, rather than a very small interval as
in system dynamics.)
Dr == P2P/ + P3 Yr + £2
Demand is a linear function of price and income in the current year.
Pr = P4(Dr- 1 - Sr) + PsYr + £3
Price is assumed to be set by producers on the basis oftheirexpectation of what
the excess of demand over supply is likely to be. This expectation comes from an
accurate forecast ofthis year's supply and an assumption that this year's demand
will be the same as last year's. An income term is also added because the average
income is presumed to be related to production costs (labor). This third equation
is now also a behavioral equation with an error term.
All of the equations in this model are (indirectly) causal and can be
represented by single arrows as in Figure 2.6. The model consists of two
negative feedback loops, as did the sample system dynamics model of the same
system.
This model is now too complex to be solved analytically. Instead it is simulated
through time. Once its structural coefficients have been estimated from
historical data, and once initial values for Pand D and a forecasted time trend for
the exogenous variable Y have been decided upon, the model can generate the
dynamic behavior of price, supply, and demand. An example of output from the
model, estimated for the United States onion market from 1930-1950, is shown
in Figure 2.7. The sharp annual oscillations are a result of the discrete one-year
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Figure 2.6 Relationships in dynamic eco-
nometric market model
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Figure 2.7 Simulation output from the econometric market model.
(a) Onion supply,
(b) Onion demand,
(c) Onion price.
Reproduced with permission from G. Stojkovic in O. A. Wold, (ed.) Econometric
Model Building,. Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing Co., pp. 400-401, 1964
lag terms in the equations for supply and price. In this dynamic model the
assumption of market equilibrium has been discarded and supply does not
necessarily equal demand at every time period. There is no explicit indication
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in the model that unsold supply or unsatisfied demand is carried over into the
next period.
Like all the sample models in this chapter, this one could be elaborated
further to include more explanatory variables in the behavioral equations, to
include non-linear relationships, or to make some of the exogenous variables
endogenous. Econometric models of entire national economies can become
quite complex, usually consisting of hundreds of equations.
c. Characteristics ofeconometrics
The dominating characteristic of the econometric method is its emphasis on
statistical verification of model structure and model parameters. Econometric-
ians are forced by their paradigm to tie their models firmly to quantitative
observations of real-world systems. The formulation of an econometric model
may be divided theoretically into two sequential phases, specification of
structure from economic theory and estimation of parameters by statistical
analysis from historical data. The second phase is the center of concern,
occupying most of the modeler's time and attention and most of the pages in
econometric textbooks and journals. To some extent, as we shall see, the
mathematical and data requirements of the estimation phase influence the
specification phase as well.
The information base from which an econometrician can draw his model
structure is the same one underlying system dynamics or any other modeling
technique-abstractions, intuitions, personal experiences, statistical data,
established wisdom, experimentation, and guesswork. In practice, most
econometricians are attracted to questions about economic variables. They
find most of the concepts they need in traditional economic theory. They tend
to make only limited use of theories from other disciplines, and when they do,
their bias tends to be as much toward the social sciences as the system
dynamicists' bias is toward the physical sciences.
No special distinction is made between physical and information flows in
econometric models. For example, many of the common variables found in
econometric models are expressed in units of unconserved monetary stocks
and flows, even when they stand for conserved physical stocks and flows
(examples are production, consumption, capital, investment, depreciation.
and imports and exports).
The underlying economic theory from which econometrics is drawn is richer
in static concepts than dynamic ones, perhaps because much of the theory was
developed before computer simulation allowed dynamic analysis of complex,
non-linear systems. Much attention is paid in economics to the optimum or
equilibrium points in a system, comparatively little to the path of approach to
equilibrium or the time required to attain it. Relatively few theorems of
continuous dynamic behavior exist, but there is a collection of techniques,
rules, graphs, and concepts for dealing with comparative static analysis or with
dynamic progression from one equilibrium or optimum point to another.
48
Economic theory also leads econometric modelers to create structures that
are partially open---driven by many exogenous variables rather than entirely
closed into feedback loops. Economics evolved as an open-system body of
theory for several reasons. Economic systems are strongly driven by forces
outside the disciplinary boundary; resources come from the domain of geology,
weather fluctuations from meteorology, consumer motivations from psychol-
ogy and sociology, labor availability from demography. Furthermore, the
relatively short-term focus of many economic problem statements means that
analysts often need not take into account the closing of feedback loops with
long time delays.
When two-way causation, or feedback, does appear in economic theory, it is
often represented by means of simultaneous equations. The simultaneous-
equation formulation is equivalent to assuming that feedback processes will be
complete within one calculation interval. This assumption is justified when the
calculation interval is relatively long compared to the time required to
complete the equilibration process, and this condition does often hold true for
econometric models, whose calculation intervals correspond to the fairly long
reporting intervals (usually one year) of data-collection agencies. The
simultaneous-equation formulation reinforces the tendency toward open
systems in econometric models; in order to solve for, or identify, all structural
coefficients in a simultaneous-equation model, an econometrician must
include a relatively large number of exogenous variables.
Although most dynamic econometric models contain simultaneous-equation
formulations, they also typically contain some feedback through lagged
endogenous variables as well. These formulations are not essentially different
from those in system dynamics models. The mathematical distinction between
the two approaches is one of relative emphasis. Econometric models contain
some feedback relationships, some of which are lagged; system dynamics
models are composed almost entirely of feedback relationships, all of which are
lagged.
Even within the disciplinary boundary of economics, the variables that can
be included in econometric models are restricted to a subset of all conceivable
elements because of the necessity for empirical validation. Each element in an
econometric model must be observable, and sufficient historic observations of
it must exist to permit estimation of its statistical relationship to other
variables. That requirement tends to eliminate the inclusion of most of the
information components of any system, especially the motivations behind
human decisions. These motivational components are not absent from
economic theory, which contains many inherently unobservable concepts such
as marginal utility, indifference curves, and the profit motive. But none of
these ideas is easily measured or contained as an explanatory variable in
econometric models.
The requirement of observability is not as confining to econometricians as a
system dynamicist might think. In the long run it creates pressures that are
already improving and expanding data collection on economic behavior
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around the world. Useful but unmeasured concepts eventually can become
sufficiently well defined to be calculated and included in databases. No GNP
statistics were available until economists devised the concept, found it useful,
and figured out how to measure it.
Econometricians can also represent an unobservable concept by means of a
closely-correlated tangible substitute or proxy. Literacy may suffice as a
stand-in for degree of modernization, rainfall may be a proxy for all the effects
of weather on crop production, or advertising expenditures may be used to
represent some of the perceived-utility assumptions underlying a consumer
demand equation. In other words, an econometrician can transform a direct
causal hypothesis ('in early stages of modernization people's material
aspirations rise, and so they consume less and save more for investment to
increase their future consumption') into an indirect hypothesis about
correlated observables ('at low income levels literacy is inversely correlated
with consumption and positively correlated with savings'). The use of
correlated rather than direct causally-related variables allows econometricians
to proceed in spite of the requirement of empirical validation, but it also
reinforces that requirement because a double set of assumptions must be made.
A relationship must be hypothesized not only between modernization and
consumption, but also between modernization and its proxy, literacy. Both
relationships must be demonstrated to have existed over the historic period
from which data are taken, and to exist in the present and into any forecasting
period. Since correlational relationships are tenuous and subject to change,
they must be rechecked continuously against the latest available real-world
data.
The principal technique used to obtain parameters for econometric models is
least squares regression, a method that generates the set of numbers that best'
fits a postulated general relationship to historic observations and that also
provides a quantitative measure of how good that fit is. The theoretical and
mathematical assumptions behind this method require that each behavioral
equation be convertible to a form in which all parameters to be estimated enter
linearly. As a consequence, most relationships in an econometric model are
linear or log-linear. The assumed relationship between literacy and consump-
tion is most likely to be expressed as:
consumption = ~o + ~I (literacy) + E
or perhaps as:
log (consumption) = ~o + ~I (literacy) + E
where ~o and ~I are constants to be determined by fitting historical data for
consumption and literacy.
To be most accurate least squares regression requires that the variation in
each explanatory variable must not be linearly dependent on the variation in
, Where 'best' is defined as minimizing the sum of the squares of the deviations
between the actual observations and those predicted by the general relationship.
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any other variable and must be strictly independent from the error term. Thus
if consumption were postulated to a function of both literacy and income,
(consumption = ~o + ~I (literacy) + ~2 (income) + E), the statistical proce-
dures for estimating ~o, ~" and ~2 will be accurate only if there is no high
degree of correlation between income and literacy or between either of those
and any of the omitted factors that might influence the error term E.
More sophisticated estimation techniques than least squares regression are
available, and when used carefully, they can partially overcome or correct for
some of the most restrictive assumptions of the simple least squares technique.
A practitioner who understands the real system well and who has mastered the
full toolbox of statistical estimation methods does not need to distort the
system specification in order to carry out empirical estimation. But in practice
most estimations are by simple least square techniques.
The structural coefficients in an equation like the one relating literacy and
consumption are estimated for the system of interest by finding observed
values for all variables over some historical period or over some cross-section
of subsystems (families, nations, firms, etc.) at a single time. Then the model
with its estimated parameters is used to generate or simulate the values of
system variables for another time period or over another cross-sectional
sample. The entire procedure depends upon the assumption that the
underlying causal mechanisms do not change in form, strength, or stochastic
properties from the estimation period to the forecasting period or from one
cross-sectional sample to another.
Econometric models tend to deal with highly aggregated quantities, even
more aggregated than those in system dynamics models. Typically, the models
are small compared to other kinds of models.
d. Typical uses ofeconometrics
As we have seen, econometric models represent systems as linear, partly open,
at or near equilibrium, and centered around variables that fall within the
disciplinary boundary of economics. The real-world systems that are most
congruent with this paradigm deal with flows of economic goods and services,
money and prices, over a fairly short time horizon. In these systems many
important influences are indeed exogenous, and many relationships are
constrained within ranges that are very nearly linear. Also, over the short term
the numerical coefficients derived from historical observations are still likely to
be valid. If adequate data are available, econometric methods can provide very
precise information about such systems. Thus econometric models are most
appropriately made for purposes of precise, short-term prediction of aggregate
economic variables. They are at least applicable to questions of general
understanding that may range across disciplines, over long time horizons, and
into circumstances that have not been historically observed.
Examples of questions addressed by policy-oriented econometric studies
include:
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Will a change in the oil import quotas of the U.S. aggravate the shortage of
domestic natural gas from 1975 to 1985, and if so, what wellhead natural gas price
would alleviate the shortage?24
What will be the effects on U.S. economic growth from 1974 to 2000 of more or
less government spending, faster or slower population growth. sustained or
decreased technical progress?25
What will be the quarterly consumer price index for food over the next four
quarters?26
How many acres will be planted in wheat in the U.S. next year if government
acreage restrictions and loan programs are altered in various ways?27
How will fiscal and monetary control decisions of the Federal Reserve Board affect
the U.S. macroeconomy over the next few years?28
Most of these questions fall within the policy design or implementation stages
of decision-making.
e. Problems and limitations ofeconometrics
The greatest strength of the economic paradigm is its insistence on continuous,
rigorous checking of theoretical hypotheses against real-world observations.
This strength leads, however, to two problems. The statistical methods used for
estimation interfere with the initial formulation of the model, and the data
available for verification are not always sufficient.
As we have seen, the mathematical requirements of estimation, especially
least squares regression, impose structural restrictions on econometric models,
which cause them to represent a world quite different from either the world of
economic theory or the world seen by other modeling schools. Econometric
models tend to consist of linear, simultaneous relationships connecting the
observable economic variables by means of coefficients derived from the
historic operation of the system. Economic theory, however, recognizes that
economic relationships may be non-linear, greatly delayed, dependent on
unobservable goals and desires, and capable of behavior patterns not
contained in the historic data. Econometric models also tend to be less
comprehensive than economic theories because of a subtle psychological
reaction to the mathematical necessity of avoiding co-variance of explanatory
variables with each other or with the error term:
By the very existence of a large number of intercorrelations among all economic
variables we can estimate but a few partial coefficients with tolerable precision.
This accounts for the contrast between economic theory and empirical research.
The theory is comprehensive: if we list the determinants of, say. consumption or
investment that have been discussed by economists we may easily find some ten or
20 distinct effects. But in econometric research we rarely try to estimate more than
four or five coefficients.29
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There are indeed areas where the narrow domain of econometrics overlaps
the broad and complex surface of real social systems. Within these areas
econometric techniques can produce accurate, informative, precise, and useful
predictions. The major problem in econometric modeling is to recognize the
limits of the congruent areas and to resist the temptation to push outside them.
Thoughtful econometricians are aware of this problem and continuously seek
to define these limits:
What then is econometrics ... best suited for? I myself would place economic
problems of the firm in the fore ... The problems confronting a firm are in general
much less complex than those confronting the economy as a whole: they often are
truly of a partial nature. Secondly, the number of observations of the same social
system can here frequently be increased. We do not have to face the dilemma of the
need for large samples in a world changing rapidly during sampling. And finally,
many economic models basically assume a planning subject. In the firm it is clear
who the planning subject is; while for the economy as a whole the originator of the
actions described ... may be clouded behind the imprecisions of thought not
necessarily excluded by the precision of the mathematics used.
If we wish to use econometrics for macro-economic purposes-to which it first
turned, perhaps because disciplines as the outflow of human perversity always first
turn to the field of application least suited to them-I would think that it can well be
used to test which of a large number of economic hypotheses can best explain an
economic reality precisely defined as to time and place.)O
One use that is clearly beyond the limits of econometric modeling is the
exploration of conditions or policies that differ significantly from those that
pertained during the historical period from which the model parameters were
estimated. The quasi-causal relationships in an econometric model may
resemble the real system sufficiently to indicate how the unchanged or only
slightly changed system may proceed into the short-term future. But they are
too rigidly tied to past behavior to represent correctly the response of the
system to totally new policies.
Nearly every econometrician would list the lack of good empirical data as the
most annoying and constricting problem in the field. Econometric researchers
pay great attention to data problems and have developed names and categories
for the most frequently occurring ones:
Among the more important problems are that there is simply not enough data (the
degrees of freedom problem); that the data tend to be bunched together (the
multicollinearity problem); that because changes occur slowly over time, the data
from time periods close together tend to be similar (the serial correlation problem);
that there may be a discontinuous change in the real world so that the data refer to
different populations (the structural change problem); and that there are many
inaccuracies and biases in measuring economic variables (the errors of measure-
ment problem).)\
Econometric techniques include a number of ingenious methods for
recovering from data problems and for extracting maximum possible
information from real-world observations. Unfortunately, none of these
53
methods can create more information than is already there, and a process that
overcomes one data problem usually makes another one worse:
For example, replacing annual data by quarterly data increases the number of data
points but tends to aggravate both the multicollinearity and the serial correlation
problems; eliminating data points referring to unusual periods, such as during war
years, overcomes the structural change problem but aggravates both the degrees of
freedom and the multicollinearity problems; and replacing variables by their first
differences overcomes the serial correlation problem but aggravates the errors of
measurement problem. 32
Inadequate data especially limit the applicability and usefulness of
econometric models for studies of non-industrialized nations, where data
problems are especially discouraging:
As the sorts of models we have been considering are being constructed for one
country at a time, they have necessarily to rely on time series data. This data is
generally available for only a few years, and when available is of uncertain or very
low reliability. As the time series are very short and as almost all variables seem to
grow or decay over the short periods for which the data about them can be
assembled, every attempt to include in the equations all the independent variables
that appear to be relevant on a priori grounds soon exhausts the degrees of freedom
and is itself frustrated by the prevalence of collinearities. For this and other reasons
there is every likelihood that the models and their equations are grossly
under-specified or mis-specified. Moreover, in a large number of cases one can
expect little help from economic theory, from mechanically applied statistical tests
or from appeals to one's intuition. Anyone of these objections taken individually is
sufficient to dissuade one from taking these macromodels at all seriously. In
combination their effect can fairly be described as devastating. 33
Another criticism econometricians commonly voice about their own field is
that econometric modeling is so often done badly. In part this may be a
byproduct of widespread use of econometrics and of very convenient computer
software-the same mixed blessing we have encountered in system dynamics
and will encounter again when we go on to discuss the other modeling
techniques. In the case of econometrics, the statistical packages that are now
standard equipment at most computer centers can be used rather easily by
skilled analysts, and also by those who have never understood or have entirely
forgotten the assumptions and precautions underlying the regression techni-
ques. Mechanical application of statistical techniques can easily be substituted
for experience with the real-world system, for knowledge of economic theory,
and for thoughtful evaluation of conclusions. Lazy, careless, or ignorant
modelers can disguise poorly-conceived models with computer-aided data-
massaging and spurious summary statistics. The same data can be used for both
estimating parameters and assessing validity. Causation can be confused with
correlation. These are not inevitable problems, they can be overcome by better
training of modelers, better self-regulation of the econometric profession as a
whole, and continuous questioning and review of econometric modeling efforts
by modelers, clients, and sponsors.
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Because econometric models are partially open, they tend to be more
sensitive to parameter variation than are system dynamics models. This
structural difference in sensitivity is magnified by the fact that econometricians
are usually striving for more precise statements about the future than are
system dynamicists. One would expect, therefore, that sensitivity analysis
would be a central concern of econometricians. However, the procedures for
carrying out and reporting sensitivity tests, especially for alternate forecasts of
the usually numerous exogenous variables, do not seem to be formalized or
regularly reported in model documentation. Testing every believable combina-
tion of values for exogenous variables would be an impossible task, and the
intuitive structure-based hunches that system dynamicists use to detect
sensitive points are less applicable to econometric models. Sensitivity testing,
therefore, seems to be a continuing problem of the field of econometrics.
Econometricians determine the validity of their models by the use of
statistical tests of model-generated data against real-world data and by the
informal comparison of model results with their mental models of 'reasonable'
values for economic variables. These two validity tests are probably as good as
any other, when the statistical tests are done honestly and skillfully, and when
the modeler has a deep understanding of the workings of real economies. A less
honest, skillful, or knowledgeable modeler, however, can produce with these
tests evidence of validity for almost any model. In other words, although
econometrics techniques include a number of sophisticated statistical validity
tests, establishing confidence in a model's output is as difficult and uncertain in
this modeling school as it is in the others.
f. Summary
If system dynamicists see the world as a conglomeration of interacting
feedback loops, econometricians see it as a collection of the economic variables
contained in statistical databases. They tend to think in terms of simultaneous
equations, linear relationships, many exogenous driving variables, and
observable money flows rather than unobservable information streams.
Econometricians utilize historical data rigorously to determine model parame-
ters and to check hypotheses. Model validity is evaluated partly by summary
statistics and partly by the agreement of estimated coefficients and calculated
output with economic theory and intuition.
The assumptions upon which econometric models are based are most
applicable to questions about systems that can be bounded by the traditional
disciplinary range of economics and by conditions that do not depart greatly
from observed ones. The purpose of most econometric models is precise
forecasting of economic variables into the short-term future. In practice
econometric modeling is limited by mathematical requirements of its
estimation procedures, by the lack of adequate and accurate data, and like
most other modeling schools, by unresolved questions about assessing model
sensitivity and validity.
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3. Input-output analysis
Economic theory seeks to explain the material aspects and operations of our
society in terms of interactions among such variables as supply and demand or
wages and prices. Economists have generally based their analyses on relatively
simple data-such quantities as the gross national product, the interest rate, price,
and wage levels. But in the real world things are not so simple. Between a shift in
wages and the ultimate working out of its impact upon prices there is a complex
series of transactions in which actual goods and services are exchanged among real
people. These intervening steps are scarcely suggested by the classical formulation
of the relationship between the two variables. It is true, of course, that the
individual transactions, like individual atoms and molecules, are far too numerous
for observation and description in detail. But it is possible, as with physical
particles, to reduce them to some kind of order by classifying and aggregating them
into groups. This is the procedure employed by input-output analysis in improving
the grasp of economic theory upon the facts with which it is concerned in every real
situation. 34
a. Origin of input-output analysis
The first semblance of an input-output analysis appeared in 1758, when
Francois Quesnay constructed his Tableau Economique representing the
interdependence of various wealth-producing activities on a single farm. 35 The
chain of development of this idea can be traced for nearly 200 years, through
such economists as Leon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto, until it reaches Wassily
Leontief, who published his original paper laying the foundation of modern
input-output analysis in 1936.36 The first official input-output table for the
U.S. economy was compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the year
1947. By 1963 at least 40 countries had completed their own national
input-output tables, and now at least one collection of more than 300 such
tables from 80 countries has been assembled. 37 Input-output tables are widely
used for national economic planning in planned economies and for forecasting
and policy analysis in market economies. Although input-output techniques
arose from the economic paradigm and were originally intended for analyzing
inter-industry flows of money and goods, more recently the field has expanded
to include flows of other quantities, such as energy and pollution. 3K
b. Sample input-output model
An input-output analysis begins with a set of data measuring the flows of
money or goods among various sectors or industrial groups of an economy in a
given year. These flows are summarized by an input-output table, which is
nothing more than an array of the purchases made by each industry (its inputs)
and the sales of each industry (its outputs) from and to each other industry in
the total economy. A very simple example of a hypothetical two-sector
economy is shown in Table 2.2. 39
This matrix indicates that the agriculture sector of the economy produced
100 bushels of wheat in a given year, of which 25 bushels were used within the
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Table 2.2 A simple input-output table
to Agriculture Manufacturing Final Totalfrom Demand Output
Agriculture 25 20 55 100 bushels
of wheat
Manufacturing 14 6 30 50 yards
of cloth
agriculture sector itself, 20 bushels were sold to the manufacturing sector, and
55 bushels were sold to final consumers (households). The second horizontal
row of the table shows how the output of the other sector, manufacturing, was
distributed; it produced 50 yards of cloth, of which 14 were sold to the
agricultural sector, six were used by the manufacturing sector itself, and 30
were sold to households. Reading down a column of the table provides a
comprehensive list of the inputs to each sector. To produce its total output of 50
yards of cloth, the manufacturing sector required 20 bushels of wheat from the
agricultural sector and six yards of its own cloth.
Of course a real input-output table for a national economy would contain
many more sectors, perhaps several hundred. The inputs and outputs might be
expressed in terms of monetary value. In that case the table would be a
summary of dollar flows to and from each sector of the economy. An example
of a somewhat more complex table (also for a hypothetical economy) is shown
in Figure 2.8. In this economy six industries have been distinguished, labeled
A-F. The flows of inputs and outputs among these six industries are shown in
the upper left-hand corner, this time in units of billions of dollars. Thus
industry A used $10 billion worth of its product itself, and sold $15 billion
worth to industry B, $1 billion to industry C, etc. In this more detailed table,
the final demand column has been disaggregated into several components
(columns 7-11): additions to inventory, exports, government purchases,
additions to capital plant, and households, which means final purchases by
private domestic consumers. Industry A added $2 billion worth of
production to its inventories, exported $5 billion worth, sold $1 billion to the
government, etc.
Reading down a column gives!l record of any industry's expenses for inputs.
Thus industry C bought $1 billion worth of industry A's output, $7 billion
from industry B, and used $8 billion worth of its own product. Industry C also
depleted its inventory by $1 billion, imported $3 billion worth of materials
from abroad, paid $2 billion in taxes to the government, depreciated its
capital by $1 billion, and paid $7 billion to households in the form of wages.
If input-output analysis ended here, it would just be a handy way of
displaying and communicating information about the complex interdepend-
ence of many subsectors in an economic system during a particular year.
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However, an input-output table is the beginning ofthe analysis, not the end. The
next step is to assume that the numbers in the table arise from continuous, linear
relationships between the inputs and outputs of each sector. To return to the
simpler two-sector example given above, the observation that 100 bushels of
wheat were produced from 14 yards of cloth and 25 bushels of wheat might be
generalized to say that for any level of wheat production, each bushel produced
requires an input of 0.25 bushels of wheat and 0.14 yards of cloth. If that
assumption can be made, the entire table can be rewritten in more general terms.
The entries indicate how much input is required to produce one unit (or one
dollar's worth if the table is in monetary terms) of output for any quantity of
production. This rewritten table is called the structural matrix for the economy,
and the numbers in it are referred to as the technical coefficients defining the
linear relationships between inputs and outputs. The structural matrix for the
hypothetical two-sector economy is shown in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Structural matrix for a two-sector economy
To
From
Agriculture
Manufacturing
Agriculture
0.25
0.14
Manufacturing
0.40
0.12
This matrix can be used to indicate for any hypothetical output of any sector
what the direct inputs to that sector must be. For instance, production of ten
yards of cloth will require an input of four bushels of wheat and 1.2 yards of
cloth. Because it will take some input cloth (1.2 yards) to produce the ten yards
of output cloth, and also some input cloth to produce the needed four bushels of
wheat (4 x 0.14 = 0.56 yards), not all the ten yards of cloth produced will be
available to final consumers. In fact, any time consumers demand one more yard
for final consumption, more than the additional yard will have to be produced
because some must go into production directly, and some must go to provide the
added wheat necessary to produce the added cloth.
In order to calculate this circularity of input factors, the structural matrix is
first reduced to its equivalent equations:
0.25W! + OAOCt + We = Wt
OAW, + O.12C! + Ce = Ct
where Wt and C1 are the total amounts of wheat and cloth produced and We and
Ce are the amounts of wheat and cloth delivered to the final consumer. These
equations can be rearranged:
WI - 0.25W, - OAOCt = We
Ct - 0.14C, - 0.12W, = Ce
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These are two equations with four unknowns. They are usually solved by
assuming the values for We and COl the final demands for wheat and cloth to be
consumed by the household sector, and solving for W t and Ct , the total
amounts of wheat and cloth that must be produced to satisfy both the
household sector and the wheat and cloth industries. The solution is:
Wt = 1.457We + 0.662Ce
Ct = 0.232We + 1.242Ce
In other words, to produce one bushel of wheat for final consumption,
industry must produce a total of 1.457 bushels of wheat and 0.662 yards of
cloth.
For more complex input-output analyses, the procedures followed are the
same as those illustrated above, but the problem of solving x equations with x
unknowns is solved by using the computer to perform a matrix inversion. In our
simple example, the final solution can be expressed as a matrix:
[
1.457
0.232
0.662 ]
1.242
which is simply the inverse of the matrix:
[
1-0.25
-0.14
-0.40 ]
1-0.12
The inverse matrix, called the table ofdirect and indirect requirements, is the
primary tool of input-output analysis. Each entry in this matrix indicates the
total (direct and indirect) output from the row industry that is required for one
unit of production of the column industry. The table can be used to derive much
useful information about the economy. It can indicate how much total
production of all intermediate and final goods would be needed to satisfy any
desired pattern of final demands. If final demand for some item suddenly shifts,
the necessary changes in production of all supporting industries can be traced
through the economy. The columns of the table can be used by individual firms
for cost planning, and the rows for market analysis. Above all, since the
necessary interlinking of industries is clearly represented, consistent planning
and analysis on a fairly detailed scale becomes possible. Expansion of
automobile production can be discussed, taking into account not only
additional steel production as a direct input to the automobiles, but also
additional steel production for more railroad cars to deliver the additional
steel, and still more steel production to build oil refineries to provide diesel fuel
to run the additional railroad cars.
c. Characteristics of input-output analysis
Input-output analysis provides a way of organizing and manipulating detailed
information about interrelated flows through a social system. Since neither the
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system dynamics nor the econometrics paradigm can easily handle such
disaggregated representation, input-output analysis is a unique tool in the
collection of techniques available to modelers.
Input-output analysts, like econometricians, use directly observable
economic data rather than attempting to represent underlying causal
mechanisms. In fact, input-output analysis is even farther removed than
econometrics from concern about why things happen; it is based entirely upon
a record of what did happen. The decision rules that cause the inter-industry
flows to be whatever magnitude they are do not appear in the model. The
input-output table that begins any analysis is derived only from the actual
performance of an economic system in a given year. No information is available
about whether that performance was typical, optimal, efficient, or desirable,
nor whether the system was in equilibrium. The input-output paradigm is
purely descriptive, not normative or even theoretical. It is descriptive in a way
that counterbalances the emphasis of much of theoretical economics, in that it
directs attention to the details of actual economic activities rather than
hypothetical equilibria and optima. It also tends to emphasize the actual
physical flows of real goods and services.
The logical step from the input-output table (which is a summary of the
operation of an actual economy in a particular year) to the structural matrix
(which is a generalized model that is used for planning, forecasting, and policy
testing) depends on three crucial assumptions:
1. Linearity. The numerical relationships between inputs and outputs in each
industry must remain constant over all ranges of inputs and outputs. This is
equivalent to assuming constant returns to scale. Linear relationships are
mathematically necessary in order to invert the structural matrix.
2. Continuity. Each industrial sector must be able to expand or contract
output marginally to any level while maintaining the same relationship
between inputs and outputs. Thus no input or output must occur in the
form of large indivisible lumps.
3. Instantaneous adjustment. Since there is no time dimension in an input-out-
put table, there is no way of representing delays or bottlenecks in the
availability of inputs or in the production of outputs. Using such a table to
investigate the effects of changes in final demand, technological conditions,
or other factors can give no information about the time necessary to achieve
these changes.
The linearity and continuity assumptions are intnnslc to input-output
analysis and can be weakened only at the cost of great mathematical
complication. The instantaneous adjustment assumption holds for static
input-output analysis of the sort we have discussed so far. Input-output
analysis can be made dynamic by combining it with some other modeling
method that provides a way of moving the matrix forward through time. For
example, an input-output table for 1985 might be used to calculate total
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national production; an econometric analysis might relate national production
to income and final demand (consumption) in various sectors in the following
year; this relationship can be used to predict 1986 final demand. The final
demand prediction can then be used with the table of direct and indirect
requirements to calculate all intermediate production levels, which will add up
to a prediction of 1986 national production. The process can be iterated to carry
the forecast further into the future. The causal assumptions behind this
dynamic analysis form a positive feedback that will generate exponential
growth in national production:
~tionol
+f production
final \+
demand (+) ,
" total~~ demand
~~
The technical coefficients in the matrix may also be assumed to change with
time as a result of exogenous technological developments or endogenous
relative price shifts causing substitution. New industries may also enter the
system, enlarging the structural matrix.
Any dynamic application of input4lutput modeling adds to the assumptions
in the static analysis another set of assumptions that express the dynamic
characteristics of inputs, outputs, and technical coefficients. This second set of
assumptions may be simple extrapolation or exogenous driving forces derived
from mental models, or it may be an adaptation of one of the dynamic modeling
paradigms such as econometrics or system dynamics.
d. Typical uses of input--output analysis
Assumptions of linearity and continuity are most applicable to systems that are
not greatly different from the system that generated the initial data. Thus
input-output analysis is most useful for analyzing marginal changes in
economic systems over the short term. Input-output· models can add
considerable detail to economic analysis and forecasts, and, as the following
examples indicate, they can represent complex flows of dollars, goods, and
even energy and water through industrial production systems. Input4lutput
analysis has been used to provide:
A forecast for the U.S. economy, dis aggregated into 90 industries, from 1965 to
1975.40
An analysis of water requirements by industry in the state of California (technical
coefficients expressed in acre-feet of water per million dollars of output).41
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A description of the effect over 60 industries and 19 geographic regions of a
proposed shift in U.S. government spending from military to non-military
procurements. 42
A record of the energy flows within the U.S. economy (357 sectors) in 1963 and
1967, used to analyze the interindustry effects of various national energy policies. 43
These studies illustrate the versatility of input-output analysis for detailed
representation of interindustry or inter-regional flows and for short-term
analysis of policy alternatives that do not include major changes or redesign the
system. This method is clearly useful at the detailed implementation stage of
decision-making, and to some extent at the policy design stage. Because the
data requirements are significant and the construction of the initial matrix is
tedious, input-output studies tend to be product-oriented; they aim to produce
a single matrix that can be used for many different purposes, and more is
learned from the computations made with the finished model than from the
process of assembling it.
e. Problems and limitations ofinput-output analysis
Static input-output models are limited in scope and fixed in structure.
Therefore the structural-conceptual problems of econometrics and system-dy-
namics are not so bothersome in input-output analysis, at least in its static
form. The modeler need not spend much time wondering about the unseen
mechanisms by which variables might be interrelated, he needs only assemble
data on the actual measurable interrelations. This gain in conceptual simplicity
is of course realized at a cost in range of applicability-many pressing policy
questions cannot be addressed with an input-output model. For those
questions that do fall within the range of applicability, however, structural
ambiguity is not a problem.
The strength of input-output analysis and the reason for its existence is its
ability to provide a disaggregated picture of a complex system. Practically,
however, disaggregation has its limits. More sectors are included in an
input-output table only at the cost of obtaining more data and using very much
more computer time and space. Since a firm-by-firm disaggregation of a large
national economy would strain any existing computer's capacity, some
aggregation of productive activities is necessary.
How to aggregate is a classic problem in every kind of modeling, with no
simple solutions. Should wheat producers be combined with rice producers?
All grain producers with grain processors? All food producers with natural
fiber producers? Natural fiber producers with synthetic fiber producers?
Aggregation of entities that are actually unlike with respect to some important
characteristic is always a danger.
Ultimately the aggregation decision can only be resolved by reference to the
purpose of the model. Unfortunately, the construction of a major input-output
model is so labor-intensive that new models are not often prepared for special
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purposes. Most modelers begin from some 'general purpose' model, usually
made for a national economy. The degree of disaggregation in these models is
decided not by purpose, but by data availability and computer capacity.
If an input-output analyst saves time in the conceptualization stage of
model-making, he spends it many times over in assembling the data to fill all
the entries in the input-output table. The kinds of data required are relatively
straightforward-they are measurable physical or monetary flows rather than
the unmeasured attitudinal variables the system dynamicist must often deal
with. But extracting these numbers from actual accounting records and making
them consistent is far from easy, and usually the power of a national
government is required to do it.
Finding appropriate and complete industry records at the proper degree of
aggregation is the first problem. For some countries or regions they simply do
not exist. Even in countries with advanced systems for collecting national
statistics, five to ten years are required to assemble one year's national
input-output table. This delay is a great handicap for a short-term linear
method whose assumptions become less acceptable as the time between
database year and forecasting period increases.
Input-output tables require internal consistency. Total inputs must equal
total outputs within each industry and for the system as a whole. Assembling a
table is an excellent way to check on the consistency of national accounts.
Unfortunately, the data are almost never actually consistent. While this is a
useful lesson to learn about economic data, it threatens to stop an input-output
analysis in its tracks unless the table can be 'reconciled'. Reconciliation of data
relies on the modeler's judgement, intuition, and knowledge ofthe real system.
It is a 'fudging' step that is rarely documented. Fudging of some sort occurs in
all types of modeling, and it may well be that the rigorous structure of the
input-output table restricts the degree offudging freedom considerably. That
conclusion would be hard to prove or disprove, however, since methods of
sensitivity analysis are as primitive in input-output analysis as they are in most
other modeling schools.
Input-output models focus the attention on real money or material flows
through an economy, but not information flows. They allow careful computa-
tion of the real costs of production, but not of the real prices of commodities.
They cannot represent the shifting exchange rates between commodities,
which is to say, the dynamics of markets and prices. They shed no light on, and
in fact divert attention from actual decision-making processes. And though
their strong point is their representation of material flows, they do not
encourage the inclusion of the ultimate sources of the economy's material and
energy flows, or their ultimate sinks. (For an attempt to include resources and
pollution in an input-output model, see the Rtf model described in Chapter 5.)
Like econometric models, input-output models are strongly affected by
mathematical requirements, especially in the central assumption of linearity.
This assumption may be more unrealistic for input-output analysis than for
econometrics because of the greater degree of disaggregation. Individual firms
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or industrial sectors may run into diminishing or increasing returns to scale,
supply bottlenecks, or discontinuous, lumpy inputs before aggregated
economies do. As we have already indicated, linear assumptions may be
entirely acceptable in the short term; the problem is to refrain from pushing the
technique beyond its range of applicability.
f. Summary
Input-{)utput analysis is a way of representing flows of money, resources, or
products among the various producers and consumers in an economy. It is
based on the assumption of linear and continuous relationships between the
inputs to each producing sector and its outputs. Input-{)utput analysis can be
used to trace the results of hypothetical changes throughout the economic
system or to make detailed and consistent economic forecasts.
An input-{)utput model provides only a static picture of an economic system,
unless it is either driven by exogenous forecasts or combined with a dynamic
modeling method. The data requirements for a detailed input-{)utput analysis
can be significant, and several years may be required to assemble the necessary
information for a model at the national level. The assumptions of linearity and
continuity limit the use of input-{)utput analysis to short-term forecasts or to
the exploration of marginal changes from historical conditions. Within these
limitations an input-{)utput model can provide a disaggregated, internally
consistent representation of a complex, interdependent productive system.
4. Optimization
Industrial production, the flow of resources in the economy, the exertion of
military effort in a war theater-all are complexes of numerous interrelated
activities. Differences may exist in the goals to be achieved, the particular
processes involved, and the magnitude of effort. Nevertheless, it is possible to
abstract the underlying essential similarities in the management of these seemingly
disparate systems. To do this entails a look at the structure and state of the system,
and at the objective to be fulfilled, in order to construct a statement of the actions to
be performed, their timing, and their quantity ... , which will permit the system to
move from a given status toward the defined objective. 44
a. Origin ofoptimization modeling
During the Second World War the planning and coordination of U.S. military
operations became so complex that several experiments were begun to attempt
to compute the deployment of personnel, supplies, and maintenance activities
that would best achieve wartime objectives. After the war the Air Force set up
a research group for the Scientific Computation of Optimum Programs to
continue working out methods for calculating optimal allocation of resources.
In 1947 this group, led by G. B. Dantzig, developed the first linear
programming model and the simplex method for finding optimal solutions.
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Linear programming spread rapidly to many fields of application, particularly
to engineering, industrial management, and economic analysis. As computers
and mathematical understanding improved, extensions to non-linear optimiza-
tion methods appeared, including integer programming, quadratic and
geometric programming, and generalized optimization techniques. 45
Optimization models select from a large number of possible policies or
options the single set that allows maximum achievement of some objective. For
example, optimization programs are used regularly in oil refineries to choose
that combination of feedstocks, operating sequences and conditions, blending
methods, storage locations, and shipping routes that will supply a large variety
of petroleum products to a large number of widely-dispersed markets at
minimal cost. Optimization is probably the computer modeling method most
often used as an input to operational decision-making, especially in industry.
b. Sample optimization model
Suppose an insurance company has $100,000 to invest and a choice of two
types of investment of unequal risk. 46 Investment type X pays an annual return
of 5% and investment type Y yields 8%. Company policy and legal
requirements stipulate that at least 25% of the available funds should be
invested in type X, and that no more than 50% can be in type Y. Furthermore,
the amount in Y cannot exceed 1.5 times the amount in X. Given all these
considerations, how should the company invest its funds to give the maximum
possible return?
There are two control variables (also called activities) open to the company:
the amount of money in investment X and the amount in investment Y. These
are the unknowns to be solved for in the model. The objective function is the
quantity to be maximized, in this case the annual return on investment, which is
Z = 50X + 80Y
(where X and Yare expressed in units of $1000).
There are a number of constraints limiting the way the money can be
invested. The most obvious is that the total amount cannot exceed $100,000
(but it could be less than $100,000).
X + Y ~100
Also, X must be at least 25% of the amount available and Y cannot be more
than 50%
X~ 25
Y ~ 50
Furthermore, Y can be no greater than 1.5 times X
Y ~ 1.5X
and finally negative amounts of money cannot be invested, so both X and Y
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Figure 2.9 Graphical solution to linear programming problem
must be greater than zero
X~O
Y~O
Thus the total problem can be stated:
Maximise: Z = 50X + 80Y
By choosing values for: X and Y
Subject to the constraints: X ~ 25
Y ~ 50
1.5X - Y ~ 0
X+Y~100
X~O
Y~O
This very simple problem has only two activities, X and Y, and so it can be
illustrated on a two-dimensional graph as in Figure 2.9. The six constraints are
plotted as straight lines, which bound the area shaded in gray. Any point within
this area satisfies all the conditions of the constraints and so would represent a
feasible investment policy. In this case the solution point that would yield the
highest return can also be found graphically. The dashed lines indicate
equal-return lines for several possible values of the objective function Z. The
line through the point A is the highest-value line that still intersects the feasible
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region. Thus the optimal policy is to invest $50,000 in X and $50,000 in Y
for a total return of $6,500 per year.
Once an optimization model is formulated, it can be used to generate more
information than just an optimum point. For example, Figure 2.9 also shows
which constraints are actually operative at the maximum point and which are
not. One can easily explore the effects of raising or lowering various
constraints. One can also work out what would happen if the objective
function were different. For example, Figure 2.10 shows the optimum
investment for two other objective functions, ZI = 60X + 75Y (in which case
A is still the optimum point and the return is higher) and Z2 = 80X + 60Y
(in which case the optimum is at B and all funds should be invested in option
X).
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Figure 2.10 Effect of changes in objective function. Hans G.
Daellenbach, Earl J. Bell, User's Guide to Linear Programming,
© 1970, pp. 31, 32. Reprinted by permission of Prentice-Hall Inc.,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
A more realistic optimization problem might have tens or even hundreds of
activities to choose from and also hundreds of constraints. In this case the
problem can no longer be solved by a two-dimensional graph. The constraints
bound a complex, multidimensional surface upon which the desired minimum
or maximum must lie. A major part of the modeler's time, of optimization
theory, and of optimization textbooks is devoted to finding efficient
techniques for searching this surface to find maxima and minima and for
ensuring that a discovered maximum is an absolute extreme point, not just a
local one. As the dimensions and complexities of the possible surfaces
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increase, the mathematics can become very complicated and the search
processes so tedious that they can only be done by computer.
c. Characteristics ofoptimization models
The optimization method requires that problems be stated in a simple and
unvarying format:
Maximize or minimize: objective function
By manipulation of: control variables
Subject to: constraints
The objective function is an expression either of the welfare of the system
(such as profit, output, orpercapita income), which is to be maximized, orofthe
cost to the system, to be minimized. The control variables are all the policy
choices available to the decision-maker. For example, in an agricultural
planning problem the objective function might be the total value of agricultural
output, to be maximized. The control variables might be land area planted to
each kind of crop and the amount of fertilizer and irrigation water applied to
each kind of crop. The constraints express the desired or necessary relation-
ships among the control variables. In the agricultural example, the areas allo-
cated to each crop must be equal to or less than the total cultivable land, or
the total fertilizer budget may be constrained not to exceed a certain amount.
When the problem has been stated in the proper format, it is solved by finding
the extreme (maximum or minimum) point in the feasible area defined by the
constraints. The mathematical difficulties of the search process are simplified if
the objective function and constraints are expressed as linear equations, as they
are in the example model we have described. If these conditions can be met, the
problem is one of linear programming. The feasible area defined by the
constraints is reduced to a faceted surface-in three dimensions it can be
imagined as a polyhedron. Any maximum or minimum on such a surface must be
at a corner, that is, at an intersection of several constraints. Thus the search
procedure can be confined to a subset of points on the perimeter of the problem
surface, and the location of an absolute maximum or minimum becomes much
more tractable. Efficient search techniques exist for linear programming
problems, and these have been incorporated into computer software packages
that permit almost effortless solution to any problem, once it is stated in the
linear programming format.
The conceptual paradigm of optimization, like that of input-output analysis,
is rigid, yet powerful and widely useful because the limited circumstances within
which it is applicable recur frequently in the decision-making process.
Optimization techniques can only be used when a clear objective function can be
stated, when all the control variables available to the decision-maker can be
specified, and when the constraints in the system can be defined precisely. These
conditions are rarely met at the general understanding or policy formulation
stages of decision-making.
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On the other hand, within the final stage ofdetailed decision-making, when a
problem has been narrowed down to a choice among well-defined options to
achieve a clearly-stated goal, optimization models are uniquely useful.
Furthermore, at earlier stages of problem definition, the identification of
objectives, policy variables, and constraints provides a powerful set of
organizing concepts that may be helpful in sorting out the complexities of
problems, even if they are not yet well structured enough to be thoroughly
analyzed by optimization techniques. The normative view of the world
imposed by the optimization paradigm encourages discussion of concrete
goals, which is in itself a worthwhile exercise.
Within the relatively strict format of the optimization paradigm, an
imaginative modeler has in fact a wide range of freedom. The objective
function can be expressed, for example, as a minimization of cost, labor, or use
of a scarce resource, or as a maximization of profit, output, productivity, or
some other measure of welfare. Two objectives cannot be optimized at once,
but secondary objectives can be expressed as constraints. In fact, constraints
and objective functions are essentially interchangeable. For example, one may
seek to maximize industrial output while insuring that energy use does not
exceed a certain limit, or minimize energy use under the constraint that
industrial output does not fall below a given target.
In addition to generating the best decision for achieving a given objective
function, a properly constructed optimization program can provide a clear
picture of the trade-offs that are implied by that decision. By strengthening or
weakening various constraints slightly or by changing parameters in the
objective function, the analyst can investigate how different physical condi-
tions or social priorities might shift the optimal decision point. The model can
also indicate sets of objective functions and constraints that have no
mathematical solution, and rule those out as inconsistent or unrealistic
problem statements.
Specification of an objective function is an obvious value statement; it is
often dictated by the model's client. Specification of constraints can be a more
disguised value statement, as well as a representation of the environment
within which the optimization decision is made. Here the judgement and
knowledge of the modeler are particularly important.
In engineering, transportation, and other physical optimization models, the
constraints on the system may be numerous and complex, but they are usually
conceptually straightforward expressions of physical laws, material properties,
or the actual spatial arrangement of the system. The most common sort of
constraint is a material balance equation, stating that the flow out of some stock
cannot exceed the contents of the stock, or that the sum of the physical parts of
the system cannot be greater than the whole.
The constraints amount to a static or dynamic model of the important
interrelationships of the system. Linear programming and other optimization
methods do not provide the basic concepts for constructing this model. In
practice, therefore. the most important assumptions in optimization models
70
are derived from some other paradigm, often from economics. For example,
common constraints in social-system optimization models are requirements
that supply must equal demand or that output must be a Cobb-Douglas
function of capital and labor.
Optimization procedures have been combined with all three of the modeling
techniques we have already described-system dynamics, econometrics, and
input-output analysis. In each case the assumptions, strengths, and weak-
nesses of the other paradigm were dominant influences on the representation
of constraints in the optimization program. 47
Originally optimization models were linear and static-they sought the best
strategy for a single decision at one moment in time, with constraints and
objective function both expressed by linear, time-independent equations.
Now, increasing sophistication in mathematical and computer techniques
allow non-linear and dynamic programming. Constraints and objective
functions can be assumed to change through time, in part as a result of an
optimal decision calculated the previous time period. To some extent major
yes-no decisions that cannot be expressed by a continuous linear function can
also be included. However, all these improvements in realism must be bought
at some price, most usually decreased transparency and tremendously
increased computer time.
Optimization models tend to be highly disaggregated and to contain
hundreds or even thousands of equations. A large linear program is difficult to
construct, debug, adjust, and run, and so it is usually designed to be used and
re-used, once it is finished, for on-going decisions. In other words, the
optimization modeling process is product rather than process oriented.
d. Typical uses ofoptimization models
Optimization examples include models to plan lowest-cost transportation
routes, to specify the least-cost sites for sewage treatment plants on rivers, to
allocate electricity demand among various generating units, and to establish
inventory ordering policies. These applications fit the optimization format very
well; the objective function is clear, and the constraints and activities are
precisely known. The objectives and constraints are so obvious that they are
unlikely to be misrepresented, and if they are, mistakes are likely to be easily
detectable. Virtually all these applications occur at the detailed-implementa-
tion stage of the decision-making process.
Less typical, at least in terms of use in actual policy-making, are optimization
models representing more general social decision problems. Some examples
within the population/resources/development subject area are:
A determination of the allocation mechanism for all types of energy resources in
the United States that would minimize the total discounted costs of meeting a
projected set of final energy demands from 1970 to 2170. 4X
A model to plan educational system development by selecting the optimal number
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of students to enter the educational system at various times in order to meet
forecasted manpower needs while minimizing costs. 49
An economic planning model for the government of Mexico that maximizes
national consumption over an 18 year period. 50
e. Problems and limitations
Optimization models suffer from many of the same problems we have already
encountered in our discussions of other modeling techniques. Linear
programming search routines have been packaged into widely-available,
easy-to-use software that can be misused by unskilled modelers. Data sources
for optimization models are the same as those for other models, with the same
uncertainties. Validation of optimization models, like all other kinds of
models, is a vague and uncertain process.
Two problems especially serious for optimization modeling are computer-
time limitations and sensitivity. Because of the tedious process of searching for
the optimum, computer costs for optimization models are generally high, often
so high that cost is the limiting factor in running and testing the model.
Disaggregation into regions or subsets adds to the cost, as does stepping
through time, since finding an optimum decision at each new time period for
each region requires an additional search process. The trade-off between
disaggregation and dynamic solution is usually severe; highly disaggregated
models are typically solved for only one time period, and long-term dynamic
models tend to be quite aggregated.
Unfortunately, the computer-time limitation can also interfere with one of
the most important activities of the linear programmer-sensitivity analysis.
Optimization models, and especially linear programming models, can be
extremely sensitive to small parameter changes. The output of an optimization
model is a single precise point (or series of points over time)-the minimum or
maximum point of intersection of an objective function with a complex,
multidimensional constraint surface. Small changes in the slope of the
objective function or shifts in the constraint surface may move the optimum
point long distances, to completely different policy choices. For example,
dynamic linear programming models of national investment policy are known
for their 'bang bang' problem: small parameter changes will shift the optimal
investment pattern either (bang) all to the early years or (bang) to the late years
of the projection. 51
The mathematics of the optimization method permit partial sensitivity
analyses for some parameters around the optimum point as an automatic
byproduct of the optimization calculation. A single model run can thus provide
some idea of the way the conclusion would change with small changes in one
parameter at a time. However, a complete sensitivity analysis is as rare in
optimization models as it is in other kinds of models and is much more
necessary. The problem of sensitivity analysis is most serious for large social
models, where there may be hundreds of sensitive parameters, where few of
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them can be precisely known, and where the cost of testing each one may be
prohibitive.
Although the basic organizing scheme of an optimization program (objective
function, activities, constraints) is an intuitive and helpful way of expressing a
policy problem, the actual representation of these concepts is often highly
abstract, complex, and opaque. The solution processes that lead to a model
conclusion bear no resemblance to happenings in the real system (and are not
intended to). Therefore it is sometimes difficult to understand intuitively why a
certain conclusion comes about or how the model assumptions have shaped the
conclusions. Furthermore, the models are often so big that one cannot possibly
keep all the assumptions in mind. In other words, optimization models are
usually black boxes.
Furthermore, as outsiders reading the optimization literature, we have
rarely found clear explanations of model assumptions or behavior in
non-technical language as a part of model documentation. This opacity is a
necessary characteristic of complicated, detailed models for precise decision-
making, and as long as the nature of the system is well understood, as it is in
many engineering and industrial applications, the only problem it causes is
difficulty in catching simple mistakes. For social-system models where the
assumptions may be controversial or questionable, however, the impenetrabil-
ity of many optimization models is more serious; it masks important
assumptions and discourages criticism.
Two severe criticisms that have been leveled at the technique of optimization
by one of its own practitioners have to do with the limited value of the very
assumptions of its underlying paradigm. First, optimization assumes that an
optimal policy path is stable long enough to be interesting.
The structure and the parameters of problematic situations continuously change,
particularly in turbulent environments. Because optimal solutions are very seldom
made adaptive to such changes, their optimality is generally of short duration. They
frequently become less effective than were the often more robust solutions that
they replace ... Therefore, more and more so-called optimal solutions are still-born
... There is a greater need for decision-making systems that can learn and adapt
quickly and effectively in rapidly changing situations than there is for systems that
produce optimal solutions that deteriorate with change ... As a consequence, the
application of [optimization] is increasingly restricted to those problems that are
relatively insensitive to their environments. These usually involve the behavior of
mechanical rather than purposeful systems and arise at the lower levels of the
organization. 52
Second, optimization assumes that there can be a clean distinction between
means (activities) and ends (objective functions).
In ... optimality the value of a means is taken to lie exclusively in its efficiency for
ends: that is, the value of a means is taken to be purely instrumental, extrinsic. On
the other hand. the value of an end is taken to lie in the satisfaction its attainment
brings, to be purely non-instrumental, intrinsic. [Optimization] does not
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acknowledge, let alone take into account, the intrinsic value of means and the
extrinsic value of ends ...
Every means is also an end and every end is also a means. For example, going to
school is a means of obtaining an education, an end. But obtaining an education is
also a means of increasing one's income, an end. Increasing income, in turn, is a
means of supporting a family, and so on ...
Non-instrumental values of means and instrumental values of ends are aesthetic
in character, and ... aesthetic as well as ethical values should be incorporated into
our theories of decision-making ... More and more people are coming to realize
that optimization of aU the quantities of life does not optimize the quality of life. 53
As we have mentioned in discussing other modeling tools, the main problem
is recognizing where they are and are not applicable. The narrower the range of
applicability, the more difficult the match between modeling technique and
policy problem, and the greater the temptation to extend the technique beyond
its appropriate area of usefulness. Optimization is the most specialized and
precise modeling tool we have discussed. Therefore it is the easiest to misuse.
Especially in its social applications, it is often brought in to refine a specific
policy when in fact there is no agreement that the policy is the right one. As
Kenneth Boulding says, optimization can find 'the best way of doing something
that ought not to be done at all.' (personal communication.)
f. Summary
Optimization techniques, such as linear programming, are most often used to
select the final best operating decision from a set of clearly-defined alternatives
at the detailed-implementation stage of decision-making. The optimization
paradigm separates any policy problem into three conceptual components: the
objective of the policy, the activities or options available to achieve it, and the
constraints and boundaries within which those options must be used. Optimiza-
tion models are normative, usually linear, static or dynamic, often disaggre-
gated, and relevant to the day-to-day concerns of decision-makers. They tend
to be product-oriented and difficult to understand intuitively. The results of
optimization models are precise and may be highly sensitive to small parameter
changes.
D. Composite models
A number of the models described in the next chapter do not fit neatly into any
of the methodological categories we have described so far. They combine and
cut across paradigms, borrowing whatever organizational concepts and
mathematical devices seem helpful in solving the problem at hand. For
instance, an input-{)utput matrix might appear as part of the constraint
equations in a model optimizing national investment policy. An optimization
model might be used to represent farmers' investment decisions within a
large-scale simulation of an agricultural economy. Econometric techniques
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might be used to estimate dynamic equations linking input-output tables for
successive years, or to estimate parameters for a table function in a system
dynamics model.
Many of these eclectic-appearing models are actually not cross-paradigm
efforts at all; they are firmly founded on the philosophical principles and world
view of one modeling school and have simply borrowed a few convenient
concepts or software packages from another. But other modeling groups make
a sincere effort to be open to all approaches and to combine paradigms. The
products of such efforts are called by a number of names, ranging from eclectic
models to goulash models. We will call them composite models.
The advantages of composite models are fairly obvious. Some of the
weaknesses and rigidities of single modeling paradigms can be avoided by using
combinations. In fact, the combinations that are most often formed are clues to
the aspects of each method that its practitioners find most binding. For example,
the composite econometric-input-output models allow input-output analysis to
become dynamic and econometric models to be disaggregated and to be more
closely tied to physical flows.
If composite models gain from the complementary strengths of several
modeling methods, they may also suffer from combined weaknesses. Con-
necting a system dynamics model with an input-output model could con-
ceivably require linearization of the system dynamics equations or greater
aggregation of the input-output matrix. Using econometric estimation tech-
niques for the constraints in a linear program could lead to the omission of
some very real social or psychological constraints for which adequate data are
unavailable. Interconnected chains of modeling methods may be limited like
real chains by their weakest link. The combination of weaknesses is likely to
dominate the complementarity of strengths, unless the linking is done very
skillfully indeed.
Other problems may arise in the formulation of composite inter-paradigm
models. Interfacing various model segments with different disaggregation
categories, data requirements, and mathematical characteristics can be con-
fusing. The purposes and time horizons of different parts of the model may
prove to be incompatible. Most important, composite models, because of
their varied capabilities and relative lack of paradigmatic limitations, tend to
require less careful and bounded problem definitions. They are often attempts
at general-purpose models, intended to explain everything about the system
and to answer all possible questions about its future. In that case the models
can become opaque and uncontrollable. As Kuhn L has said, paradigms may be
limiting, but they are also necessary to bound and focus one's thinking. Modelers
may be able to overarch and encompass all the modeling paradigms to construct
their statements about the nature of the world, but they must use some sort of
organizing concepts in the process.
As the examples in the next chapter will indicate, it is more difficult to make
a useful composite model than one within a single paradigm. Combining
paradigms requires skill and wisdom in more than one technical school. If the
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model is made by a team, the individual members must be able to com-
municate across paradigms, to accent the strengths and avoid the pitfalls of
their own methods, and to maintain simultaneous respect and skepticism for
the other methods with which they are linking. These abilities are as rare
among modelers as they are among other kinds of scientists; no one receives
formal training in cross-paradigm communication.
As an example of the difficulties of cross-paradigm communication, let us
examine in more detail the paradigms of system dynamics and econometrics,
especially as each is seen by the other. These two modeling schools are
philosophically further apart than any other pair. They have a long history of
generating heat rather than light when they are brought together.
E. An example of paradigm conflict: econometrics and system dynamics
System dynamics provides a theory of causal structure and its relation to
dynamic behavior that is a powerful guide to model specification. Economet-
rics offers numerous techniques for finding empirically-based parameters
and for formal comparison of model results with real-world observations.
One technique is particularly applicable to long-term analysis of possible
changes in historic trends. The other is best suited to short-term precise
prediction in situations that do not differ from those that have occurred in the
past. It would seem that use of the two methods together might produce
models that combine realistic structure with precise parameters, models that
could be useful at every stage of the decision-making process, particularly
useful for attacking middle-term problems that are not easily analyzed by
either method alone.
This logical combination of two complementary modeling tools has almost
never been attempted. On the contrary, very few econometricians have
bothered to learn system dynamics techniques, and those system dynamicists
who have been schooled in econometrics do not regularly use its tools or
concepts. Members of the two schools seem to regard each other as
competitors rather than as potential coIlaborators and find little to praise in
each others' work:
Econometric models have intruded only slightly on the political and managerial
domain of mental models ... The parameter values in the models are a consequence
of mathematical manipulation and are not individually relatable to real-life human
motivations. Most such models are driven by exogenous variables in such a manner
that the models do not generate long-term economic behavior out of their own
internal structure. The econometric methodology strongly discourages the
formulation of general non-linear relationships even though many of the most
important behavior models in real social systems arise because of non-linear
relationships. Econometric models are limited to relationships that have held
under system conditions prevailing at the time of data collection; but some of our
greatest social problems arise because our social systems are operating under
conditions that have not previously been encountered ... Most importantly,
econometric models cannot deal with variables for which data has not been
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collected. They assume that the world is described only by those variables that have
been quantitatively measured. That assumption alone would exclude them from
entering the realm of the mental models that dominate political and economic
behavior. 54
The methodology that was used by the M.LT. team is that when you have a
situation that you're trying to evaluate, you sit down in an armchair without any
knowledge of the situation except what common sense tells you ... The point is that
over the last few hundred years there has developed a methodology in scientific
research ... It is customary to look at some data, to look at the experience of the
countries involved. Forrester did not do that in his study ... If you ask me whether
there is room for collaboration between ecologists and economists and scientists
and engineers, I certainly think there is ... But if you mean, am I going to build a
model in which I postulate relations without talking to knowledgeable experts, a
model with one hundred equations none of which have been confirmed by an
empirical study, a model in which I am seriously going to predict what will happen a
hundred or two hundred years from now, I think the answer to all these questions is
no. 55
In part this hostility may be due to the personalities of the methodological
founders, the natural parochialism of academics, and the inevitable jockeying
for political influence and scarce funding resources. However, a closer
examination of the two modeling paradigms reveals a deep philosophical gulf
between them, one that is not easily bridged. The basic world views upon which
the two paradigms are built are quite different, and about as easy to reconcile
or even to see simultaneously as the world views of the modern graduate
student and the mystical Mexican sorcerer in Carlos Casteneda's books. 56
Either paradigm, seen from the perspective of the other, looks incomprehensi-
ble, unrealistic, and misleading. Methodological conversations between
econometricians and system dynamicists tend to degenerate into frustrating
meaninglessness as each side misses the other's main points. Key words such as
'validation', 'sensitivity', 'data', 'equilibrium' and 'prediction' are used in
different ways based on different implicit assumptions.
Thomas Kuhn is not optimistic about building bridges across paradigm gulfs:
The proponents of competing paradigms are always at least slightly at cross-pur-
poses. Neither side will grant all the non-empirical assumptions that the other
needs in order to make its case ... Though each may hope to convert the other to his
way of seeing his science and its problems, neither may hope to prove his case. The
competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by
proofs ... The proponents of competing paradigms will often disagree about the list
of problems that any candidate for paradigm must resolve. Their standards or their
definitions of science are not the same ... More is involved, however. than the
incommensurability of standards. Since new paradigms are born from old ones,
they ordinarily incorporate much of the vocabulary and apparatus ... that the
traditional paradigm had previously employed. But they seldom employ these
borrowed elements in quite the traditional way. Within the new paradigm, old
terms, concepts, and experiments fall into new relationships one with the other ...
Communication across the revolutionary divide is inevitably partial ... In a sense
that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing paradigms
practice their trades in different worlds ... The two groups of scientists see different
77
things when they look from the same point in the same direction ... That is why a
law that cannot even be demonstrated to one group of scientists may occasionally
seem intuitively obvious to another. Equally, it is why, before they can hope to
communicate fully, one group or the other must experience the conversion that we
have been calling a paradigm shift. Just because it is a transition between
incommensurables, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made a
step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience. Like the Gestalt switch, it
must occur all at once ... or not at all. 57
In this section we will look at econometrics and system dynamics simultan-
eously, switching back and forth to see each from the point of view of the other.
The resulting image will necessarily be disjointed, since it will not have a
constant reference point. It will also magnify the methodological division
somewhat, because this description itself is an over-simplified model of reality.
And, needless to say, we are not capable of giving a totally unbiased
description, despite our best efforts to do so. If the following discussion does
not induce mutual understanding in the 'proponents of competing paradigms',
perhaps it will at least give uninvolved observers of the competition some idea
of what one side is saying, and what it thinks the other side is saying.
As Kuhn says, the problem begins with the list of solvable problems. System
dynamicists and econometricians are led by their paradigms to notice different
problems and to strive for different kinds of insights into socioeconomic
systems. For instance, a system dynamicist confronted with the patterns of city
growth shown in Figure 2.11 would be struck by the dynamic similarities and
wonder what universal underlying causal structure led to the growth and
stagnation of all those cities. (It would take a system-dynamics perspective to
draw such a figure in the first place.) An econometrician might be more likely
to notice the differences and ask why St Louis peaked at a lower population
than New York, or to wonder what the population of Chicago will be in 1990.
Both kinds of questions are certainly legitimate, and their answers could be
useful for various sorts of policy decisions. Unfortunately, each modeling
school tends to regard the questions of the other not only as unimportant, but
as inherently unanswerable.
Econometricians seem to feel that useful information must be precise-a
picture that is not entirely in focus is not worth looking at. They would like to be
able to see the future in quantitative detail. They find little substance in the
ambiguous, qualitative, long-term output of system dynamics models. It does
not seem very interesting just to know that the system is likely to be oscillating
or growing; they would like to know exactly when the next turning point will
come, or whether the growth will be at 6.5% or 7.0% per year.
To achieve as much precision as possible, econometricians work with
statistical methods, which require historic databases, linear equations, and
relatively open structures. They know that these methods become less and less
dependable as they are applied farther into the future, and therefore
econometricians have come to feel that the long term is simply inaccessible to
modelers.
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Figure 2.11 Population growth curves for older American cities.
Reproduced with permission of The MIT Press from J. W.
Forrester and N. J. Mass 'Urban Dynamics: a Rejoinder to Averch
and Levine', in W. W. Schroeder, III, R. E. Sweeney, L. E. Alfeld,
(eds.) Readings in Urban Dynamics, Vol. 2, Cambridge, Wright-
Allen Press, p. 21, 1975
System dynamicists regard most efforts to gain precise predictions of social
systems as a waste of time. They believe that human unpredictability is too
dominant a factor in social systems to allow anything more than qualitative
behavioral forecasts, even for aggregate systems where much unpredictability
can be averaged out. Therefore they find it hard to understand the great effort
econometricians go through to obtain better and better estimations or to quote
their findings to six or seven significant digits. Especially when many exogenous
variables must be predetermined, the whole econometric exercise looks to a
system dynamicist like a transformation of one set of uncertain and unscientific
guesses into a second set ofequally uncertain guesses, presented with deceptive,
scientific-looking precision.
System dynamicists should know from their own theorems ofsystem behavior
that most aggregate systems possess acertain momentum, and that within ashort
time horizon the relatively simple structural hypotheses of econometrics are
usually quite appropriate. But system dynamicists tend to reject not only the
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possibility but the utility of working within short-time horizons. In the system
dynamics world view, since the short term is already determined, unchangeable
by policy, it is totally uninteresting. Furthermore, system dynamics theory says
that policies designed only for short-term gain often lead to long-term loss.
Therefore modelers should not reinforce their clients' interest in short-term
results.
These opposing ideas about what kind of knowledge about the future might be
useful arise from different basic assumptions about the nature of social systems.
The econometric assumption reflects the common view of the policy-making
world-that the world is essentially dualistic and open. A sharp distinction is
drawn between the economy and the environment (government, weather, Arab
nations, consumers, investors, or whatever). The environment delivers specific
inputs, to which the system gives specific responses. Each system, input, and
response may be unique, and thus particulars of different situations are more to
be studied than similarities. The best strategy for policy is to foresee the next set
ofspecific inputs and to be prepared to give optimal responses to them. Thisview
leads to policy questions about end states, rather than paths to those states, and
about particular characteristics of the system under particular conditions:
1. If the price of natural gas is deregulated this year, what will its equilibrium
market price be? How much windfall profit would accrue to the gas
companies?
2. How much increase in income taxes would be required to reduce the current
rate of inflation by 2%? What would that tax do to the unemployment rate?
3. Given normal weather conditions, current fertilizer prices, and a subsidy of 5
cents per bushel, how much wheat will be producea in the U.S. next year? If
no export embargoes are imposed, what will domestic wheat price be?
System dynamics, on the other hand, assumes that systems are primarily
closed. Not only does the environment influence the economy, but the economy
influences the environment. In fact, the distinction between the system and its
environment is rarely clear (except for obvious exogenous factors like
incoming solar energy). Attention is focused on the general system reaction to
general disturbances and on the dynamic path of a response rather than its end
state.
System dynamics ... regards external forces as there, but beyond control and hence
not worthy of primary attention ... Instead, the focus is upon examining the
organization's internal structure; the intent being to arrive at an understanding of
how this structure ... can be made more resilient to environmental perturbation. In
adopting this approach, system dynamics is embracing the wisdom of the human
body. The body, rather than forecasting-and then marshalling its forces in
anticipation of-the arrival of each kind of solid and liquid input, remains
continually poised in a state of general readiness for whatever may befall it. 58
This view of the nature of systems leads to a very different set of policy
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questions:
1. How would deregulation of natural gas price affect the general depletion
life-cycle pattern of U.S. natural gas reserves and the eventual transition to
new types of fuels?
2. What are the dominant positive feedback loops causing inflation? How
could equally effective negative loops to counterbalance them be built into
the economic system without causing unemployment?
3. Why has wheat production fluctuated more in the past five years than in the
preceding fifteen years? Which sort of policy-direct price supports,
increased buffer stocks, or increased exports--could induce stabilization of
production while not increasing consumer prices?
It would be hard to say whether these questions are more or less important than
the previous ones. They do, however, reflect a clearly different attitude about
how social problems arise and how to go about solving them.
After choosing different problems and dismissing the legitimacy and
feasibility of each other's problem areas, econometricians and system
dynamicists go on to solve their problems with totally different procedures.
The differences here have deep roots in conflicting theories of knowledge.
Perhaps both sides would agree that the nature of the world and human
perceptions of it produce a number of happenings that humans can observe
readily, resulting from an underlayer of unseen causal motivations, events and
interconnections. This underlayer can be known from one's own inner
experience of it, but it cannot be measured and one person's experience of it
cannot be compared directly with another's. The disagreement begins in
deciding which part of that double-layered world to represent in a model.
Econometrics is firmly grounded in observable reality. Econometricians
may and do speculate freely about unseen psychological and physical driving
machinery, drawing on substantial causal theory from their parent paradigm of
economics. But their models must contain explicitly not what they experience,
but only what they know, and in their paradigm one can know only what one
can measure. Therefore their models tend to represent observable phenomena
only, with the hypothesized causal connections implicit. There are no strong
preconceived notions about the nature of those connections. They may be a
web of feedback loops, a series of unrelated stochastic forces, or some
combination of these. Whatever the underlying structure is, its nature and its
relationship to the surface phenomena may vary randomly or shift entirely.
Therefore stochastic error terms must be added to equations, and a continuous
stream of new observations must be obtained to verify that the system
continues to run as it has in the past. Econometricians feel a pressing need for
more data, better measurements, more recent updating, better access to
databases.
System dynamicists, on the other hand, feel that measurable events
represent only a small fraction of what one can know. They plunge
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enthusiastically into the lower layer of unseen experience, armed with theories
that help them relate visible dynamic variations in systems to invisible
feedback-loop structure. They attempt to guess that structure, as the
econometricians do, but then they include their guesses explicitly in their
models. They are searching for timeless general relationships, not those that
are peculiar to one system or one time period. Therefore they use information
from any period and any subsystem, including, among many other sources, the
same statistical data from which econometric models are derived. However,
they generally prefer direct, qualitative observations of the physical processes
and human decisions in the system, rather than quantitative aggregate social
indices.
System dynamicists recognize a spectrum of increasingly precise informa-
tion, ranging from intuitions, hunches, and anecdotal observations at one end
to controlled physical measurement at the other, with social statistics
somewhere in the middle. They believe that this spectrum offers far more
information than is currently used, and that the real need is not for more data
but for better use of the data already available. They point out that
econometricians, by confining themselves to the narrow part of the spectrum
consisting of social statistics, which contain no information about operating
policies, goals, fears, or expectations in the system, are hopelessly restricted in
learning about how social systems work.
These two approaches to the interpretation and use of various kinds of
knowledge result in continuous, fruitless cross-paradigm discussions about the
relative importance of structure versus parameters. Econometricians probably
spend 5% of their time specifying model structure and 95% estimating
parameters. System dynamicists reverse that emphasis. They find that their
long-term feedback models are prone to wild excursions if even one small
information link is left unclosed but are often maddeningly unresponsive to
parameter changes. Having worked with such models, system dynamicists find
it difficult to imagine why anyone would bother to estimate most coefficients
precisely, especial1y when the coefficients are part of a model with what is to
them an obviously open and linear structure.
The econometrician, on the other hand, may find that in his models a 6.5%
growth rate produces a very different result from a 7.0% growth rate, and his
client may care a great deal about that difference. To him the system
dynamicists' cavalier attitude about precise data seems both irresponsible and
unsettling. Furthermore, since his paradigm provides no acceptable way of
finding model parameters without statistical data, he cannot imagine how a
system dynamics model becomes quantified. Since the numbers are not
obtained by legitimate statistical methods, they must be il1egitimate, made-up,
suspect.
The structure-parameter disagreement is also revealed in the complaint
often voiced by econometricians that 'system dynamicists deliberately design
their models to generate the results they want'. System dynamicists do
habitually specify in advance the dynamic behavior they will regard as a first
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test of confidence in the model, and do operate with some knowledge about
what kinds of structure will produce what kinds of behavior. However, the task
of making a complex dynamic simulation model behave in any reasonable way
is surprisingly difficult, especially with a closed structure, with a paradigm
requiring every constant and variable to have a recognizable real-world
meaning, and with a bias against including time-dependent driving functions.
When one has worked with models like this, one begins to regard the relatively
sensitive econometric model as much easier to manipulate. Therefore system
dynamicists answer the econometricians' complaint this way: 'Give me an open
system with five dummy variables and 40 exogenous driving functions and I
could design my model to generate the results I want!' Both complaint and
counter-complaint miss the essential point-the two kinds of models are each
subject to rigid constraints of different sorts and are sensitive in different ways.
A scrupulous modeler in either field will feel too bound by the characteristics of
the real system to engage in conscious manipulation of results, and an
unscrupulous modeler in either field can get away with outrageous fiddling.
Unfortunately, neither field is sufficiently self-monitored or self-critical to
reward honesty consistently or to eliminate fiddling.
Not only the inclusion or exclusion of intangibles, and the numbers and their
sources are sources of disagreement. Even the basic decisions about what
aspects of observable reality to include are made entirely differently in the two
modeling schools. System dynamicists, as we have seen, are attuned to see and
represent the stocks and flows in systems-and in fact can see nothing else, as
this frustrated attempt at cross-paradigm communication indicates.
As I see traditional economic models, they are very concerned with money flows,
and especially with maintaining consistency among money flows. Supply must
equal demand, sales must equal revenues, savings must equal investment, etc.
These flow-equalities are the bedrock upon which economic models stand.
As I see the economic world, however, it is logistically impossible to keep all
flows equal at all times. A store cannot have arriving merchandise come in at the
back door just as customers appear to buy it. Therefore it establishes a stock of
inventory to allow its flow to be unequal. A consumer cannot arrange to receive
money just at the rate he wants to spend it. Therefore he maintains several stocks,
including money in his pocket, deposits in the bank, and various kinds of debts, in
order to permit his spending flow to differ from his income flow. Everywhere I look
in economic systems, I see stocks that exist so that flows can be unequal.
When, with great excitement, I communicate this observation to my economist
friends, they assure me that they already know it. When I ask them why stocks do
not appear in their models, they give me three answers:
1. In economic systems, stocks are relatively invariant, therefore they cannot be
important in influencing the interesting variations in flows that we want to
understand.
2. Stocks are vanishingly small compared to flows, especially when the flows are
measured over the normal economic accounting period of one year.
3. Anyway, it would be mathematically easy to add stocks to existing economic
models, but there is not much reason for doing so because nothing would be
learned from it.
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Now, in my world view, the invariance of stocks is no surprise because the
economy is entirely made up of feedback systems to stabilize stocks. Inventory
holders raise prices if their inventories fall too low and lower prices if inventories
rise too high. Farmers will borrow if their debt level is low but will refuse to expand
further if their debt level becomes too high. Given the same income, consumers will
buy at a very different rate if the condition or number of their possessions is low
rather than high (as indicated by postwar consumption rates). To the extent that all
these actions are effective, stocks will vary only slightly. But that doesn't mean that
stocks are therefore unimportant in explaining economic variations. To the
contrary, it means that stocks are the prime determinants of nearly all economic
decisions. The secondary determinants are the constraints on those decisions, which
are also usually stocks.
To represent an economic system without stocks seems to me like representing a
thermostat-furnace system without the room temperature. The room temperature
is exactly the signal that turns on the adjustment mechanism. If the system is
effective, room temperature varies only by a few degrees. But those small
fluctuations trigger great variations in the rate at which heat is flowing from the
furnace. And though the stock of kilocalories in the room at anyone time is very
small compared to the year's accumulation of heat flow from the furnace, the room
temperature is nevertheless a vital determinant of the behavior of the system.
It seems to me that economists spend a lot of time trying to find relationships
between flows-between supply and demand, between consumption and income,
between investment and GNP. From my viewpoint that effort is doomed to failure
because there is no unique relationship between flows. In the thermostat example it
would be impossible to establish statistically a correct relationship between the
flows. Heat inflow is a function of the gap between the room temperature and the
thermostat setting. Heat outflow depends on the difference between room
temperature and outside temperature. Depending on the temperatures and the
thermostat setting, inflow and outflow could have almost any relationship to each
other at a particular moment, and that relationship would change in the next
moment.
Of course, while the system is working well, and the room temperature is
relatively constant, one can be under the illusion that one has established a fairly
good relationship between flows. This illusion breaks down just when the system
breaks down and the stock (room temperature) begins to vary, which is just when
you most need to understand the system. Witness the sudden uselessness of every
economic model in 1973 when the stock-based control systems broke down and the
stocks began to change.
Therefore I must respectfully disagree that stocks can be omitted from a model
because they seldom vary, or because they are small compared to a year's
accumulation of flows (they would be even smaller compared to a millenium's
accumulation of flows!). I must also disagree with the economists' third point, that
stocks are easy to include in a model. The stocks themselves may be, but the
decisions based on them are not, because we know so little about them. We know
so little about them, not because they are unknowable, but because so far little
attention has been paid to them. 59
After each type of modeler has worked on an inherently unsolvable problem
in the other's view, and has gone about it with entirely the wrong emphasis, the
misunderstanding becomes complete when the finished models are examined
for validity or credibility. Each kind of model fails to meet the other's
standards. The econometrician had a hard enough time understanding where
the system dynamicist's numbers came from. Now he must evaluate the result
84
without a single R2, t-test, or Durbin-Watson statistic to help him along. He
will find it impossible to calculate these statistical summary indices for a system
dynamics model, because there will be multiple covariances and colinearities
and no data for many of the model's variables.
The system dynamicist, who considers summary statistics either deceptive or
meaningless, looks for the intuitive reality of the individual causal relations and
the total dynamic behavior of the econometric model. He finds linearities,
driving exogenous variables, and worst of all, time-dependent dumm;'
variables, which correspond to highest-order cheating in his paradigm. The few
instances of feedback he finds will be predominantly positive feedback, which
he knows will carry the entire model to ridiculous extremes, if forecasts are
generated for more than a few years into the future.
Even sincere efforts to understand each other's evaluation techniques tend
to produce muddled cross-paradigm conversations, such as the following one
between a system dynamicist and two mathematical economists, all of whom
seem to be trying very hard to communicate.
Howard: We are used to seeing in the sciences one curve labeled 'predicted' and
another labeled ·observed'. These curves allow us to make evaluations such as:
'This is good' or 'This is not so good'. Is there any reason in principle ... why you
cannot take actual sales, production, and inventory data, use your model to
obtain 'predicted' sales, production, and inventory figures for the corresponding
period, and make a comparison?
Forrester: Yes, there is a reason why you cannot ... Suppose you take two models,
absolutely identical in structure and parameters, but both having different noise
components in their decision mechanisms. If you start these models from
identical initial conditions and let them run, their behaviors will diverge so
quickly that there is no way of predicting what will happen on a specific day. Yet,
the two models will exhibit similar quantitative performance characteristics.
They will both be stable or unstable, for example ... Thus one must predict, not
for the particular event, not the shape of the particular time history, but one must
predict the change in the performance characteristics: profitability, employ-
ment stability, and characteristics such as these. The test you suggest of
comparing a particular time history with the output of a model is not a test that
you can expect to use, although it is a test that many people have been
attempting for many economic models.
Howard: But I think that you have to have some quantitative measure of how
good your model is ... How can we possibly criticize you when you say, 'It has
the same qualitative behavior'? We both look at the same simulated history,
and I say it does not look at all like the real thing, and you say it does. You say
that you cannot with your model duplicate the actual sales data because of the
noise in the system. All you can do is get a signal that has the same
characteristics as the actual data. I say that this statement has no content ...
How can we get a quantitative agreement on what constitutes the same
characteristics?
Forrester: This is a very troublesome question in the abstract, and yet in the actual
specific case it is not answered in the rigorous objective sense that you speak of;
neither is it in any of our real-life activities. I think you are trying for something
here that we do not have in other areas of human endeavour. We do not have it
in medicine or law or engineering. You are trying for something here that is
more nearly perfect, more objective than in fact we know how to do anywhere
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else. I do not disagree with the desirability of it. I say we do not have it and we
are not ready for it. Where we seem to have it in certain of the statistical model
tests, I believe it is misleading and on an essentially unsound foundation.
Holt: It is interesting to contrast Professor Forrester's willingness in model
formulation to quantify such unstructured concepts as 'integrity' with his
unwillingness in model testing to accept quantitative tests of these models.
Even where quantitative data are available for such variables as employment
fluctuations both from the company and from the model, he accepts qualitative
judgements on similarity as perfectly adequate.OI)
(Reproduced by permission of MIT from GreenbergerOll and Forrester. x)
Can these two apparently antithetical ways of looking at and modeling
social systems coexist within the mind of a single person? Can they coexist
within the modeling profession? Or is it necessary, as Kuhn implies, I that one
paradigm must come to dominate the other totally?
Some people maintain that system dynamics and econometrics can indeed
be merged within one person's mind and that in practice such mergers are
appearing. System dynamicists can certainly be found who use statistical
techniques to determine model parameters, and econometric models increas-
ingly seem to contain non-linearities, distributed lags, and feedback. But
these examples are just borrowings from each other's techniques, not shifts in
world view. If the problem addressed by a computer model reflects a basically
static concern with particular responses to particular events, if the model
variables are observables, if the validation procedure involves detailed
matching with historic data, if stocks and flows are not carefully disting-
uished, then we would say the model is in the econometric paradigm, no
matter what mathematical characteristics it has or what computer language it
is written in. If the problem is centered on generic dynamic behavior of a
mostly-closed system, if the variables include motivations and goals, if the
validation includes assessment of the realism of the model structure, then it is
a system dynamics model. We cannot imagine how the two basic philosophies
can be mixed or merged in one model, although the operating procedures that
have shaped and been shaped by these philosophies might be exchanged.
The outcome of the econometrics-system dynamics competition may be
similar to the pattern of competition between species in an ecosystem.
According to the competitive exclusion principle, two species struggling for
the same ecological niche cannot coexist for long. One must eventually
eliminate the other completely, as Kuhn says one competing scientific
paradigm eventually eliminates the other from legitimate professional
practice.
However, when diverse niches are available, one species can lose in one
kind of niche and dominate in a different kind. Econometrics and system
dynamics clearly fit different niches in the modeling and policy-making
environment. Within the short term, a system's behavior is determined by
decisions and events that have already happened and that are propogating
through the delays in the system-buildings are under construction, children
are growing up, orders are being filled, debts are being paid. The length of
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the short-term period is determined for any system by the length of the
dominant delays. New policies can have little or no effect during this period,
but accurate predictions can be made to help one prepare for what is coming
down the pipeline. In this niche, where one can predict but not affect the
system, econometrics fits well. However, in the longer term one can act to
change the system, and because such actions are possible, accurate and
unconditional prediction is impossible. Over this longer period the feedbacks
are closed, one is concerned with the control or design of the system as a
whole and its conditional, general response to possible changes. This is the
system dynamics niche. As long as both specific short-term predictions and
long-term system changes are needed, both econometrics and system
dynamics can be actively pursued, probably with continued mutual hostility,
at least until a better competitor comes along.
F. Conclusion
Each type of modeling brings along with it some underlying beliefs about the
world that are, when they are stated bluntly, both insightful and highly
questionable. Each is an oracle of a very specific type, designed for one
limited way of dealing with the future. For instance, here is a summary of
some of the beliefs underlying the four methods described in this chapter:
1. Systems consist of timeless underlying structure, which generates observ-
able behavior over time. That structure is composed of physical stocks and
flows, controlled by decision processes that depend on information (often
biased, delayed, and incomplete) about the stocks. It is possible to know
the structure and the behaviors inherent in that structure, but, because of
inevitable randomness, it is not possible to predict the exact configuration
of stocks and flows at a given time in the future. One should strive to
configure a system's structure to increase the likelihood of desirable
behaviours, not to predict or prepare for or make optimal use of inherently
unknowable precise future conditions.
2. Systems consist of millions of individual decisions, the aggregate effects of
which are linked through accounting identities and through behavioral
relationships that may shift over time. One can never know these
relationships by accumulating all the individual actions or by speculating
about their motivation, but only by observing what their aggregate effects
have been in the past. Statistical techniques allow one to sort out and state
very precisely not only the historical relationships but also their historical
degree of randomness and uncertainty. On the basis of this understanding
one can make precise but short-term predictions or conditional predictions
about the future.
3. Systems consist of interlocked sequences of transformational processes.
Each process requires a set of inputs and results in a set of outputs; outputs
of one process can be inputs to another. Ultimately all inputs come from
nature and outputs go to consumers, at which points they no longer need be
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accounted for. The relationship between inputs and outputs for any single
transformation is alterable by technical change, which is exogenous. All
inputs and outputs are physical and thus inherently measurable and
knowable. With that knowledge one can explore in detail the consequences
of growth in the system, with or without changed technologies, or shifts in
the desired mix of final outputs.
4. For any system there is a nearly infinite set of configurations or states, and a
set of constraints that rule out many of those states as infeasible. There is
also a clear objective, or set of objectives, that allow system states to be
ranked in terms of desirability. The possible states, the constraints, and the
objectives are all inherently knowable, and stable over the time it takes to
implement a policy. Policies should be chosen to move the system into that
feasible state that best meets one's objective.
Everyone of these methods assumes that some aspect of the system is
inherently knowable and quantifiable. Everyone also assumes some know-
ledge of what is good or desirable, but optimization is the only one that requires
explicit statement of goals. Econometrics takes explicit account of some
inherent randomness or unknowability of the system; system dynamics builds
the existence of randomness into its epistemology but does not attempt to
quantify it; input-output analysis and optimization take no formal notice of it.
All of the methods get fuzzier and less authoritative as the boundaries and
complexity of the system expand, as the time of interest goes further into the
future, and as changes to be tested diverge more from what has been observed.
In other words, with all methods it is easier to describe a system that exists or
has existed than one that might exist. Though the methods span the range of
policy interest from general understanding to detailed implementation, they
are clustered, especially in their actual use, more toward implementation.
Most of them assume a great deal of understanding and of accurate
measurement of the system-in most cases they assume more than actually
exists.
Each modeling school defines a particular way of looking at the world and
provides a set of tools for working on particular kinds of problems. None is
comprehensive enough to encompass all that might be observed about the
world or to solve all problems. And of course very many observations and
problems fall far outside the entire field of computer modeling. Modeling can
certainly contribute greatly to human comprehension, prediction, and control
of complex systems. But like any other tool, it must be used with wisdom and
skill, and that means with understanding of its appropriate uses, of its
limitations, and of the way it influences its users' perceptions of the world.
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PART III
Nine Models
The roads by which men arrive at their insights into celestial matters seem to me
almost as worthy of wonder as those matters in themselves.
Johannes Kepler
Astronomia Nova
Here we describe in some detail the nine models in our survey. The models
and their sponsoring and modeling institutions have already been listed in
Part I. Table 3.1 contains a summary of each model's purpose, methodologic-
al paradigm, and time horizon. In this section, as in the table, the models will
be presented in order of decreasing time horizon. Before we begin, however,
a word about the process of describing and comparing diverse, complex
computer models is necessary.

CHAPTER 3
How to Describe a Model?
One goal of our project was to represent all the models in a common format
understandable to a non-technical audience, so that the procedures, insights,
assumptions, and conclusions of each modeling effort could be compared and
contrasted, There are many possible formats for describing a model, each of
which accents certain model characteristics and hides others. Rather than
select anyone representational format, we decided to use four, one verbal and
three diagrammatic, to present as complete a picture of each model as possible.
A. CHECKLIST
The primary representational form we will use is words. We will describe each
model verbally according to the following outline or checklist of major points:
Institutional setting. Who are the sponsoring organizations, the client, and the
modeling group? What circumstances brought them together? What tasks
and deadlines were assigned to the modelers? What kinds of communica-
tions existed among sponsor, client, and modelers before, during, and after
the project?
Purpose and problem focus. What was the model built to do? To what real
world problems is the model addressed? What phenomena are to be
explained, what policies are to be tested, or what information is to be
generated?
Method. What modeling paradigm and mathematical techniques have been
used in formalizing the system? What limitations are imposed on the model
by the techniques used? Is the paradigm selected appropriate to the model's
purpose?
Boundaries. Over what period of time does the modeler attempt to describe the
system's behavior? Is this period consistent with the model's purpose? What
variables have been included in the model? Which are affected by system
behavior (endogenous) and which are independent of system behavior
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(exogenous)? Are the reasons for variable inclusion/exclusion made clear?
Are the included variables consistent with the purpose and time horizon?
Structure. What form does the network of variable interaction take? How does
each variable tie into the system? Are model elements represented in detail
or in highly aggregated form?
Data. Where did the numbers come from? Are data adequate to the
requirements of the model? How have crude data been refined to meet the
model's data requirements? How have 'soft' variables such as attitudes been
handled? What has been done where needed data were not available?
Conclusions. What is concluded about the system described by the model?
What policies are recommended? To what extent have the modeler's
conclusions been shaped by the choices of problem, technique, boundary,
structure, and data? To what extent do the modelers base their conclusions
on information from mental models? Were they able to answer the question
they set out to answer?
Testing. How has the model been tested? What criteria were used to judge
model validity? How does the model behavior respond to changes in
parameters? Is it sensitive to real uncertainties? How robust are the policy
conclusions?
(Note: In some modeling paradigms validity tests must precede the
drawing of conclusions and in others they must follow. Therefore the above
two checklist items are sometimes inverted in the model descriptions.)
Implementation history. Have the modeler's efforts been useful in formulating
policy? Who, if anyone, has used the model? What successes and what
problems have been encountered by people using the model?
Computer requirements. How much computer time is necessary to run the
model? How much computer memory space does it require? For what
computer system was it designed? In what language is it written?
Documentation. How well does the model documentation allow the above
checkpoints to be assessed? Is the writing clear, organized, informative? Are
equations available? Are they explained? Is it possible for the model to be
run and tested by anyone other than the group that wrote it?
In attempting to answer these questions for all the models in the study, we
encountered two major difficulties. The first was in locating information.
Although all of the models were documented, most of them were not written
up with the intent to answer all the questions we were asking. Some were
described in dozens of short articles, but no comprehensive or technical
description of the model was available. Few model documentations revealed
the subjective milieu of beliefs, motives, and constraints that affected the
model. The modelers seemed to aspire to anonymous objectivity and avoided
mentioning human and institutional factors that influenced their work.
Piecing together answers for all of our questions, thus, was not a
straightforward task. The information we gained from personal communica-
tion and formal documentation frequently had to be supplemented by
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guesswork. For example, where the model purpose was not stated, we
sometimes could infer a purpose from what the model did, who paid for it, and
how the modeler described the system. To minimize the dangers of guesswork
we have attempted to identify our inferences in the course of discussion, and we
submitted all our descriptions to the modelers for review, requesting that they
correct any errors.
A second difficulty with the checklist is that verbal communication is
necessarily sequential, while model characteristics such as boundaries and
causal structure may be simultaneous, circular, or so complex that a verbal
rendition must be either oversimplified or impossible to follow. To circumvent
this problem we have supplemented our verbal description with some simple
graphic presentations: boundary diagrams, causal diagrams, and comparison
with a reference structure.
B. BOUNDARY DIAGRAM
The choice of boundary-what aspects of the real world to include in and
exclude from the model-may be the decision that most influences the
outcome of the modeling process. To understand a model or compare several
models, one must have a clear picture of how that choice has been made. Figure
3.1 shows an example of a boundary diagram for a simple hypothetical food and
agriculture model.
The diagram distinguishes among three sets of variables. Endogenous
variables, listed in the inner circle, are determined or calculated within the
model. In a system dynamics model the endogenous elements are those
contained within feedback loops. In an econometric model the endogenous
elements are those defined by simultaneous or time-lagged equations.
Exogenous elements, in the outer circle, affect the state of the model system
but are not affected by it; they are either constants or driving functions that
must be specified as inputs before the model can be run.
Omitted elements are completely absent from the model and are listed
outside both circles. The list that could be included in this section of the
diagram is obviously endless. Only those elements most closely related to the
exogenous and endogenous ones are indicated, to draw attention to the
assumptions that define the model's boundary and to indicate the most fruitful
areas for possible model expansion.
C. CAUSAL DIAGRAM
We have already introduced the causal notation in Chapter 1 and used it to
represent some of the sample models in Chapter 2. Figure 3.2 shows a causal
diagram of a simple simulation model that corresponds to the boundary
diagram in Figure 3.1. The single arrows indicate causal relationships. The two
exogenous elements are indicated by open arrows (:::»). A causal diagram of a
simple econometric model is shown in Figure 3.3. This model is a mixture of
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C = 16.8 + 0.02P + 0.23P_ 1 + 0.80(Wp + Wd
I = 17.8 + 0.23P + 0.55P-I - 0.15K_ 1
Wp = 1.6 + 0.42Y + 0.16Y-I + 0.13t
Y =C+I+G
P = Y - Wp - T
K = K_ 1 + I
Causal diagram
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where
C = consumption
I = investment
Wp = private wages
Y = output
P = profits
K = capital stock
G = government spending
Wo = public wages
T =- business taxes
t = time
/buSiness t;.
~ ~_ taxes
public ~ profits
wages ~+ +/ 4+ \.d''''~':"'"~" ( • ;""':"ent'\-
wages . ~ ~
j ~ .output
. + +.~ t + capital
time + stack
I't
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Figure 3.3 Equations and causal diagram representation of the Klein
Interwar Econometric Model
causal (behavioral) assumptions indicated with single arrows, and correlational
or definitional relationships indicated with double-headed arrows ( t ).
The main advantage of a causal diagram is that it provides a holistic summary
of simultaneous, interlinked model assumptions, as a linear string of words
could never do. One can learn from a glance at a causal diagram what the basic
structure of the model is, whether it is open or closed, what links exist between
model variables, and where important links may be missing. If the model is not
too complex, one may also learn from the arrangement (or absence) of
feedback loops roughly what dynamic behavior patterns the model will be
capable of producing.
On the other hand, exact quantitative relationships are not pictured in a
causal diagram. In order to determine whether the relationship represented by
each arrow is strong or weak, linear or non-linear, instantaneous or delayed,
reference must be made to the model equations. The causal diagram is only a
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rough sketch of the qualitative structure of the model. It may and should lead to
questions about quantitative assumptions, and at that point the discussion
moves from structure to parameters, and from diagrams to mathematical
equations.
We encountered one problem in depicting the nine survey models in the
causal diagram format; some models are so complex that a faithful translation
of all their causal assumptions produces a diagram that provides about as much
information as a plate of spaghetti. In some cases we have included these
overcomplex diagrams in this report anyway. They communicate little about
specific model assumptions, but they make a clear point about the intelligibility
and manageability of the total model. In other cases we include causal diagrams
of parts of a model to clarify a particular set of assumptions or to explore the
reasons for the model's behavior.
D.REFERENCESTRUCTURE
The causal diagram may provide a simple representation of what is contained in
a model, but it does not allow an easy comparison of the inclusions and
omissions of several models. Therefore we evolved a fourth way of
representing the nine models. After studying the causal diagrams of all of
them, we produced a compendium of all the elements and inter-relationships
that any modeler had thought important to economic-demographic systems.
Of course there was a great deal of overlap; most models contained a
population, a production function, and a measure of material standard of
living, for instance. The areas of overlap indicated the most basic and
important aspects of general population-production systems, according to a
consensus of the nine different modeling groups. Figure 3.4 illustrates in a
causal and very aggregated format the elements and relationships that most
often appeared in the models.
The arrows of Figure 3.4 represent a number of extremely complex
real-world phenomena that are included in the models in a variety of different
mathematical forms. For instance, the set of arrows leading from investment to
capital, energy, and the other factors of production stand for a set of
investment allocation decisions that could incorporate concepts such as relative
costs, marginal returns, profits, inventories, financing constraints, production
delays, and many other considerations. An elaborate optimization model
could be built around this small section of the system. The multiple arrows from
the various factors of production to economic output could be represented by a
simple Cobb-Douglas production function, by an input-output matrix, or, in
the case of agricultural production, by a set of ecological and biological
relationships. Other complex interactions between the physical system and
human decisions occur in the allocation of output between consumption and
investment, in the determination of the population's consumption habits, and
in the influence of food, income, and other factors on the population growth
rate.
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If Figure 3.4 is redrawn to emphasize the social, economic, and physical
factors interacting to influence human decisions, the diagram in Figure 3.5
emerges. This is not a causal diagram as used in previous figures in this report.
Instead, it emphasizes the decision points in the system by enclosing them in
ovals. Each oval could represent an extremely complex portion of a model,
which in turn represents an extremely complex set of individual and
institutional decisions.
Population size and income (and in a disaggregated model population
characteristics and income distribution) are inputs to a set of socio-economic
decisions, called 'consumption', which determine effective demands for all the
priced products of the economic system. These demands, together with
agricultural and industrial outputs (supply), enter a set of 'output allocation'
decisions, that determine how output is divided among taxes, current
consumption, research, and investment, and also how taxes, consumption, and
investment are distributed over the population. Per capita income and services
and their distribution, combined with demographic factors, influence the
population growth rate through a series of 'population increase' decisions.
Population determines the size of the labor force, which enters the 'production
processes', along with all the non-labor factors of production such as capital
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and technology. 'Labor allocation' decisions, including the decision to migrate,
distribute labor between industry and agriculture. 'Technological' decisions
affect both the industrial and agricultural production processes. 'Resource
availability' represents the availability and costs of various natural factors of
production such as land, minerals, water, and fossil fuels. The costs of wages,
materials, and other factors are balanced against available investment funds in
'investment allocation' decisions to determine what kinds of substitutions
among factors will take place and what kinds of new capital will be required.
Of course not all models contain all these elements, and each model is likely
to represent them differently. For example, 'population increase' might be
exogenous in one model, it might respond to food availability and family
planning services in another, and in a third it might be an extremely complex
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function of social norms, education, female employment rates, and income
distribution. We will include a few words in each oval ofthe reference structure
diagram to indicate what sorts of factors have been included in each model as
inputs to that particular set of decisions. Table 3.2 lists the sorts of factors that
might be included in each decision oval.
Table 3.2 Sample factors that might be included in decision functions
Consumption
goals and desires
prices
advertising
habits
income
credit and cash flows
stock of household goods
income distribution
Output allocation
prices
tax policy
transfer payments
income distribution
interest rate
social hierarchies
capital goods stock
Technology
R&D expenditures
development delays
development capital
knowledge stock
perception of technical needs
prices
Resource availability
resource stock and distribution
land-quantity and quality
reclamation
erosion
depletion
pollution
cartels
Labor allocation
wages
education
migration
unions
discrimination
housing availability
perception delays
Investment allocation
costs
marginal returns
interest rates
forecasting
profits
cash and credit flows
prices
government incentives and regulations
Population increase
nutrition
health care
fertility control technology
status of women
education
income and income distribution
social fertility norms
population age structure
Industrial and agricultural production
capital
labor-wages, skills, and availability
technology
energy price and availability
resource price and availability
land
weather
Although the use of a reference structure is a test of model comprehensive-
ness, we do not mean to imply that a more comprehensive model is necessarily
'better' than one that omits part of the reference structure. Models are created
to simplify the real world, which is too complex to understand in all its detail.
Any model that contained all the factors in Table 3.2 and represented all the
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decision functions in complete detail would be incomprehensible. Since every
model must omit and simplify, the omissions and simplifications of each model
must be judged in the light of the model's purpose. A model intended for
precise prediction of a few closely-linked variables over a short time horizon
may focus on just one decision function from Table 3.2 in great detail, while
treating the rest of the system as exogenous. On the other hand, a long-term
model designed to explore qualitative trends may include nearly everything in
the system, but represent none of it in detail. The reference structure diagram
therefore can be used to represent and compare the nine models but not to
judge them, at least not without reference to the purpose of each model.
E. TOLERANCE
The nine models described here have been identified as 'better than average',
not only by us, but by other modelers, clients, and sponsors. We describe them
here as factually as possible. We realize that no such presentation can be
entirely free from the biases of the authors, nor can it be read by an audience
that is free from bias.
Each model has strong and weak points. Those who are looking for flaws will
certainly find them. Included in even this small sample are mismatches of
methods with purposes, sloppy documentation, absurd assumptions buried in
overcomp1ex structures, conclusions that do not even follow from model
output, and project management strategies that destroy the possibility of
influencing actual policy. Where we have detected these problems, we have
pointed them out. There are undoubtedly others we have missed.
It would be a mistake, however, to read these models only for their faults, to
associate errors exclusively with specific modelers, or to conclude that the lack
of perfection precludes the usefulness of these models or of the entire practice
of modeling. Finding fault can be a constructive practice if it is used for
learning, so that the faults are not perpetuated. It is a waste of time if its only
purpose is to assign blame or to give up. Most of the problems to be found in
these models are widespread. We could have described other models with
worse problems and with almost no strengths to balance them. Among those
other models would be many of the mental models that might be used in the
absence of these formal ones.
Furthermore, the number of mistakes a person makes is often related to the
number of new things tried. Many of these models are innovations, covering
totally new ground or attempting to represent systems in creative and
unconventional ways. They may be experiments that did not work completely,
but their own creators have undoubtedly learned from them and will avoid
their mistakes in future work. The imperfections in these models are valuable
to all of us, because we can also learn from them.
In short, these nine models were selected because, in one way or another,
they are pioneers of the modeling field. It would be an injustice if they were to
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become symbols of modeling errors simply because they were included in our
sample, while other models more deserving of criticism were not.
Decisions must be based on some model in any case, and no model is perfect.
The proper question to ask about any of these models is not 'is it perfect?', but
'does it contribute something to the decision for which it was designed, beyond
what the available mental models could contribute?'.
CHAPTER 4
SAHEL: the Tragedy of the Commons
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
In June 1973 the United Nations called a meeting of its agencies and donor
organizations to discuss the severe drought and famine in the African
Sudano-Sahel area. The United States delegation at this meeting agreed to
produce a study to 'identify the methodology, the data requirements and the
possible alternatives of inquiry from physical, economic, social and cultural
points of view' needed for a 'comprehensive examination of technical problems
and the major alternative development possibilities' for the region. l The
Africa Bureau of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) took responsibility for the study. In August 1973 USAID contracted
this work to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) to be completed
by September 1,1974.2 The Center for Policy Alternatives at MIT assembled
a multi-disciplinary group to work on the Sudano-Sahel project, and each of
the group members began to work on an in-depth study of some aspect of the
problem.
At the time these arrangements were being made, Anthony Picardi was a
doctoral candidate in civil engineering, working with the Sudano-Sahel
project's principal investigator, Professor William Seifert. Picardi had studied
system dynamics with Jay Forrester's group at MIT. System dynamics was
viewed as one of many appropriate methods for the multidisciplinary study
with which MIT was charged, and Picardi came to be included as one of the
group hired under the USAID-MIT contract. His work on the project served
both as his doctoral dissertation and as a report to USAID. His contribution
was a small part of the total project, which included detailed studies of the
economics, water resources, transportation, nutrition, health care, and social
institutions of the Sahel region.
The project team of which Picardi was a part was under pressure to produce
quick results, given the urgent situation in the Sahel. Less than three months
elapsed between the time USAID took responsibility for the study and the time
they contracted it to MIT. Two weeks after the MIT contract was signed, the
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study began. It was to have been completed with a deadline of one year. (The
final report was actually completed 18 months after the study began.) The
project was of necessity hastily conceived, and perhaps for this reason it lacked
institutional grounding. The study was commissioned from the United Nations
to USAID, and then through USAID to MIT, with no strong continuous
working relationship between the analysts and any clients who might ultimately
implement the recommendations. USAID arranged visits of the project team
to Africa, heard interim presentations of results, and reviewed the final
reports, but no one from USAID, the United Nations, or the Sahelian nations
was directly involved in the daily planning or progress of the study.
As a graduate student working on a very large, multifaceted effort, Picardi
had no clear idea who might eventually respond to his analysis or how it would
fit into the total Sahel project. It was clear, however, that he needed to write an
acceptable doctoral dissertation. Therefore, academic institutional require-
ments probably influenced his model more than did client requirements.
B. PURPOSE
The Sudano-Sahel project's stated objective was to:
... construct a framework-a comprehensive system of theories and concepts-that
will help the Sahel-Sudan countries and international donor organizations to reach
informed judgements about various alternatives for the region's long-term
(20-25 years) social and economic development. 3
After a three-week trip to Chad, Mali, and Upper Volta during which he
witnessed the effects of the drought first-hand and discussed its causes with
Africans, Picardi decided to limit his part of the study to the problem of
desertification. He cites three reasons for this choice:
... it is a genuine human and ecological problem commanding worldwide concern;
restoration and maintenance of the Sahel ecological resource base is a necessary
(but not necessarily sufficient) step in any livestock production system in West
Africa; and the problem was manageable for one person at the intended level of
detail. 4
Picardi saw three crucial things happening in the Sahel: people were
starving, livestock were starving, and the range was being overgrazed and was
turning to desert. He wanted to understand how the interrelationships of
human population, livestock, and the grazing range in the Sahel had led to this
unsatisfactory system behavior, and what changes might be necessary to
reverse these trends. His questions were imprecise and general, more in the
range of general understanding than of detailed decision-making.
In researching the Sahel problem, Picardi found that it could take the range
more than a century to recover from serious overgrazing. Thus he increased his
model's time horizon beyond the 20--25 years designated by USAID, to 150
years. Of these 150 years, the first 50 coincided with history.
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C.METHOD
Picardi worked entirely within the system dynamics paradigm.) His modeling
procedures generally followed the process outlined by Forrester in Industrial
Dynamics: 6
1. Establish a dynamic problem definition.
2. Formulate a hypothesis about the feedback mechanisms causing the
observed problematic behavior.
3. Build a formal simulation model incorporating that hypothesis.
4. Run the model, compare its behavior with what is known about the real
system, and revise the model until it is an acceptable representation.
5. Identify changes that would improve system behavior.
Picardi used the standard system dynamics tools to formulate his model. The
DYNAMO compiler allowed him to write and link a series of finite difference
equations and to graph the time trends they produced. DYNAMO also
contained automated routines for piecewise-linear approximation and expo-
nential smoothing with which to represent non-linear relationships and
distributed time lags. The system dynamics paradigm provided a conceptual
base for identifying important feedback loops in the system, and a flow diagram
format to represent rates, levels, information and material flows, non-linearities
and delays. The paradigm also predisposed him to seek information from many
sources, including non-statistical ones, and to focus on the social, cultural, and
motivational factors in the pastoral system.
Picardi was seeking general understanding of the long-term dynamic behavior
of the Sahelian ecological and pastoral system as it responded to weather
fluctuations. He was searching for policies that would raise the nomads' standard
of living and reduce their susceptibility to drought. The system seemed to be
nearly closed and dominated by feedback relationships among the people, their
cattle, and the grazing range. Given this purpose, system dynamics was an
appropriate method to choose. Of course, Picardi, as a system dynamicist,
probably chose from the broad complex of problems in the MIT Sahel study a
problem definition that fit his method, rather than vice versa.
D. BOUNDARIES
According to the system dynamics paradigm, the initial form of a model should
include only those variables minimally necessary to explain the problematic
behavior of the system.? Picardi defined the problem in the Sahel in terms of
human population, livestock population, and range condition. His initial model
SAHEL2, therefore, contained essentially these three variables and enough
other information to explain their causal interrelationships.
Picardi was convinced, both by his preconceptions and his knowledge of
specific conditions in the Sahel, that the long-term behavior of the system was
largely determined by causal feedback. Accordingly he made most of his model
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Figure 4.1 Boundaries for SOCIOMAD
variables endogenous. He did, however, include a number of exogenous
variables to represent forces outside the system that had influenced or might
influence the Sahel (see Figure 4.1). Principal among these exogenous forces
were variable rainfall and government policies influencing human and
livestock death rates such as public health services, interference with tribal
warfare, and veterinary services. The literature also indicated that well-drilling
in the Sahel-Qne of the projects humanitarian relief organizations had already
implemented--eaused migratory peoples to spend more time in the region.
Thus Picardi included well-drilling as an exogenous policy that affected not
only available water but also time spent by nomads in the Sahel.
In the course of its development, the Sahel model went through many
revisions. In his thesis Picardi describes three versions of the model:
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SAHEL2, ECNOMAD, and SOCIOMAD, in order of increasing complex-
ity. In ECNOMAD and SOCIOMAD, he expanded the boundaries of
SAHEL2 to include endogenous representations of the cultural factors
influencing the nomads' decisions about managing the livestock herd.
The Sahel models are essentially closed, ecological models. They do not look
much beyond the pastoral system of the Sahel. Elements such as industry,
settled agriculture, formal education, fossil fuels, or modern market mechan-
isms are omitted. Government is not represented explicitly, although
government programs are implied by many of the exogenous variables. As we
shall see, this choice of boundaries turned out to be wide enough to encompass
the problem, but too narrow to encompass those sorts of solutions that involve
any permanent change in either the culture or the resource base of the nomads.
E. STRUCTURE
First we shall describe the structure of SAHEL2, the simplest model, in detail.
We shall then briefly describe the structural additions made in ECNOMAD
and SOCIOMAD.
SAHEL2 can conveniently be divided into three sectors-soil, livestock,
and human population. The soil sector captures the dynamics of the renewable
but erodable resource base that supports the human and livestock populations
of the Sahel. The sector's dominant structural features are two positive
feedback loops (see Figure 4.2), which are activated by high rates of
forage-utilization intensity (that is, overgrazing). Under normal conditions
grazing is light, the soil degradation rate is balanced by regeneration, and
forage production is stable. If for some reason grazing becomes so heavy that
the soil degrades, forage production will decrease. Unless the livestock herd is
decreased, the remaining grass will be even more heavily grazed, degrading the
soil still further, and so on. If activated, this vicious loop causes exponential
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Figure 4.2 SAHEL2 soil sector (state variables in upper case)
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deterioration of the soil condition and thus of the forage-production potential.
If the pressure on the range is reduced, the range can regenerate by a reversal
of this process.
The soil-forage deterioration loops described above are drought-sensitive.
A lack of rainfall will reduce available forage. If available forage is reduced to
an amount that is too low relative to the livestock population, overgrazing will
occur. If this overgrazing unbalances the system to an extent that it cannot right
itself-and it frequently will when drought is prolonged or extremely severe or
when the stocking levels are high-overgrazing will set the soil-degradation
loops into a downward spiral. If nothing is done to stop it, the downward spiral
will operate until the range is converted to desert and the livestock population
is destroyed.
The soil and forage resource base supports the livestock population and
limits its growth. The one positive loop in the livestock sector (see Figure 4.3) is
the familiar biological population growth loop. Population grows at a rate
proportional to its numbers, that is, exponentially. If disease or other factors
do not keep the livestock death rate as high as the birth rate, exponential
growth proceeds until lack of forage or increased slaughter by the nomads
(called offtake) raises the death rate and brings the population into balance. In
SAHEL2 the population growth loop tends to make livestock population
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grow to the maximum size supportable on the range, reflecting an assumption
that the nomads' cultural values lead them to try to maximize their herd size
(this assumption is elaborated in SOCIOMAD).
The livestock population is directly self-regulatory: livestock deaths and
human offtake of livestock are proportional (but with a varying coefficient of
proportionality) to the number of livestock. Also, the livestock population
adjusts to limits imposed by the soil sector. This adjustment is accomplished by
means of high death rates and low birth rates that reduce the livestock
population when forage utilization intensity is high. In times when forage is
scarce, the nomads are assumed to move livestock out of the Sahel.
Whatever resilience the system has against the downward spiral of the
soil-degradation loops comes from the self-regulatory (negative) loops
described above. If, when the range system is stressed, livestock population
decreases faster than the soil deteriorates, the range will have an opportunity to
recover. If the regulatory power of the livestock sector's negative loops is too
weak, overgrazing will destroy the soil resource and drive the system to desert.
An obvious deduction from this structural hypothesis is that aid programs
that decrease death rates of livestock, such as veterinary measures that reduce
cattle death rates, may destabilize the system. Any measure that weakens the
negative feedback loops controlling the livestock population, so that the soil
degrades faster than the livestock numbers decrease, will enhance the
possibility of desertification. Another such measure is well-drilling, which
decreases the pastoralists' tendency to migrate away in times of drought.
The human population in SAHEL2 is limited by the amount of food the
livestock sector produces, much as the livestock popUlation is limited by the
forage produced by the soil sector. The structure of SAHEL2's human
population sector is very similar to that of the livestock sector (see Figure 4.4).
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As a high forage-utilization intensity feeds back to reduce livestock popula-
tion in the livestock sector, so low food per capita (where the food is derived
totally from the livestock) feeds back to increase the human death rate and to
cause out-migration. The structure of the human population sector also
includes a standard biological growth loop; more people produce more births
per year, which increases the number of people. The human population
sector is analogous to the stock sector in the exogenous inputs it includes.
Aid-giving measures directed toward improving the human condition, such as
public health programs and measures to stop inter-tribal warfare, weaken the
negative feedback loops that have traditionally regulated human population.
The main differences between the livestock sector and the human
population sector arise from the respective positions of the two sectors in the
larger system. Livestock depend on the soil, a resource which is easy to
deplete and slow to recover. Humans depend on and manage livestock, a
resource which will grow quickly if forage is available. Thus excess stock will
tend to bring the downfall of the whole system, while excess humans will tend
merely to lower the human standard of living. Another important difference
is that human decisions and values control both the human and the livestock
populations, and thus the major decision variables in the model-offtake
rate, human birth rate, and out-migration rate-are in the human population
sector only.
After constructing SAHEL2 and trying various experiments with it,
Picardi concluded that the pastoral system of the Sahel was potentially
unstable, especially when modern veterinary care, health care, and other
developments alter traditional system balances. He traced the instability to
the lack of effective feedback between the range capacity and the human
decisions that affect both human and livestock popUlations. The only
constraints in the system to keep the livestock population from exceeding the
range capacity are the traditional death rates of people and cattle and the
traditional patterns of nomad movement. When these constraints are
removed with no other changes, the resultant excess stock tends to drive the
range towards desert.
Having identified the information available to the pastoralists' decisions as
crucial to the stability of the system, Picardi constructed ECNOMAD and
SOCIOMAD to elaborate on the social and economic factors that influence
the nomads' decisions. He did so:
1. 'To examine the possibilities of implementing a maximum sustainable
yield use of the ecosystem using conventional economic incentives'.
2. '... to examine the trade-offs ... in the sustained-yield model of
behavior'. R
ECNOMAD postulates that the nomads allocate their herd among four
functions: milk production, trade forfood, trade for goods, and what Picardi
terms 'social infrastructure', a function that amounts to insurance against
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disaster. The actual abundance of milk, purchased food and goods, and 'social
infrastructure' relative to the desired abundance of each of these factors
determine their relative marginal utilities, which then determine how herds will
be allocated (see Figure 4.5).
With SOCIOMAD Picardi investigates the dynamics of the cultural values
underlying these economic allocation decisions. While ECNOMAD contains
the assumption that the desires for livestock for social infrastructure, wealth,
and children are constant, SOCIOMAD assumes that they vary with both
endogenous and exogenous influences. The desire for herd, for social
infrastructure, is made variable by assuming that the memory of a famine,
represented in the model as delayed information generated by a previous food
deficit, increases the cultural value of maintaining some extra herd as a buffer
against possible future famine. Desire for wealth is simulated by including an
exogenous 'wealth target'. Desire for wealth will tend to rise toward that target
un less the society achieves no increase in income for a number of years-in which
case the desired wealth tends to slump back toward the level of wealth at which
the culture has been living. Human fertility is modeled as decreasing (after a
delay) in response to increases in both average lifetime and income per capita.
In the progression from SAHEL2 through ECNOMAD to SOCIOMAD,
the Sahel models become increasingly complex. The model additions that bring
on this complexity are 'soft' cultural variables, such as desires for and relative
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valuations of goods. The additions made in ECNOMAD and SOCIOMAD
allow new policy questions to be tested, such as whether an increase in the price
the herdsmen receive for cattle would lead to smaller herds. However, these
elaborations do not significantly alter the model's behavior.
The total scope of the largest model, SOCIOMAD, is indicated in the causal
diagram, Figure 4.6 and in the reference structure diagram, Figure 4.7.
F. DATA
Picardi modeled a system in which statistics are almost non-existent. He dealt
with this problem by conducting a wide-ranging information search that
encompassed ecological, demographic, and economic information at all
degrees of precision. He found a small area of the Sahel, the Tahoua district in
Niger, where livestock records, demographic surveys, and rainfall measure-
ments had been made. 9 His references include ecology textbooks, anthropolo-
gical reports, sociological journals, magazine articles, and the records of
French colonial governments. He has been able to cite one or more references
for virtually all model parameters.
Many of these citations, however, do not unambiguously state an exact
numerical value for the variable they are intended to justify. For example, one
estimate of how long it would take the soil to recover from serious abuse states
that the ecological succession that follows overgrazing may take 'several
generations,.IO Another estimate of recovery time, this time based on
observations made in the southwestern United States, states that 'at least 80
years would be needed for a significant successional change in the Sahel and
subdesert'. II In the model, Picardi uses 80 years as a figure for the maximum
time it would take soil to recover from overgrazing; this number is probably
uncertain by at least 50%.
For parameters representing cultural values such as marginal utility of
livestock for social infrastructure, no numbers were available. In these cases,
model parameters were guessed from verbal descriptions, such as anthropolog-
ists' observations of actual allocation decisions under varying circumstances.
Picardi devotes an entire chapter to the determination of the most important
numbers in the model: the potential productivity of the range. the response of
the vegetation to various livestock densities, and the degree to which various
technological improvements such as irrigation might increase the potential
resource base. Picardi had the expertise of the other MIT team members to rely
on here, including hydrological engineers and agricultural economists. The
numbers in his model are probably as good a compilation of current knowledge
as is possible. Current knowledge, however, especially of the cultural values
and long-term ecological changes which are at the heart of the Sahel models. is
not very precise.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The ten years preceding the Sahel ian drought had unusually high rainfall.
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Figure 4.7 SOCIOMAD reference structure. Elements with heavy outlines are
included in the model; elements with light outlines are not included.
which allowed both human and animal populations to grow to unprecedented
levels. If the system is simulated without the drought, a famine occurs anyway,
somewhat later and more severely, since the populations rise higher and do
more damage to the range. The overstocking of the range arises naturally from
the logical consequences of the nomads' value system; each herdsman benefits
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directly from increasing his own herd and receives no immediate reward,
economic or cultural, for conserving the range. The result is called by Picardi
'the tragedy of the commons-when commonly held resources are exploited
according to individual self-interest, the resources will be overexploited and
destroyed by the same people who benefit from them'. 12
Picardi concludes that the Sahel pastoral system has existed for many years
on the brink of an intrinsically unstable set of human-livestock-range
relationships. Under traditional conditions this instability becomes evident
only during rare occurrences of severe drought. Most of the ways that
aid-giving agencies attempt to help one part or another of the system, however,
drive the system further toward instability, so that desertification begins to
proceed even during less severe droughts. The main source of instability is the
lack of effective feedback between range condition and livestock population.
This conclusion was originally derived from the simple SAHEL2 model; it was
strengthened by the more elaborate ECNOMAD and SOCIOMAD.
Picardi tried many policies to see if there was a way to stabilize the system
through politically acceptable means. Everything he tried, including reforesta-
tion measures and private incentives, failed to bring the desired stability. Some
policies had surprisingly counterproductive results. For example, raising the
real price of the nomads' cattle, relative to the market goods for which they are
traded, decreased the slaughter rate and allowed herds to build up faster to the
point of over-grazing.
The only measures found capable of increasing system stability were:
1. Removing all outside intervention such as health services, well drilling,
elimination of warfare, and veterinary services, thereby stabilizing the
system by the traditional means of disease, famine, drought, and war.
2. Establishing a direct feedback link between range condition and stocking
level. The feedback response cannot be too rapid, however, or the
variance in stocking rate and human welfare is even greater than that
induced by normal weather variations.
What is needed is an offtake policy which does not respond to each yearly variation
in the sustainable stocking rate, but which maintains the standing stock at some
level based on the long-term condition ofthe range and the available forage. Such a
policy would smooth out the fluctuation in herd size, creating a much more
favorable economic environment and a more reliable source of sustenance for the
human population. 1J
This policy assumes an ability to regulate livestock numbers that no one in
the Sahel is known to possess and that would directly contradict the prevailing
nomadic value system. Besides being difficult to implement, direct regulation
of livestock numbers tends to be destabilizing in a different way. It causes
intense variation in human welfare and high rates of out-migration, unless
complemented with measures such as supplemental feeding in drought years. 14
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Picardi concludes that all policy objectives one might have for the Sahel
cannot be achieved; that some stark choices must be made:
The preservation of the traditional decision making structure and preservation of
the ecological resource base are incompatible objectives. Increases in the health
status of the population are achieved at the expense of potential improvements in
material wealth ... Food shortage, either of famine proportion or chronic in nature,
can be eliminated only when population growth stops and the overall level of
population is low enough so that per capita production can result in an adequate
diet. 15
Picardi apparently assumes that such policy trade-offs are generalizable to
other regions, since he concludes a summary article by raising a number of
basic ethical questions:
Is it advisable to continue traditional approaches to aid when these may have
contributed to the problem? Do outside aid organizations have the moral right to
intervene in a fundamental and pervasive way in a traditional society? Can any such
programs be imflemented without excessive violence in the form of enforcement
or corruption?!
Picardi's conclusions are a direct result of his choice of model boundary. The
nomads' economic system is limited to traditional livestock output only, and
the Sahel's nomad population must remain dependent on the resource base of
natural grazing lands alone. A combination of technological policies to
increase the productivity of this resource base with social value changes to
accommodate new technologies was not considered, except to wonder about its
moral acceptability. Expanding the boundary to permit food and energy
imports or industrialization of the population would certainly have altered the
policy conclusions. In response to this criticism, Picardi writes:
Please note the choice of system boundary was made after travel and extensive
discussions with all manner of ministers from three West African countries ... It is
patently obvious that any 'industrialization' done in West Africa must be done in
the more populous Sudan zone and that long term sustained imports of food or
materials to the Sahel are completely beyond the political and financial capacity of
the Sahel countries. The opportunity costs of both of these ideas are so enormous
and so obvious that they were eliminated without discussion. 17
H. TESTING
As a system dynamicist, Picardi, denies the importance of point-prediction in
assessing model validity and rests the credibility of his models on how well their
structure captures real-world interconnections and how well their outputs
correspond to real-world behavior trends: 'One should ask whether the
simulated problem behavior arises from the same mechanisms in the models
that produce the real-world problems and whether the results of policy
simulations derive from a reasonable interaction of system elements ... How
120
well these models replicate the real world in all its definable detail is irrelevant'. 18
With one exception, 19 all model output is presented in the form of long-term
graphs. Model sensitivity to uncertain parameters and to policy variables is
demonstrated by contrasting a time-graph of the model's base run with a
time-graph of the model output obtained by changing policy variables or
uncertain parameters. Structural causes for sensitivity are discussed.
In the first tests, Picardi presents the uses of the SAHEL2 model to evaluate
the system's sensitivity to policies commonly advocated for the Sahel-such as
famine relief, well digging, and range control. In two other groups of runs, he
tests model performance under various patterns of rainfall-rain being an
unpredictable variable as well as one that is frequently blamed for all the failures
of the system being modeJed. 20 These runs show that rainfall influences the
system but that the model's internal unstable structure amplifies the stochastic
influence of weather uncertainty. 21 A third set of runs demonstrates that the
system is somewhat sensitive to changes in cultural parameters such as the
relative valuation of wealth and social infrastructure. 22 Along with these tests
on cultural parameters, Picardi demonstrates that ECNOMAD is not sensitive
within a broad range of variables to changes in some uncertain values. 23
The ultimate sensitivity test of a system dynamics model is the robustness of
policy conclusions when uncertain model parameters are varied. Picardi gives
several demonstrations that the policies he tests produce the same generic
effects, even under several different assumptions about, for example, future
rainfall. Figure 4. 8shows the time behavior of one variable, soil condition, under
four different policies, each tested with six different assumptions about rainfall
patterns. Policy Set 1 (continued present policies) shows great instability and a
generally declining resource base, whatever the rainfall assumptions. Policy Set
2 (direct stock control) shows improved soil condition in all cases, but still some
instability. Policy Set 3 (direct stock control and supplemental feeding) and
Policy Set 7 (Policy Set 3 plus veterinary services, herd management. and several
economic policies) both show improvement with still Jess sensitivity to weather
variations.
I. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
Picardi's models place negligible demands on any computer system.
SOCIOMAD, the largest of his models, consists of 191 variables. Run costs vary
from system to system. but on most standard computer systems a dollar would
pay for several model runs. Picardi's models are written in DYNAMO but could
be translated into general-purpose languages such as FORTRAN or BASIC.
J. IMPLEMENTATION
As discussed under 'institutional setting', the Sahel models were a minor part of a
major study. The Sahel models were never seriously considered independently
of the larger study, and never viewed as tools for direct policy implementation.
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Figure 4.8 SOCIOMAD simulations with six different rainfall patterns showing
characteristic soil condition behavior modes. Reproduced by permission of A. C.
Picardi
The Sudano-Sahel project itself was conceived in an atmosphere of urgency,
and no clear mechanism for it to relate to actual decision making, either in
USAID or in the Sahel, was incorporated in its conception.
However, Picardi's conclusions certainly carried a significant policy
message. He believed that the intrinsic goals of the people in the system were
bound to drive their economy to the brink of ecological disaster, and that
current aid programs, by helping the people to meet those goals, were
hastening and intensifying the disaster. The best way to improve matters would
be:
1. To withdraw current aid efforts so that the system could at least return from
present-day worse to historic bad, or
2. To redirect efforts toward the goals and decision-making structures of the
people, that is to alter the culture directly so that a materially-improved
and less vulnerable new society could be established.
Picardi's model could have been used to provide semi-specific guidelines about
where that cultural interference might have been most effectively directed, but
Picardi was himself so morally uncomfortable with that choice that he did not
press the model very far in that direction.
The entire MIT project report with Picardi's findings in one chapter was
submitted to USAID at the end of 1974. USAID's initial response to the MIT
study was decidedly cool. The agency did not publish the project report, did not
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provide MIT with funds to publish it, and did not actively acknowledge its
existence either in communications with the public or with Congress. As a
thesis, however, Picardi's model was publicly available, and MIT did
reproduce and distribute about 100 copies of the final project report, some of
which were requested by USAID and Sahelian national officials. Virtually
everyone in the USAID Africa Bureau was at least aware of the project's
existence, and many were familiar with the report's contents. In 1976 USAID
developed a major new development program for the Sahel and successfully
obtained Congressional funding for it. The MIT project report was used as one
of many inputs to the design of that new program, and data, quotations, and
figures (recaptioned) from the MIT report were used (without acknowledge-
ment) in the funding proposal to Congress. The new program focused on
increasing agricultural production and did not noticeably incorporate either of
Picardi's two major policy alternatives.
As of 1979 there had been a nearly total personnel change in the USAID
Africa Bureau, but the new Sahel program was still being carried out.
Congressional attention had shifted first to Egypt and then to Southern Africa,
and the MIT report was described as 'on the shelf'.
Picardi received his Ph.D. and joined the Cambridge firm of Development
Analysis Associates, where he worked for the Saudi Arabian government on
planning for water and electricity development. He used a system dynamics
model for long-term demand forecasts and a dynamic integer programming
model for designing supply networks. He worked directly and closely with his
new clients, traveling to Saudi Arabia three or four times a year.
Picardi reports that several U.S. government agencies, dealing with issues
such as fisheries and energy, have expressed interest in his Sahel paper, more in
the tragedy of the commons idea than in details about the Sahel. One
expression of interest has come from the International Livestock Center in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but Picardi lost contact with them during the
Ethiopian revolution, and since then he says they have produced standard
livestock models with no representation of range condition. As Picardi says,
'they kind of lost the idea'.
Picardi writes with dissappointment about his work's lack of impact. Under
the heading 'Limitations to this Study', he states, 'the primary limitation of this
study's usefulness to date is the almost total lack of a client'. 24 In 'Suggestions
for Further Research' he says, 'further research on this ... problem will be
useful only if it enlists the participation of policymakers responsible for
long-term decisions in the Sahel ... '.
Picardi seems to have concluded that an academically-based general-under-
standing model can have impact only through the spread of insights and ideas,
which may then influence decisions in ways that probably never can be traced.
He has written several articles and made several speeches to communicate his
general conclusions:
I have hopes that the central theme of the study-that the Sahel is a social and
cultural problem rather than one amenable to a technical 'fix'-will come across to
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enough of the ... readers to add incrementally to the conviction that we should deal
differently with this class of problems (the 'tragedy of the commons' problems).25
K. DOCUMENTAnON
A clear and complete technical report on the Sahel models is presented in
Picardi's Ph.D. thesis and the identical report he prepared for USAID. All
computer equations, definitions of variables, and units in which variables are
measured are given in an appendix.
A substantial part of the thesis is devoted to describing the culture, history,
economy, and ecology of the Sahel. Model descriptions and explanations of
output frequently refer back to the real-world situation. Picardi documents all
his data sources in a technical appendix in his thesis. 26 In this appendix he
proceeds through the computer program line by line, justifying each equation
with references from the literature. Numerous sensitivity and policy test runs
are shown.
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CHAPTERS
RfF: Adding a Conlbine to a Tractor
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
In a message to Congress dated July 18, 1969, President Nixon recommended
the establishment of a Commission on Population Growth and the American
Future. 'In his message (the) President ... pointed out that the population of
the United States was expected to increase by 50% in the next 30 years', and
further noted that: 'In the governmental sphere ... there is virtually no
machinery through which we can develop a detailed understanding of
demographic changes and bring that understanding to bear on public policy'. 1
The President submitted to Congress a draft Bill. This Bill specified that the
proposed Commission was to include up to 24 members, appointed by
himself, that it should complete its final report two years after the legislation
was passed (which would be 1972, an election year), and that it should be
allocated $1.4 million. The Commission's responsibilities were to investigate:
1. The probable course of population growth, internal migration and related
demographic developments between 1970 and the year 2000.
2. The resources from the public sector of the economy that will be required
to deal with the anticipated growth in population.
3. The ways in which population growth may affect the activities of federal,
state, and local government.
4. The impact of population growth on environmental pollution and on the
depletion of natural resources.
5. 'The various means appropriate to the ethical values and principles of this
society by which our Nation can achieve a population level best suited for its
environmental, natural resources, and other needs'. 2
In March 1970 the Population Bill became a law. Shortly thereafter Nixon
appointed his commissioners, including two housewives, seven university
professors, three foundation administrators, two senators, a corporate
president, the vice-president of a large labor union, three students, and, as
chairman, John D. Rockefeller, III. The group met for two or three days each
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month during the Commission's two-year lifetime. A staff of around 40 people
(most of them part-time) did background work between Commission
meetings. In its first six months of operation, the Commission defined the
scope of its investigations to the point where it was ready to contract out
research assignments. Thereafter it spent its time co-ordinating research
activities, synthesizing research findings, and holding public hearings.
The Commission contracted about a hundred individual studies. The
computer model we are considering here was the largest part of the largest
single contract. It was also the Commission's dominant piece of research on
economic-environment-population relationships. A computer model was not
explicitly requested in the contract. The commissioners decided what specific
population-environment questions they wanted answered. They further
decided that Resources for the Future (henceforth referred to as RfF), a
resource-orientated 'think tank' with a reputation for sober, unpartisan, and
conventional analysis, would be a credible group to conduct the study. They
did not, however, specify what techniques RfF was to use in its analysis. At
least one person, the Commission's Executive Director, was not under the
impression that RfF was going to do a mathematical model of the problem. 3
Ronald G. Ridker, an RfF analyst, was appointed director of the Population
Commission study. He had approximately one year to perform the task. He
was authorized to sub-contract parts of the research, and as will subsequently
be described, he did so.
B. PL1RPOSE
The RfF study's purpose and time horizon were defined with a precision that no
other model in our case studies comes close to matching. The sponsoring body
itself had a clearly designated purpose, spelled out by law. RfF was assigned to
answer the fourth of the five parts of the Commission's mandate, namely to
investigate the 'impact of population growth on environmental pollution and
on the depletion of natural resources within the next 30 years'. 4 This purpose
was even more specifically designated in the research task the Commission set
for RfF. Two population growth scenarios were to be investigated: the growth
patterns that would result from an average family size of two children vs. three
children. The definition and means of representation of environmental
pollution and natural resources were left to RfF.
C. METHOD
Observers have often noted, generally with dismay, that modelers seldom
build on one another's work. The RfF model is an exception. The RfF team did
not actually build a model-they revised an existing model and adapted it to
their purpose. The changes made in this retrofitting process were not trivial. If
one could compare the original model to a tractor, the modifications RfF made
were more like transforming it into a combine than like putting up a sun
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umbrella. That is, the RtF additions resulted in a whole new set of processing
mechanisms to accomplish a different purpose-they were not mere refine-
ments of the existing structure. However, the basic driving unit was kept more
or less intact.
RtF's original 'tractor' was Clopper Almon's inter-industry forecasting
model, an input-{)utput model* constructed in the mid-1960s to forecast
behavior of the American economy from 1965 to 1975.5 The RtF additions
converted the Almon model's output, primarily dollar sales for 90 industrial
sectors, into amounts of pollutants generated and quantities of resources used.
The RtF team also expanded Almon's ten-year time horizon to 50 years (20
years beyond what was requested by the Commission), and by adding
alternative forecasts, converted Almon's exogenous predictions of final
demand from population and economic growth into scenarios dependent on
family-size decisions.
Why the choice of input-{)utput analysis as the basic technique for a
long-term forecasting study? The modelers felt that detailed representation
was essential for exploring the designated problem. They state:
In this situation, aggregate analysis is of little help; indeed, it may give highly
misleading results. Each sector of the economy has different resource requirements
and emits different types and quantities of wastes. The effect of wastes on the
environment depends on the form in which they are emitted. Moreover, the kinds
of treatment possible, as well as their costs, vary between sectors and types of
pollutants. Despite the fact that we are interested in an over-all assessment,
disaggregation is absolutely necessary.n
The RtF model is indeed disaggregated. Resources are divided into nineteen
mineral ores and five energy sources. Pollution is represented by one category
of solid waste, seven kinds of liquid pollutants, and five kinds of gaseous
emissions. The economy that generates pollutants and consumes resources is
separated into 185 economic sectors. t
Almon's model, the core of the RtF model, is an attempt to use input-output
analysis as a dynamic forecasting tool. There are basically two ways to convert a
static input-{)utput table to dynamic form: embed it in a dynamic simulation
model, or use the table as an accounting device and drive it with a host of
exogenous forecasts. Almon chose the second of these alternatives, and Ridker
accepted this choice in his adaptation. Most of the RtF model's interesting and
important assumptions are in its exogenous forecasts. We shall, therefore, give
relatively little space here to the input-output model but instead describe at
some length the method used to make exogenous forecasts.
* The basic characteristics of input-output analysis have been described in Chap-
ter 2.
t We discuss here Almon's model in the 90-sector form it took when he documented it
in the book, The American Economy to /975. However, Almon had obtained a
I8S-sector input-output table by the time RfF began building on his model. Thus the
RfF model, like later versions of the Almon model, contains 185 sectors.
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The endogenous part of Almon's model can be described rather simply. The
model's core is an input-output matrix of the United States economy
disaggregated into 90 sectors. It consists of a few thousand statements noting
that a change in output for any given economic sector requires a proportional
change in input. All relationships between inputs and outputs are linear. There
are no state variables and, consequently, no delays. The only feedback in the
model comes through a set of mathematical operations that smooth out
inconsistencies between exogenous forecasts. In other words, it is a typical
input-output model designed to represent consistently a complicated network
of interconnected flows without attempting to explain why those flows are that
way, where the ultimate sources and sinks for the flows might be, or how the
flows might change in response to different conditions.
To make his model move forward through time, Almon provided exogenous
forecasts for population, labor productivity, employment, the technical
coefficients of the production process, and a number of other such quantities.
He borrowed some of his important forecasts from other models. His
popUlation forecast used the second highest of four alternative projections
made by the United States Bureau of the Census. His input-output matrix was
based on the one prepared by the Department of Commerce for the year 1958.
Changes in the technical coefficients of this input-output matrix (i.e.,
predictions of the input mix required to produce a unit output) were taken from
a study by Anne P. Carter and others. 7
Almon's exogenous forecasts fall into two distinct groups. First, there are
aggregate forecasts, where the thing to be predicted is one major economy-
wide index. Such forecasts inciude average change in labor productivity,
military spending, expansion of foreign trade, and percent unemployment.
These forecasts are essentially derived from mental models, with little
justification or reference to statistical tests. Second, there are what Almon calls
'structural forecasts', sets of technical coefficients governing each of the
model's 90 sectors. Such forecasts include, for each sector, changes in
consumer spending per dollar additional income, capital spending required per
dollar sales expansion, labor required per dollar sales, and material required
per dollar sales.
Some of these structural forecasts Almon creates for himself, accompanied
by an apology 'for the limited use we have been able to make of the results of
others,.H His forecasting techniques are diverse and flexible. As he sums it up,
'judgement, technical knowledge, and econometric research should combine
in making ... forecasts. The methods needed are as various as the problem ... ,.9
Linear least-squares regressions are tried here and there, kept when they seem
reasonable or when nothing better can be found, rejected when they seem
unreasonable, or when something else works better.
For example, regressions were tried for factors influencing consumer
demand and for determinants of investment in capital goods. For consumer
demand, least-squares estimations were kept as a means of determining the
effect of price, time trend, and change in price on demand, but found
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unsatisfactory for estimating income elasticity of demand. Here algebraic
manipulation of survey (cross section) data was used to work out a weighted
income elasticity. For capital goods investment, the regression results were
discarded, and a complex formula was used that balances depreciation of
capacity against exponential growth of technological efficiency (capacity
acquired per dollar invested). 10
To forecast changes in the labor productivity of individual sectors, Almon
uses the simple technique of charting time series data for productivity onto
semi-log graph paper, drawing a line through the observed data, and extending
theline. 11
Almon implies that he would like to have used approved statistical
techniques throughout his analysis, but the approved techniques frequently did
not produce results that satisfied his own judgement or mental model. Thus he
had to piece together forecasts as best he could, balancing formal techniques
with intuition until the results seemed reasonable. He is quick to point out the
inadequacies in his formulations. His undertone of self-criticism, of thoughtful
searching, and of hard reasoning give one the impression that he has made a
well-informed, honest try and may very well have come up with the best
formulations possible, given the difficulty of the task and the tools at his
disposal.
In choosing to build upon this model, the RtF modelers implicitly chose the
underlying assumptions of his method-an input-output core, lack of state
variables or delays, absence of feedback, many exogenous driving factors, and
basically linear relationships. The time horizon was expanded to 50 years, the
number of sectors to 185, and some structural additions, the components of the
combine, were added. The structural additions largely comprised more linear
functions that converted one series of numbers into another series of numbers.
For example, to determine total pollution generation, product outputs from
the Almon model were multiplied by an exogenously-driven series giving
pollution generation per unit output for each sector for the next 50 years.
By adapting Almon's model to a 50-year time horizon without changing its
forecast-driven nature, the RtF modelers forced themselves to make an
amazingly detailed series of 50-year forecasts external to the model itself and
essentially based on mental models. The problems of generating these
forecasts were stupendous. The coefficients for pollution generation per unit of
output required forecasting thousands oftechnical relationships for 50 years on
the basis of three to five years of sketchy data. Forecasting resource
substitution (for example, substitution of polyolefins for paper and newsprint,
substitution of glass fiber for steel, etc.) frequently required estimating the
outcome of a process that had barely begun, or even of a process that had not
yet begun.
The modelers responded to these difficulties by hiring technological
forecasters to make educated guesses. RtF contracted out their studies of
resource substitution and pollution generation to the International Research
and Technology Corporation (henceforth IRT), a consulting company that
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specializes in technological forecasts. The IRT forecasters, in turn, pieced
together explicit forecasts, primarily from expert mental models and known
technological trends and constraints. They made systematic assumptions, such
as that the best technology in 1970 will be the average by 2000,12 and that
substitution of one resource for another will follow a logistic growth trend.
Statistical methods are unusable for future events about which there are no
historic data. Therefore IRT shifted to estimation 'based on scattered data
modified by heuristic judgement'. 13
In choosing the method of input-output analysis buttressed by many
exogenous forecasts, Ridker and the RfF team chose an efficient accounting
device that gave them the detail they wanted. They also had a working model to
buildon, an important consideration given their one-yeardeadline. On the other
hand, by choosing a static method, they threw the burden of the modeling work
onto the exogenous 30-50 year forecasts made outside the model itself, and by
insisting upon detail, they required thousands of those forecasts, each of which
had to be quite precise. Ideally each forecast should be dependent upon all the
others, just as the actual industrial sectors are interdependent. But the necessary
consistency through time among these many forecasts depended only upon
mental models; the input-output model guaranteed consistency only within
each particular year of the forecast. Thus in emphasizing detail and specificity,
Ridker sacrificed several other potential advantages of mathematical modeling,
including internal consistency and accessibility (since the most important
assumptions and modeling decisions cannot be seen in the model equations
themselves). The appropriateness of this trade-off can be decided only by
reference to the model purpose; it will be discussed again later in this chapter.
D. BOUNDARIES
The Population Commission presented the RfFwith a sharply defined problem,
and before model construction began, the study's focus was even more precisely
defined. The RfF modelers were attacking a topic with almost infinite
complexity, and they had but one year to produce a finished report. To meet
their deadline, the modelers interpreted the problem as defined by the
Commission in the narrowest possible sense.
They decided to include only such variables as are needed to link population
directly to domestic pollution generation and resource usage. International
aspects of the resource problem, such as the foreign sources of many fuels and
minerals, were omitted. 14 Variables that might have been central to the
immediate question but that, given current knowledge, were 'very difficult to
link to population and economic growth in a simple and quantitative fashion' ,15
were also omitted. In this latter category were, for example, fusion energy and
long-lived pollutants such as nuclear wastes and heavy metals. Attitudes,
political factors, over-all quality of life or quality ofthe environment, feedbacks
and interactions among pollutants, and other such elusive factors were probably
ruled out by the same criterion.
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Figure 5.1 RtF boundary diagram
The model boundaries that resulted from these deliberations are shown in
Figure 5.1. In order to calculate the endogenous variables, the Rtf model
requires forecasts of:
1. Over-all trends-population growth, economic growth, government
spending.
2. How, in detail, these over-all trends will work through 185 productive
sectors-time trends for consumption patterns, the ratio of resource
inputs and pollution outputs per unit product outputs, and resource
substitution.
Many of these forecasts entail important and hard-to-predict variables, such
as the rate at which nuclear power will replace other modes of electrical
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generation, how automobile purchases wilI be related to income, and how
quickly 185 industrial sectors wilI automate.
E. STRUCTURE
The structural elements of the Almon model-an input-output matrix com-
bined with some heavy-duty exogenous forecasts-should by this time be clear,
The calculation sequence folIows a series of logical steps designed to calculate
annual gross sales for each of the model's 185 industrial sectors (see Figure 5,2),
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Figure 5.2 Calculation steps in RfF model. Exogenous forecasts are
underlined, solid arrow ( ~) indicates direct calculations, dashed arrow (--~)
indicates iteration to make estimates consistent
Step 1. Project the exogenous variables-population. labor productivity,
government expenditures by sector, imports. exports, trends in consumption
and employment, and resource, pollution, and technical coefficients-for the
time horizon of the model.
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Step 2. Calculate labor force from population and employment. From labor
force and labor productivity, calculate GNP. GNP minus government
expenditures divided by population gives disposable income per capita.
Step 3. From disposable income per capita and the structural forecast for
private demand (the coefficients tha t relate purchases per capita per sector to
income, time, and other variables) calculate private demand per capita from
each industrial sector. Calculate total private demand from per capita
demand and population.
Step 4. From a trial projection of total industry sales, calculate investment,
construction spending and inventory accumulation, using coefficients from
the structural forecasts. Apportion investment spending among the 185
sectors using a set of constants (Almon uses coefficients calculated in 1958 by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics)16 to get investment demand.
Step 5. Add government demand (calculated in Step 1), private demand (from
Step 3) and investment, construction and inventory-related demand (from
Step 4) to get final demand.
Step 6. Run final demand through the input-output matrix to get total industry
sales.
Step 7. Compare the industry sales calculated in Step 6 to the trial projection of
sales used to calculate investment in Step 4. If the two do not agree closely,
return to and recalculate investment using the value for sales calculated in
Step 6. Repeat Steps 4 through 7 until a convergent solution is reached.
Step 8. From total industry sales (Step 6) and sectoral forecasts for labor
productivity (Step 1), calculate employment in various industries. Add up
employment in separate industries to get total employment. If total
employment agrees with the projected employment level (Step 1),
calculations are complete. If not, assume government will use its power* to
increase incomes in order to increase demand and thereby increase
employment up to the desired level (assumed to be 4% unemployment); go
back and change per capita income. Recalculate Steps 2-8 until employ-
ment reaches the predetermined figure.
The net result of this calculation is to convert a number of unrelated
exogenous forecasts into a detailed picture of the total economic production
that would necessarily result if all the forecasts actually came to be. It is an
open-system accounting exercise, not a picture of the wayan actual economy
works. Primary attention is devoted to the way population and income shape
aggregate consumer demand. It is then assumed that demand brings forth the
necessary production.
The iterative procedures are mathematical devices that simply adjust
investment and disposable income as residuals to make the accounting
consistent for the endogenous variables. The only permissible inconsistency
* Presumably through taxes. No accounting is made of the costs incurred by the
government in acting to increase demand.
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within these variables is the difference between government expenditures
and taxes (GNP minus disposable income), which is adjusted as necessary to
obtain full employment, with no long-run requirement of a balanced federal
budget. As Almon says: 'The concept of the full employment tax rate is
something of a deus ex machina who appears at the end to hold the piece
together,.17
Operationally, the RfF model is quite similar to the Almon model. It
contains a few new variables-principally to render the model more sensitive to
demographic influence-and requires two more steps in the model accounting
sequence. Demographic sensitivity is introduced by bringing family size into
the function that relates per capita demand to income. The two new accounting
steps relate (linearly) pollution generation and resource usage to total output.
Pollution generation is assumed to occur both in production and in consump-
tion-the proportionality constant depending on the sector. Different assump-
tions may be made about the course of pollution generation by altering
coefficients to represent abatement programs.
The addition of pollution and resources is made without inclusion of any sort
of feedback. Thus it is possible for the model to use resources freely without
regard to whether those resources exist. Reserves do not become depleted.
Prices may rise as a result of exogenous assumptions, but not as a result of
endogenous depletion. Resource substitutions may occur due to exogenously
programmed changes in the technical coefficients of the input-output matrix;
however, these substitutions will occur regardless of the usage of resources
calculated within the model.
The reference structure diagram for the RfF model is shown in Figure 5.3. Its
open structure is apparent from the diagram; as demanded by the Commission,
it transforms population pro jections to resource-use projections through a very
complex accounting procedure.
F.DATA
The 185-sector input-output matrix contains tens of thousands of technical
coefficients. IR They are derived from industry records, accounting data, and
the necessary reconciliation that makes an input-output matrix internally
consistent. Other numbers in the model change the input-output coefficients
over time. Several sets of up to 185 coefficients each are required to break down
the information that goes into the input-output matrix or convert it into desired
forms as it comes out. One of these sets allocates private demand among the
185 productive sectors, another allocates government demand, a third set
converts the total sales coming out of the 185 sectors into persons employed (by
assuming labor productivities), a fourth determines investment in each sector
from changes in output. Further numbers are required to convert production
outputs into resources used and pollution generated. And, finally, there are the
numbers that determine the aggregate forecasts of population growth, labor
productivity, and other variables.
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Figure 5.3 RfF reference structure. Elements with heavy outlines are included in the
model; elements with light outlines are not included.
We doubt that any outside reviewer could trace the sources of all these
numbers, their uncertainties, sensitivities, biases, and meanings. Some of
them have a firm empirical base. The input-output coefficients were provided
by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics from actual industrial
accounts from the year 1967. The time trends for the technical coefficients are
much more nebulous. Almon reports spending exasperating hours trying to
update a 1958 table to 1963 using his time-trend coefficients-only to find that
'time and time again the figures ... (thus obtained) failed to agree with
published statistics' .19 Though the RtF coefficients may be an improvement
over Almon's, one must wonder whether they are enough of an improvement
to produce reliable updates over a 30-50-year period.
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The bases for other numbers are not specified and it is not clear how they
were derived. For example, the coefficients that apportion export demand
among sectors are not listed in either Almon's or the RfF documentation, nor
are their sources identified. Pages of tables give numbers for pollutants
generated in various industrial sectors and costs of pollution abatement, 20 but it
is not clear which of these numbers were used to generate the project
conclusions about the cost and effectiveness of pollution abatement.
In short, the processing, recording, and justification of the hundreds of
thousands of numbers in the RfF model required an orderliness and effort that
Ridker and his associates could not achieve within one year. Now that several
years have passed since the model was last run, the modelers themselves have
difficulty reconstructing the sets of numbers that were actually used, much less
describing where they came from.
G. TESTING
The size of the RfF model makes testing expensive and time-consuming. The
computer time required for one run of the RfF model cost $56.00 in 1972, and
interpretation of a single run could easily require more than a full person-day of
work. 21 Furthermore, the number of coefficients in the model presents a
boundless spectrum of things to test. At one run per day, for example, it would
take about six months to work through a variable-by-variable sensitivity test of
just one of the many sets of 185 exogenous coefficients. The results of such tests
would be incredibly difficult to interpret.
Given their time, material, and information constraints, the RfF modelers
could not possibly do a complete job of model testing. An initial series of
debugging tests was performed to eliminate obviously unreasonable behavior.
In these tests, model output was used to locate questionable parameters.
Parameters thus located were re-thought and changed if an alternative value
seemed more appropriate.
No sensitivity tests were performed. Policy tests were confined to tests of the
specific questions asked of RfF by the Commission, plus a few tests devoted to
exploration of a pollution-abatement scenario.
The Commission's questions were explored with four scenarios:
1. High population growth-high economic growth.
2. High population growth-low economic growth.
3. Low population growth-high economic growth.
4. Low population growth-low economic growth.
'Low' population growth is equated to an average fertility of 2.1 children per
woman; high population growth a total fertility of 3.1. Economic growth is
varied by altering assumptions about changes in production per hour worked
(labor productivity) and hours worked per laborer. High growth is equated
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to 2.5% gain in labor productivity each year, coupled with a reduction in hours
worked of 0.24% per year. Low economic growth is represented with a 2.5%
gain in labor productivity coupled with a 1% per year reduction in hours
worked (resulting in a 29-hour work week by the year 2000).22 One suspects
that a reduction in the assumed rate of increase of labor productivity, or even a
constant productivity, would have had major effects on the model's output, but
this possibility was not tested.
Three pollution scenarios were tested for each of the population-growth
scenarios. They were:
1. No change in the present emission levels.
2. A continuance of present trends-increasing efficiency of production
leading, naturally, to reduced pollution emission levels; and
3. An active abatement policy, i.e., abatement as required to bring pollution
generation down to the 1975 air and 1973 water pollution standards
recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency. The model
calculates the cost of such an abatement policy. However, it appears not to
add that cost into the calculation of final demand or to remove it from any
other consumption category.
H. CONCLUSIONS
Four types of conclusions were derived from the Rtf modeling effort. First,
there were the conclusions expressed by the exogenous forecasts. These
conclusions were derived from technological forecasting subcontracts, expert
opinion, and other mental models. They are consistently optimistic, assuming a
steady, smooth substitution of more abundant resources for scarce ones,
increasing abatement of pollution, and exponentially growing labor productiv-
ity. Bottlenecks, strikes, embargoes, depressions, droughts, failures of the
price mechanism, and interruptions in technological advance are not included
in the model or tested as possibilities.
Second, there are the conclusions literally present in the model output.
These include conditional forecasts of how many resources would be used and
how much pollution generated by 185 productive sectors, given the assump-
tions in the model's structure, the two-child, three-child scenarios, and the
forecasts just described. These conclusions are occasionally problematic, if
model output is taken literally. For example, under the high population
growth-high economic growth assumptions, the model forecasts that the
United States will have consumed 206 million tons of copper and 2.16 million
tons of tungsten between 1968 and 2020. These amounts are equivalent to
two-thirds of the world's 1970 known reserves of copper and over 150% of the
world's 1970 known tungsten reserves (more than two-thirds of which are in the
People's Republic of China). 23
Few of the Rtf model's literal conclusions are published. This is to be
expected. A complete output for just one run would consist of hundreds of
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pages of numbers and would probably take more space than all the final Rtf
model documentation put together. Many of the raw output figures are almost
meaningless except in the perspective of general-trend information. For
example, it is of little use to know that X pounds of sulfur dioxide will be
produced in 1991 under scenario 2 without knowing how that pollution
production figure compares to present production or to production under
another scenario.
A refined and edited version of the raw output is presented in the model
documentation. This is the third set of conclusions-the conclusions that
Ridker and his associates have drawn from the model by deciding what parts of
the output to believe or not to believe, to report or not to report, to highlight as
important or to ignore. In some cases, the modeler's conclusions originated
directly from the model output. For example, model output clearly indicates
that resource usage and pollution generation are more responsive to economic
growth than they are to population growth. The modelers explain why this is so:
'Since a fall in population size is associated with an increase in GNP per capita,
the effect of the decreased numbers (in the low population growth scenario) is
partially offset by the greater income. and hence higher consumption'.24 In
other cases, the modelers' conclusions are explanations of why model output
should not be taken literally. For example, the Rtf report to the Commission
notes that, according to the model, world resource reserves will not be
adequate to meet needs for ten of the 19 minerals studied. The report goes on
to say that 'modest price increases would bring in supplies from potential
reserves, probably beyond what requirements call for ... for some minerals,
while other apparent inadequacies will be met by substitution'. 25 In all,
however, the report concludes 'that there is no serious reason to believe that
projected standards of living cannot be met because of mineral or fuel
shortages. Adjustments will be necessary, but none of them are likely to entail
significant loss in material welfare during the next half century'. 2fl This
conclusion does not follow directly from the model but from the mental models
of the modelers telling them to reject certain aspects of the computer model
output.
The Rtf team's major conclusion is that population growth does have a
generally negative effect on the society, and therefore a slow population
growth rate would be preferable to a rapid one:
If ... we choose to have more rather than less children per family ... we commit
ourselves to a particular package of problems: more rapid depletion of domestic
and international resources, greater pressures on the environment, more
dependence on continued rapid technological development to solve these
problems. fewer social options and, perhaps. the continued postponement of the
resolutions of other social problems. including those resulting from past growth ...
If we choose to have fewer children per family, leading to a stable population
within the next 50 to 75 years, we purchase time, resources. and additional options:
time to overcome our ignorance and to redress the mistakes of past growth,
resources to implement solutions. and additional freedom of choice in deciding
how we want to live in the futureY
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Although these same conclusions apply even more to economic growth, RfF
is more reluctant to call for a slowdown in the growth of economic output:
Similar consequences could emerge from the choice open to us with respect to
alternative rates of economic growth. Indeed, the numerical analysis ... indicates
that a reduction in economic growth would reduce resource consumption and
pollution emissions by more than would a comparable reduction in population
growth. But growth in the economy can be utilized for different ends than it is put to
now. While it adds to problems that need solution, it also adds to capacity to solve
problems. It is difficult to find similar offsetting advantages from additional
population growth at this stage in United States history. 2~
Neither RfF nor the Population Commission chose to investigate further the
ways the economy 'can be utilized for different ends than it is put to now'.
Instead, the focus of the study remained on the effects of population growth.
The overwhelming impression the RfF documentation gives is that the
problems of population growth are not particularly urgent, threatening, or
unsolvable:
The study ... can be interpreted as saying that if some costs are paid and some
adjustments made, no catastrophe is likely to result from continued growth during
the next half-century. Indeed, at least as far as the United States is concerned, the
results are fairly sanguine. We appear to have the resources and the know-how
both to continue growing and to cope with the problems of that growth, if we are
willing to adjust our lifestyles a bit. This is not to say that there will be no serious
shortages during the next 50 years, but that these shortages are unlikely to arise
solely as a consequence of population and economic growth. 29
Fourth and finally, there are the conclusions that the Population Commis-
sion arrived at due to the RfF model's influence. It appears that the
Commission members interpreted model results in accord with their own
understanding of the population problem rather than listening carefully to the
modelers' conclusions. For example, in the Commissioner's report to the
President and Congress, the population-environment relationship is outlined
as follows:
1. Population growth is one of the major factors affecting the demand for resources
and the deterioration of the environment in the United States ...
2. From an environmental and resource point of view, there are no advantages from
further growth of population beyond the level to which our past rapid growth has
already committed us. Indeed, we would be considerably better off over the next
30 to 50 years if there were a prompt reduction in our population growth rate ...
3. With continued growth, we commit ourselves to a particular set of problems: more
rapid depletion ...of resources, (and) greater pressure on the environment. J(J
The model's conclusion that economic growth pressures the environment
more than does population growth is forgotten in the above statement. What is
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remembered is that population growth has an effect, which was indeed a model
finding. but not the only one or the most significant one.
I. IMPLEMENTATION
The Commission seemed to be in a favorable position to implement policies
resulting from the RtF model or any of its other contracted studies. The
Commission included many powerful figures, including leaders of government,
industry, labor, and academia. Moreover, the Commission was in the public
eye-its findings were reported on the front page of The New York Times, on
television, in film, and in a widely distributed paperback book.
There were, however, some problems that interfered with this seemingly
favorable implementation position. The Commission on Population Growth
and the American Future recommended, as one of hundreds of specific
suggestions, that abortion laws be liberalized. On March 17, 1972, in the heat
of the primaries for the presidential campaign, headlines across the country
reported that a presidential commission had come out in favor of abortion.
President Nixon thereupon went out of his way to disown and discredit the
Commission. And despite the Commission's attempt to keep things in
perspective, the abortion issue loomed large in the popular image of the
Commission, overshadowing its many other findings.
RtF did not rely on the Commission alone to publicize the model findings.
Ridker summarized the model's results in several academic articles and in
Congressional testimony. 31
The United States still has no formal population policy and no apparent
interest in one, although some specific Commission recommendations have
been adopted, primarily through agents other than the President (the Supreme
Court in the case of abortion). Several other nations established population
commissions at that time. some of them patterned directly after the U.S. one.
Ridker became fascinated with the basic question of the impact of
population and economic growth on resource availability. He reasoned that the
poor countries of the world might have worse resource problems than the U.S.,
and so he managed to stimulate and find funds for similar studies in India,
Colombia, and Indonesia. He himself did not work on these studies, nor did
they follow his modeling method. The question behind his model lives on, not
the model itself.
Ridker himself was dissatisfied with the analytical shortcuts he had taken to
meet the Commission's schedule. He found funding to do the whole study
again at Resources for the Future with a broader scope and more time to work.
He began with an even more complex model called SEAS that had been
developed at the Environmental Protection Agency (partially under the
direction of Peter House, one of the makers of the SOS model to be described
next) and adapted it to his own purposes. The study was foundation-supported
and had no specific policy client. 32
141
J. DOCUMENTAnON
The Rtf team was hired to answer a specific question, not to develop a
computer model. Although the Commission did accept the model as a means of
study, it did not see the model as a piece of technical workmanship requiring
detailed documentation. There is no sign that the modelers were asked for
anything more than a general explanation of how the thing worked. Indeed,
two basic pieces of the model's documentation33 were published only at the
request of the director of the Rtf study. Moreover, the group was hard-pressed
to construct and test their model in the year allotted to them to complete the
study. They could not be expected to find time for detailed documentation.
Three works describing the Rtf model, or parts of it, have been written. One
is a description of the changes required to make the model's demand function
more sensitive to family size. 34 One is a two-part report prepared by analysts at
International Research and Technology Corporation describing the technolo-
gical forecasting process that determined the technical coefficients of the
input-output matrix and the coefficients that relate pollution to sales output. 35
The third is the general model description included in the eight-volume series
published by the Commission. 36
The former two documents are carefully detailed descriptions of substudies.
The third is a broad, general description of the model that gives an impression
of what is in the model but does not come close to the completeness needed for
critical evaluation. By adding Almon's book to the list of documentation, one
obtains a sort of co-ordinating hub from which one can begin to piece together
an understanding of how the model represents the world.
The model's equations are not published in any form. The exogenous inputs
used to drive the model are not systematically described, indeed some of them
are never described. An impression of the model's structure cannot be gained
without referring to Almon's documentation of his model. And one cannot find
exactly how the Rtf model differs from the model Almon documented in his
book. Crucial details of model output are not presented. For example, the
figures for consumption of energy resources are not printed, making it
impossible to check the evidence behind the statement in the Commission's
report that: 'Whether population growth will strain fuel supplies, or cause
serious environmental damage in the process of acquiring and processing the
necessary fuels, depends on future developments in technology'. 37
In short, the Rtf modelers managed within a year to complete a
tremendously complex model and to describe it in a literate, qualitative,
non-technical report. They did not manage to document the model technically,
to publish its equations, or even to keep careful internal records of their work.
They themselves could not now repeat the model runs upon which their
conclusions were based.
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CHAPTER 6
SOS: the Perfectly-Adjusting Society
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The State of the System model (SOS) was developed by Peter House and
Edward Williams, originally under the sponsorship of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The impetus for the model came
from House, an EPA employee, who wanted to demonstrate the usefulness of
computer models as policy tools and as ways to explore the linkages between
environmental systems and social systems.
The EPA assigned House to develop a prototype model, and he contracted
with Williams, then employed at Chase, Rosen, and Wallace (CRW), to
collaborate with him. Within eight months they had produced SOS-l, which
was documented as an official EPA report. 1 At that point the EPA cut back
sharply on socioeconomic modeling efforts and SOS funding stopped.
(However, a 'lesser-risk' model2 SEAS, patterned after the RtF study
previously described, was pursued under EPA sponsorship.)
House and Williams (who by then had left CRW and joined EPA) continued
to work on the model as a low-priority staff study in addition to their regular
duties. With the approval of EPA officials but without strong support, they
continued to develop the model as time was available. The final report on the
improved model SOS-2 was published by the two modelers as a book.' The
manuscript of the book was prepared after both House and Williams had left
EPA.
The EPA tolerated the SOS modeling effort and gave it initial support.
However, it would be an exaggeration to say that the EPA was either a sponsor
or a client of SOS. Neither the financial commitment implicit in the word
'sponsor' nor the recognized need for a model implicit in the word 'client' are
present in the EPA-SOS relationship. SOS was a 'hobby model', analyst-gen-
erated and designed primarily to convince skeptical government agencies that
modeling could be used to gain insight into problems of environmental
management.
144
145
B. PURPOSE
In the foreword to the SOS book House and Williams present their view of the
environmental debate. They observe that:
1. Since the day of Malthus doom has recurrently been foretold by students of
the 'dismal school'.
2. The dooms foretold have not come to pass, societies have repeatedly
adjusted to or overcome the problems associated with growth.
3. Malthusian ideas are again in vogue; 'suggestions are legion that we shall
either suffer the fate of a wastrel in terms of one or more of our resources or
we shall perish in our own waste'. 4
4. 'Many of the efforts on limits analysis have turned out to be a mixture of pet
theories, poorly tied partial conceptualizations and overly gross approxima-
tions of the total system'. 5
5. Despite the ability of social systems to alter and evade physical limits, these
limits do exist and should be taken into account in long-term planning.
The State of the System model is intended to communicate an alternate
theory of the interplay between human society and physical limits, a theory that
includes other adaptation mechanisms besides a deliberate slowdown of
population and capital growth. House and Williams also seem to envision SOS
as a conceptual base from which policy models can be built. They remark on the
need for holistic planning and question whether the currently-used 'extrapola-
tion or trend-continuance paradigm' is an adequate tool for the planner. They
believe that computer simulation models would do well in cases where
trend-extrapolation fails. As for their model, they speak of 'the use of a system
such as this model to compare alternative scenarios of our national goal
statements'. However, the SOS modelers do not assert that SOS, in its present
form, is ready for use as a policy tool. They do propose that it be used as a
teaching and research tool. 6
In short, the purpose of SOS is the acquisition and communication of general
understanding about economic-environmental interactions. The model is
intended to demonstrate, by virtue of the insights it generates, that computer
modeling is an essential tool in long-term policy-making. These are basically
academic reasons for making a model, far removed from the immediate
demands of any real policy client. SOS is primarily a device to satisfy ihe
intellectual interests and personal goals of the analysts and to interest
policymakers in the long-term implications of current decisions.
C.METHOD
SOS is a simulation model, strongly influenced by the basic concepts of
cybernetics and general systems theory, but not adhering to any particular
modeling paradigm. No statistical estimation procedures are evident, and
economic elements are not represented according to classic theory. Input-out-
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put matrices and optimization procedures are not used. Although feedback
relationships are present. no attempt is made to attribute model behavior to
feedback processes, and little emphasis is placed on time delays or non-lineari-
ties. If any paradigm can be discerned as a guiding influence on the model, it
would be that of ecology. The model documentation cites the Lotka-Volterra
population growth modee and quotes from C. S. Holling, a prominent
ecological modeler,H suggesting that House and Williams are familiar with the
ecological modeling literature.
Perhaps it would be best to describe the model as a general, state-determined
simulation model, constructed around ideas largely but not entirely derived
from ecology. The method is unstereotyped. The modelers appear to have
taken each process and asked 'how best could we represent this?', rather than
relying on traditional formulations. As a result, each model relationship is
fresh and experimental. As might be expected in such a large, innovative
effort, some parts of the model are clever and insightful, others are far-fetched.
awkward, or unclear.
One of the clearest influences on the model's formulation and documenta-
tion is the FORTRAN computer language. In a typical FORTRAN program,
many relationships are expressed as if-then statements leading to on-off
behavior, rather than gradual non-linear shifts from one type of behavior to
another. FORTRAN is also a categoricalla[lguage, designed to keep track of
and manipulate long lists of one or two dimensions (vectors and matrices).
Though nothing in FORTRAN prohibits working with aggregate variables, the
language is so efficient in handling things in groups and categories that
disaggregation becomes simple and natural.
SOS exemplifies both of these FORTRAN traits. If-then thinking dominates
the model. The system responds to changes by switching behavior abruptly at
threshold points. For instance, recycling programs or resource substitutions
are suddenly turned on when a resource falls below a preprogrammed
depletion point. Disaggregated categorical thinking so prevails that virtually all
model variables are disaggregated and all model processes occur through
multiple interactions among many variables, accomplished mathematically by
manipulating matrices.
Apart from showing the marks of FORTRAN, SOS has the following
mathematical properties. It includes many state variables, such as population,
capital, and resource reserves, which accumulate past system changes. Many
processes are regulated by constant or semi-constant coefficients (semi-con-
stant in the sense that the coefficients remain constant until the system passes
some discrete threshold, whereupon the coefficients are adjusted up or down
by some constant proportion of their value). A few explicit time delays are
included, and many delays are implicit in the model's state variables. There are
some non-linearities in the system. Everything in the SOS-2 model is literally
a function of everything else-the system is completely closed.
SOS is intended to be a perfectly general structure that could represent any
nation or region, given the appropriate numerical parameters. The specific
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version described by House and Williams, SOS-2, is calibrated to depict the
United States.
D. BOUNDARIES
The model is designed to simulate long-term events; SOS-2 runs from 1970 to
the year 2000. More recent extensions allow the model to be run up to 2020.
In the SOS model the nation or region is subdivided into four conceptual
sectors (hereafter referred to as 'sets'). The interactions among these sets are
the focus of the model. The four sets are
1. Human population.
2. Resources.
3. Economic production.
4. Societal adjustment mechanisms.
Human population is influenced by birth, aging, death, migration, changes in
occupational attributes, and various service requirements. Resources occur in
the form of reserves that increase or are depleted. Some resources are
replenished annually, some may be recycled, some may be replaced by
substitutes. Economic production is subject to consumer demands and requires
funds, capital, maintenance, new investment, resources, pollution cleanup,
and imports and exports. The adjustment mechanisms sum up system
attributes such as food per capita or air quality, compare those attributes with a
standard, and try to ad just the system to bring it up to the standard.
All the variables in the model are endogenous (see Figure 6.1). The only
exogenous inputs are the coefficients that specify switches and standards. For
example, the minimum acceptable levels of economic output must be specified,
and the various resource mixes that can be intersubstituted. These coefficients
look somewhat similar to the ones required for the RfF model, but there is an
important difference. In RfF the values of the coefficients were specified at the
outset for 50 years into the future; these coefficients completely determined the
behavior of the model system. In SOS the coefficients only indicate what
resource mix or labor supply or pollution generation pattern might prevail,
depending on happenings in the simulated system. Rather than stating how
much copper will be needed per unit of manufactured output in the year 1990,
for instance, SOS coefficients will state how much copper will be needed per
unit of manufactured output in any year if the copper cost exceeds X while
copper-substitute costs remain below Y.
The amount of detail included in the model can easily be adjusted by
increasing or decreasing the number of entries in each set. For example, the
model could accommodate ten resources or a hundred. The only difference
between the two would be that the hundred-resource version would require
longer lists of input data and would generate more detailed output. SOS-2, the
demonstration model of the United States, provides a moderate-to-high
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degree of detail: 18 resources, twelve production sectors, 24 population
groups, and twelve demand standards are included.
Conspicuously absent from the model are any interruptions of the
mechanistic system adjustments. Pollution abatement is automatic, although it
may take a few years to be fully implemented. Funds are smoothly shifted
between system components according to component need. There is no delay,
bias or error in the system's perception of a pollution or resource problem, no
political haggling, and no suboptimal adjustment for the benefit of special
interest groups. The only cost associated with system adjustment is the cost of
capital expansion.
Also absent from SOS-2 are destruction of renewable resources from
overuse, and any influences on the system from the world outside its
boundaries. Erosion, international resource depletion, war, balance-of-pay-
ments problems, and weather all are excluded. Though some index of income
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distribution could perhaps be derived from the model, income distribution is
not included explicitly.
The geographic locations of resources are not considered in SOS-2.
Resource stocks are defined without distinction between domestic resources
and imports. Depending on the parameters chosen, the system may either have
access to all world resources or only to its domestic resources. In either case,
the question of exogenous influences on resource availability is avoided.
E. STRUCTURE
One might liken the SOS structure to the arrangement of feedback mechanisms
in the human body. In the body the brain supervises by higher-level feedback a
group of partially self-regulatory subsystems, the organs. In SOS the brainlike
adjustment mechanism checks out the relative performance of the system's
parts, and on the basis of perfect information about the entire system, directs
the parts in such a way as to keep the whole in good health.
In other words, SOS's four sets are arranged in a feedback hierarchy. The
three sets in the lower level of this hierarchy-population, production, and
resources-are each subdivided into a number of parts and are each partially
regulated by feedback within the set. The higher level of the feedback
hierarchy is occupied by the adjustment mechanisms that note the relative
states of the 'lower' sets and make adjustments to correct for 'undesirable'
states. These lower and higher feedback sets are based on markedly different
kinds of information about social systems. The three lower level sets represent
relatively clear physical processes, such as production, investment, pollution
generation, resource usage, and human reproduction. The adjustment set
represents intangible processes such as perception, social adaptation, goal-set-
ting, technical advance, and value change.
In reviewing the structure of SOS we shall first describe its three 'organs' and
their operational rules and then describe how the model's 'brain' functions.
1. Population
Population in SOS changes through births, deaths, and migration. Each of
these processes occurs at a rate proportional to the population size, thus the
system includes the normal population feedback loops as shown in Figure 6.2.
The proportionality coefficients that determine the rates of birth, death, and
migration come from the model's brain, according to what the brain perceives
about the state of the system.
Age structure js modeled by breaking the population down into age cohorts
and apportioning births, deaths, and migrations among the cohorts. Within
cohorts, population is further divided into consumption 'partitions', used to
calculate demand for productive output. In SOS-2 these partitions include
population in education, in institutions, unemployed, and in paid and unpaid
labor. The population is distributed among these partitions according to linear
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functions of the previous year's outputs of the various productive sectors. Thus
if the education output increases, more population can be accommodated in
education; if the manufacturing outputs increase, more population is shifted to
paid labor. If the number of workers in the total labor force is not sufficient to
fill the total labor demand, each productive sector receives a proportionate
fraction of its labor need; no productive sector has preferential access to labor.
2. Production
In SOS economic production takes place in twelve production sectors: five
public sectors (education, transportation, health and welfare, public safety,
and administration) and seven private sectors (agriculture, non-durable
manufacturing, durable manufacturing, communication and transportation,
wholesale-retail trade, services, and mining). The same mathematical
structure is used to represent all twelve production sectors. Sector differences
are created by tailoring data and coefficients to create variations of the basic
form. For example, high resource-use coefficients would be used in the durable
manufacturing sector, while relatively low coefficients would be used for
education.
Each sector produces a number of output units equal to the funds spent in
that sector for production, divided by cost per unit output (see Figure 6.3).
Cost per unit output depends on resource usage per unit output (dependent on
relative availability and substitutability, as modulated by the adjustment set)
and on cost per unit resource used. 'Resources' include not only raw materials,
but also capital and labor. The cost per unit of resource is calculated in the
resource set, as a function of resource scarcity, which is itself de.termined by the
effect of past production on resource reserves.
The assumptions that determine the funds available for production in each
economic sector are difficult to unravel from the model documentation. The
production set description is incomplete and seems to differ in the chapters
describing the generalized model SOS and the specific model SOS-2. As far as
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we can tell, the funds available to each sector grow exponentially, with a
growth rate that is dependent upon consumer demand (from the population
set) and also dependent upon alterations from the adjustment set. All of the
funds available to a sector cannot be used for productive output, some must be
set aside for a set of activities called maintenance.
Maintenance costs are divided into three categories. One category is normal
maintenance costs, calculated as a function of the capital stock in place.
Another accounts for investment in expansion of production. The third is
pollution cleanup costs. The costs of normal maintenance and pollution control
are direct functions of output. Expansion cost is a function of change in output
over highest previous annual output. The costs of all three processes are
summed and subtracted from the funds available for production.
Thus exponential growth in output is the normal behavior assumed in SOS,
but this growth can be slowed or interrupted by several events-by reduction in
demand due to demographic factors, by intervention from the adjustment set
(to be described later), by increased maintenance costs, or by increased
resource costs, or, of course, by some combination of all these.
3. Resources
The SOS resource set keeps tabs on physical quantitIes (as opposed to
monetary values) of things that are used in production, including land, labor,
capital, mineral resources, energy resources, clean air, and clean water. In
addition to accounting for resource quantities, the resource set also calculates
resource costs and passes cost information on to the production set. Different
dynamic processes are ascribed to resources according to whether or not they
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are renewable, whether they can be recycled, and whether or not they
depreciate. Special attributes are assigned to labor due to its obvious
dependence on population.
The general structure of the resource set describes many possible resource
processes and uses zero coefficients to block out processes that do not apply to
particular resources. For example, recycling mechanisms are included in the
general structure. For resources such as fossil fuels that cannot be recycled, the
recycling part of the program is de-activated by setting the fraction recycled
always equal to zero. Renewable resources such as water are fully restored to
their initial values each year; they cannot be overused or destroyed.
Non-renewable resources have a zero annual restoration rate.
A much simplified diagram of the general dynamic mechanism for all
resources is shown in Figure 6.4. The resource set takes in information about
resource usage from the production set, calculates the effect on reserves, and
passes on information about the state of resource availability to the adjustment
set. This then adjusts any deficit caused by overuse through expansion of
reserves, cost increases, substitution, or recycling.
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Figure 6.4 SOS resource sector
Computationally this general representation of structurally diverse resour-
ces is very efficient. Efficient communication within the computer, however,
does not always lead to clarity for human beings. Trying to follow the concrete
assumptions in the treatment of specific resources quite literally boggles the
mind because each separate resource is buried within the coding of the general
process. For example, if one wanted to learn about the model's treatment of
copper, one would find that the numbers related to copper are somewhere
within long data tables listing for all resources:
1. Initial reserves.
2. The possibility of substituting other resources.
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3. The degree to which price increases can increase reserves.
4. The extent to which production mix modification can eliminate the need for
each resource.
5. How much resource will be recycled under what circumstances.
6. The effect of depletion on price.
7. The speed at which substitution, reserve expansion, and development of
recycling can progress.
All these factors are indeed reasonable to include in a resource model. But
the exact numbers for how much copper can be recycled, or to what extent and
at what price aluminum can be substituted for copper must be fairly important
and debatable model assumptions. Checking up on the actual numbers that
regulate these processes for the case of copper as opposed to petroleum or land
or water requires a search through the model's unindexed and poorly-substan-
tiated data descriptions. Even after locating the data, one would find some
important structural questions unanswered. For example, the text implies that
recycling and expansion of resource reserves costs something, but does not tell
if and how these costs are accounted for in the model's structure.
4. Adjustment set
As we have said, SOS superimposes a higher stratum of control onto the causal
mechanisms of the population, production, and resource sets. This higher-level
control is qualitatively different from the feedback within sets. The feedback
within sets describes gradual, automatic, ongoing processes such as growth,
maintenance, and deterioration. By contrast, the higher-order feedback
processes, which the authors term 'system adjustments', are discrete,
non-continuous processes set off by flags and warning lights. Their operation is
conditional: if resource R goes below such and such a level, adjustment number
one goes into operation. If resource R drops below a second level, adjustment
number two begins. If demand satisfaction for product M goes below the M
threshold, then the system attempts to shift more funds to the sector that
produces M.
The triggering mechanisms that activate system ad justments are of two sorts:
demand satisfaction and resource depletion. The adjustments triggered by
resource depletion are fairly straightforward. When a warning light goes on,
signifying that reserves are low for some resource, the cost for the resource
rises, the system looks for a cost-competitive substitute for the resource, and at
the same time, if possible, reserves are expanded. Environmental quality
standards are also included in the mechanism; clean air and water are modeled
as resources that can be 'depleted' by pollution.
The adjustment triggered by unsatisfied demand is an innovative piece of
modeling based on a cybernetic theory of social adjustment. If output per
capita of some product falls below the demand standard, the system tries a
series of measures designed to alleviate the problem. If any measure succeeds,
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system adjustments stop until the problem recurs or some other problem
triggers another adjustment mechanism. The adjustment steps begin with
short-term measures, such as deferring capital maintenance for a year and
spending net export balances to make up the deficit. If short-term measures do
not work, long-term measures are tried in the following order:
1. The resource mix used to generate a unit of output is shifted to cut costs.
2. Funds are shifted from production sectors that have surplus to the sectors
that are not meeting demand.
3. If unemployment is high, out-migration is increased (or in-migration
decreased).
4. If all else fails, demand standards are decreased. The demand adjustment
can also work in reverse; if production overfills demand, the standards are
gradually raised.
The adjustment process is represented optimistically. Production costs can
be cut without a decrease in consumer satisfaction: maintenance can be
deferred without a loss of productivity. Adju'stments start promptly as the
situation calls for them, although they may take time to complete. Previously-
used resources are still available for recycling. Reductions in demand occur
with no social trauma, and there is no discussion of how these reductions are
distributed across the population.
The Reference Structure diagram for SOS-2 is shown in Figure 6.5. SOS
covers the entire structure in one way or another, with some interesting twists.
Government is represented not as a drain on output, but as a productive sector
in its own right, competing for resources and attempting to meet consumption
demand for public services. If the adjustment set is located anywhere on this
diagram, it is in the 'output allocation' position, where it shifts funds among
productive sectors, raises or lowers demand standards, and directs technology
(though apparently at no cost).
Over-all the SOS structure portrays a culture with an inherent propensity to
grow and consume. Positive feedback loops drive both the population and
production sectors. However, as growth begins to stress resource limits, the
model system adapts-first by becoming more efficient in its use of resources
and by shifting its usage patterns to stress more plentiful resources, second by
reducing consumption and population growth. The adjustment mechanism is
modeled as an all-seeing, all-powerful central government, rather than a series
of decentralized and suboptimal personal adjustment decisions. It is assumed
that information is instantaneously and accurately available throughout the
system; each set, including the controlling adjustment set, knows exactly and in
detail what is happening elsewhere. For example, thresholds are set so that
resource-conserving reactions set in when a resource is 50% depleted, but the
question of how anyone might know when a resource is 50% depleted is never
raised. If such a model can impart any useful message about real social systems,
it must be a picture of how a perfectly controlled society would behave, if it
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could exist. Thus the most that SOS might be expected to do is to sketch out the
'best possible' edge of the range of futures open to the region or nation
represented.
F.DATA
SOS is intended as a generic structure, equally applicable to state, regional,
and national levels. Data are seen as secondary considerations, to be loaded
into the model as suits the user's purpose.
In the documented example, SOS-2, the model is parameterized with
United States national statistics. The authors identify their data sources only by
telling us that 'the data and assumptions were all taken from fairly readily
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available secondary source materials such as the Statistical Abstract, U.S.
Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, the Minerals
Yearbook, several Congressional or Commission reports on natural resources,
and so forth'.9 Production function and resource substitution data are said to
come from EPA's SEAS system.
The inaccessibility of the SOS data is especially maddening because the
authors occasionally use sweeping arguments, supposedly based on data, to
justify their assumptions, as in:
A major assumption in the model is the representation of many functions, such as
the output coefficients that produce changes in consumer-need partitions, as linear
or constant when even the most cursory analysis refutes this assumption when the
entire range of possible data values is considered. In this experimental model,
general trends in expected ranges of data are to be explored and in these ranges,
small compared to the total possible ranges, much of the empirical data suggests
that the assigned forms of fit are reasonable. !II
G. TESTING
The SOS documentation offers no evidence that the model has undergone any
sort of testing beyond some simple policy runs. No attempt is made to
demonstrate the model's ability to replicate history. No arguments are
presented to the effect that the model's response to parameter or structural
changes is a reasonable replication of the way the real world responds.
SOS contains more than 2,000 numerical constants. Many of these
constants, such as the degree of substitutability of one resource for another or
the threshold conditions at which the system will begin looking for ways of
finding substitutes, are, by necessity, guesses. Conceivably the model's
behavior might be quite sensitive to one or another of these uncertain
parameters. For example, the conditions under which energy shortages appear
are probably highly sensitive to the parameters one uses to describe the
substitutability of coal for petroleum or to the threshold point at which oil
depletion is assumed to spur investment in solar energy.
The situation would seem to call for extensive sensitivity testing. But no such
tests are described in SOS documentation. To make matters worse, the data
used are not identified by source and the methods used to estimate parameters
are not described. Therefore one lacks even the means to decide which
parameters are well-substantiated and which are pure guesses.
The one testing exercise that is described is designed to show that modeler's
assumptions predicate the model's conclusions. In this exercise the basic SOS
structure is given six sets of parameters to represent six theories of how
societies do (or should) operate, and 40-year runs are made using each of the
six modified structures. These six runs are not designed to duplicate any actual
region over any specific time period; they simply demonstrate the dynamic
capabilities of the model system.
In the first of the six runs the basic model is simplified to simulate the result of
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historical exponential growth within a finite resource base, with no societal
adjustment mechanisms. The productive sectors promptly run into a resource
limit and collapse. Successive runs add to and expand upon this exponential
growth model.
Run 2 adds a 'technological fix'; that is, the system reacts to resource
depletion by instituting substitutes for depleted resources and by shifting the
production mix to favor the more plentiful resources. The model shows
'modest growth with some perturbations' throughout the 40-year period, but
the authors predict that a longer run would exhaust the resource base: 'Many
fixes may be possible but finally the set of adjustments that are viable are
exhausted and the output drops well below original output levels'. II
Run 3 modifies the exponential growth model to show zero population
growth (ZPG). The result does not differ greatly from the Base Case.
Run 4 combines ZPG and the technological fix. The result is slower
economic growth because of a reduced labor force, less 'raggedness' because of
fewer technological adjustments, but still impending shortages near the end of
the run.
Run 5 adds 'cultural adaption' to the 'technological fix' assumption by
allowing transfer of funds between sectors and by allowing demand to fall when
the system cannot meet the implied levels of demand. This flexible society is
rewarded with total demand satisfaction, but shows considerable fluctuation
and over-compensation in individual sectors as demand shifts.
Run 6, the 'anomic society' run, duplicates the 'cultural adaption'
assumptions of Run 5 but lengthens the time required for the culture to adapt.
This society is too sluggish; its reluctance to adjust causes 'all expectations to be
met well for three years, then all expectations to be slightly missed for about six
years and finally a collapse of the outputs in the final two years'. 12
H. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions from the SOS model are most fully described in a more recent
House and Williams publication. 13 The model is run in a 'reference scenario',
in which sectoral growth rates are set initially at those rates that pertained in the
United States from 1950 to 1970. Under these conditions the system generates
severe resource crises early in the next century. and the problems appear at a
rate faster than the many adjustment mechanisms in the model can correct.
In the simulated year 2010, second level crisis corrections were needed for the first
time as all sectors associated with goods production and transportation became
increasingly deficient in meeting required demands. However, the deficiency was
not great enough to decrease any of the demand levels (a third level crisis). In the
year 2012. the situation became worse as material prices escalated rapidly, led by
the resources of lead/zinc and petroleum. By this time, major fund transfers from
government areas were occurring to provide investment and thus stimulate
corrections. In 2013, as the price of lead/zinc doubled and copper jumped 20%,
many demand expectations were lowered for the first time in the total scenario.
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The already high depletion levels for lead/zinc. copper. and petroleum (all over
90%) suggested that correction mechanics would be too slow to save sufficient
reserves for a smooth adjustment. By 2016, this proved to be the case as
lead/zinc and copper resources availability collapsed. Since seven of the twelve
production sectors draw on these resources, the later-year results were judged not
credible. 14
These resource problems were not solved by adding a forecasting capability
to the model system. The planning addition makes 20-year linear projections
of demand satisfaction patterns. If a future problem is indicated, funds are
shifted in advance of actual need to sectors that are likely to fall short, and
demand standards for those sectors are also prevented from growing. The
system performs worse under these changes, because a smoother economic
growth pattern over the first few decades exhausts resources even more
rapidly.
Next a conservation scenario was tried, in which recycling capabilities are
increased and material use is decreased for any resource that becomes more
than 50% depleted, and consumer demand levels are reduced generally. This
strategy avoided material shortages completely, but produced a labor
shortage, slowing growth of the more labor-intensive service sectors.
Since the cost of metals did not increase as quickly in the conservation scenario.
more funds were available to produce other resources, including laboc since the
labor force had been near full employment, salaries increased .,. In these
simulations (as often occurs in policy-making), a measure reducing one problem
causes new effects to arise that are unforeseen and that occur in quite remote
sectors of our modeled system. IS
The best results were obtained by combining this conservation scenario with
the forecasting capability. No crises occurred over the 50-year model run. In
other words, the simulated United States socioeconomic system, with all its
assumed adaptive mechanisms, did not function well on its own-the
adaptations came too late and took too long. The system that avoided these
problems entirely over the next 50 years required substantial government
planning, forecasting, and augmenting the private sector's adjustment
mechanisms. It also required value changes that reduced consumers' material
goals.
It is difficult to find a clear and concise summary of the SOS findings as a
whole. The primary message seems to be that the United States system as
currently structured is adaptive but not quite adaptive enough. The best way to
improve it would be to add a controlling, centralized, corrective overview
institution, which uses mathematical models as forecasting tools.
It should be noted that SEAS and SOS are only two of many models available and
that the family of research tools includes many quantitative and qualitative
techniques other than models to search further into detailed questions of interest.
The major point of interest is that as the policymaker strives to provide more
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complete long-term solutions to problems before they become specific crises,
methods and approaches do exist that can be refined to support his efforts. 10
The structure and parameters of SOS seem to designed to produce optimistic
results, Every imaginable adjustment mechanism is included. Adjustment
delays and costs are minimized and political and distributional problems are
omitted, The central control mechanism runs with clock-like efficiency, and
the social consequences of meeting shortages by lowering expectations are not
discussed. The bias in the model is obvious and to some extent admitted by the
authors in their opening statement of the purpose of the model.
However, to the extent that a model can be biased and honest, this one seems
to be both. Resource limits are included, the adjustment mechanisms do
impose costs on the system as a whole, and the closed boundary does not allow
problems to be pushed out of the model's domain into some unaccounted
real-world externality. As a result, the conclusions do not support entirely the
preconceptions of the modelers. The system is quite capable of generating
problems faster than it can adjust to them, even with an optimistic bias. If the
assumptions are made more pessimistic (as in the 'anomic' run), the model
output can indicate severe problems, and can also give some general ideas
about how to prevent them.
I. IMPLEMENTAnON
SOS is an unlikely candidate for direct implementation. It was developed by
two people working in their private capacities and pursuing their own ideas
rather than responding to any institutional needs. Even if SOS had had an
official client, implementation would be unlikely. At least in its present state of
development, the model does not test any concrete policies or draw any
policy-directed conclusions. It is a general-understanding model. and if it
supports any particular viewpoint, it is that resource problems will not
necessarily solve themselves smoothly or inexpensively. The primary policy
conclusion that House and Williams wanted to get across, that EPA and other
government agencies should use computer models for long-term planning, was
accepted, at least during Democratic administrations, but SOS was not chosen
as an EPA planning model.
House and Williams were essentially their own clients, developing a model
they could use as evidence in proving a point to the world. Even they seemed to
lose interest eventually. House left EPA, wrote a number of books that
mentioned SOS among many other models, used SOS once as a teaching tool
for a university course, and went on to develop bigger and more ambitious
models. Eventually House reappeared in government as director of the Office
of Technology Impacts of the Department of Energy (DOE), still promoting
models but now sounding more like a client, with complaints about the long
development times, inadequate databases, and absence of unmeasurable
qualitative factors in the models available to him. Williams says he sent out
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about a dozen card decks with the SOS computer program in response to
requests from various users, including Battelle, but he does not know that any
of them actually ran or used the model.
Williams rejoined House at DOE, working on the assembly of a massive
computerized information system for energy policy modeling. House and
Williams did consider dusting off SOS, beefing up its energy resource sector,
and using it as a long-term complement to the 'accounting models with no
feedback' the DOE uses. 17
J. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
The SOS FORTRAN model contains about 1800 lines. Its run cost is about
$25.00. Output from a run creates a sheaf of computer printout about
three-quarters of an inch thick. IH
K. DOCUMENTAnON
The SOS FORTRAN program is listed in full, and the equations themselves
are quite well documented. Comments are interspersed throughout the
program, providing information about what operation is being performed in
what line. The program is carefully arranged to facilitate following its logic and
locating operations within the program. Should anyone ever want to check the
performance of the SOS model, or to compare the program with the
interpretation of it presented in the model text, he would be able to do so.
In contrast to the completeness and careful organization of the FORTRAN
program, however, the model's verbal description is incomplete, unclear, and
poorly organized. Language is used carelessly and imprecisely; many sentences
convey no meaning at all. Documentation of test runs is sloppy, both in
substance and in logic. The mathematical alterations producing the various
changes in output are described only in imprecise qualitative terms. In the first
group of runs, the reader is casually informed that the model producing the run
output is 'slightly different' from the model described elsewhere in the text
(details not offered). 19
A similar lack of quality is manifested in other dimensions of the model
documentation. The description shifts suddenly from the idealized concepts
behind SOS to the actual model SOS-2, without sufficient warning to the
reader that there are differences between what the authors intended to model
and what they actually modeled. Composition errors, such as incorrect
opposition of concepts and unexplained terminology, are common. Little
concern is shown for reader convenience. Variable name definitions are
presented in clusters scattered over a hundred pages of equation descriptions.
Consequently, variable name definitions are hard to find, which severely
hampers anyone attempting to follow the description of model equations.
Trying to piece together the logic of the model is an infuriating exercise.
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The SOS documentation is quite abstract, in the sense of being separated
from worldly reality. Operations are discussed categorically as the interaction
of sectors, components, resources, and measures. Reference to the items
within categories is rare, and the real-world analogues of model processes
receive almost no mention in the text. Concrete reality is subsumed by category
headings, and documentation takes on the air of pure idea-play. Reading the
text, one feels the vague discomfort common to laymen in the presence of
dedicated computer technicians, the suspicion that these people are more at
home in their mathematical creations than they are in the real world.
This blurry verbal documentation is especially disheartening because the
model was built to convey general understanding. The SOS-2 model appears
to be an interesting tool for exploring various assumptions about the approach
of an economy to its carrying capacity, but the SOS documentation does more
to fog the issue than it does to clarify it. In the course of formulating the model
the modelers have had some unique and innovative structural insights. It is sad
to see those insights buried in a document that is incomprehensible to anyone
but a FORTRAN expert.
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CHAPTER 7
TEMPO: Educating the Third World
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
TEMPO, General Electric's Center for Advanced Studies, was founded in 1956 in
Santa Barbara, California. Population studies are headquartered in Washington,
D. C. '" The population studies unit was founded by the late Stephen Enke in 1967.
Unit personnel have developed economic-demographic computer models, applied
the models to developing countries, produced teaching materials, and have
conducted new research in the economic-demographic area ... Work to date has ...
involved TEMPO personnel in over 30 countries on five continents. Most of the
work has been performed under contract to the U.S. Agency for International
Development. The unit currently consists of ten professionals, fifteen consultants,
and three supporting staff. 1
TEMPO is an industry-sponsored 'think tank'. In the late 1960s the Office of
Population of the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) contracted the services of TEMPO's Population Unit to help
developing nations analyze the economic effects of population growth. The
TEMPO Population Unit constructed for this purpose an economic-demog-
raphic model, called TEMPO I, or in its later versions TEMPO II. This model
was designed to be general and easily adapted to the specific economic and
demographic situation in each developing country. Specialists from the
TEMPO Population Unit were trained to go to different countries to teach the
concepts of economic-demographic planning, using the model to help
stimulate policymakers' awareness of popUlation impacts on country develop-
ment. The staff was chosen to be proficient in French and Spanish, as well as in
economics, computer programming, and associated skills.
After eight years of working with economic-demographic models, the staffs
of both USAID and TEMPO felt that the transfer of ideas and technology was
most effective when the adaptation of the TEMPO model to a nation's
individual situation was performed by analysts in that nation. 2 Therefore, the
TEMPO staff shifted to advising and supporting local analysts as they applied
the TEMPO model to their own nation's situation. As of 1974 the model had
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been adapted to represent Guatemala, Jamaica, Turkey, Chile, Brazil, India,
Nigeria, Mexico, Taiwan, Tanzania, Nepal, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru,
Indonesia, and Colombia.
B. PURPOSE
TEMPO was originally requested by USAID 'to prepare materials and provide
technical assistance for the analysis of the interactions between population
growth and economic development'. , USAID's Office of Population believed
that demographic variables are important but too often unrecognized factors in
the development process. They wanted to demonstrate accurately, quantita-
tively, and convincingly to Third World planners that rapid population growth
can be a deterrent to economic growth. They also felt that a computer model
geared specifically to each client nation would persuade policy staffs of the
benefits to be gained by using quantitative methods in the planning process.
The orginal model on which the TEMPO models are based was constructed
in the late 1950s by Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover to investigate
population-development relationships in India. 4 Although the Coale-Hoover
model has undergone many refinements and adaptations in its transformation
into TEMPO I and TEMPO II, the fundamental assumptions and behavior
(which will be discussed later) have not been greatly changed. Its structure is
simple and its behavior follows clearly and understandably from its basic
assumptions.
The TEMPO model has been used to generate similar and predictable
forecasts for many countries, primarily for educational purposes. This exercise
can be likened to the process of reconstructing a classical laboratory
experiment in a chemistry class. While the outcome is known, at least by the
instructor, the process of performing the chemistry experiment and interpre-
ting its results is an effective way of getting the student to relate actively to the
theory being taught, and of developing the student's skill in the process of
logical inquiry.
The TEMPO Population Unit gradually expanded the original TEMPO I
model to incorporate more policy levers than population growth rates and to
produce a model that could be generally useful in development planning. They
describe the purpose of TEMPO II as 'to investigate the long-term (e .g.
30-year) effects of different assumptions about demographic rates and
government policies affecting those rates, in addition to gaining insights into
other types of development planning tradeoffs·. 5 The structure of TEMPO II is
still logically simple, however, and its purpose is still primarily didactic.
C. METHOD
The TEMPO model is a straightforward mathematical simulation of the
dynamic changes of population and capital in a developing country. It is moved
through time by algebraic statements relating the condition of the system at
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time t to the condition at time t + 1. There are a few non-linearities, expressed
by functions such as a logarithmic Cobb-Douglas production function.
However, most relationships are linear; for example, total consumption is a
linear function of GNP and of population. While some parameters are
statistically estimated in some specific country-adapted variants, statistical
techniques are seldom mentioned in TEMPO documentation.
There is substantial dynamic feedback built into the model's structure, and
the documentation occasionally refers to the concept of feedback. However,
specific feedback loops from the model are never mentioned or related to
model behavior. No specialized techniques, such as input-output matrices or
optimization, are used anywhere in the model. All the major assumptions of
the simpler model, TEMPO I, can be described by just eleven algebraic
expressions. TEMPO II can be described in 34 equations.
In short, the TEMPO method is non-specialized, uncomplicated computer
simulation, well-suited to the purpose of communication of one major idea
about population and economic development.
D. BOUNDARIES
The TEMPO model,like its predecessor the Coale-Hoover model, focuses on
the general effects of population growth on economic growth. Both TEMPO I
and TEMPO II represent population as a flow of people through a series of
five-year age cohorts. Entries into and exits from this stream of people are
exogenously determined by age-specific birth and survival rates. On the
economic side, the model calculates endogenously capital, labor force
employed, gross production, consumption, savings, and investment. Labor
participation rates and the rate of technological improvement are exogenous.
The later, more elaborate TEMPO II model has a larger boundary than
TEMPO I. Several exogenous variables are turned into endogenous ones by
the addition of:
1. An explicit government sector.
2. Feedbacks from education to labor productivity and from family planning
programs to fertility.
3. Division of the economy into subsistence and modern sectors, roughly
equivalent to a rural-urban disaggregation.
With these additions, such variables as subsistence-modern migration, tax
payments, government deficit, and price indices (inflation) are introduced as
endogenous variables, and taxation rates, allocation of government spending,
and targets for education and family planning become exogenous policy
variables (see boundary diagram, Figure 7.1).
In the process of adapting TEMPO II to a client nation, the TEMPO staff
often adds new structures and variables to examine questions of specific
interest to the client. For example, the Chilean version of TEMPO I includes a
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Figure 7.1 TEMPO II boundary diagram
more elaborate treatment of health services and education than the generic
form of the model. 6 The Venezuelan version of TEMPO II explicitly includes
foreign investment in the petroleum industry. 7
E. STRUCTURE
For simplicity we shall first examine the structure of TEMPO I, then TEMPO
II.
TEMPO I consists of a demographic sector and an economic sector. The
demographic sector is an accounting device that projects future population size
and composition by subtracting deaths and adding births (both disaggregated
by age and sex) to a base-year population. 8 Age-specific fertility and mortality
rates are exogenous. Usually two or three fertility forecasts, including
continuation of current fertility and a sharp reduction in fertility, are
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compared. The accounting is carried out on a five-year cohort basis to allow
explicit representation of population characteristics such as labor potential and
births per year, which depend on the population's age profile. Young and old
cohorts are weighted less than middle-aged ones in calculating 'equivalent
consumers' for the consumption function. The only feedbacks in the
demographic sector come about because births are proportional to the number
of women of fertile ages and because the number of deaths in a cohort is
proportional to the cohort's size. There is no influence from the economic
sector on either fertility or mortality rates.
The economic model is essentially a straightforward application of a Cobb-Doug-
las production function .... Output is generated by inputs to the economic process;
these inputs are labor, physical capital. and technological change. 9
Of the three inputs to production, technological change is exogenous, capital is
determined by internal feedback through investment from the economic
sector, and labor is determined in the population sector. Only employed labor
is presumed to add to production; employment is a function of capital, and as
the unemployment rate decreases, capital is substituted for labor.
The internal feedback in the economic sector is dominated by two positive
feedback loops (see Figure 7.2). In the first loop output increases investment;
investment increases capital; capital then increases output. In the second loop,
more capital increases the need for labor, which increases employment. More
employed labor generates more output, allows more investment, and further
increases both capital and the capacity of the system to utilize labor
productively.
Two factors can slow the expansion of TEMPO I's economic growth loops:
labor scarcity can reduce production, and consumption can reduce investment.
Both labor and consumption are tied to the growth of population. but the
timing of their respective influences is quite different. The labor supply is
increased by population growth, but only after the 15 or more years required
for a new-born to enter the labor market. Consumption increases the moment a
new-born appears in the model (though not by a full consumer-equivalent).
Therefore, an increase in population will immediately depress the model's
economic growth rate by diverting some output from investment to consump-
tion. Fifteen years later the added population may increase the economic
growth rate by relieving a labor shortage, but at the same time the consumption
of these new laborers increases, as they become full consumer equivalents.
TEMPO I can be used to test the wisdom of slowing population growth to
enhance economic development, but it is not detailed enough to answer the
obvious follow-up questions: what government programs can affect population
growth, and how can they be financed? To answer these questions, the
TEMPO staff developed TEMPO I into TEMPO II. with an explicit
government and financial sector, a feedback from government family planning
programs to the birth rate, an education sector, and a division ofthe population
into modern (urban) and subsistence (rural) economic activities. TEMPO II is
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Figure 7.2 TEMPO I causal diagram
designed to explore such questions as whether it would be effective to shift
some funds from education to family planning, or to finance government
investment, education, or family planning programs from such sources as cuts
in other programs, foreign borrowing, taxes, or inflation.
The population in the subsistence sector of TEMPO II behaves identically to
the modern population (and to the population in TEMPO I) except that:
1. Subsistence population birth rates are not affected by the family planning
program.
2. Subsistence popul~tionout-migrates into the modern population.
The economy associated with the subsistence population is very simple. Its
output is proportional to population, subject to diminishing returns as
population increases.
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Subsistence-to-modern migration proceeds at a rate proportional to the
difference in production per capita in the two sectors. As modern sector output
generally grows much faster than subsistence sector output (because of
increasing returns through technology and no diminishing returns), people
tend to migrate steadily from the subsistence sector to the modern sector (see
Figure 7.3). This migration somewhat slows the growth rate of per capita
income that would pertain otherwise in the modern sector and increases it in the
subsistence sector. Migration into the modern sector decreases the capital-la-
bor ratio, which increases unemployment. Unemployment, however, does not
feed back directly to migration into the modern sector. Migrants from the
susbsistence sector into the modern sector immediately assume modern-sector
fertility, which has generally been lowered by family planning expenditures.
Production in the modern sector is a function of capital, technology, and two
types of labor, educated and uneducated. As in TEMPO I, technological
progress grows exogenously, allowing any given amount of capital and labor to
produce an exponentially increasing amount of output. A constant fraction of
the educated labor force is employed. Employment of the uneducated labor
force is a fraction dependent on the capital-labor ratio.
Desired or 'preliminary' consumption in TEMPO II is the sum of three
factors, preliminary private consumption, private investment, and government
purchases. If these three factors add up to more than the total productive
output of the economy, each is scaled down proportionately (or by weighted
proportions if the user prefers). Whenever demand exceeds supply in this way,
a general price index is increased to represent inflation. The three components
of demand are determined as follows:
1. Preliminary private consumption is a linear function of population and
disposable income (total output minus taxes plus transfer payments).
2. Preliminary private investment is equal to disposable income minus
preliminary consumption minus government borrowing.
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3. Preliminary government spending is a function of several exogenous policy
choices, as described below.
In TEMPO's government sector an exogenously-determined portion of
gross production (the sum of modern sector output and traditional sector
output) is taken in as taxes and distributed among eight uses: general
government spending, defense, transfer payments, health, social overhead
capital, direct government investment, education, and family planning. Of
these eight uses, the first four do nothing in the model other than consume
output that otherwise would have been invested. By not making these four
classes of government expenditure feed back into the model's causal flows,
the TEMPO II model tacitly assumes:
1. That government expenditures on health do not lower death rates.
2. That general government spending and defense spending do not affect
any other model variables,1O either by diverting labor away from the
private sector or by adding capital to it.
As for the latter four uses of government funds, government expenditures
on social overhead capital and direct government investment increase the
capital stock by an amount directly proportional to the funds spent. This
capital is not distinguished from private capital, and thus the effect of these
two types of government spending is to increase the economic growth rate.
Expenditures on family planning are assumed to reduce births, thereby
decreasing the population growth rate. Expenditures on education increase
the society's cumulative level of education, which in turn increases labor
productivity. Education is not assumed to have a direct effect on fertility or
mortality.
For all government expenditures except family planning and education, the
quantity of funds budgeted is an exogenously-determined fraction of gross
production (perhaps adjusted downward if total demand exceeds total pro-
duction). For family planning and education, the user supplies a target-
either a fertility rate or the fraction of the population that should be educated
to primary, secondary, and tertiary levels. Then the model endogenously
determines the cost of attaining that goal. The cost of attaining the education
target is calculated by multiplying a constant cost per student by the number
in the age cohort to be educated. Similarly, the cost per family planning
acceptor is multiplied by the number of women who would have to accept
family planning to attain the prescribed fertility rate. Acceptance of family
planning is synonymous with cessation of fertility during the period of
acceptance." Cost per acceptor is constant and relatively low up to a specified
rate of acceptance, but increases linearly for acceptance rates beyond that
point.
In the model it is possible, and even likely, that government spending will
exceed the tax rate. The resulting government deficit necessitates government
borrowing, which diverts funds away from investment. and this slows econo-
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mic growth. At the discretion of the user, exogenous aid funds may also be
assumed as additions to the government budget.
TEMPO's own causal diagram of the TEMPO II structure is shown in Figure
7.4. This diagram is partial and does not include all the internal feedbacks in the
economic sector. The Reference Structure diagram for TEMPO II is shown in
Figure 7.5. The relatively few equations of TEMPO II manage to capture a
large number of demographic-economic interactions, primarily by keeping
each assumption aggregate and including only the very most basic factors.
TEMPO II is a 'broad shallow' model. interrelating many important economic
variables but with simple, sweeping assumptions that do not include the detail
and variability of a real economy.
The structural additions in TEMPO II do not alter the basic feedback
relationships of TEMPO I or its behavior in any major way. The government
sector, as it diverts funds away from investment, adds a new potential
inhibition to the economic growth loops, unless government investment
happens to be the only item of governement expenditure. The education
sector, by adding costs proportional to the population growth in the younger
cohorts, increases the economic cost of population in the short term, but
decreases it as more highly skilled and productive laborers enter the work force
in the long run. Disaggregation into subsistence and modern sectors removes a
portion of the economy from participation in the capital-output growth loop
and puts part of the population beyond the reach of the family planning
program. The conceptually richer government sector of TEMPO II allows
exploration of such options as increasing government debt in the short run in
order to finance family planning programs, which will cut education
expenditures in the long run. Or the model can simulate the results of less direct
government investment in capital and more government support of education
to produce more highly skilled workers. 'These decisions made over a period of
years may have significant impact on the total development of the country, and
consequently on the long-run availability of goods and services'. 12
F. DATA
TEMPO I and TEMPO II are small models. They require only a few,
aggregate, standard economic and demographic parameters of the sort that are
likely to be available, or at least to be guessable, even for non-industrialized
countries. Sensitivity testing, to be described later, plus much experience
adapting the models to different national situations, have shown the
population effects on the economy as indicated by the model to be quite
insensitive to differences in economic parameters. Therefore data acquisition
is not a major part of the TEMPO modeling effort.
GE-TEMPO does not take much trouble to document the data used in
model applications. In the Chilean version, for example, neither data inputs
nor data sources are listed. 13 However, suggestions for how to adapt the model
by changing its parameters are given in the general description of the model. 14
D
E
M
O
G
R
AP
H
IC
I
M
O
D
EL
V
A
R
IA
B
LE
S
E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
I
P
U
BL
IC
e
du
ca
tio
n
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
in
ve
st
m
en
t
to
ta
l
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
e
x
pe
nd
itu
re
s
a
th
er
90
ve
rn
m
en
t
e
x
pe
nd
itu
re
s
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
1
-
-
-
-
-
to
ta
l
po
pu
la
tio
n
v
a
ria
bl
es
+
~
+
Ibu
dg
et
de
fic
it
-
-
-
-
,
-
-
-
-
-
d
I
+
+(
I I
+
I
I
:1+
t
I
I I
rbi
r,t
hs
I
M
O
DE
RN
P
O
PU
LA
TI
O
N
,
II
Fi
gu
re
7.
4
Pa
rt
ia
l
ca
u
sa
l
di
ag
ra
m
o
f
T
E
M
PO
II
.
N
ot
e:
T
he
a
rr
o
w
s
in
di
ca
te
di
re
ct
io
ns
o
f
de
pe
nd
en
cy
po
in
tin
g
fr
om
th
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
a
ria
bl
e
to
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
tv
a
ria
bl
e
o
fa
fu
nc
tio
na
l
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p.
A
pl
us
sig
n,
as
fr
om
m
o
de
rn
G
P
to
pe
r
ca
pi
ta
m
o
de
rn
G
P,
in
di
ca
te
s
th
at
a
po
si
tiv
e
o
r
n
e
ga
tiv
e
c
ha
ng
e
in
th
e
in
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
a
ria
bl
e
w
ill
ca
u
se
a
c
o
rr
e
sp
on
di
ng
c
ha
ng
e
in
th
e
de
pe
nd
en
t
v
a
ria
bl
e.
A
m
in
us
sig
n
in
di
ca
te
s
an
in
ve
rs
e
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p,
w
ith
an
in
cr
ea
se
in
o
n
e
v
a
ria
bl
e
be
in
g
a
ss
o
c
ia
te
d
w
ith
a
de
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
o
th
er
v
a
ri
ab
le
,a
n
d
co
n
v
er
se
ly
.
R
ep
ro
du
ce
d
w
ith
pe
rm
is
si
on
fr
om
S
E
nk
e,
U
sin
g
TE
M
P
O
ll:
a
Bu
dg
et
Al
lo
ca
tio
n
a
n
d
H
um
an
Re
so
ur
ce
s
M
od
el
,
G
en
er
al
El
ec
tri
c
C
om
pa
ny
-T
E
M
PO
,
Sa
nt
a
B
ar
ba
ra
,C
al
ifo
rn
ia
,C
en
te
r
fo
r
A
dv
an
ce
d
St
ud
ie
s.
p.
10
,
19
73
.
.
.
.
.
.
-
-
-
l
.
.
.
.
.
.
172
RESOURCE AVAILABILITY
demand
CONSUMPTION
linear function of total
disposable Income and of
number of consumer equivalent s
toto I
private
income
population
\
LABOR ALLOCATION
modern- sector employment
function of capitol/labor
rot io; subsi stence- modern
millration function of output
ptlr copifO r ...-----
POPULATION INCREASE
aile-specific fertility and
mortality exoQenous except for
family plonnlnQ effect
resource use
Figure 7.5 TEMPO II reference structure
These descriptions give potential users a straightforward description of where
to go to find data, how to handle data that are not in the correct form for model
use, and how to include new data in the computer program.
G. CONCLUSIONS
TEMPO results are always explained by following through the causal linkages
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in the model and translating them into clearly-understandable words and
concepts related to real-world processes. For example:
The direct impact of increased family planning services is to reduce fertility.
Decreased fertility slows population growth and makes for future populations
smaller than they otherwise would be. For a period of several decades, the size of
the labor force is relatively insensitive to changes in fertility (since all new workers
for the next 15 years are already born). Also, to the extent a smaller population
leads to lower consumption, the growth of capital may be accelerated. Thus growth
of total output remains relatively unchanged-and may be slightly higher-so that
the decline in fertility increases the growth in per capita output. Higher per capita
output increases tax revenues, private savings, and investment, and allows larger
outlays for education. An increased stock of capital reduces unemployment and
increases output per worker. The labor force becomes more educated, hence more
productive, and accordingly receives higher incomes...
Instead of expenditures on family planning, government might decide to invest
considerably more each year on direct productive investment. The main impact
would be to increase GOP. Population growth would not be slowed, however, and
GOP per capita would increase less rapidly than if the same expenditures had been
directed toward family planning programs. 15
The TEMPO staff has provided a summary that draws together general
conclusions from 19 country applications, ranging from Nepal (less than $100
GNP per capita) to Venezuela (nearly $1,000 GNP per capita). They find one
result common to all the models they have made:
Despite the wide diversity of cultures, historical experience, economic systems,
languages, etc., the same fundamental economic-demographic mechanisms
proved to be at work in each case. It is universally true that school-age populations,
and therefore school enrollments, are very sensitive to changing fertility. Any
decline in fertility consequently reduces demographic pressures on school systems,
providing the opportunity for improvements in enrollment ratios and better quality
education.
In contrast to the school-age population, the work-age population is relatively
insensitive to declining fertility for two decades or more. Largely as a result of this
insensitivity of the labor force to changing fertility, projections of GNP are also
relatively insensitive to fertility change over two or three decades. Thus. slower
population growth, produced by declining fertility, translates directly into a more
rapid growth of GNP per capita.
This conclusion is extremely robust in the sense that it is relatively invariant
under the diverse socioeconomic conditions encountered in the different countries'
studies and under widely differing parameter values for the key equations in the
models. to
This conclusion is the logical outcome of the model's structure, which counts
population growth as an immediate depressant on economic growth, while its
only economic benefit is the eventual increase of the labor force. Changes in
model structure could alter these conclusions in many ways. For example, were
other resources than land shown as limited (the land constraint is implicit in the
diminishing returns to labor in the subsistence sector), the economic drag of
population growth might have been magnified. On the other hand, had death
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rates decreased with nsmg standards of living or modernization. the
fertility-reduction strategies could have been counterbalanced by declines in
death rate. Had education been represented as decreasing fertility as readily as
family planning programs, a stronger advocacy of education programs rather
than family planning might have come out of the model. And if rising per capita
GNP had been assumed to reduce fertility, more emphasis might have been put
on government investments in capital rather than condoms. (The next two
models in our survey explore this last assumption in detail.)
Small, broad, shallow models such as TEMPO are in one sense the highest
goal of the modeling profession. Elegant sim plicity, retaining the essence of the
issue and removing the confusing detail, is what modeling is all about,
especially when the model has an educational purpose. But the danger in
making such models is that the essence of the real system may be simplified
away entirely. TEMPO has been widely attacked for its simplicity, especially
with regard to its omission of economic-demographic feedback (see the next
two models), and to its sweeping assumption that family planning expenditures
instantly and linearly prevent births. A strong argument can be made that
family planning programs just provide a government-subsidized, more
pleasant, and less costly substitute for widely-known folk methods already used
to prevent undesired children. 17 In fairness to the TEMPO staff, the
family-planning assumption in the model is an exact reflection of the
assumption that pervaded the planning community, including the USAID
sponsor, at the time TEMPO I was made. That assumption was gradually
modified and expanded in aid institutions during the 1970s, however. while it
remained unchanged in later versions of the TEMPO model. TEMPO was
originally designed as a teaching model to increase the sophistication of
development planners, but over the ten-year history of the model the students
outgrew the teacher.
H. TESTING
The TEMPO model is among the most thoroughly and intelligently tested of all
the models in our survey. In part this is because the model is small enough and
clear enough that each of its uncertain parameters can be identified and varied,
and the effects of the variation can be easily understood. Also, the TEMPO
modelers have used an unambiguous and sensible criterion for sensitivity: a
parameter is considered sensitive when its variation caused a reversal of the
main policy conclusion of the model. That is, a change in a 'sensitive' number
would cause the model system to perform better under rapid population
growth than under slower population growth.
The fertility-dependent conclusions of the TEMPO II model are generally
insensitive, by this definition of sensitivity, to parameter changes. Tests were
conducted to ascertain the effects of differing numerical assumptions for life
expectancy. technological progress, effects of labor and capital on GNP
(Cobb-Douglas coefficients), increase in consumption per increase in GNP,
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initial ratio of capital to GNP, and initial unemployment rate. Tests were
made altering parameters both singly and in combination. The combinations
were chosen so as to change all parameters simultaneously in the direction
that would be most favorable to high fertility and then in the direction least
favorable to high fertility. As a result of their sensitivity tests. the modelers
conclude that economic-demographic projections remain essentially
unchanged, even when the values of parameters are subjected to substantial
(10-300%) changes either individually or simultaneously. lH This is a level of
robustness very rare among model-based conclusions.
The TEMPO Population Unit does not raise the question of model validity
in its documentation. No evidence of validity, such as fits with historical data
or arguments for the 'reasonableness' of model behavior, is presented.
TEMPO's originators make their model assumptions extremely clear; the
reader is free to accept or dismiss the model on the grounds of those
assumptions and the model output.
I. IMPLEMENTAnON
TEMPO II is a mature, generic model. Since GE-TEMPO built their basic
economic-demographic model in 1968, they have adapted it to over 30
nations. The forms taken by adapted models vary widely. A 'truncated
model' that can be operated by hand calculation was developed and applied
to Bolivia and Nepal. A four-sector model that explores such policy areas as
foreign and government investment in industry, promotion of import
substitution, and education, as well as population policy, was developed for
Venezuela.
USAID and TEMPO worked together closely in deciding which countries
were appropriate for use of the models and in bringing the models to the
attention of government officials. The TEMPO staff worked out of USAID
missions in the chosen countries. Different strategies were employed,
depending on the circumstances of each area. In Peru the TEMPO team
worked directly with the National Planning Ministry and developed a
population plan of action. In Venezuela the best available institution was a
research and training institute for government administrators, and the model
was altered to include Venezuela's extensive petroleum sector. A Regional
Population Center in Bogota became a place from which the models, or at
least the idea of modeling, were purveyed to other Latin American nations.
As they worked in different countries, the TEMPO staff gradually modified
their approach. I') They began to sell the process of modeling more than
specific models or model results. They worked with professionals in the
recipient country, letting them put their own ideas into the models and make
their own mistakes. The recipient-country analysts. most of whom had been
trained in the universities of industrialized countries, wanted to make the
models more complex and sophisticated, far beyond what the data base of the
country could support. The TEMPO staff meanwhile was trying to simplify
176
the models, to make them more transparent and easier to present in a short
time to an audience of policymakers.
TEMPO models were definitely used in some form in many countries,
including Peru, Colombia, Honduras, Ecuador and Venezuela. Most of these
countries were the sites of extended implementation efforts, with presenta-
tions, seminars, and courses on modeling, all funded by USAID. In at least two
countries, Togo and Mali, the simple TEMPO I model was taken from the
literature and used as a basis for planning without the prior knowledge of either
USAID or TEMPO.
According to reports of the TEMPO staff, recipient countries received the
models with mild suspicion or open curiosity but not with hostility, even though
the anti-natalist message was directly contradictory to the pro-natalist views of
many governments. The strongest reactions against the models came from the
American and European academic communities, where the TEMPO models
were occasionally denounced as simplistic and propagandistic and the project
participants as Malthusian imperialists. Several counter-models, including
LTSM and BACHUE, were made to demonstrate that TEMPO's results had
been rigged by making economic growth sensitive to population growth but not
vice versa.
Relations between TEMPO and the USAID Office of Population sponsor
were friendly for ten years. Then in 1977 the director of the Office was replaced
and TEMPO's fortunes plummeted. For two years TEMPO received no
USAID contracts at all and its staff were dispersed. TEMPO II was simplified
into two new models, called DEMOS and RAPID, intended to be carried into
a country on a minicomputer and to be explained to decision-makers within an
hour. This work was carried out, not by TEMPO, but by other USAID
contractors. A set of economic-demographic models intended for similar
purposes was started by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
Since the TEMPO models are clearly stated and have been widely
distributed, they must certainly have made their point. Whether making that
point was decisive in causing a shift in policy is unclear. We have found no
documented examples of a policymaker being introduced to TEMPO,
changing his outlook, and going off to establish a massive family-planning
program. On the other hand, from 1960 to 1980 a major shift took place in the
attitudes of the world's governments about population growth. In 1960 only
10% of the world's people had access to family planning programs. In 1980
90% did. The governments of 80% of the people in the developing world are
now concerned about their population growth rates and are instituting some
sort of population policy. 20
Of course we shall never know to what extent TEMPO furthered this shift in
world perceptions about population growth. The impact of a model designed to
spread an idea is often hard to trace. Probably even the staffs of USAID and
TEMPO are unaware of all the reactions to and consequences of their
persuasive efforts around the world. At the least, as we shaIl see, TEMPO was
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a direct inspiration to other modelers exploring economic-demographic
interactions.
J. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
The TEMPO models are remarkably uncomplicated and efficient. TEMPO I
contains about a dozen basic equations, TEMPO II around three dozen (some
of which are repeated several times to generate the different population age
cohorts). Computer time, space requirements, and programming language are
not described in the model documentation. Given the size of the model,
however, its computer requirements must be very small. It could easily be
written in FORTRAN or any other general programming language.
K. DOCUMENTAnON
Over the years the staff of the TEMPO Population Unit has frequently been
requested to explain the TEMPO models to both technical and non-technical
audiences. Often the models have been communicated to people who are most
comfortable in languages other than English. In keeping with the need for such
explanations, the body of documentation that has grown around the TEMPO
models is well designed for a general audience. Users' manuals, model
descriptions, and more technical items, such as documentation of model
sensitivity, are as plain-spoken as possible. Jargon is avoided. Equations are
seldom presented without a verbal description of their conceptual import. The
model documentation refers constantly to the real-world processes being
represented; the reader never gets lost in abstractions.
A plain-language documentation was easier to put together for TEMPO
than it would have been for many models because the TEMPO models are
small and present few mathematical or conceptual complexities. Descriptions
of the models concentrate on presenting the structure of the model, the
rationale behind the structure used, and the output produced with various
policy options. Data are cited in country applications, but not stressed. Almost
no statistical analysis is presented.
In the process of describing structure, algebraic notation rather than any
particular computer language is used. To our knowledge, TEMPO has not
published the actual computer program for any of their models, except for the
truncated versions. The TEMPO models are sufficiently simple, however, that
any competent programmer could reconstruct a working computer program
from the algebraic equations with little difficulty.
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CHAPTERS
LTSM: the Race between Production and
Consumption
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
The Long-Term Socio-Economic Simulation Model (hereafter referred to as
LTSM) was part of a project entitled 'Methodological Research and Country
Case Studies on the Effects of Different Rates of Population Growth on
Agricultural Development'. The project was funded by the United Nations
Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and administered by the Policy
Analysis Division of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO).
The FAO's intent was similar to that of TEMPO-to assist planning
authorities in non-industrialized nations to describe their own nations and test
policies to meet their own needs. The modeling effort was organized in three
stages. The first two-constructing a general or prototype model and
experimentally fitting that model to a specific nation as a demonstration-are
described here. The first demonstration model was calibrated with data from
Egypt. The third stage-transferring the model and responsibility for its
development from the FAO to collaborating nations-was at least begun in
Egypt, Pakistan. and Jordan. with the Pakistan model sufficiently well
developed to be documented in draft.
Although the modeling institution (FAO), sponsor (UNFPA). and clients
(member nations) are all different and widely separated geographically. they
are all part of the United Nations organizational structure, and thus
communication and co-ordination of efforts was possible. Enthusiasm for the
modeling approach in general and LTSM in particular was high within FAO's
Policy Analysis Division, and therefore the institutional environment of this
model was friendly and positive.
B. PURPOSE
A primary objective of the LTSM project is:
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,'. to assist developing countries in more fully integrating the population
components into their development planning, especially in the agricultural sector.'
Other purposes include basic research in modeling and in understanding the
process of economic development,2 and enhancement of planning capability
in participating countries via experience gained from the project.
A more specific problem statement can be found in the first published
report, in which the criteria for including and excluding things from the model
are listed. The model is specifically intended to be long-term, multisectoral,
and suitable for planning on a national level, with special emphasis on
agricultural development, as one might expect from the FAa sponsorship, and
on employment, and population. The model is explicitly not patterned after
'purely theoretical models', short term or fully aggregated ones, or those
applicable to the world as a whole or to single, specialized regions. Two lists are
given in Table 8.1 of the sorts of policy problems the modelers have
deliberately included and omitted from their representation .."\
Table 8.1
Included
population growth
scarcity of arable land
unemployment
rural-urban migration
backwardness in education
economic dualism
capital shortage
poverty
indebtedness to foreign countries
Omitted
political tensions and conflicts
regional disparities
income distribution
pollution and natural resources
migration across national boundaries
shortage of skilled labor
inflation
land tenure systems
A possible unstated purpose of the LTSM model may have been to provide a
more complete alternative to the TEMPO model (described in Chapter 7).
TEMPO illustrates the detrimental effect of population growth on economic
growth, but does not contain any feedback effects of economic growth on
population growth. The LTSM modelers carefully point out that their model is
designed to represent both sides of the economic-demographic feedback loop.
The LTSM modelers have also been in close contact with the BACHUE
modeling effort (described in Chapter 9), another attempt to represent
economic influences on fertility.
Purposes for the country-specific adaptations of the model were intended to
be determined on an ad hoc basis, depending on the circumstances in
participating nations. Problem focus was expected to differ from nation to
nation. 'For example, food balance will be one of the major focuses of the
Pakistan project, and rural-urban migration in the Egypt project':+
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C.METHOD
The purpose of LTSM limited the choice of methods to be used. The sponsor's
desire for wide applicability required that very general problems be addressed
with a flexible format. The fact that most potential user-nations have neither an
abundance of technically-trained personnel nor sophisticated computer
facilities mandated that the model be kept easy to understand and moderate in
its demands on computer hardware. 5 The focus on Third World countries,
which are typically data-poor, ruled out heavy reliance on data-demanding
statistical techniques.
To complain about the unavailability, uncorrectness, and inconsistency of data is
too common among planners for developing ... countries. We do not want to join
them and base on this any excuse for feeding large amounts of mocked-up data and
uncertain assumptions into the model. We are rather inclined to sacrifice elegance
and sophistication to build a model which is conceptually, structurally as simple as
possible so as to minimize data requirements both in quantity and quality.
Accordingly, LTSM was written to be a non-complex simulation model,
using FORTRAN, the most general and widely-available computer language.
The modelers give two reasons for choosing simulation as their modeling
method. First, because the model is long term, it must contain much
uncertainty and many degrees of freedom. Therefore it must be possible to
explore alternate assumptions about factors beyond the planners' control.
Second, not only exogenous factors, but also various policy choices must be
kept variable and testable, to generate a clearer picture of planning objectives
and the trade-offs among them.
The aim is not to offer a clear-cut and unambiguous program to the government of a
country, but the more modest (and in our opinion more meaningful) approach to
explore the possible results of different combinations of sequences of actions. 7
Bela Martos, who constructed the original model, drew from his experiences
as an economist and planner in Hungary, and particularly from the central
planning models of Janos Kornai. s Wuu-Long Lin, who adapted the model to
the specific case of Egypt, used some formulations from econometrics and
economic theory. However, the model is less bound to statistical techniques
than the typical econometric analysis; it contains more dynamic theory; and its
time horizon (20-25 years) goes beyond the range that most econometricians
would consider appropriate to their techniques. Jay Forrester, the founder of
system dynamics, is also given ideological and methodological credit as an
influence on the LTSM. 9 However. the study does not strictly follow the system
dynamics paradigm. The LTSM modelers. although they include many
feedback relationships, do not use feedback concepts to explain the dynamic
behavior of their model. Moreover, they linearize far more than a system
dynamicist would, they make most relationships dependent on rates of change
lR2
rather than levels, and they represent time delays only insofar as they are
implicit in the program's state variables.
D. BOUNDARIES
LTSM concentrates on the interactions among population, land, foreign trade,
and production. Population is disaggregated into traditional (working in the
family-labor sphere) and modern (working in the hired-labor sphere) sectors as
well as by age and sex. Land, like population, is divided into traditional and
modern acreage according to whether it is farmed with family labor or with
hired labor. Seven production sectors are included: agriculture, non-capital
goods, capital goods, services, construction, government services, and
education. Three of these sectors, agriculture, non-capital goods, and services,
are divided into traditional and modern categories. The other production
sectors are treated as modern for purposes of employment calculations (to be
discussed later).
The many exogenous variables of the model (see Figure 8.1) are categorized
by the modelers as either 'policy target' variables, to be varied and
experimented with in the course of simulation, or exogenous variables that
must be forecast outside the model. Examples from the exogenous category
include labor participation rates, imports, and capital-output ratios. There are
five policy target variables: investment allocations, exports, consumption, land
reclamation, and 'population policy'. Classifying these central model variables
as policy levers implies a substantial amount of government control in the
LTSM society. The heavy use of exogenous functions greatly simplifies the
model's structure. It also ties the model's output closely to predictions or policy
choices that must come from mental models.
A model like LTSM, which is dedicated to simplicity, must omit a great deal
and provide only abbreviated representations of those variables that are
included. Weather, income distribution, wages, prices, soil erosion, and
defense spending might all influence population and development. for
example, but none are included in LTSM.
The modelers have been persistent in keeping LTSM simple and fairly
uncontroversial: their rule seems to have been 'when in doubt, leave it out'.
The omission of a relevant variable or relationship is usually recognized by the
modelers and explained in the documentation. For example:
These ... omissions have been made partly for keeping the model as simple as
possible, partly because the problems in question only arise in a small number of
countries, are rather short or medium term problems or just too hard to cope
with. III
The cumulative effect of the economic policy is measured (among other indicators)
by foreign indebtedness. We do not restrict its level, nor do we feed it back to
change the policy. Simply when choosing among the available options, the ones
with excessively high and thus impossible or undesirable level of indebtedness
should be rejected. We do not attempt to predict the world's willingness to lend. 11
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Figure R.l LTSM boundary diagram
[The] importance which we impute to education is not reflected in the model.
Our representation simply connects educational investments with its effect on
average education cumulated in the adult population in a very simple and rough
way. Our reason for doing so is motivated by the fact that good long-term
educational planning models tend to be complex exercises in themselves. 12
E. STRUCTURE
LTSM can be understood as a competition between production and consump-
tion. Consumption is the single most important check on economic growth in
the model. That which is consumed cannot he invested, and without
investment the economy does not grow.
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Figure 8.2 Calculation of consumption in LTSM
The way the model accounts for consumption is shown in Figure 8.2. Total
consumption is defined as the sum of government consumption and private
consumption. Government consumption at any time is equal to government
consumption in the previous year plus the increment in government
consumption. Incremental government consumption is proportional to the
funds allocated for investment in education and in other government services.
This allocation is an exogenously-determined policy variable.
Private consumption is the product of consumption per capita and population.
Per capita consumption increases at a rate proportional to the rate of increase in
total production per capita. Notice the rate linked to a rate here; it is not the
absolute level of output per capita but its rate of change that is presumed to
increase consumption. This kind of formulation is common in LTSM. Nearly
every behavioral equation in the model is based on a rate ofchange rather than an
absolute level. The elasticity ofthe consumption response to GNP growth rate is
exogenously determined and is considered a policy variable. The elasticity is
zero in the downward direction; that is, if income per capita should fall,
consumption per capita will not fall.
Population, the second determinant of consumption, is a separate sector in the
model, including many state variables and considerable internal feedback. The
essential variables of the population sector, their internal feedback, and the
inputs to the population sectorfrom other model sectors are shown in Figure8.3.
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The population is disaggregated into four age cohorts (not indicated in the
diagram) in the prototype model and 16 cohorts in the Egyptian demonstration
model.
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Figure 8.3 LTSM population sector
The number of births per year is a function of the number of females of
childbearing age and the fraction of women in these categories giving birth
(fertility). Fertility is decreased if there is a positive growth rate in the level of
education, if there is growth in levels of employment in the modern production
sectors relative to the size of the female population, and if the government
imposes a population policy. The population policy is an exogenously-set
multiplier on the educational effect on fertility-it makes education more
effective in depressing the birth rate, and it is ineffective if education does not
improve. No cost is assigned to the imposition of the population policy, and its
exact mechanism is not specified. Note again the behavioral linkage between
rates. The rate of decrease of fertility depends on the rate of increase of
education, not directly on the level of educational attainment the population
has reached. Thus a 10% increase in education would decrease fertility by (say)
5% regardless of what educational level or fertility level the population had
reached.
This arrangement creates two positive feedback loops (see Figure 8.3).
Increase in population furthers still more increase in population both through
raising (after an aging delay) the number of women of childbearing age and
through diluting the average growth rate of education per capita. Being tied to
two positive feedback loops, population will grow exponentially unless some
force acts to offset its structural propensity to grow, either through decreasing
the birth rate or increasing the death rate (or both simultaneously).
The annual number of deaths in the model is the product of population and
mortality (deaths per thousand persons per year). Mortality is decreased by
investment in government services per capita and by the growth rate in GOP
per capita, both of which are slowed by population increase. Thus the death
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rate is tied to two negative feedback loops. If GOP and government services
remained constant, an increase in population would erode GOP per capita and
government services per capita, thereby increasing deaths, decreasing
population, and stabilizing the system.
In summary, the consumption side of the consumption-production race is
dominated by exponential population growth, which can at least theoretically
be offset by per capita production growth rates so slow that mortality rises, or
by employment and education growth rates so rapid that fertility drops.
LTSM's basic production function for each productive sector states that
production is equal to production in the last time period, plus the product of the
capital-output ratio and investment in the last time period. Investment in each
sector is equal to the total investment available (the previous year's output
minus consumption) times the fraction of investment allocated to each sector
(exogenous). Depreciation of capital is not modeled explicitly, but must be
subsumed in the capital-output ratio. This ratio also contains an exogenously-
determined technological improvement factor. The role of labor in production
is omitted, under the assumption that labor is in surplus and thus never a
limiting factor. The authors are careful to emphasize that the model pertains
only to a labor-surplus economy.
The form of this basic production equation is replicated for production in
non-capital industry, capital-producing industry, education, services, and
government services. Different sectors of production have different capital-
output ratios. Only the agriculture and construction sectors (as will be
discussed below) vary the basic production function.
Construction output is determined as described above, but construction
investment is calculated endogenously-the only investment that is not
considered an exogenous policy variable. Demand for new construction is
calculated as a (linear) function of the new investment scheduled for all the
other economic sectors. If the construction capital is not capable of producing
that much construction. the fraction allocated to construction investment is
increased and all the other investment allocations are reduced proportionately.
This internal balance is maintained only for construction. If other sectors
require more capital than is available, the difference is made up from imports
and the foreign debt level is increased.
In the agriculture sector, production is the product of land and yield per unit
land (see Figure 8.4) Land may be increased by an exogenously-driven land
reclamation policy variable, and it is decreased by construction activity such as
road building. Yields increase with increases in investment in machinery or
annual inputs (fertilizer. seeds. and pesticides) per unit land. Again the rate of
change of yield depends on the rate of change of inputs. Yield response to the
increase rates of both inputs and investment is linear and unbounded.
In LTSM annual agricultural input usage increases with gains in agricultural
production. and agricultural production increases with higher input rates
(heavily outlined inner loop in Figure 8.4). Input costs are calculated and
subtracted from gross output. which could counteract this positive loop. except
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Figure 8.4 LTSM agriculture sector
that material inputs are also assumed to become more efficient as a function of
time (and presumably, technology). Not only does agriculture have this internal
growth loop, it is also driven by the same production-investment loop that drives
the model's other sectors of production (also outlined heavily in Figure 8.4).
Since it is internally driven by a positive feedback loop, unhindered by
diminishing returns and free from soil erosion or other environmental problems,
production in LTSM's agriculture sector grows rapidly. The only obstacle to
agricultural growth in the model seems to be agriculture's ties to the less
aggressive growth structure of the total economy. Rather than coming back to
agriculture directly, agricultural production is lumped into GOP. GOP growth
increases investment across the board. In so doing, it increases investment in all
sectors, only a fraction of which returns to agriculture. Thus the agriculture
sector can expand through investment only by pulling the whole economy up
with it.
In summary, economic production in LTSM is driven by positive feedback. In
each productive sector production creates investable output, and investment
increases production. This mutually-reinforcing growth configuration, like all
positive feedback structures, will produce exponential growth. Exogenous
forces directly influence the growth rate by altering:
1. Sectoral capital-output ratios.
2. The distribution of investment between sectors.
3. Sectoral ratios of gross to net production (i.e., cost margins).
Consumption can put a brake on the growth loop by decreasing the total funds
available for investment.
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Economic-demographic feedback appears in the model when the production
and consumption sides are joined. For the most part this feedback slows
economic growth. If the growth loops on the production side cause economic
growth, people will have higher incomes, and (depending on exogenous policy)
more government services. Both higher incomes and more government
services will lower death rates and population will begin to grow, increasing
consumption. Rising consumption will encroach on investment. Reduced
investment will inhibit economic growth, perhaps to the point that incomes fall
and the death rate rises. However, if the economic growth loops are strong
enough to resist the population drag, eventually higher employment and
education will decrease birth rates, permitting an economic take-off.
Education expenditure plays an important role in the model in nudging the
balance between population and economic growth toward the economic side.
Growth in education per capita lowers fertility and decreases the rate of
population growth. Slower population growth means fewer children to educate
and fewer mouths to feed, therefore less consumption. Less consumption
leaves more funds for investment in education and in economic growth. The
'population problem' can be solved by this loop. Note, however. that if
population begins to stifle economic growth, the education loop becomes a
vicious circle. Instead of a launch toward economic take-off, there are more
people, less education per capita, higher fertility, more people, less funds for
education and growth, and more children to educate.
Dangling from the LTSM structure but apparently not essential to it are two
population-shift processes, urban-rural migration and movement from the
family labor sphere to the hired labor sphere (we shall call the latter process
'employment migration'). Labor in LTSM is not an input to production, and
the urban-rural balance does not seem to affect model behavior greatly. The
fertility in the family-labor sphere is higher than that in the hired-labor sphere
and fertility is decreased by rapid rates of growth of employment. Therefore
employment migration has some demographic consequence, apparently its
only consequence. Rural-urban migration appears to have no effect on the
system at all, aside from serving as an indication of policy results.
The urban-rural and family labor-hired labor shifts are modeled almost
identically. To avoid redundancy we shall describe only the structure
simulating employment migration. As described by the modelers, the
employment function rests:
... on the assumption that employment growth. except for [that of] the modern
agriculture [sector] is proportional to capital invested. The more rapid growth of
capital will result in a more rapid growth of employment. That is, modern sectors
are considered as the dynamic element whose expansion of employment depends
on the process of capital formation. However, traditional sectors are assumed to
absorb the residual of labor force. 13
The causal structure of the employment function is diagrammed in Figure
8.5. Starting from the lower left side of the diagram, investment in the modern
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Figure 8.5 LTSM migration structure
economic sectors simultaneously increases production and employment.
thereby altering production per worker. If production increases faster than
employment (which will happen so long as the exogenous incremental
capital-output ratio is higher than the exogenous incremental capital-labor
ratio) labor productivity will rise, increasing the productivity gap between
modern and traditional spheres.
As productivity in the traditional sphere falls behind, workers will move
from the traditional to the modern sphere. The speed of movement is regulated
by a factor termed a 'gravity multiplier'. This gravity multiplier causes motion
between the sectors to be most rapid when numbers of traditional and modern
workers are equal and to approach zero as the population in either sphere falls
to zero. The gravity multiplier seems to be derived from a sort of diffusion
theory of migration; the more workers there are in a sector, the more are like!y
to switch to another sector. However, in this model the flow goes only one way,
from traditional to modern.
Laborers switched out of the traditional sphere become employed as further
investment in the modern sector creates jobs for them. If unemployment
becomes very low, the modern sector substitutes capital for labor (at no cost)
and hires fewer laborers per unit of investment.
In the traditional sector, out-migration reduces the labor force but not
production. Because labor productivity is defined as the ratio of production to
laborforce, out-migration increases labor productivity in the traditional sector,
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which tends to decrease the modern-traditional labor-productivity gap. The
smaller gap reduces the rate of out-migration.
The important structural elements of LTSM are shown on the Reference
Structure. Figure 8.6. LTSM contains enough exogenous policy variables that
anyone who understands the model's structure could adjust parameters to
produce economic growth or stagnation. However. reasonable choices of
parameters cannot allow population growth rates to rise above 4% per year.
Since only a pessimist would make economic growth come out to less than 4%.
most parameter choices will give economic growth an edge over population
growth.
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Expenditures on agriculture and education will tend to be very rewarding,
agriculture because it contains the input-production growth loop described
above, and education because expenditure on education nudges the popula-
tion-economic fulcrum toward economic growth. By contrast, investment in
health services, which lower death rates and thereby increase the population
while simultaneously removing funds from productive investment, will tend to
stifle economic growth.
Although there are many state variables in the model (such as the population
levels, which are accumulations of the flows of births, deaths, and migration)
the usual dynamic function of these variables in delaying and damping system
changes are undercut by the nearly ubiquitous linking of rates to rates. For
example, if changes in education were accumulated in an education level and
fertility then made a function of that level (perhaps with a further delay
assumed for perception and social change), expenditures of education would
have a much smaller and slower effect in the model system. The rate-rate
linking generally makes the model behavior more volatile than that of a model
based on level-rate links.
F. DATA
The LTSM documentation contains a clear and useful summary of the data
requirements and outputs of the model. 14 Data requirements are modest and
consist primarily of initial values for such inherently measurable quantities as
land under cultivation, sectoral production, outstanding foreign debt, and
population by age and sex. The data for policy inputs are more numerous and
more difficult and will be discussed further under Testing below.
The Egyptian experimental application uses data from standard sources,
both from Egyptian statistical agencies and UN agencies. The model's
documentation does not identify sources of individual numbers. It merely lists
general sources.
A more recent adaptation of the model to Pakistan contains a lengthy
appendix, listing not only data sources but tables of actual data used in
determining the model parameters. I:;
G. TESTING
To verify their model's behavior, the LTSM modelers compared simulated
results with historical data for the years 1964-1969. Some of the results of this
test are shown in Figure 8.7. By calculating the coefficients of variation
between real and simulated data, the modelers decided that model output was
'very comparable' to actual system behavior. If) The comparability of simulated
and actual data is said by the modelers to be 'the most convincing evidence
found for accepting the structure of this simulation model in analyzing the
Egyptian economy and accepting its predictive ability' .17 Model projections
are also compared with projections from the FAG Egyptian Country
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Figure 8.7 (a) Reported and projected employment, Arab Republic of Egypt,
1964---1969. (b) Reported and projected population, Arab Republic of Egypt,
1964---1969. (c) Reported and projected GDP, Arab Republic of Egypt. 1964---1969. (d)
Reported and projected investment, Arab Republic of Egypt 1964---1969. Reproduced
from Lin and Ottaviani-Carra, p. 45
Perspective Study as a means of demonstrating the model's validity by
'intuitive judgement'. IX The model projections usually fall between the high
and low estimates of the earlier FAO projection. No explanation is given as to
how comparison with other projections demonstrates model validity, nor are
the assumption behind the other projections presented.
This five-year historical tracking test is far from sufficient to demonstrate the
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general reasonableness of the model's behavior, even if we ignore the poor fit
of the GDP and investment variables. Economic-demographic feedback can
hardly become manifest over such a short period. No long-term model runs are
illustrated in the documentation-in fact, the model does not seem to have
been run past the simulated year 1980. The 'long term' behavior of a model
named Long-Term Socioeconomic Model seems to be unexplored. (The
Pakistan adaptation of the model is matched with data from 1968 to J974 and
run out to 1990. 19)
Variable sensitivity was observed by altering one at a time each policy
variable of the standard model and observing the effect over the simulation
period 197(}-1980. A matrix is presented showing what effects changes in nine
policy variables will have on 13 endogenous variables after ten years of
simulation. 20 From this matrix one can, for example, find that a 100O/C increase
(over the standard run) in agriculture's share of investment leads to at least 5°,{
more private per capita consumption in 1980, and that a 100% increase in land
reclamation will lead to 5% less employment in 1980. It is difficult to
understand all the sensitivity results intuitively. For example, it is not clear
what chain of events causes a 10% decrease in agricultural exports to produce a
>5% drop in education level. The mode of presentation only allows the reader
to examine how changes in exogenous parameters affect other parameters at
one point of time.
H. CONCLUSIONS
Three scenarios representing different 'development alternatives' were tested
in the Egyptian demonstration model for their effects over the period
I97(}-1980. The first (Alternative I) represents 'quasicontinuation of past
trends in ... policy formation'.21 The second, a high employment strategy
(Alternative II), features investment in industry, education, and health (at the
expense of investment in agriculture mld other sectors) along with a population
policy. The third (Alternative III) emphasizes investment in agriculture (at the
expense of industry and services), increased land reclamation, and no change
in education, health, and population policies.
Results of these three policy alternatives are presented (to four significant
figures) and compared at length. Predictably, agriculture does best under the
agricultural strategy and employment is highest with the industrial strategy.
Predictably, also, given the extra growth loop in the agricultural production
sector, the agricultural strategy results in faster economic growth and higher
GDP. The results of the three policy tests are summarized in Table 8.2.
The authors do not emphasize the trade-offs implicit in this table, nor do they
indicate whether the relationships shown there are inevitable: for example,
they do not indicate whether some other policy set could be found that would
produce high GNP with low population growth.
As previously discussed, the projection period used is too short to manifest
much demographic feedback. The model's demographic implications would
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Table 8.2 Results of LTSM policy tests22
Policy
Alternative I
(continuation of
present policies)
Alternative II
(increased total
investment, 50%
increase in
education and
health expenditure)
Alternative III
(increased land
reclamation and
investment in
agriculture)
GDP
medium
low
high
Agriculture
output Employment Population
medium low medium
low high low
high medium high
have come out much more clearly had model runs been sufficiently long to
show the effects of today's policies on the next generation, and to cover a full
population-doubling time (less than 30 years at the 2.1 % to 2.6% growth
rates manifested by the model). Demographic conclusions drawn from the
half-generation projection contrast 41 million people for Egypt under the
high-employment, low-fertility Alternative II to 43 million for Alternatives I
and III. The modelers also find that more migration to cities and into the
modern labor sphere occurs in Alternative II.
The modelers are careful to label their findings as tentative, to stress 'the
limitations of quantitative approaches as aids in decision-making,2J and to
avoid making generalizations about the effect of one or another policy on
development. Their conclusions are mostly constrained to literal reporting of
model performance in forms such as: 'agricultural development is higher under
development Alternative III than under Alternatives I and II' ,24
The application of the model to Pakistan, which involved some elaboration
and structural change (such as distinguishing between small and large farms
and making population exogenous), was also run only under broad policy
alternatives, five of them this time. The results are summarized by the authors
as follows:
Alternative I which assumes a quasi-continuation of the historical development
pattern is inferior to Alternative II which places major emphasis on better income
distribution, agricultural sector development and rapid fertility decline ."
Development strategy aiming at industrial sector development, self-reliance and
large farms (Alternative III) turns out to be substantially inferior to both
Alternatives rand II as it yields lower rate of GDP growth, percapila consumption,
food surplus and higher unemployment .. , High unemployment ratio (average
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20.4-21.8% in formal labor sectors) is common to Alternatives I. II, and III. This
implies that unemployment is the major problem facing the Pakistan economy
during the projected period. Development strategy under Alternative IV is
specially designed to reduce unemployment and, at the same time, achieve better
income distribution ... Alternative IV(a) combining policies of better income
distribution, phased sectoral development focus, better economic management
with rapid fertility decline ... results in higher overall GDP growth, per capita
consumption and investment rate and lower unemployment ratio as compared to
other Alternatives. Alternative IV(b) which adds a policy of containing consump-
tion orientation at historical levels, yields the highest GDP growth, per capita
consumption, investment rate and food surplus, and the lowest unemployment
ratio ... Differences in economic-demographic features of various development
strategies imply that important policy choices exist for Pakistan economy which
should make long-term perspective planning a useful exercise in national
planning. 25
I. IMPLEMENTATION
A planning group in Egypt did carryon their own adaptation of the model in
their country (as opposed to the demonstration model of Egypt done in Rome).
Pakistani planning experts completed and documented their country's version
of the model. As of 1979, the model was no longer in use at the FAO, and the
staff that worked on it were dispersed to otl!er tasks. Whether the message
from the preliminary model runs quoted above were ever heeded at the
policymaking level was not determinable. The long-term institutional support
and promotion that TEMPO enjoyed did not persist for LTSM. The general
friendliness to the idea of modeling in FAO's Policy Analysis Division at the
beginning of the LTSM project waned markedly, not so much because of any
reaction to LTSM, but because of the retirement or transfer of some key
institutional supporters. 26
J. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
LTSM is considerably larger than TEMPO. The prototype model consists of
about 140 endogenous variables, of which 74 are not repetitious. 27 The model
can easily be programmed in either FORTRAN or DYNAMO following the
generic equations given in the documentation. Exact computer requirements
are not specified, but the data requirements are not large, and the model
calculations should take very little time on any modern computer.
K. DOCUMENTATION
The FAO's intent was to build a prototype model that planning agencies in
participating nations could adapt to their respective conditions and needs.
Presumably the FAO modeling staff was to be available to help with these
adaptations. Given this purpose, documentation had to make the model clear
and usable, but need not attempt impeccable coverage ofdetails. This is exactly
the sort of documentation FAO team produced.
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LTSM's documentation is straightforward, well organized, and easy to
comprehend. The model has been described in a number of contexts to both
technical and non-technical audiences. 2H In the original and still basic
description of the model 2'" generalized discussion of the study's scope and
purpose leads into a description of system simulation, what it is, and why
system simulation is an appropriate methodology for the study'S purpose.
Equations are presented and explained. Variable names are systematically
defined, which makes program explanations easy to follow. Testing procedures
are explained. Output is presented, in both complete and summary forms, to
show the results of testing.
Bela Martos' verbal descriptions of the modeling procedure in slightly
Hungarian-flavored English should be awarded a prize for honest, straightfor-
ward, unpretentious model description. Here are a few examples:
The level of production in each productive sector is determined by its productive
capacity and no possible underutilization is taken into account ... This gives the
whole model a supply-oriented character. Our reasons for choosing this approach
are twofold. First the studying of previous models ... convinced us that demand
projections serve as the usual starting point. Thus this type of model structures is
sufficiently explored and we found no reason to repeat others' approach ... We do
not think that the long-term planning process consists of the application of a single
model. 30
We are well aware that many long-term models contain an input coefficient matrix
which is theoretically supposed to change in time. But when it comes to real
calculations they usually replace it with a time independent matrix, not having any
better choice. It is not always true that something is better than nothing and we
think this is just the case when it is not. 31
With a fixed set of the calibrated parameters and with the initial set of policy
variables we have calculated a candidate for the 'standard path' ... It need not be
'good', we shall not necessarily recommend it as one of the selection for final
consideration by the policymaker. Its only role is to yield a standard with which all
other paths shall be compared. The procedure is similar to that used in calibrating
the parameters. It is not worth experimenting too long. The 'standard path' can be
dethronized anytime during ... the simulation and replaced by another. 32
Candid acknowledgement is made of the model's faults, as the modelers
perceive them.}} A 'Guide to the Computer Program,34 explains how to
parameterize the computer program. The language used throughout is clear
and to the point. Jargon is minimized. French, Spanish, and English versions
are available.
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CHAPTER 9
BACHUE: a Twenty-Legged Robot
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
BACHUE is another entrant in the on-going political debate about the role of
population growth in economic development. One side of this debate argues
that population growth is a serious hindrance to economic development and
that fertility reduction is a necessary step toward economic growth. Opponents
of this position attack it on many grounds. They claim that it ignores the
positive effects of population growth on economic demand and on the labor
force. It also ignores the possibility that high fertility is a result of poverty and
can only be changed by eliminating poverty. Finally, advocacy of population
control is sometimes attributed to a belief of wealthy people that the poor are
ignorant and unthinkingly have too many children. This belief aggravates those
who believe the poor are poor because the wealthy have exploited them or
otherwise denied them opportunity to achieve material well-being.
Advocates of the fertility-reduction position have a number of well-estab-
lished mathematical models with which to uphold their position. TEMPO,
discussed previously, is one such model. Another is TEMPO's predecessor, the
Coale-Hoover model. I Until the early 1970s, opponents of the fertility-reduc-
tion position had not produced such explicit quantitative models. In
consequence, they could not debate TEMPO and its kind in the arena of
quantitative analysis. Thus there was a demand for mathematical formalization
of the ideological alternative to the TEMPO-type model.
One tentative response to this demand was the LTSM model of the FAO
(which was also trying to make another point: that agriculture is as important as
industry in development planning). A stronger response came almost
simultaneously from the United Nations International Labor Organization
(ILO). There Richard Blandy, then the head of the Population and
Employment Project. decided to build a more sophisticated economic-demog-
raphic model than any then available. Blandy and his colleague, Rene
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Wery, built an initial model which they called BACHUE after a Colombian
goddess of love, fertility, and harmony between man and nature.
BACHUE was developed under a friendly, informal management. Its
initiator was head of the project, thus it tended to be administered through
personal interest rather than through bureaucratic formalities. Schedules,
plans, and management were flexible, and the modeling team was free to work
according to the opportunities that appeared in the course of the model's
progress. Over the five-year lifetime of the Population and Employment
Project, the BACHUE modeling staff gradually evolved from two people
finding spare moments to organize their ideas to three full-time modelers2 plus
a supporting staff working on developing the model into a usable tool for policy
analysis.
B. PURPOSE
As one of the BACHUE modelers put it, the model's original purpose 'was to
give a more balanced hypothesis as a response to the popular anti-natalist
position shown by the Coale-Hoover and Enke-TEMPO type models,.3 More
specifically, BACHUE was constructed to bring into an economic-demog-
raphic model some factors that many professional analysts felt to be important
in economic-demographic relations. Such factors include income distribution,
employment, feedback from social conditions to demographic processes, and
the ways in which population growth stimulates as well as slows economic
growth. Thus the original purpose of the model was partly didactic and partly
academic-it was an experiment in integrating theories about social change
during economic development, especially theories the modelers felt had been
ignored.
As BACHUE developed, its purpose became broader. The first prototype
BACHUE model evolved into specific country applications, and as it did so,
the antithesis to TEMPO developed into a thesis in its own right. The
BACHUE team established communication with interested academics and
country planners, first in the Philippines and then in other countries. They
listened to the theories and problems of the specific countries and incorporated
some of them in an expanded model, BACHUE-2. Gradually the modelers'
initial hopes that BACHUE might eventually serve as a general planning tool
began to be realized.
The model's purpose is now explained in this way:
There are several potential uses for models in the BACHUE series, but the main
rationale for their development is to provide a laboratory that can evaluate policies
which affect the size and distribution of population, and policies which might create
productive employment and alter the distribution of income over the longer term.
At the same time, the models examine the effects of economic change on the
growth, distribution, and structure of population, as well as the reverse effects of
demographic change on economic development. 4
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This is a purpose so broad as to admit almost any socioeconomic theory into the
model, and, as we shall see, BACHUE has turned out to be a model of
enormous size. But the modelers do describe some particular angles of the
industrialization puzzle they are especially interested in, and they justify their
interest with one of the few value statements we encountered in any of the nine
model descriptions:
The subject focus of our work .. ,is population. employment and income distribu-
tion. rather than population and development as a whole. This partly reflects a
self-imposed limitation. an attempt to somewhat reduce the size of the subject to be
covered .. , But it also reflects the values we bring to the subject.., Underlying our
work are biases towards the provision of productive employment. a more equal
distribution of income and wealth and the elimination of poverty as the central
objectives of development. Linked to these objectives are an appreciation of and a
respect for the rights of individuals and families ... While these biases are perhaps
not particularly novel. nor objectionable, we prefer to make them clear since they
of course influence the content and interpretation of our work.)
C.METHOD
BACHUE is a medium- to long-term model; it is usually run to the year 2000.
It is basically a simulation model, but the BACHUE modelers are not strictly
allied to one school of modeling. Literature citations in BACHUE documenta-
tion imply that prototypes for the work include system dynamics models.6 The
model builders stress the difficulty of understanding complex feedbacks with
an unaided mental model. They emphasize the model as a total system, rather
than specific relationships within the model. They attempt to make most
important model variables endogenous, especially demographic variables.
which are exogenous in TEMPO. And they adopt the system dynamics view of
the world as dynamic, recursive, and dominated by lagged responses.
In the real world. few interrelated events are truly simultaneous-they relate to
each other with delays which may be a day or a month. a year or more.
BACHUE-Philippines incorporates these Jags by treating the process of growth as
a disequilibrium one-a process of continually adjusting towards equilibria which
themselves change over time.?
However. the BACHUE modelers also feel that system dynamics models
tend to be too aggregated. They believe that the distribution of economic
output and decisions at the level of individuals and households are of central
importance in understanding interactions between economic growth and
population growth, In defining their model. therefore. they favored represen-
tation of disaggregated networks of variables rather than aggregate indices.
Population is disaggregated into a total of 152 age. sex, location, and
education groups. The economy is represented as an input-output matrix with
13 production sectors. Economic output is allocated to over 40 population and
employment groups. All the cross-interactions of these subdivisions add up to
over 750 endogenous demographic variables and over WOO economic ones.
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Another important methodological attribute of the BACHUE modclers is
their preference for statistical determination of model parameters wherever
possible. In BACHUE-2, the Philippine country application (as of 1979 the
only application on which documentation was available) statistical estimation
techniques were used extensively both to determine model parameters and to
define behavioral relationships between variables. Many regression analyses
were performed, both on national data and on international cross-section data.
The result is that most behavioral equations in the model are linear in the
parameters and incorporate only directly measurable entities. The verbal
description of the model contains many hypotheses about the goals and
motivations that underlie reproductive or economic decisions. but the model
itself contains only variables that are statistically accessible. For example, the
modelers state that income is a poor indicator of consumer savings and that
assets and permanent income would be more satisfactory to use, but in fact
income is used in the model because data were not available on the other
factors. 9
The BACHUE modelers have not made statistical estimation an absolute
fetish, however. Where data were not available, as in the case of price
elasticities of demand, or where data were sparse, as in the case of incremental
capital-output ratios, the modelers used their best judgement to fill in gaps and
smooth out inconsistencies. Occasionally when the modelers had reasons to
believe that the historical relationship as captured in regression analysis was
likely to change, statistical findings were disregarded. For example, Philippine
data showed no conclusive evidence that declines in fertility had been
associated with increases in educational level or standard of living. However,
analyses of international cross-sectional data indicated that such declines had
occurred in other developing nations at levels of income and education
somewhat higher than those that prevailed in the Philippines. The modelers
therefore disregarded Philippine data and used international cross-sectional
data to estimate the response of fertility to educational and economic variables.
In combining the dynamic, closed-system feedback concepts of system
dynamics, the disaggregated matrix-manipulation techniques of input-output
analysis, and the statistical inference tools of econometrics. the BACHUE
team created a unique cross-paradigm model. The borrowings were combined
thoughtfully, in a deliberate attempt to achieve the strengths and avoid the
weaknesses of the individual modeling schools. The process created a horde of
new conceptual, methodological, and structural difficulties. The combination
of extreme disaggregation with statistical estimation resulted in staggering data
requirements. The attempt to estimate formally parameters in a feedback
structure violated some of the basic premises (such as absence of col1inearities)
of regression analysis and also required frequent linearization. violating the
premises of system dynamics. And the disaggregation of a closed-loop model
produced a structure of such behavioral complexity that. as we shall see, the
model must be used primarily as a black box rather than as an aid to intuitive
understanding.
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D. BOUNDARIES
The BACHUE model is organized into three subsystems: population,
economics, and income distribution. In discussing BACHUE's boundaries we
shall describe the model's subsystems one after another. For each subsystem
we shall enumerate the variables included, the level of aggregation at which
they have been represented, and whether they are exogenous or endogenous.
Variables that have been omitted will be discussed in association with
subsystems within which they might have been included. The BACHUE
boundaries are summarized in Figure 9.1.
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Figure 9.1 BACHUE boundary diagram
In BACHUE's demographic subsystem population is grouped by five year
age cohorts, by urban or rural location, by sex, and by level of educational
attainment. Marriage, marital fertility, rural-urban migration. and mortality
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are calculated endogenously for each age and education group. Education
participation rates are introduced exogenously as a policy variable. In addition,
exogenous policy controls are available for most demographic-change
variables. The endogenous calculation of birth rates may be modified
exogenously to represent family-planning programs; migration rates may be
modified to represent restriction of migration.
Desired family size, attitudes about the economic utility of children, the
status of women, nutrition, sanitation, machismo, and other hard-to-quantify
variables are not explicitly included in the population susbsystem. However, in
many cases they are implicit in model relationships. For example, education, a
quantifiable variable that is strongly associated with attitude change, is
assumed to have a significant impact on fertility, age of marriage, and
migration. Likewise, income and income distribution-proxy variables that
reflect sanitation conditions among other things-determine death rates.
BACHUE's economic subsystem contains 13 productive sectors, catego-
rized according to whether they are modern or traditional and whether they are
urban, rural, or split between urban and rural (Table 9.1). Private investment,
exports, import substitution, input requirements per unit output, income
elasticity of demand, and price elasticity of demand are exogenously
determined for each sector except agriculture. Technical coefficients relating
inputs to outputs are held constant. An exogenous constraint is generally
placed on the growth of agricultural productivity, and an additional exogenous
constraint is placed either on the rate of growth of aggregate output or on the
balance of payments deficit.
Table 9.1 BACHUE-2 production sectors
Modern Traditional
Urban
Split
Rural
mining
modern consumer goods
other manufacturers
modern services and
wholesale trade
government
construction
transportation and
public utilities
export crops
forestry
traditional consumer goods
traditional services and
retail trade
domestic food crops
livestock and fishing
From all these exogenous parameters and from information about the
demographic and income distribution subsystems, the economic subsystem
endogenously calculates, by economic sector, consumption demand, final
demand, total output, and value-added. Only one price is calculated
endogenously, the relative price index for rural versus urban products.
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The economic subsystem is primarily determined by demand and by
exogenous influences. Given the modelers' goal of closing the economic-de-
mographic feedback loops, the exogenous representation of such important
economic variables as investment and aggregate output seems surprising. The
modelers justify this decision by the following four arguments: 10
I ..A realistic generation of aggregate output in the model would have
required a complete disaggregated system of prices ... It is very easy to think
of simple ways to generate investment and output endogenously at an
aggregate level, but we do not consider that a highly aggregated supply side
would add significantly to the power of the model,'
2. 'The influence of demand can be underrated in production-oriented
models. Demographic changes are likely to have important impacts on
patterns of demand, and thus on the nature of economic growth.'
3. 'There is considerable uncertainty as to the relationships between
demographic factors and output growth as a whole, particularly in relation
to issues such as natural resource availability, facility of structural change,
and the rate and nature of technical progress. Without substantial
additional research, we considered it unwise to develop this area.'
4. 'The values of output embodied in government plans and targets are
themselves valid as a framework for analysis, since it is in the context of such
plans and targets that alternative policies would be designed and tested.'
Resource availability, land use, ecological variables, markets, and supply
constraints from labor or capital are all omitted from the model. Socio-political
and institutional forces impinging on economic behavior, such as attitudes
towards risk, economic goals. and effects of uncertainty are omitted. Monetary
system variables such as inflation, exchange rates, and credit structures are also
omitted.
The income distribution subsystem calculates various categories of employ-
ment for each sector-rural and urban employment, skilled and unskilled
employment, self-employment and wage employment, etc. From employment
and values-added it calculates individual wages and non-wage incomes and
translates them into household incomes. Income, income distribution, and
household family size determine private consumption.
The modelers have omitted from their representation of income distribution
nearly all of the variables sociologists and psychologists stress when discussing
that subject, variables such as social structure, self-esteem, entrepreneurship,
competitiveness, race, access to information, power relationships, and other
sources of cultural diversity. Ownership of wealth is not clearly distinguished
from receivership of income, although a self-employed category appears in the
labor market disaggregation. The income-distribution subsystem essentially
mirrors the visible and countable aspects of the existing distribution system,
without representing directly the underlying forces that caused it to evolve that
way or that might change it in the future.
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E. STRUCTURE
Imagine the problems that would confront an engineer assigned to design a
20-legged robot that could dance the lead role in Swan Lake. The first
problem would be the intrinsic clumsiness of things with many parts. How do
you keep them from getting snarled up? How do you develop control
mechanisms that keep the legs moving together in sensible patterns so the
position of each is correct relative to the positions of the others? If the engineer
were ingenious enough to perform this task, a second problem would appear.
How do you program in advance the movement of 20 legs in a fashion that an
audience will find intelligible, much less graceful?
The design problems the BACHUE modelers created for themselves when
they opted to build a disaggregated feedback model are not unlike the
problems confronting our hypothetical engineer. A feedback model is, in
effect, a robot whose appendages are numbers rather than physical hardware.
And as with the problem of 20 legs, the difficulties of coordinating feedbacks
in a way that mimics real-world behavior increase very rapidly with the number
of parts. Indeed, in some ways the robot problem is much simpler than
BACHUE's disaggregated feedback problem. With the 20-leg robot one at
least knows that the knee bone is connected to the thigh bone in every leg. In
the interplay between 152 population groups, it may be difficult even to
establish which variable is linked to which, much less whether the whole works
is really being controlled by some force that has not been taken into account.
Yet despite the seeming impossibility of the task, the reasons for
undertaking that task are apparent. If you have come to see the world as a
series of interacting feedbacks, it is clear that realistic representation of system
behavior req uires attention to feed back structures. If the information stream in
which you live is rich in categorical detail and you are tuned in to the
importance of group differentiation, it will be hard to accept a model that
excludes such detail.
In describing BACHUE's structure, we shall proceed subsystem by
subsystem as we did in describing boundaries.
BACHUE's demographic component serves to keep track of the total size of
the population, and to produce such information about attainments, rural-ur-
ban distribution, and age profiles as is required by other model components.
The biological reality of aging and the theory of the demographic transition are
the primary bases upon which the demographic sector is built.
Population moves automatically through a sex-compartmentalized age-co-
hort structure with the passage of time. Births are a function of (among other
things) the number of women of childbearing age. A fraction of each age
group, a relatively high fraction for the very old and very young, a relatively
low fraction for other groups, dies each time period.
The aging module is not conceptually difficult. It is a system we all know
well; it contains many repetitions of identical forms; there are few cross-flows,
and most flows are uni-directional and sequential (people don't change sex, nor
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do they move from older to younger age groups nor from more-educated to
less-educated levels). Only observable physical flows-in this case flows of
people-are being accounted for.
This biological part of the population module does not deal with the most
important questions about the demographic sector; namely, what determines
fertility, mortality, education, and migration. The BACHUE modelers have
formalized a version of the theory of demographic transition in order to deal
with fertility and mortality. The theory of demographic transition holds that
the process of industrialization generates a demographic shift from a
high-fertility, high-mortality norm to a low-fertility, low-mortality norm, with
the mortality decrease preceding the fertility decrease by several decades.
Factors hypothesized to be responsible for the fertility decrease include:
I. A change in the economic and social value of children as the population
becomes more urbanized and fewer people live directly from the land.
2. Changes in family structure, particularly women's roles resulting from
female participation in wage labor and education-related value shifts.
3. Relaxation of the pressures to bear many children in order to ensure
survival of a few.
The mortality decline is generally thought to result from improved sanitation,
new medical techniques, control of infectious diseases, and improvement of
nutrition and housing conditions.
The BACHUE modelers have translated the above theories into their model
in rather literal terms. To simulate urbanization they have replicated the
biological module twice, once for urban population, once for rural population,
and then have added migration between the two. Fertility and mortality are
assumed to be affected by the same factors in rural and urban locations, but the
resulting demographic patterns may be very different because their determi-
nants (such as education) are not distributed evenly in urban and rural regions.
Education is tabulated in the model for each age, sex, and location group.
Education is ranked in three levels: less than primary education (illiterate),
completed primary, and completed secondary education. The number in each
age-sex-Iocation group having attained each level of education is a function of
exogenously-determined dropout rates and enrollment rates. Once the age
group has passed through its school-age years, the number of educated people
in rural and urban sectors can be changed only by rural-urban migration.
The determination of fertility has been broken down into two sub-questions:
age of female marriage and age-specific fertility within marriage. Age of
marriage is assumed to be a function of the educational and labor-participation
characteristics of women between the ages of 15 and 29. The more educated
women in that age group and the higher the proportion engaged in wage labor,
the higher will be the average age of marriage. The other factor determining
the birth rate, marital fertility, is assumed to decrease with increased life
expectancy, with increases in the fraction of the population with more than a
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primary education, with increases in female labor participation, and with
decreases in the fraction of the population engaged in agriculture. This
formulation will produce higher fertility in rural areas than in urban areas,
which contain no agricultural production, and which usually have higher
education levels and higher life expectancies than rural areas. Both age of
marriage and marital fertility are assumed to change instantly with changes in
their determining variables.
Mortality in BACHUE is a function of income level and income distribution.
The function is non-linear; as incomes increase and income distribution
becomes more even, the effects on mortality become less and less strong.
Health services and nutrition are not explicitly represented but are assumed to
be correlated with income.
Demographers have found that the distribution of marriage, child-bearing,
and mortality across the age groups of populations tends to follow regular,
stable patterns. Statistical summaries of these patterns-termed life tables-
are available for many populations. If one assumes that the age-specific
patterns of marriage, birth, and death contained in a life table will continue,
one can use a life table to transform an aggregate demographic statistic into
age-disaggregate data. This is precisely what the BACHUE modelers have
done to convert average age of marriage into age-specific marriage rates,
marital fertility into age-specific fertility rates, and life expectancy into
age-specific death rates. That is, once the life expectancy has been determined
to be 42 or 67 or whatever, a table of coefficients is used to look up the
mortality rates of 0-1 year olds, 1--4 year olds, etc., in typical populations with
42 (or 67) year life expectancies.
The use of life tables exemplifies a common strategy for reducing the
complexity of disaggregate structures. Just as movement of a 20-leg robot
could be simplified by keeping the legs moving in constant relationship with
each other, the dynamics of many variables can be simplified by assuming that
one kind of event, such as birth or death, is distributed among different
population groups in constant proportions. The danger of such an approach, of
course, is that real-system proportions may not be constant. However, this
danger is probably minimized in the distribution of factors with strong
biological determinants such as mortality and fertility across population age
categories.
Having formulated a structure describing the internal population dynamics
of urban and rural populations, the modelers next formulate the migration
between the two. Here the same basic life table strategy is utilized, but in a
more complex way because more variables have to be brought together and
redistributed into more categories. An aggregate propensity to migrate is
calculated as a function of social variables from elsewhere in the model. This
propensity to migrate is then passed through a matrix of coefficients to
generate not only age- and sex-specific migration rates, but also education-spe-
cific ones. These disaggregated migration rates are then further modified by a
function depending on the relationship of urban population numbers to rural
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population numbers (different functions are used for urban-rural and
rural-urban migration). The specific migration functions are described in detail
in Chapter 13.
Compared with BACHUE's demographic subsystem, the economic subsys-
tem is more a mechanical accounting sequence and less an attempt to simulate
real-world processes. We will describe the economic subsystem here in
(roughly) its order of calculation. This done, we shall step back and look at the
structural properties inherent in this sequence.
The computational steps in the BACHUE economic subsystem are:
I. Calculation of final demand.
2. Calculation of total production needed to meet final demand.
3. Adjustment for exogenous constraints on economic growth and calculation
of the amounts of demand satisfied by imports and domestic production.
4. Accounting for model elements affected by production such as capital
accumulation, taxes, and balance of payments.
The basic sequence is illustrated in Figure 9.2, with the many sets of constant
coefficients that regulate the computations emphasized by enclosing them in
double boxes.
Final demand has four components: household consumption, government
spending, investment, and exports. Export demand for each economic sector
grows at an exogenously-determined rate. Aggregate investment is also
exogenously determined. It is divided into three categories-housing,
government, and private investment. The share of government is a policy
variable. Housing investment is a function of the share of rents in household
consumption. The remainder of private investment is the residual (the assumed
total minus the assumed government share minus the endogenously-calculated
housing share). Investment is apportioned to the various sectors according to a
set of constant allocation coefficients.
Aggregate government expenditures may be calculated in several ways.
They may be completely exogenous. They may be a function of population size
and of GOP per capita (this formulation is used in BACHUE-Philippines).
They may be proportional to government revenues (calculated in the last
model iteration), or proportional to government revenues with added demand
created by government programs simulated in the model. No matter how
aggregate government demand is calculated, it is apportioned among the
sectors through use of a set of constant coefficients-the assumption being that
the sectoral distribution of government spending will remain constant.
The last component of final demand, household consumption (see Figure
9.2), is both the largest component and the one most tied to BACHUE's
major feedbacks. Household consumption of any sector's product is deter-
mined separately for each income decile and for urban and rural populations.
The same equation form is used for all groups. Variations come through
differences in the constant coefficients used.
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Household consumption is total household income minus taxes minus
savings. Savings are assumed to be a linear function of the specified household
income category and of family size. Total household consumption is obtained
by multiplying consumption per household by the number of households in
each population group. Consumption in each economic sector is then made a
function of total consumption, household size, and relative price.
Once calculated, final demand is put through an input-output matrix to
determine gross demand, the total production including interindustry
exchanges. needed to meet final demand. Constant coefficients are used,
therefore invariant linear proportions are assumed in the purchases each
economic sector makes from other sectors. Gross demand is assumed to be
filled by a mixture of domestic production and imports. The modelers must
distinguish between the two. for they have very different effects on the system.
Information on the sectoral composition of domestic production is central for
determining income flows in the income-distribution subsystem. Imports, on
the other hand. affect the balance of payments but do nothing to domestic
income distribution. Separation of imports from domestic production is
attained by controlling the fraction of demand fulfilled domestically with an
exogenous set of coefficients of import substitution.
One variant of BACHUE is purely demand-driven; that is. it assumes that
domestic production is automatically equal to the gross demand as calculated
using the input-output matrix (with the exception of agricultural production,
described below). The more commonly-used version. the version used in the
Philippine model. assumes that there is a limit to how fast domestic production
can expand. This limit is simulated by introducing a constraint of 7% per year
on the growth of aggregate output. If the constraint is imposed and the
demand-indicated production exceeds the constraint. all demand components,
imports and exports, values-added and domestic production are reduced to the
maximum amount the constraint will permit. The adjustment is distributed
equiproportionally among model sectors.
An additional constraint is imposed in the domestic foodcrop production
sector in order to represent the land constraint on agriculture and the sector's
slowness to adopt structural changes. Labor productivity in the agriculture
sector is constrained to grow at around 3% per year (slightly higher if
agricultural prices rise). The agricultural labor force may be rising or shrinking.
depending in part on labor dynamics calculated in the income-distribution
subsystem and in part on rural-urban migration rates. The dynamic result of the
labor productivity constraint is thus tied into complex feedback processes and
is not easily predicted by intuition. One can say with certainty. however. that
agricultural output will not grow in the model at more than 3% per year unless
there is high migration into rural areas. which is unlikely.
This constraint on domestic food crops combined with rapid population
growth, will cause domestic food production to be well below demand. The
model will make up the demand shortfall partly by imports. Such a demand
shortfall is also assumed to cause a shift in the relative terms of trade between
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rural and urban production sectors. A shortage of domestic food crop
production raises prices not only for domestic food crops, but for export crops,
fishing, livestock, and forestry as well. Higher prices feed back to alleviate the
excessive demand situation by increasing domestic food-crop labor productiv-
ity somewhat and by reducing household demand for agricultural products.
This is the only price mechanism in the model.
Once domestic output, imports, and exports have been calculated. the
economic subsystem's main tasks are essentially complete. The calculation
sequence then turns to information-organizing chores. manipulating the
information it has produced into performance indices that will be useful to
other subsystems. Values-added are distributed between urban and rural
locations. Government revenues are calculated. Taxes are levied on incomes
(generated in the income distribution subsystem), on imports, on output, and
for some sectors on values-added (at exogenously determined rates).
Government spending is then subtracted from government revenues to give an
indication of Government surplus or deficit. A balance-of-payments index is
tabulated from imports, exports, foreign income transfers (from the income
distribution subsystem), and domestic excise taxes.
Finally, capital accumulation is calculated. Capital in any sector is equal to
capital in the last time interval, plus investment, minus depreciation. To
compute investment, aggregate investment (which, as previously stated. is
exogenous) is broken down by sector. This formulation operates on the
premise that the greater the increase in a sector's value-added and the greater
its capital requirements per unit output, the greater will be its share of
aggregate investment. Depreciation is assumed proportional to domestic
output. Capital, it should be noted, is calculated only to generate information
used in the income distribution subsystem. It has no influence on output, on
input requirements for production, or on other aspects of the economic
subsystem.
BACHUE's economic subsystem is strikingly different from the demog-
raphic subsystem previously described. The demographic subsystem is
arranged around 152 state variables flowing into one another in orderly
sequence, dictated primarily by biological laws. By contrast, BACHUE's
economic subsystem does not represent the real flows of resources through
various inventories and processing stages to final manufactured goods, nor the
decisions governing those flows, nor the information upon which such
decisions are based. The sector is dominated by exogenous parameters. The
operating logic is the mathematical necessity of making certain computations
so that the final result comes out roughly right, even though those
computations do not match any identifiable operation in the real system.
In the demographic subsystem there is good reason to believe that the
coefficients used are indeed very nearly constant in the real system.
Cross-cultural and time-series examination both reveal fairly stable trends for
age distribution of demographic events. In the economic subsystem there is less
reason to assume the constants used will remain constant. Input-output
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coefficients can certainly be expected to change in a period of economic
development. as can the composition of investment, exports, or government
spending.
In nearly every case the modelers have admitted that the constant
assumptions are regrettable, but necessary because they could not acquire
sufficient data to make the relationships variable or did not want to
complicate the model in order to do so.
lt should be noted that the basic assumption behind the economic sector is
that production follows directly from demand and is not constrained by the
scarcity of any factor of production. This assumption is completely opposite
from the central economic postulate of LTSM and TEMPO-that production
is dependent upon capital and that population growth slows production
growth by diverting output away from capital investment and into consump-
tion. In BACHUE more rapid population growth leading to more consump-
tion will spur economic growth by increasing demand and will not slow
investment (which is exogenous) at all. The only factor that might drag down
the economy would be a distribution of income so unequal that the masses of
people are unable to consume and thus to stimulate more production.
When the economic subsystem calculations are complete for one interval of
simulated time, the following information has been generated:
1. Values-added for 13 sectors, grouped as to whether they are urban or rural
and whether they are modern or traditional.
2. Capital accumulation of 13 sectors.
3. Domestic output for the 13 sectors.
4. Government revenues.
The demographic subsystem, at the end of a simulated interval, has calculated
the numbers of people in 152 population groups classed by education, sex,
age, and location.
The problem before the income distribution subsystem is to put together
the above information and come up with some indication of who gets
what-of how income is distributed among different population groups. Of
particular concern to the model's sponsoring organization, the International
Labor Organization, are the differences between urban and rural incomes
and the employment prospects for educated and uneducated workers in
traditional and modern sectors.
The general strategy used in the income distribution subsystem is as
follows. First the total labor supply is calculated by applying endogenous
labor force participation rates to each of the demographic subsystem's age,
sex, location, and education groups. These labor participation functions were
formulated, like many other relationships in BACHUE, on the basis of
several statistical experiments to sort out important determining factors from
unimportant ones. In the case of the Philippines, the statistics indicate that
important factors (included in the model) are household headship, education,
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income, availability of modern sector employment. and, for married females.
fertility.
Given the labor supply. the model then subtracts away from each age. sex.
etc. category the unemployed. Unemployment is calculated in different ways
for different categories. For instance, urban educated workers tend to become
more unemployed as modern sector jobs become less available and as wages
slip relative to wage expectations. Urban uneducated employment. in contrast.
depends only on the differential between educated and uneducated wages in
the modern sector.
Now that the number of employed workers is known. the share each
employment group will get of each sector's value-added is ascertained. The
employed workers are allocated to each economic sector according to a
complicated series of calculations involving capital. technical progress. and
other factors. Wages and self-employed incomes are determined by dividing
the appropriate share of the sector's value-added by the number employed.
Finally, corrections are made for multiple job-holding. variation of income is
accounted for, calculations are made to account for rents, taxes, and
urban-rural income transfers, and information is compiled into aggregate
indices of household income and income distribution for urban and rural
population.
To make the above general strategy specific to various sector groups and
employment categories, the modelers have had to formulate numerous
hypotheses. For example, rules had to be set down for calculating. for each of
the model's 13 economic sectors, the respective shares of value-added going to
educated, uneducated. and self-employed persons. First non-wage shares are
calculated. For each sector they are assumed to be a function of the relative
contributions of urban and rural sectors to the economy's total value-added
(hypothesizing a connection between degrees of urbanization and the fraction
of the pie taken by the profit-earning class). What remains after non-wage
shares are taken out is split between educated and uneducated wage earners.
The gain in the uneducated's share is proportional to the increase in
uneducated workers in the sector. What remains after the uneducated's share
has been subtracted becomes the educated's share.
Further formulas establish labor mobility between sectors. Patterns of
change are based on wage differences between sectors. This representation,
combined with the fact that wages are the quotient in the share of value-added
per employee, establishes a corrective feedback loop that will attempt to keep
workers distributed in such a way that all sectors have equivalent wages.
Once wages and employment have been calculated, the subsystem must
convert them into indices of household income. This final step takes into
account variations in income within income groups and variations in the
number of employed persons in each household. The book-keeping involved in
these calculations is quite intricate. However, the structure is based exclusively
on use of constant coefficients, and the step is essentially an accounting one.
Having examined the structure of BACHUE's three subsystems, we should
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Figure 9.3 BACHUE reference structure
step back and look at the total structure that is created when these three
subsystems are linked. The Reference Structure diagram is shown in Figure
9.3. The model is basically demand-driven--eapital, labor, and resources do
not constrain production, although there is an exogenous constraint on the rate
of growth of total output. Demand is largely influenced by income and by
demographic structure. Changes in income distribution and in total income will
change the sectoral composition of output, as will changes in age structure and
location of population. Alteration of sectoral composition has extensive
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ramifications in the income distribution subsystem, causing shifts in sectoral
values~added, then wages, and then sectoral employment. Shifts in wages, in
turn, may affect rural-urban migration patterns.
If children receive more education than did their parents, when they come of
age and start making the major decisions in the system, fertility will decline.
rural-urban migration will increase. and the portion of population looking for
educated employment will increase. If the system's coefficients are such that
economic growth has exceeded population growth (they probably are, as the
constraint put on economic growth in the standard run is 7% per year-a figure
that population growth cannot reasonably equal), incomes in general will rise
and demand will shift away from agricultural and toward industrial commod-
ities-presumably stimulating growth in the modern urban sectors.
Such are the general flows of causal influence implicit in BACHUE's linked
subsystems. More precise identification of major feedbacks is quite difficult
due to the model's complicated structure. It is possible, and even likely, that
the feedbacks leading through one part of a variable set may have different
behavioral characteristics from the feedbacks leading through some other part
of the same set. For example, rising income could increase consumption of
modern manufactures while decreasing consumption of traditional handi-
crafts. As a result, the feedback loop shown below would be positive for
modern manufacture and negative for traditional handicrafts. A similar loop
for domestic food crops might be positive, but being constrained by labor
productivity growth (as it would be in BACHUE), it might lead to slower
~ ±consumption,+
income per capito production
+~income ./
generation +
growth than does the equivalent loop for modern manufactures. Thus in the
course of aggregate economic growth there would be a decline or leveling of
traditional handicrafts, a modest increase in domestic foodcrop production,
and a spurt of growth in modern manufactures. The important element thus
becomes not the feedback loop per se, but the respective behavior of individual
elements in the sets through which the loop passes.
BACHUE's patterns of causal influences render comprehensive analysis of
structural operation impossible. The best one can hope for is the gradual
accumulation of a 'feel' for the model's behavior, acquired from running the
model over and over and trying to generalize what sorts of changes in inputs
lead to what sorts of dynamic results. This 'feel' for the model, which the ILO
modelers all seem to possess, is not arrived at logically nor can it be checked by
an outside observer, nor does it necessarily lead to a correct interpretation of
why the model does what it does. It is distinguisable from a mental model of the
real Philippine system only in that one has slightly more information about the
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individual relationships in the model, and one has the opportunity to observe
the model system's reaction to a wider variety of inputs and over a much shorter
observation time.
In short, BACHUE's structure and resulting behavior cannot be completely
understood. Though the logic of the model's pieces may be quite clear, in
entirety the model is a mystery that our minds cannot follow. Its output,
therefore, must be assessed through black-box procedures, trying different
inputs and judging the outputs according to their correspondence with those of
other models, including mental models.
F.DATA
BACHUE was created in a data-rich environment. The ILO Population
Employment Project, of which BACHUE was a part, included more than 60
investigations of various economic-demographic relationships, many of which
were quite relevant to BACHUE's problem focus. The modelers drew freely
from the data available to them.
All data sources for BACHUE are identified, and they include a wide variety
of information. At the core of the model is an input-output table aggregated
from a 194-sector table prepared for the 1965 Philippine economy by the
National Economic Council. Labor force data came from a 1968 National
Demographic Survey of the Philippines. Studies of nuptiality and migration
were available from the Population Institute of the University of the
Philippines. Also used were national accounts, several household expenditure
surveys, foreign trade statistics, and data from government ministries on taxes,
prices, and education.
The modelers characterize their information base as 'extensive but patchy,
both in quality and coverage'. II Sufficiently long time series were not generally
available, so cross-sectional data were used extensively, including inter-
national cross-sectional data to supplement Philippine data. In some cases
highly refined derivatives such as standardized life tables were incorporated
into the model. Almost no information was available about such dynamic
factors as technological progress, import substitution, and occupational
mobility, and most of these factors were made exogenous.
For each model subsystem the modelers describe at length the methods they
used to formulate and parameterize the model's equations. As discussed under
method, the modelers used statistical methods both to specify and to estimate
their equations, but in a flexible fashion. Where data were not available for
obviously important variables, such as unemployment, parameters were
guessed. When statistical methods produced results that the modelers
considered unreasonable, the modelers modified the results to conform to their
mental models of the situation. As a general rule, however, the modelers used
statistically-based equations wherever possible, and except for a few central
variables they chose to omit relationships if they could not find adequate
information to quantify them.
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G. TESTING
As a subject for testing. BACHUE is at once intriguing and frustrating,
because it contains so much to be tested. There are scores of parameters whose
sensitivity should be examined. There are a like number of exogenously-fore-
cast variables for which different time trends should be examined. And the
modelers have set the model up in such a way that a large number of its
behavioral relationships are subject to policy modification. Policy parameters
were deliberately chosen so as to make it possible to test the major options
usually discussed among development planners. Questions of the day. such as
large-scale capital-intensive versus small-scale labor-intensive development.
public works programs, promotion of education, family-planning programs,
nationalization of industry. and more progressive income taxes, can be
simulated to a considerable degree of detail. Exploring all these options
thoroughly would be an enormous task.
BACHUE has the interest value of a well-designed game. Its output is a
picture of the model economy with so much detail that it appears very real. The
model is sufficiently complex that its behavior cannot be predicted. and it is
likely to continue to produce surprises even after several hundred simulation
runs. Yet at the same time the model's individual assumptions are fairly
comprehensible, and upon careful examination of model output one can
produce a satisfying. if not necessarily correct. explanation of which
assumptions made the run come out as it did.
To encourage testing by persons other than themselves, the modelers have
developed a conversational version of the model. This version operates on an
interactive computer system. It automatically gives instructions to the user and
makes it easy for people with no familiarity with the computer to try a wide
range of policy tests.
BACHUE has been extensively tested. The modelers reject the possibility
that any model can be proved valid. but they list the following criteria as factors
that can contribute to building confidence in a model:
1. Internal consistency.
2. Quality of data base.
3. Acceptable estimation procedures.
4. Sensitivity to parameter changes that matches real-system sensitivity.
5. Insensitivity to structural changes.
6. Ability to track historical data.
7. General plausibility of model behavior.
The BACHUE team themselves assess the internal consistency of their
model as good, their data base as patchy but no worse than that of other
models. and their estimation procedures (ordinary least squares plus guesses)
as not totally rigorous but appropriate to the quality of the data base. Their
approach to assessing sensitivity to parameter changes is unusual. First they
construct a 27 x 27 cross-impact matrix in which each element ail represents
2lH
the three modelers' estimate of how much of the variation of variable j is
explained by variable i (assuming the relationships are linear). The basis for
each estimate is simply the modelers' intuitive understanding derived from
experience in working with the model. Then the matrix is raised to the flth
power and the rows and columns are summed to give the total forward and
backward linkage effects of each variable after time period fl. This analysis
indicates that the model variables with most effect on other variables are birth
rate, migration rate, age structure, output and employment structure, internal
terms of trade, and exogenous inputs. Income distribution and employment
have relatively little effect.
This elaborate procedure is based only on the modelers' hunches about the
strengths of interaction between variables taken in twos. An outside observer
cannot assess the accuracy of the two-by-two sensitivity estimates, much less
the effect of non-linearities or the concurrent interaction of three or four
variables. Although a thorough exploration by computer of the actual effect of
each variable on the total behavior of the system would be impossibly time
consuming, at least a few runs testing variations of some of the most obviously
uncertain parameters would be helpful.
The BACHUE team has done considerable testing of structural hypotheses
in areas where they or others consider the structure weak. For example, the
assumption of exogenous total output has been altered to represent:
I. No constraint at all on output growth (totally demand-driven).
2. Output growth constrained by balance of payments.
3. Output determined by Cobb-Douglas production function with exogenous
technological progress.
4. The same production function but with technology made an endogenous
function of population growth.
All these changes except the balance-of-payments constraint slow the
economic growth rate, increase fertility, mortality, and migration, and lead to
deteriorating income distribution. Other tests involve changes in the formula-
tion of technology, imports, exports, human fertility, labor force participation,
and investment. In another test, the time lags in the model (nearly all one-year
lags) are shortened to three months. A much more interesting test would have
been to lengthen them.
These tests show that the model is sensitive to structural change (as most
models are), but the alternate formulations are rejected by the modelers
because in some sector of the model they produce results that are in conflict
with 'conventional economic wisdom', and because each of the changed
structures is still too obviously simple compared to the real system.
So while conceding that output should be endogenous. and that our conclusions
would be on firmer ground if it were, we consider that the supply side would have to
be modeled in considerable detail if it is to be useful. This implies a complex
sectoral output/price system, and extensive analysis of investment. money
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markets. and associated institutions. We did not have the time and resources
needed to develop such a system. U
The BACHUE team does not regard short-term tracking of historical data as
a very meaningful test for a long-term simulation model; however. this test has
been carried out by running the model from 1965 to 1975 with smoothed
historic values for the exogenous variables. As expected. the model does not
duplicate short-term fluctuations and cycles (it was not designed to). but it does
follow the ten-year trend of the Philippine socio-economic system.
The final test of confidence is the ability of the model to generate believable
long-term behavior. In BACHUE 'reference' runs the changes in fertility,
mortality, migration. sectoral economic growth, and income distribution
generally follow those observed for other countries that have industria lized in
the past. Whether this future is actually believable for the Philippines depends
on one's expectations about how future global conditions may differ from the
past; whether, for example, international trade will break down, fusion power
will become feasible, nuclear war will occur, or all nations will become sharing,
altruistic, and globally-concerned. BACHUE assumes that none of these
'surprises' will occur. and therefore it generates unsurprising results; the
Philippine economy industrializes smoothly and slowly along more or less
typical growth curves.
H. CONCLUSIONS
The 'reference' run, reflecting continuation of current policies and attitudes in
the Philippines and a 7% limit on aggregate growth rate, shows a rapid
economic development. By the year 2000 the Philippines reaches a
development level comparable to current Spain or Greece, or Japan of the
early 1960s. The population has doubled and is still growing at 2% per year.
Urban and industrial sectors grow most rapidly, but rising food demand
improves the terms of trade of agriculture. Unemployment decreases and
income inequality improves somewhat but the poorest 20% still have incomes
well below the average Philippine income of 1965. 14
The modelers begin their policy tests with investigations of individual policy
Ievers--education, family planning, stimulation or inhibition of migration,
changing employment conditions (wage subsidies, enhanced mobility, etc.),
and public works programs. These policies are tested in various forms and
intensities. The individual policy tests build toward a series of tests of
integrated policy strategies. A package of 15 parameters and sets of parameters
(e. g. total output growth rate and sector-specific growth of import demand) are
simultaneously varied to simulate an industrialization strategy. A second such
package simulates a rural development strategy, a third outlines a strategy
designed to promote more equal distribution of income, and a fourth aims to
simulate the policy strategy formulated for the Philippines by the 1973 ILO
Comprehensive Employment Strategy Mission.
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The BACHUE study's main conclusions are derived from generalization
and interpretation of these individual and policy-package conclusions. These
we shall paraphrase from the modelers' description of them.
First, the modelers conclude that income distribution is very stable and not
easily influenced by the policies available in the model. They found that
absolute income levels on the whole could be affected, as could the distribution
of poverty between urban and rural areas. They also found that comprehensive
policy packages tended to have more influence on income distribution than did
individual policies. However, barring structural alterations that are not
possible to simulate with BACHUE, the modelers conclude that poverty
cannot be eliminated through conventional political means.
Second, 'demographic response to economic change is varied and often
important-at least as important as economic response to demographic
change, the direction of causation that is usually stressed'. 15 Fertility was found
to be quite policy sensitive-but not as sensitive to a direct family-planning
policy as it was to policies directed toward promotion of income equality.
Slower population growth as a whole had little effect on poverty reduction, at
least over the 25-year time horizon of the model.
Third, the urban-rural interface was found to be crucial. Terms of trade
between agricultural and industrial sectors were found to influence incomes,
demand patterns, migration, and the course of development in general. This
interface was found to be policy-sensitive, often in ways that are not intuitively
obvious-for example, policies to increase agricultural productivity increased
poverty in rural areas but decreased it in urban areas.
Fourth, migration policies were found to be more efficient levers for
influencing human welfare through the turn of the century than were
fertility-reduction programs. The greater effectiveness of migration policies
was attributed to the model assumptions that migration operates much more
rapidly to change the characteristics of a population than does fertility.
These main policy conclusions are supported by an interesting document
comparing BACHUE results with the results from a model of the Korean
economy constructed by Irma Adelman at the World Bank. 1il The Korean
model is in some ways the antithesis of BACHUE: it is a short-term model,
population is exogenous but investment and output are endogenous, markets
and prices are included in detail, with firms and households optimizing their
economic responses, the monetary system is included. Despite these differ-
ences, and the differences in the Korean and Philippine economies, both
models produce the basic conclusions listed above.
In broadest terms, the BACHUE conclusions began from the modelers'
preconception that TEMPO is an inadequate representation of economic-de-
mographic relationships. From this preconception came a more precise set of
hypotheses about economic-demographic interactions formalized into the
model. Then came specific policy conclusions based on the results of
experiments performed with the model. Finally, out of specific policy
conclusions evolved general conclusions about relative influences of various
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types of policy. Conclusions from the first two stages (which we might call input
conclusions) are directly linked to conclusions in the latter two stages (which
we might call output conclusions). Sometimes the linkage is so direct that it
approaches a tautology. For example. the modelers conclude that feedback
from economic conditions to demographic behavior-which has been omitted
from TEMPO-is important. Therefore they include strong demographic-eco-
nomic feedbacks in the model structure. Model output shows economic-de-
mographic feedback is important. and the modelers confirm their original
conclusion.
In other cases the interaction of input conclusions resulted in unexpected
output and truly model-generated conclusions. For example. the modelers
themselves appear surprised to find that increases in productivity in the
agricultural sector have a pronounced tendency to lower rural incomes.
Likewise, they seem not to have expected migration to play such a major role in
leveling income distribution. Or, in a reverse direction. the modelers framed
the model structure in such a way that education plays a large behavioral role.
They report, after examining various runs featuring education policies:
The effects of educational changes are widespread, but not particularly large up to
the end of the century. This is partly because average educational levels of the
population respond relatively slowly to changes in the education system. 17
We previously expressed the opinion that BACHUE is too complex to be
completely understood. That complexity prevents a total analysis of which
model assumptions are primarily responsible for its conclusions. and therefore
the conclusions are difficult to assess. However, unproven as it may be.
BACHUE's ability to lead to unexpected results such as those described above
identifies a useful tool for moving analysis out of the rutted pathways of
intuition and generating fresh questions about the operation of a complex
social system.
I. IMPLEMENTAnON
The prototype BACHUE model was developed with hopes that Philippine
nationals would adopt the model as a planning tool and that other nations
would request that similar models be developed. In 1980 BACHUE-2 (the
Philippine version) was housed in the Philippine National Economic and
Development Authority, the body responsible for providing short. medium.
and long-term plans for the country. It was providing a major input into
formulating that body's long-term plans. Also, the Philippine Minister of
Labor maintained close interest in the model's development.
Sinultaneously, interest spread to other nations. In collaboration with
institutions and governments in the respective nations, models for Brazil,
Yugoslavia, and Kenya were being constructed in 1980. Furthermore, the ILO
hired eight people to be located in Latin America. Middle East, Africa. and
Asia for further applications.
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The BACHUE modelers' approach to implementation was deliberate and
energetic. The modelers began in the Philippines in 1974 by holding a three-day
workshop on the model for 50 key people in the Philippine government and
academic planning community. At the workshop they presented an early
version of BACHUE-Philippines, which was operating well enough to
produce examinable results. Model assumptions were explained and discussed.
Criticism was invited and used as a basis for later model revisions. Thereafter, a
Steering Group, composed of leading academics in the population and
economics fields, continued to advise and criticize during the model
development.
The Steering Group served several useful functions. It operated as a quality
control device; it brought into the modeling study people whose criticism, if
voiced from the outside, might have been an impediment to the model's
reception. And it extended the modelers' range of contacts in the international
planning community. Indeed, it was through contacts of the model's Steering
Group that BACHUE's Brazil and Yugoslavia models were started.
So far the modelers have had their greatest implementation success with
BACHUE-Philippines-the only version of the model that was not developed
in the country to which it is applied (BACHUE-Philippines was constructed in
Geneva). The relative success of the foreign-made version was not expected.
Reflecting on that point, one of the BACHUE team writes:
[ once thought this too (that involvement of analysts from the nation being modeled
improved the likelihood of implementation) but am now more equivocal, since
models being used in planning offices or whatever may often only be used if they
back up existing government policy. Those model results that do not back up
government policy may have a better chance of changing government policy if not
developed by government analysts but developed by independent institutions-
preferably in the country concerned. IK
J. COMPllTER REQUIREMENTS
We have no information on the computer capabilities required to run
BACHUE. It is obviously a large model and is not likely to be adapted, like
TEMPO, for hand calculation in countries without computers. We would guess
from the number of runs its makers report in the documentation that it must be
somewhat less expensive to run than the largest models in this survey (RfF,
KASM, and CHAC).
K. DOCUMENTAnON
BACHUE's present state of documentation illustrates a recurrent conflict in
model building. Getting a model into a position of influence requires a huge
amount of time with public relations, administration. and (verbal) communica-
tions about the model. Of course it also involves much time and thought
devoted to improvement of the model itself. But documentation is usually not
necessary to impress policymakers, and so it gets done last.
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It takes a versatile, tireless, and extremely talented person to work
simultaneously as a modeler, a public relations man, and an author, without
suffering loss of quality in any of those tasks. The BACHU E team has worked
for high standards in all three aspects. They appear to have managed the
work-allocation problem through close relationships among team members,
with each of the project's principal workers having a hand in all aspects of
model development. Regardless, it has been a very demanding task, in which
everything has taken longer than expected.
A book on the BACHUE model was published in 197R. I'} It is an honest
attempt to make the model, its potential, its assumptions, and its conclusions
clear and examinable. The language used has the tone of experience in
communicating the model to planners, economists, and demographers.
Disciplinary proprieties, such as identification of data sources, and treatment
and specification of the parameter changes made for a given run are carefully
observed. Formats are worked out for ease of understanding-for example, a
consistent and carefully chosen set of indicators is used to describe model
output, and a constant presentation format is included for each of the model's
three subsystems. Vocabulary, though geared to an academic audience, is kept
as free from jargon and unnecessary technicalities as possible.
BACHUE's documentation starts off with general introductory statements
addressing questions such as: Why model? What can models do? Why
BACHUE? What can BACHUE do? Why has BACHUE used the approach it
has? In other words, the introduction covers paradigm, purpose, and method.
Following this is a review of the main BACHUE assumptions and conclusions.
Then come detailed chapters on the Philippine economy and on the three main
subsectors of the model. One chapter covers validation, and two long chapters
discuss results of policy tests as single policies and as policy packages.
Given the great complexity of the model, the documentation is remarkably
clear. The results of statistical tests that led to specification of the model
relationships are described, and reasons for accepting or rejecting the
statistical conclusions are discussed. The discussion throughout indicates an
honest desire to communicate the model, a well-thought-through modeling
philosophy, great care in model formulation, and considerable familiarity with
the way the model runs. Unfortunately, a thorough 'feel' for a model of this size
is almost impossible to translate into words. It is derived only from years of
working with the model itself. The BACHUE modelers have undoubtedly
learned a great deal from making the model, only a small portion of which they
can capture in the verbal documentation.
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CHAPTER 10
KASM: Not a Puree but a Stew
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
In the late 1960s the Technical Assistance Bureau of the United States Agency
for International Development (USAID) decided to conduct a comprehensive
analysis of each economic sector of a recipient country, to obtain an overview
before reaching a decision about aid programs. Sector analyses, as these
comprehensive overviews are called, have since been performed for a number
of economic sectors in a number of aid-recipient nations. The methods used in
these analyses have varied greatly, ranging from predominantly qualitative to
predominantly quantitative approaches. In several cases a computer model has
been included.
The Korean Agricultural Sector Simulation Model (KASS in its first version,
KASM thereafter) was begun in 1971 as part of an attempt to broaden sector
analysis so that it could be useful to the analyzed nation as well as to USAID.
The Korean modeling effort was done in the Agricultural Economics and
Systems Science Department of Michigan State University (MSU).
KASM was the second sector analysis MSU did for USAID. The first was a
non-modeI-based, large-scale study (35 professional man-years, $1.5 million)
ofthe Nigerian agricultural sector. The complexities and high cost of that effort
led to the suggestion by some of the MSU staff that a computer simulation
model might help to co-ordinate and process information generated in sector
analyses. A prototype simulation model of the Nigerian agricultural sector was
worked out. I Civil war in Nigeria prevented further development or
implementation of the modeling project, however, so the country of
application was changed to South Korea. Much of the basic structure of the
Nigerian model was retained, and within nine months the model had been
adapted to the conditions and data base of Korea. C
To make this project useful to the recipient country as well as to AID, close
involvement with a Korean planning institution was necessary. The institution
225
226
selected was Korea's National Agricultural Economics Research Institute
(NAERI), a branch of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF). At
the onset of the KASM project NAERI's responsibility had recently been
shifted from farm-management research to national policy analysis. When the
MSU team began the project, they described NAERI as in the process of
transition from micro-economic, farm-level orientation to a broader national
analysis and management viewpoint.
The KASM project consisted of three interrelated efforts:
1. The simulation model.
2. An American/Korean planning team in Seoul assigned to establish a
modern planning system for MAF, using the model as well as other
planning tools.
3. A training program, primarily conducted at MSU, in which Koreans would
learn modern planning techniques, including use of the computer model.
Koreans and Americans worked together to be sure that the model could deal
with the questions of concern to Korea and that Koreans could understand,
use, and update the model.
Beyond the common aim of establishing systematic planning around a
computer model, NAERI, USAID, and MSU each had their own institu-
tional purpose for making the model. Presumably NAERI welcomed outside
expertise at this time of expansion of its responsibilities. At any rate, it had
obvious incentives to incorporate suggestions from the dispenser of United
States aid funds. USAID originally commissioned the Korean study because
it wanted to identify bottlenecks, constraints, and limitations hindering
development in the agricultural sector, to assess the effects of different policy
strategies on the agricultural sector, and to establish priority areas for aid
funds. 4 And a perpetual background concern of USAID was to justify to the
United States Congress, by whom the AID budget is appropriated, the
expenditure of foreign aid funds. MSU, as well as wanting to meet the
planning needs of USAID and Korea, undertook the study with their own
institutional goals in mind. The MSU group believed in systems simulation as
a policy tool. They were eager to demonstrate and disseminate systems
methods in agricultural planning. The study was undertaken with specific
intent to build up a library of agriculture-related computer programs to assist
other institutions in expanding their analytic capability. The project also
generated funds and research topics for about 30 graduate students and
provided overhead funds to sustain the Agricultural Economic Department's
Development Analysis Program. 5
Thus the KASM project developed in a synergistic association of three
diverse and geographically distant organizations. Communication was main-
tained through regular written progress reports and through periodic travel of
American and Korean personnel between Seoul and Washington and East
Lansing, Michigan. The project continued as MSU's responsibility for five
227
years, and in 1977 the emphasis shifted to transferring all maintenance and
further development of the model to Korea.
B. PURPOSE
According to the most specific description the modelers give, the model was
constructed:
1. To be able to project the implications over a 1S-year period of the Korean
government's third five-year plan and two alternatives to that plan.
2. To be 'capable of handling a broad range of future policy alternatives'. 6
These are not very distinctly defined policy goals. Rather, the MSU team
sought to create a comprehensive model that could shed light on many different
agricultural policies. The main guidelines that were used to limit the model's
scope were the focus on the agricultural sector and the IS-year time horizon.
This is the first model we have described that is directed more toward specific
decision-making than toward long-term understanding or broad policy for-
mulation. The modeling team worked closely with agricultural planners from
the beginning of the project. They listened to the problems and questions of the
agricultural ministry and tried to produce a model that could answer virtually
all its questions. In contrast to the models we have examined so far, the KASM
model is product-oriented. It is envisioned as an on-going, continuously-
revised, frequently-consulted management tool. As we shall see, this purpose
required and produced a very different sort of model from the process-oriented
models discussed so far.
C.METHOD
A pluralistic approach to modeling prevails in MSU's Agricultural Economics
Department. The dominant attitude is 'all modeling techniques have
something to offer-use each in its proper place'. Accordingly, the approach
used by the KASM team was broad and eclectic. The KASM model includes
every modeling technique we have discussed in this book. Simultaneous
equations, regression analysis, linear programming, and input-Dutput analysis
are all incorporated within a core model that is essentially a dynamic
simulation. Flexible modules for representation of repeating structural forms
(such as delays, non-linear relationships, and passage of a population through a
series of age cohorts) have been devised and used.
The model is divided into components, and has grown by adding new
components. Each component tends to fill one functional role in the model and
to be dominated by one modeling technique. For example, the Farm Resource
Allocation and Production component (FRESAL) is a linear program that
determines the optimal allocation of land and agricultural inputs to various
crops. The National Economic component (NECON), which represents the
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non-agricultural economy, is based on a small (16-sector) input-output model.
The Oemand-Price-Trade component (0EMANO) solves sets of simultaneous
equations to calculate consumption, demand, and price for farm and non-farm
commodities.
Typically a component was built by one person or group, developed as an
independent unit, and then linked to the full KASM model. As most
components are frequently different from those used in the next, the linking of
components required considerable reaggregation, redefinition, unit conver-
sion, and other sorts of interface accounting. In one case, the grain management
program (GMP), the calculation interval required to capture events of interest
(two days) wasso different from thatofthe other components (one year) that the
linkage was never made. The GMP is used as a separate model.
The modeling schools combined in KASM in a way quite different from that of
BACHUE, the other cross-paradigm model we have described. BACHUE uses
ideas and techniques from econometrics and system dynamics in a consistent
blend throughout the model. KASM is less like a puree than like a stew; large
chunks of distinct model types are combined, with simulation as the surrounding
gravy. This approach allows many modelers with different kinds of expertise to
work on the model separately. It also allows flexibility in using the model.
[The] components can be either run together to carry out a general sector
analysis ...or individual components can be decoupled and run to perform
specialized analysis related to particular subsectors such as population, farm
production, demand, etc. 7
KASM thus contains sections of dynamic simulation that are intended to be
literal representations of decisions and processes with the Korean agricultural
system, and other sections that are 'black boxes', mathematical abstractions
designed to calculate the results of such decisions and processes by arriving at
them through a completely different logical chain than the one that pertains in
the real world. The KASM modelers feel that this combination captures the
advantages of both approaches:
The 'black box' approach is based on past observations from an existing system and
cannot be used in designing a new system that does not yet exist. On the other hand,
in certain management problems the task at hand is to manage an existing system
whose inner workings are unknowable. In this case the 'black box' approach is the
only recourse. In summary then, the nature ofthe system will determine which of the
approaches should be applied or in what combination both should be applied.
Clearly, use of the two approaches together brings more information to bear on the
modeling problem and will generally lead to better models than either approach
alone. H
D. BOUNDARIES
The spectrum of information from which the KASM team has drawn is quite
broad. The effort has been multi-disciplinary, with inputs from the fields of
agronomy, sociology, demography, public administration, and biochemistry, as
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well as the obvious fields of agricultural economics and systems science. The
use of data from many sources, including standard statistics, agricultural
research, and expert opinion, is accepted. 9
As will be noticeable, however, when we discuss specific variables, the
model has not included (and hardly could include) all factors that significantly
affect the operation of the Korean agricultural system. Rather, it has
concentrated on economic factors such as output, profit, and price, from which
are calculated aggregate economic welfare measures such as output per capita.
Cultural factors such as political stability, income distribution, and social
values, and ecological factors such as soil erosion, pollution, and biological
diversity are omitted. The KASM authors include in their general discussions
and even in their system diagrams such factors as personal freedom, equity, air
and water quality, opportunity, and quality of life, 10 but no attempt is made to
include them even indirectly in the model.
Those variables that are included tend to be represented in highly
disaggregated form. There are, for example, 180 population groups (disaggre-
gated by age, sex, and urban-rural location), 19 agricultural commodities, four
land categories, twelve factor inputs to agricultural production, and 16 sectors
in the national economy.
The boundary line between endogenous and exogenous variables has moved
outward from early versions of the Korea model to later ones. The dominance
of exogenous variables was so pronounced in KASS, the first Korea model,
(see inner circle in Figure 10.1) that one critic of the model described it as:
... an accounting device where predetermined time series data for Korean
agriculture 1970-85 (land yield, prices, input costs, birth rates) are translated into
closely related output time series for the same period (farm income, farm
expenditure, food demand, population size). I I
The expansion of boundaries appears to have proceeded as follows. A key
variable in the original model, such as land yield, was represented as
exogenous, although it obviously was determined by factors operating within
the Korean agricultural system. Eventually a new model component was
created, with a structure that represented the variable endogenously. The new
component, however, required information that was not generated by the
existent model structure. Rather than create a new structure to calculate this
needed information endogenously, the modelers added a new set of exogenous
variables.
The above process creates new exogenous variables at least as fast as it
incorporates old ones. In most cases, however, the newly-created exogenous
variables are factors that are more truly exogenous to the system (such as world
prices for agricultural commodities) or conceivable policy instruments for the
Korean government (such as agricultural-input price subsidies, rates of
taxation, and price controls). A few important variables remain, however, that
are clearly endogenous in the real system but exogenous in KASM. Primary
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Figure 10.1 KASM boundary diagram
among these are age-specific birth and death rates, labor productivity, and
input-output relationships.
E. STRUCTURE
KASM is best described not as a model but as a system of six models. 12 The
models can be used separately or linked together to form one extremely
complex representation of the Korean agricultural system. Each of the single
models is equivalent in size to other models described in Part III.
The main connections among the six functional components of the complete
KASM model are shown in Figure 10.2. The six components are:
1. Population component (POPMIG). This sector converts exogenous
age-specific fertility and mortality rates (influenced by birth control and
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public health policies) into 45 two-year age cohorts for males and females in
both farm and non-farm households. Off-farm migration can be either
exogenous or a function of job opportunities and Jiving-standard differen-
tials. 13 The population component influences the rest of the model through
food demand and agricultural labor supply. This component is essentially a
demographic accounting modeL driven entirely by exogenous assumptions.
2. Technology Change component (CHANGE). This component takes
information about input prices. product prices. and government investment
in land and water resources and technology, and calculates how much arable
land will be available. what input application rates will be. and what yields
can be expected. CHANGE is a dynamic model of agricultural innovation.
It begins with many exogenous assumptions about government investments
in technological change and combines these assumptions with price
information and with a geographic diffusion subcomponent to simulate the
spread of new technologies over the available land area. The result is a set of
production functions, which alter constraints and activities of the
optimization model within the next component FRESAL.
3. The Farm Resource Allocation and Production component (FRESAL).
Given land, inputs. technologies, and therefore expected yields from
CHANGE, labor from POPMIG. expected producer prices from the
Demand component. and expected input prices from the National Economic
component, this section of the model represents the farmers' decisions about
how to allocate resources among 19 possible agricultural commodities. The
allocation decision is made by a recursive linear program. with an objective
function of 'cautious' (highly risk-averse) maximization of expected profits.
The component chooses among 61 activities such as production of twelve
annual crops, five livestock commodities. and two perennial crops, capital
investment. financing, importation of grain. and hiring seasonable laborers.
There are 60 constraints. including four land categories, labor, machinery,
and draft-animal limitations. capital stock. feed balances. and financing
constraints. Once the allocation decisions have been made. this sector
calculates agricultural output by crop, total input demands, and farm income.
The parameters within this optimization model are continuously updated by
new information from the CHANGE component.
4. The Demand-Price-Trade component (DEMAND). Agricultural output
from FRESAL, effective demand from POPMIG, and government policies
with regard to stockpiling and pricing are brought together to determine
commodity prices. The model is run in one of three modes:
a. Consumption is set exogenously and prices and import-export balances
are calculated to clear the market.
b. Import-export levels are set and consumption and prices vary.
c. Prices are set and consumption and trade balance calculated.
Substitution across commodities is taken into account. World market prices
are exogeneous. This sector operates by iterative solution of simultaneous
equations.
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5. The National Economy component (NECON). This is a 16-sector
input-output model that generatcs non-farm income, labor needs, and
agricultural input prices. The technical coefficients are assumed constant.
except for agriculture. Labor productivities are exogenous. Final demand
for this sector is determincd partially by input demand from FRESAL.
partially by food demand from DEMAND. partially by exogenous public
investment and exports, and partially by its own internal calculation of
private investment and non-food demand. Private investment for each
sector is assumed to be a function of profit and capacity utilization.
Consumption is a function of price and GOP per capita.
6. Accounting component. This sector generates summary indices, such as
GOP, trade balance. and nutrition levels, utilizing information from all the
other components of the model.
Since each of these components was constructed separately and uses
different assumptions, techniques, and degrees of aggregation. getting them to
mesh involves many interface problems of the sort we have already seen in
BACHUE. For example, all of the 19 crop outputs of the Resource Allocation
component have to be aggregated into one of the 16 sectors of the National
Economy component. Conversely, the 16 labor demand calculations from this
component must be distributed over 180 population categories to determine
migration flows.
It is not possible for us to go into the assumptions within each component as
thoroughly as we have done for previous models in this chapter. Some
important formulations such as migration, technological change. consumption.
and investment will be discussed further in Chapter 13. An idea of the way the
KASM sectors are interrelated can be gained from Figure 10.3. which shows in
simplified form the main causal flows that influence rice output when all model
components are coupled. The two three-dimensional boxes in the diagram
represent optimization routines. In them resources such as land and capital are
allocated simultaneously among the twelve annual crops. An analogous causal
structure could be drawn from the eleven other annual crops in KASM. Were
one to focus on some variable other than the output of rice (for example.
earnings from the export of silk, or per capita protein consumption). one would
see the model from a different, but equally complex perspective. The most
basic interrelationships in the model are summarized in the Reference
Structure diagram, Figure 10.4.
Needless to say, understanding the operation of this model system is
impossible. In three years of training no Korean seems to have come close. An
internal working memo suggests that even the experienced modelers at MSU
had difficulty comprehending the way the model works:
Generally. the increasing complexity of the total model, mainly indicated by the
intensification of linkages between the production. supply, marketing. and
demand subcomponents. makes it more and more difficult to detect the reasons for
a certain model behavior. In other words. the greater complexity results in an
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Figure lOA KASM reference structure
increasing number of 'surprises' in the model output. Although all this may bring
the model closer to the real world situation, one should give some thought to the
optimal level of detail and disaggregation the model results are supposed to
contain. 14
That is not to say that individual components of the model are not
explainable. For example, the KASM team can and does explain fairly clearly
how the linear program in the resource allocation component operates. 15 The
difficulty arises not in understanding individual components, but in under-
standing the interaction of components. How does the linear program in
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FRESAL reallocate capital to or from mulberry or barley production when a
new high-yielding rice variety is assumed in CHANGE? How does economic
information from NECON shift the rural-urban distribution of the population
in POPMIG? If price elasticity of demand assumptions were changed in the
Demand-Price-Trade component, how would that affect agricultural input
usage rates? The KASM team members, after years of running the model.
almost never offer explanations of their results in terms of interlinked
assumptions from several model components. They simply describe the output
and let us decide for ourselves why it might have happened that way.
The reasons why the KASM model has been taken to the point of extreme
complexity compared to other models in our survey are several. First, the
model was intended from the beginning to be useful at the decision-making
level, with a shorter time horizon than our other models and a degree of detail
congruent with the interests and responsibilities of national agricultural
planners. General understanding of the system was not sought-it was
assumed. The importance of foreign investment aid, the necessity for higher
agricultural productivity, the insensitivity of population growth to economic
events, the normal operation of the market, the ability of laborers to adjust
smoothly to changing employment demand, all were taken for granted, and on
the basis of these assumptions, very specific questions about investments,
productivity increases, etc. were asked. Second, the time, resources, and
manpower available to this project were significantly greater than they were for
most other models, and so greater detail was possible. Another complicating
factor may have been the close contact with Korean policymakers. This contact
provided the advantages of model relevance and implementation, but the
disadvantage of a continous stream of current decision-making questions, most
of which the modeling team tried to accommodate in the model.
The trade-off between detail and clarity plagues all modelers and is probably
never resolved to anyone's satisfaction, especially in someone else's model.
Instead of expressing our own discomfort with the complexity of KASM, we
will include a warning from the KASM team:
Any formal model should be used with great caution. and KASM is no exception.
KASM can be a powerful analytical tool for public agricultural decision making in
Korea, where many more complex decision options can be investigated more
reliably than could be done with informal or simpler formal models. Nevertheless,
erroneous conclusions can easily be drawn from simulation results unless analysts
and decision makers alike take care to understand. by tracing through the model's
data and causal structure. what gives rise to those results. Wrong decisions can be
made based on wrong explanations of projected responses to alternative decision
assumptions. If,
F. DATA
The KASM model. even in its earlier simpler forms, contains many thousands
of numerical parameters. For example, simply providing initial values for the
population sector of the original KASS model with its 45 age cohorts, two
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sexes, and separate farm and non-farm populations requires 180 numbers.
Adding age-sex-specific death rates, protein requirements, caloric require-
ments, age-specific birth rates, age-sex-specific migration rates, etc. brings the
total data requirement of this sector alone to nearly 1,000 parameters. A
summary of some of the data required for other KASM components is shown in
Table 10.1.
KASM documentation includes after each component description a short
general discussion of the data required for that component and the sources
used. 17 Time series usually begin in the mid-1960s. Sources generally are
official statistics-population, housing, and agricultural censuses, government
economic statistics and input-output tables, family income and expenditure
surveys. KASM team members also spent considerable time in the Korean
countryside checking the accuracy of the data against their own observations. IX
Some parameters were taken directly from statistics. many others were
estimated through regression techniques, and quite a few came from
judgement or guesses. Exogenous time series usually were taken from exist-
ing sources-world price forecasts from the World Bank, consumption trends
from Korean food and nutrition specialists, with Japanese trends used as a
model for stages of development beyond those that Korea had already reached.
As one might expect, the data available to the modelers were far from
complete or reliable. The KASM team indicates that considerable effort was
necessary to rework not only the Korean data, but the Korean data-collection
system:
In Korea. as undoubtedly in most other developing countries, there are problems
with respect to reliable data for analysis. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in
available data forced the modelers to rework data in order to smooth out
discrepancies and bring estimates within reasonable bounds. Frustrations with
available data were no doubt substantially responsible for the work the KASM
team has done in re-organizing the agricultural data-collection process in Korea.
During the period of forced sales of grain to the government, the planted area was
underreported. After these sales were abandoned and following the government's
decision to rigidly control fertilizer distribution on the basis of planted area ... the
planted area tended to be overreported. Reported crop yields also appear to have
been influenced by various factors. such as the ex~ectation by officials at higher
levels that target average yields had been achieved.-
"
The model is initialized with data from 1970 and run to 1974 to test its
tracking ability. Then, pragmatically but unscientifically, it is updated with
1974 figures before being used for projection to 1985. 21
G. CONCLUSIONS
Since KASM was intended to be used in the middle state of the decision-mak-
ing process to generate fairly detailed information about policy and implemen-
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tation decisions over a five- to IS-year period, conclusions drawn from the
model tend not to be the sorts of sweeping generalizations about the
development process that we have seen emerging from longer-term general-
understanding models. The closest the KASM team has come to a large-scale
conclusion was the summary of research results derived from the first. simple,
mainly-exogenous KASS model in 1972. From that model, the researchers
derived two conclusions: 22
1. In the short term, a set of agricultural development policies would increase
agricultural output. decrease rural-urban migration and enhance the rate of
modernization of the agricultural sector.
2. In the long term, expanded investments in agricultural research and an
effective family planning program will be needed.
Since then the expanded model KASM or pieces of it have primarily been
used to draw very specific conclusions or to make short-term forecasts at the
request of Korean government officials. Examples of conclusions that have
emerged from KASM in this mode of operation followY
1. An over-riding objective of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
(MAF) was to reduce imports of feed grains. The KASM team provided
three projections; a base run without policy interventions. and two runs
testing restrictions on the swine and poultry sectors. 'The alternatives thus
analyzed and refined by discussions with the Livestock Bureau were
combined with information from other sources to form the policy basis for
policy decisions in the Fourth Five-Year Plan.'
2. In 1974 the MAF was trying to establish what commodities should be
developed for export, to where. and in what quantities. The KASM team
attacked this problem with the Demand-Price-Trade component's foreign
trade sector. testing several alternate assumptions about future world
market prices. The model proved too aggregated for this purpose; the 19
commodity groupings could not provide information about single crops.
But the model results did serve as a check for conclusions the MAF had
already reached.
3. After several years of trying to reduce domestic rice consumption because
rice had to be imported at high prices, Korea became self-sufficient in rice in
1975. The question then arose. how could the rice-consumption restrictions
best be lifted, especially so as to shift consumption to rice and away from
wheat (the only grain still imported). The KASM Demand-Price-Trade
component was run with several different price patterns for barley, rice, and
wheat. The conclusion was that the government should keep real rice prices
constant. phase out the dual price system for barley, and remove the wheat
subsidy.
Detailed decision-making conclusions such as these are evanescent. They
may apply to today's conditions but be completely reversed tomorrow. They
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require not only a correct model structure, but up-to-date parameters, since
conclusions result from fine tunings of model parameters, not from patterns
inherent in the model structure. Fine tuning requires a skilled modeling team
on the spot, as perpetual consultants, to identify the part of the model relevant
to the problem, alter and update parameters as necessary, and explain the
results to the policy-makers.
H. TESTING
Each component of the KASM model was constructed separately and
therefore tested separately before being linked with the rest of the model. The
component tests are described only briefly in the KASM documentation. 24
The tests seem to have consisted of matches with historical data, examination
for internal consistency, and some sensitivity testing. It is reported, for
example, that the migration function is sensitive to assumptions about
employment,25 and that intensive 'manual' tuning of elasticities and
substitution relationships in the DEMAND component was necessary. 26 In no
cases are testing details given. The modelers of each component do end their
descriptions of their component with a discussion of areas that are not yet
satisfactory and make suggestions for further improvements. These discussions
suggest that much more testing has actually been done than has been reported.
Testing of KASM as a whole is also described only vaguely. The KASM
team lists four tests they consider essential to establishing their model's
credibilityY
1. Coherence-where the model is checked for internal logical consistency,
abstracted from its real-world referent.
2. Correspondence-where the behavior and structure of the model [must
match that] of its real-world referent. Structure is included because it is
not enough that a model be able to project; it should also explain past and
projected behavior in terms of accounting and dynamic causal relation-
ships. Time-series tracking, sensitivity tests, and decision runs all provide
information for correspondence testing.
3. Clarity-where the model must be not only unambiguous ... but also
comprehensible to decision-makers and analysts alike.
4. Workability-where credibility ... also depends on how well [the
model's] prescriptions work out when implemented in the real-world.
The KASM modelers appear satisfied that their model passes these tests, but
they provide very little evidence for the reader. Their description of
total-model testing consists of no more than the following:
Coherence tests take place as part of the debugging process of individual
components. Correspondence testing of KASM is an iterative process wherein
components are tested individually and in various combinations against knowledge
of the real-world referent and then are retested continually as new knowledge is
gained ... The clarity and workability of KASM receive their biggest test whenever
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the models are used for decision analysis. Korean decision makers and investiga-
tors understand the models more and more each time they use them. Similarly, the
models become easier to use and interpret as familiarity increases. Workability
tests are passed as decisions are implemented with positive results. 2M
I. IMPLEMENTATION
The KASM study was conceived and carried out from the beginning with final
implementation in mind. As described in the section on model purpose,
USAID commissioned the study partially to help decide what to fund in Korea
and partially to institutionalize systems analysis into the planning process of the
Republic of Korea government. The first goal seems to have been at least
partially realized; projections from the early KASS model were used among
other information in deciding upon a USAID loan to Korea for agricultural
research,29 and the MSU team was involved in negotiation of another USAID
loan to finance 66 small-scale irrigation projects.30 (This negotiation did not
include any direct use of the computer model, but it relied on the expertise the
team acquired in creating the computer model).
To further the second goal of modernization of the planning process, in 1973
the original KASS modeling team was supplemented by an American-Korean
Agricultural Planning Project team (KAPP) to assist the Ministry of
Agriculture and Fisheries in establishing a planning system, including use of
the KASS models. The KAPP team acted as an interface between the modelers
and the Korean ministers, helping the modelers understand the policy
problems of Korean agriculture and suggesting new model components.
Furthermore, a training program was instituted so that both MSU and USAID
could eventually withdraw and leave Koreans in control both of planning and
of further development and use of the models. This withdrawal was originally
planned for June 1974 and finally took place in 1977.31
The KASM modelers do not seem to envisage their model as the exclusive
determinant of Korean agricultural policy:
KASM or any single model, formal or informal, must not be relied upon as the sole
source of information for complex decision making. No single model can possibly
provide all the information necessary-economic, social, political, military,
administrative, short-term, long-term, normative, nonnormative, etc. This is
equivalent to saying that every problem-oriented model for public agricultural
decision analysis will of necessity be composed of multiple formal and informal
models. 32
On the other hand, they clearly do view it as an integral part of governmental
decision making:
Such a model can be a valuable analytical tool in helping decision makers in their
planning, policy formulation, and program development activities... It is both
broad enough and detailed enough ... that in most cases relatively minor modifica-
tions and extensions allow all or parts of it to be used in specific applications to
solutions of specific problems... It is used in an iterative and interactive context,
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with investigators and decision makers carrying out the functions of the
decision-making process. 33
There seem to have been numerous requests from Korean planners for
information generated by KASM. Several of these requests have already been
mentioned in the discussion of model conclusions. However, most of the
information seems to have been used for purposes of bureaucratic reports
rather than for the shaping of programs and policies. Examples quoted by the
KASM team as successful applications of the model include the following: 34
1. In 1975 KASM projections were used to prepare Korea's country position
paper for the United Nations World Food Conference.
2. KASM population projections have been incorporated as the official MAF
projections for the Fourth Five-Year Plan.
3. The MAF Livestock Bureau has taken KASM consumption projections
and:
...used them in the plan with some modification. On the supply side, the
dynamics of the model projected turning points and cycles or declines in the
herd sizes, while traditionally, planning projections are monotonically increas-
ing. Although the Livestock Bureau did not accept the supply results for the
Five-Year Plan, interest was expressed in using them at other times for policy
analysis. 35
4. The Director-General of MAF asked the KASM team to review the final
draft of the Fourth Five-Year Plan before submitting it to the Minister. The
team prepared a written set of recommendations for him. 36
Dr Lee Fletcher of the Technical Assistance Bureau of USAID, who has
been actively involved in evaluating the KASM project, says that the separate
components of KASM and the smaller, problem-oriented models associated
with the project-specifically the Grain Management Program, a short-term
(three-year) simulation model of grain inventory and pricing mechanisms-ap-
pear to be more directly useful to decision-makers than the large KASM
model. 3?
Some of the most important impacts of the KASM effort have come not from
model-generated recommendations, but simply from the presence of systema-
tic, analytical investigators gathering and synthesizing information about
Korean agriculture. Perhaps the most notable single change the KASM team
has instigated was a major revision of the process of collecting and reporting
agricultural statistics, a change that was necessary to provide reliable data for
the model. 31'
The permanent installation of KASM and modern planning techniques in
the Korean government proved more difficult than either USAID or MSU
anticipated. Training technical people to use and update the model and
keeping them working on KASM-related work once they were trained was a
major problem in the implementation strategy. When the KASM project
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started, NAERI had only three people with advanced degrees in agricultural
economics, and none in systems science. Since then 45 Koreans have received
some sort of technical training, 14 of whom now work in the KASM division of
NAERI.39 However, it has been found that at least doctoral-level training in
systems science is necessary before a person can actively contribute to KASM
model development, and no Koreans in the project have yet reached that level of
skill.
Holding personnel has been difficult because there is great demand for people
with technical training in Korea. Highly-trained people are likely to leave the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries altogether, for the wages it can pay are
below the wages a technically-trained person could command in the universities
or elsewhere. Even if they remain in agricultural civil service jobs, trained
personnel are likely not to remain working with the model, because the Ministry
does not like to concentrate its skilled manpower resources in anyone field.
Further implementation problems arose because the analytical capabilities
developed at NAERI were organizationally distant from the actual decision-
making positions in MAF. A series of recommendations were made by the
KASS/KAPP review team, both for greater exposure of MAF officials to the
possible uses of their technical resources and for reorganization of MAF. 4o
In terms of meeting the stated goal of its makers and sponsors, KASM may
have reached its implementation peak during the time the MSU team was
tending it and enthusiastically advancing its merits. Their personal expertise was
probably more valuable than their model outputs. In fact, one of the
unquestionable results of the KASM project was the thorough education of a
number of people at MSU in the agriculture and politics of Korea, and the
education of Korean government officials in the systematic, quantitative
approach to policymaking.
When the Americans left, the KASM model was housed in Korea in a
newly-created research institute KREI, with a staff of MSU-trained Korean
personnel who were able to run the model but not to use it creatively orto update
it. KREI also requested technical assistance from MSU for installing the grain
pricing model in Korea and running training sessions in its use. 41
The KASM model has been recreated in many forms throughout the world. It
has been adapted for use by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) in
analyzing US-Korean trade patterns. Members ofthe KASM team made similar
models for the European Common Market and for the USA, and these models
were linked at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in a
supermodel of international agricultural commodity trade. 42 MSU received
inquiries about adapting the KASM model for Turkey and Thailand. George
Rossmiller, the director of the KASM model, went on to serve as the U.S.
agricultural attache to OECD and as an international trade policy analyst in the
Foreign Agricultural Service of the USDA.
In summary, a tremendous effort was made by USAID and the KASM team to
install within the government ofa developing nation, within a few years, the most
modern and sophisticated planning techniques, including an unusually complex
245
computer model. If they had succeeded, Korea would have had a planning tool
more comprehensive than any used for U.S. agricultural policy. It is perhaps
more surprising that so much was accomplished than that the task was not
100% completed.
J. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
All of the components of the KASM model are written in FORTRAN. The
program, relative to other models in our study, is bulky. The final KASM
model requires four minutes of CPU time on a CDC Cyber 75 computer for a
15-year simulation run. 43 Disaggregation of this model into three separate
geographical regions increased the run time to 35 minutes, and therefore this
version of the model is no longer used. 44
The KASM team put considerable effort into arranging computer use in
Korea. NAERI has free use of the Korean National Computer Center's Univac
1108. Using this machine proved inconvenient, however. The waiting time
between submitting a run and getting output allowed an average of only three
to four runs a week on any line of work. To expedite runs, the team contracted
to rent computer time from the Korea Institute of Science and Technology.
Unsuccessful attempts were also made to implement a computer hook-up with
United States facilities via satellite. 45
K. DOCUMENTATION
The KASM effort is profusely documented. There are 84 items listed on the
team's publication list for the three years July 1, 197o-June 30, 1974. The list
includes working papers, Ph.D. dissertations, and miscellaneous papers, some
in English, some in Korean. The multiplicity of documents, however, is not
very helpful to an outsider attempting to understand the model. Most of them
are either very general or very narrow and technical.
The most comprehensive single document available is a book summarizing
both the model and the institutional processes of constructing and implement-
ing it. 46 The book contains a great deal of technical information about the
model but falls short of being a complete documentation for modelers-it
contains few actual model equations, few tables of input data, and only vague
descriptions of model output. Unfortunately, the book is also incomplete in
describing the institutional and political environment of the project. More can
be learned from a half-hour conversation with any member of the modeling
team than from the guarded prose of the formal documentation.
In fact it is only from conversations with members of the KASM team that we
have come to realize how far this model's documentation falls short of
communicating the many lessons to be learned from the KASM experience.
This project is one of the most sustained, ambitious, thoughtful. and costly
attempts ever made to incorporate computer modeling in a governmental
planning organization. Individual participants in the experiment have tried
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many innovative ideas both in modeling and implementation, some of which
worked, many of which did not, but all of which could be educational to the
entire modeling community. There are many valuable stories to tell about
KASM. We hope that more of them will be told in print.
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CHAPTER 11
MexicoV: Statistical Patches
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
Among the oldest and most respected names in econometrics is that of the
Wharton School and its associated institutions, Wharton Economic Forecas-
ting Associates (Wharton EFA) and the Wharton Economic Forecasting Unit
(Wharton EFU). The man who is principally responsible for the Wharton
School's econometric reputation is Dr Lawrence Klein, one of the founders of
modern econometrics.
MexicoV is a product of the Klein-Wharton school of modeling. Abel
Beltran del Rio, the model's author, constructed MexicoV when he was a
doctoral candidate under Klein at the Wharton School. Klein's influence on the
model's development is shown by regular citations of his work throughout the
dissertation and by his co-authorship of a published report on the model. 1
While constructing MexicoV, Beltran del Rio attracted sponsorship for the
model from over 50 Mexican business and governmental agencies. This
sponsorship allowed him to start a department within Wharton EFA for
continued econometric study of the Mexican economy. From this base Beltran
del Rio and his associates worked to refine and update the Mexican model and
to communicate their findings to interested persons in Mexican businesses and
government.
The connection between Beltran del Rio and his sponsors is more academic
than commercial.
Our relationship with the firms and institutions in Mexico has been and still is one
of a sponsorship, rather than of commercial nature ... In more than one sense their
annual funding has a nature of a grant. I think this has been important, because it
has allowed us to minimize the time-consuming provision of commercial 'quid pro
quo'. This has meant for us almost a complete concentration on research. 2
Beltran del Rio had been a Mexican businessman for many years before he
248
249
entered the Wharton School. Unlike most of the modelers described in this
study, he worked from an insider's perspective and knew his sponsors as peers.
Indeed, MexicoV is the only example among our case studies of a citizen of a
less-industrialized country modeling his own nation, funded by sources within
his nation.
B.PURPOSE
Mexico V was intended to serve many purposes. It was the basis of a doctoral
dissertation. It still serves as a research tool for exploring the structure of the
Mexican economy. It is an economic forecasting device and an instrument for
exploring the economic implications of possible government policies. Beltran
del Rio and Klein also indicate that the model is intended as a demonstration of
how sophisticated statistical techniques can be used to glean useful information
from imperfect data, as a step toward better modeling, and as a spur to better
data collection:
Methods of dealing in modern econometrics with 'undersized' samples have been
developed, and it is with these methods in mind that we have tackled the empirical
task of implementing this measurement of the econometric structure of Mexico.
We hope that it can set a pattern for future econometric research in the rest of Latin
America. 3
It is clear from Beltran del Rio's descriptions of the Mexican economy and
from the performance indicators he selects in evaluating model output that
certain economic problems are of particular concern to him. The model is to
describe the behavior of the economy 'for the full period of the present
Echeverria administration, 1971-76,.4 The problems of concern center around
the interrelated phenomena of income disparities, rapid population growth,
unemployment, and uneven growth rates of different economic sectors.
Questions that interest Beltran del Rio include, for example: Will there be
enough employment for a work force expanding at 3-4% a year? Can economic
growth be promoted without causing serious inflation, incurring trade deficits,
and/or worsening the already troublesome disparities in income? Which
economic sectors will grow and modernize most rapidly, and what might the
government do to make growth rates more even?
C.METHOD
The way Beltran del Rio used econometrics to determine the structure of
MexicoV was unusually formal and rigorous. A considerable portion of his
work went toward establishing the relationships among the model's variables.
Therefore we shall discuss here at length the method by which Beltran del Rio
arrived at MexicoV's structure, in addition to his method of estimating
parameters.
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According to the philosophy evolved at the Wharton School, the task of the applied
econometrician is to try to explain and link, as far as possible, all the
macroeconomic accounting systems available, i.e., national accounts, input-out-
put, flow offunds. 5
In the Mexican case this task was not simple. While applied econometricians
have generally converged on a neo-Keynesian demand-driven structure as the
best econometric representation of a fully industrialized economy, basic
structure is an open question for nations undergoing industrialization.
Beltran del Rio began his attempt to specify a structure for the Mexican
economy with a tentative outline of which variables were to be exogenous,
which were to be endogenous, and where lags were expected to appear. This
list was based on economic theory and Beltran del Rio's own knowledge of the
Mexican economy. From there he went on to 'a detailed empirical survey,
based on the analysis of statistical material.. .and on work of the institutional
economists,. 6 The survey resulted in a long verbal description of actual
conditions in the Mexican economy as indicated by macroeconomic data, and a
rough sketch of how variables were to influence each other in the model.
This rough approximation was extended by a three-front search for
alternative structural hypotheses. On one front Beltran del Rio searched the
theoretical literature on economic development, focusing on four theorists
(Nurske, Leibenstein, Hirschman, and Lewis) who had developed explicit
mathematical models of the development process. 7 On the second front he
reviewed five previously-constructed econometric models of Latin American
nations, paying particular attention to the modeler's treatment of inflation,
capacity creation, production, income distribution, and political factors. 8 On
the third front, he examined mathematical formulations of three basic
theoretical models-dassical, Keynesian, and Marxian. His examination of
these three basic theories included both a qualitative examination of how
realistically their formulations describe Mexican economic conditions and a
formal, quantitative examination of how well their equations fit the Mexican
data. 9
Having generated initial structural hypotheses about the determinants of the
variables to be explained, and having assembled a series of other hypotheses
from the economic literature, Beltran del Rio proceeded to select the best
specification for each model relationship. Ideally, he states, the choice among
the alternative hypotheses 'should be resolved by trying all the alternatives and
by selecting the one that agrees best with the empirical description, unless it is
clearly inferior in stat.istical fit. 10
As an example of how Beltran del Rio actually made his selection, we shall
describe the process by which he arrived at his consumption function. The
various hypothetical consumption functions included:
1. A Keynesian formulation, in which consumption per capita is a function of
disposable income per capita.
2. A dynamic version of the Keynesian function, in which consumption per
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capita is a function of the current year's disposable income per capita and
the previous year's consumption per capita.
3. A Marxian version in which total private consumption is class-disaggregated
and a function of income-the wage-earners consuming a high portion of
their wages and the capitalists consuming a lesser fraction of their (higher)
income.
4. A dynamic Marxian version in which total consumption is represented as a
distributed-lag function of wages and capitalist incomes.
Beltran del Rio selected the dynamic Keynesian formulation, using the
following process of elimination:
The simple, unlagged Keynesian function fails to incorporate the dynamics of
Mexican consumption. The permanent income hypothesis [on which the
Keynesian equation is based] not only implies a degree of sophistication that can
hardly be found in poor economies, but also produces a seemingly low estimate of
long run mpc [marginal propensity to consume] of 0.79. For the United States,
similar consumption functions produce estimates that range between 0.834 to
0.828. The Marxian formulation, in spite of being the one suggested by empirical
analysis ... for its inclusion of income distribution, was excluded because in the
unlagged form, although quite acceptable in its coefficients, it fails to introduce the
dynamics of Mexican consumption. The lagged form, on the other hand, gives an
unacceptably high long-run propensity to consume out of wage income, 1.33. This
may be due to improper measurements that could be corrected in the future
by ... revised figures ... 1
After deciding the nature of the model's basic structural relationships,
Beltran del Rio went on to fill in the details. He disaggregated where data
allowed more detailed representation (for example, inclusion of more
categories of imports and exports). He performed further searches to identify
exogenous political forces. In the process of refinement, the model went
through five versions-hence the final model was called Mexico V.
The parameters of the model were estimated by ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression, except for the ten equations containing distributed lags,
which were estimated 'by fitting a polynomial of third degree with two
end-point restrictions'. 12 The high degree of interdependence of the model
variables would theoretically call for a more sophisticated statistical technique,
such as two-stage least-squares (2SLS), and a 2SLS estimation of the final
model was partially completed. It was not finished because of difficulties with
the Mexican data and because of the high cost of the method. 13
The mathematical model resulting from the above procedures has the
following properties: it contains 143 equations, 40 of which define statisticaHy-
estimated endogenous variables, the rest of which are accounting statements
(e.g., total consumption = private consumption + public consumption) or
definitions (e.g., rural labor force = rural population times rural labor
participation rate). All the estimated equations are linear. Ten ofthe estimated
equations contain distributed lags of up to three years. Over a dozen one-year
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delays come into the model through definitional statements that include rates
of change.
In some instances, both in estimated and definitional equations, a variable is
defined as a lagged function of itself. For example, coffee exports are related to
the previous year's coffee exports. However, only in the case of capital, which
(in order to represent depreciation) is defined as 90-95% of the previous year's
capital* (plus current investment), does the representation appear to be a
deliberate accumulation or integration of flows.
The model contains 46 exogenous variables (not counted in the 143
equations). In almost all cases, exogenous forecasts were prepared through
extensive discussions with experts. For example, government-decided vari-
ables are forecast through consultation with Mexican sources familiar with
government plans. Forecasts of the many United States variables that affect the
Mexican economy were made through consultation with the economists at
Wharton EFA who specialize in forecasting the behavior of the United States
economy.
D. BOUNDARIES
Beltran del Rio aimed to represent the following factors, which he perceived as
important regardless of data availability: 14
1. The process of creating capacity, through capital and technological imports,
in the context of general capital limitations and abundance of unskilled and
semi-skilled labor.
2. Internal and external sources of instability: the impact of political climate
on the economy and the dependence on foreign trade; the internal and
external sources of inflation.
3. The dominant role played by the federal government as infrastructure
builder and entrepreneur; public finances.
4. The general unevenness in economic life, as exemplified in functional
income distribution, in rural versus urban production, in federal versus
non-federal taxation.
5. The rapid demographic processes resulting in high population growth,
rural-urban labor force migration, and unemployment.
6. The proximity to the United States market with its effects on international
labor migration, tourism, and border transactions.
7. A decision-making time horizon that is shorter than that pertaining in more
industrialized countries.
This is an ambitious list, and most of the items on it are not dealt with in the
model. Excluded from the above list and from the model are:
* 90% for private capital, 95% for public capital.
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1. Physical constraints. Mining exports are not limited by resource reserves,
coffee production is not constrained by acreage of potential coffee-grow-
ing land, agriculture in general is not constrained by water or land
availability. (Sufficient data did not exist to permit a supply-oriented
formulation of the productive sector). 15
2. Environmental variables, such as erosion, salinization, or pollution.
3. Social factors: education, values, and social norms affecting income
distribution, consumption, population dynamics, or labor productivity.
These exclusions are easily explained. All are long-term influences that are
unlikely to change greatly over the five-year time horizon of the model. None
could have been easily verified from available data, particularly during an era
of rapid economic growth.
Mexico V's treatment of the agricultural sector is quite cursory. Specific
crops that are important in trade are considered, as well as production of the
sector as a whole. However, factors of production such as land, labor, water,
and chemical inputs are not included.
In general, political forces, government-decided variables, and influences
from other nations are exogenous. Thus the presidential election cycle,
paving of roads (a determinant of tourism receipts), the international market
price for cotton, and the United States hourly manufacturing wage (which
affects labor exports to the United States) are all exogenous. In addition,
some variables that would appear in reality to be determined by the inner
workings of the Mexican economy are exogenous to the model. For example,
domestic consumption and domestic production of copper, cotton, lead, and
nonferrous metals are exogenous. Some of these variables may be made
endogenous with the planned addition of an input-output matrix and other
structural additions to later versions of the model. Beltran del Rio also states
that he intends to determine the population-growth function endogenously
in future versions of the model. 16
Figure 11.1 shows the boundary diagram of the MexicoV model. The
number and importance of exogenous variables make the modeler an
important structural adjunct in Mexico V. In Beltran del Rio's opinion, a good
economist working with a bad model can produce better forecasts than a bad
economist with a good model. 17 Successful forecasts probably cannot be
produced with Mexico V unless someone who knows Mexican politics and
economics quite well is available to provide good and detailed guesses about
the future of imports, exports, Presidential elections, and other exogenous
variables.
E. STRUCTURE
Beltran del Rio makes no systematic attempt to trace long chains of
relationships, or to relate the structure of his model to its behavior, but we
shall try to do so in this description.
254
land
r.sourcls
roin fall IEXOGENOUsl
rote of
l.chonOI
publ it
I.t,rnal
dobt
erosion
foreign
re.ervlS
liveslock
education
waves
Iminimum
/ doily woV"
/I U.S. index of
industr 10\
Iproduetion for faa
//ond beveroves
/
/
/' /' pawed rood buildinv
,/
urban and
rural lobar
fa rces
population
Vrow1h rate
imports of:row
moteriols and
fuels other
VDods
urban and
rural lobar
participation
retes
population
------
elports of
900ds and
marchondi se
other items
on current
oe co un ts
disposable
Income
p,r COPltO
price of
all
fert i Ii z er
usoge
Dummy VARIABLES for ~ ~ - TENDOGENOU~ --- "- "-
go .... rnmenf restrictions ./ . prlvot. '"
on bracero program / 'Y public .ca~ltol capitol""'" .
/ depreclotlon depreciation" domlstlc
ending of U.S.. . "consumption of
sugar Imports /publlc public prlvat. prlvat. '\.
from Cuba / investment capitol capitol investment {otton,copper1llod
devaluation / ,"on- f.rrous metols
.ffects / total ooor,oo', agricultural capitol \
federailipart / demand GNP outpul goods \
tOll. colleCllon / import! \U.S. disposable
US 'ro.de !bolonce oron domestic \income
protection for I of trode product (GOP) border psr capite
on-ferrous I urban Imports \
~'nt:~: reVISIons tprivote and public ;~odd~~~~~n \U.S. hourly
Mexican political \consumptions ratio of copocitie, ,lwove rate
cycle \ urban inflotien
C , . I }U.S. GNPex ep lana ,Income l indirect to rural
federal.tax and nen- federal population
collection \ t
,ales
\
\
\ ,
,
"-prices of Brazilian "-
coffee Me.icon I ..............
Jopenese and ........
European exporis
Me.icon suvor
U.S. elport price
index
IOMITTED]
attitudes income
distribution
Figure 11.1 Boundaries of Mexico V
At the core of the MexicoV structure is a series of demand-driven growth
loops (see Figure 11.2). Growth of private consumption (which tends to
occur due to the model's exponentially-growing population) results in an
increase in total aggregate demand (by definition, consumption plus invest-
ment). Higher aggregate demand means higher GNP. GNP growth results in
a growth of national income and of disposable income per capita, if GNP has
grown faster than population. Income per capita feeds back to increase
private consumption. A similar chain of events occurs through increases in
public consumption: increased public consumption creates increased aggre-
gate demand, thereby increasing, in turn, GNP, national income, and income
taxes. Income taxes are part of total taxes, which further increase public
consumption.
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Figure 11.2 MexicoV growth loops
Reinforcing the linkage between consumption and economic growth, both
urban (secondary- and tertiary-sector) output and primary-sector output are
increased by increases in consumption. These increased outputs raise gross
domestic product (GOP). Increased GOP creates higher inventories, thereby
increasing investment, aggregate demand, GNP, national income, and so on.
Moreover, increased investment in turn increases urban output and GOP.
Investment also increases capital stocks, which feed back to boost investment
still further.
Yet all is not necessarily growth in Mexico V (see Figure 11.3). One side effect
ofthe growth ofoutput is that it promotes high rates ofcapacity utilization which,
in turn, creates rising wages. 18 Rising wages set off the inflationary wage-price
spiral, which decreases real monetary values. In other words, the positive
feedbacks associated with economic growth tend to enhance the positive
feedback of the inflationary process which, in turn, curtails real economic
growth. Economic growth also triggers inflation because rising GOP results in
higher indirect taxes, which are passed on as increased prices.
Other forces that tend to restrain growth in the model include:
1. Rising population, which decreases income per capita.
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Figure 11.3 Forces countering growth in MexicoV
2. Rising incomes and private consumption, which lead to higher imports of
consumer goods, thus worsening the balance of trade and decreasing
GNP.
3. Rising investment which increases imports of capital goods, also worsening
the balance of payments.
The model also contains structural elements describing unemployment,
migration, imports, and exports. Imports and exports are almost completely
driven by exogenous variables. They are represented in surprising detail (see
Figure 11.4) considering that their only effect in the model is to modify the
growth rate of GNP.
The dynamics of labor and migration, on the other hand, are driven by
endogenous economic variables as shown in Figure 11.5. Economic growth
results in investment and in capital formation. Urban capital is calculated
from total capital using a statistically-estimated linear equation. The residual
of total capital minus urban capital is assumed to be rural capital. Urban and
rural capital, respectively, create urban and rural productive capacity.
Capacity per worker in the labor force gives potential urban and rural labor
productivities (capital per worker). The discrepancy between potential urban
and rural labor productivity stimulates rural-urban migration. Migration, by
reducing the number of workers in the rural sector and increasing the number
in the urban sector, tends to close the gap in potential labor productivities.
Concurrently, growth of capacity tends to raise labor participation rates,
and population growth tends to increase the labor force in both rural and
urban sectors. (The same population growth rate is assumed in both sectors.)
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Figure 11.4 Import--export sector of MexicoV. Unlabeled single arrows (i)
indicate inputs calculated elsewhere in the model. Double arrows (0) indicate
exogenous inputs
Thus the labor force tends to grow along with growth in capacity and to
decrease potential labor productivities, while capital formation attempts to
raise them.
Our attempt at a reference structure for Mexico V is shown in Figure 11.6.
The reference structure concept was adequate for the simulation-based models
we have described previously, but it does not 'fit' Mexico V very well
because econometric models such as this one are not intended to make
causal sense. For example, capital is calculated in the model, but it
does not affect production in any way. Its only effect is on labor pro-
ductivity and migration-which are calculated for informational purposes
only and which also affect nothing else in the model. Output allocation
is a meaningless concept in this model, since output results automatically
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Figure 11.5 Demographic movement in Mexico V
from demand (consumption plus investment plus exports), and once It IS
produced it disappears from the system. There are two measures of output,
GNP and GOP, which are determined by completely separate logical processes
and never formally linked. There is no structural guarantee that GNP and GOP
have any relationship to each other at all in Mexico V, or that output is bound in
the least by capital or labor, or that energy imports should change the same way
industrial production changes.
The variables in Mexico V do keep reasonable relationships to one another,
because its many coefficients are derived from a real economy, where elements
unconnected in the model are actually tightly related. From the point of view of
a causal structural modeler, Mexico V, like other econometric models, appears
to be a loose assortment of indirectly-related variables, held together by
statistical patches. There are so many of these patches, however, that the final
construction is fairly firm, and it probably even exhibits the same general shape
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Figure 11.6 MexicoV reference structure
as the real system. For the short-term forecasting purposes of Mexico V.
nothing more is required.
Insofar as we can analyze its structure, MexicoV appears to be dominated by
positive feedback-which is to be expected from a series of relationships
statistically estimated in a period of economic growth. When an economy has
been growing rapidly, positive feedbacks are dominant, negative ones are
overwhelmed, and regression analysis can be expected to identify a great many
positive relationships. For short-term forecasts, this positive-feedback domin-
ance is probably appropriate. If the model is constantly updated over a long
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period, changes in the strengths of the positive relationships will presumably be
picked up in the incoming data, at least if the changes are gradual rather than
sudden.
F. DATA
Beltran del Rio lists in full the database on which his model draws. The listings
show that for the most part equations were estimated using data from the
years 1948-1970. No verbal descriptions or source notations accompany the
data tables; thus it is not possible to identify the sources of specific numbers.
However, numerous official Mexican statistical documents in the bibliography
of Beltran del Rio's dissertation suggest that primarily official statistics were
used. Occasional references to data difficulties (such as a 1969 version of
official information on private consumption, investment, and inventory
change) imply that assembling data for MexicoV was not a straightforward
task. Several comments indicate that a relationship could not be explored due
to lack of data. Although Beltran del Rio and Klein state that a major objective
of the modeling process was to demonstrate the use of limited data in
econometric modeling, 1'.1 no special description of data-handling techniques is
given.
G. TESTING
The process by which MexicoV was developed was one long series of tests.
Different sets of hypothetical single relationships were tested against empirical
measures of Mexican conditions. The outcomes of the statistical tests were
examined for congruence with the mental models of the modeler and his clients
(e.g., whether the tests produced the expected signs and whether coefficient
values were reasonable). The hypothetical relationships that best matched
both the data and the mental models were incorporated into the model.
The full model was tested first for its ability to reproduce the behavior of
variables over the period from which their coefficients were estimated (unless
there are technical errors, the model should be capable of passing this test
easily), and second, for its ability to reproduce historical behavior outside the
period of the model's database. Variants of model structure were tried
(MexicoI through MexicoV, later Mexico VI and Mexico VII). Finally, when
the full model passed all these tests reasonably well, it was accepted as a
forecasting too).
The above series of formal tests was supplemented by informal testing of the
model: as Beltran del Rio put it, he 'played around with it and subjected it to all
kinds of crazy things to see how it reacted'. 20 That is, the model was run over
long time horizons, or with extreme values for exogenous inputs. Beltran del
Rio likens the process to getting to know a riding horse; testing a model, like
putting a horse through its paces, makes one familiar with its 'temperament'
and its quirks, thereby allowing one to 'compensate for' and 'counteract'
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+16.04651PRCOP
(-2.306)
1.09724DUMRS
(-2.106)
unwanted tendencies. These informal tests are not documented, and one gets
from the model description no feeling for the model's sensitivity to exogenous
assumptions.
The results of the formal statistical tests are completely documented.
Statistically-estimated equations are always accompanied by four summary
indices of their performance. The coefficients in these equations are carried out
to six or seven significant digits. An example of an equation listing in the
model, complete with summary indices, is:
Exports of copper
ECOPR 1.13451
(2.297)
R2 = 0.9088
19.88620PRCDU
(2.627)
S.E. = 0.04806
+ 7.69851COCOP - 11.75707COCDU
(1.717) (-2.552)
DW = 2.1233 F(5,13) = 36.8633
where DUMRS is a dummy expressing the United States non-ferrous metal
trade protection policy (1.0 for 1958-68,0.0 elsewhere), PRCOP is domestic
copper production, PRCDU is DUMRS x PRCOP, COCOP is domestic
consumption of copper, COCDU is COCOP x DUMRS, and all of these
independent variables are exogenous.
Listings of eight-year (1968-1976) values for all major model variables under
two policy scenarios are provided, along with the complete tabular listings of
the exogenous data used in forecasts. Verbal and tabular summaries of the
results of the two policy scenarios are also provided.
As two years of the forecasting period had passed by the time Beltran del
Rio's dissertation was completed, it was also possible to test the model by
comparing predicted to actual values. This is done briefly in a verbal descriptive
summaryY In general the model predicted the correct direction but wrong
magnitude of change of economic quantities. Some illustrative numbers are
given in Table 11.1. Beltran del Rio postulates that the difference between the
model-generated results and the actual behavior may stem largely from his
underestimation of the 'hard shocks' the Echeverria administration gave the
economy. Beltran del Rio's exogenous forecasts of the rate of change of federal
capital formation were 0.96% and 10.5% for 1971 and 1972; the real values
turned out to be -14.4% and +74.1 %.
Table 11.1
Variable Actual value Model forecast
Output growth rate
Inflation rate
1971
1972
1971
1972
3.7%
7.2%
4.9%
4.2%
5.7%
6.8%
3.7%
4.9%
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H. CONCLUSIONS
Going from the most general to the most specific, we will describe the
conclusions Beltran del Rio has drawn through constructing MexicoV in three
categories:
1. Conclusions about the modeling process.
2. Conclusions about the economic structure of the Mexican economy.
3. Conclusions about Mexican economic conditions in forthcoming years.
]n the first category, Beltran del Rio's major contribution was his
experimentation with formalization of classical, Keynesian. and Marxian
theories in econometric models. The main conclusion from this experiment was
'that the purely theoretical effort is bound to produce a non-realistic model,
and that the empirical descriptive effort should precede the theoretical'22
None of the macro theories proved completely useful, but all had parts that
coincided with empirical descriptions of the Mexican economy and that proved
useful as parts of the forecasting model.
]n the second category-the structure of the Mexican economy-Beltran del
Rio's conclusions are, of course. manifest in the structure of Mexico V; that is,
they are the model assumptions. Below are examples of such conclusions:
1. Details of the import-export balance must be vitally important to the
development of the economy (import-export calculations account for 50 of
the 143 model equations).
2. The six-year presidential term introduces regular trends into government
economic behavior, and thus into the economy as a whole (a dummy
variable turned on during presidential election years affects private
investment).
3. Changes in inventory are a function of changes in the price index and the
GOP and are not a direct function of the size of the inventory or of
consumption, wages, or income distribution.
4. The fraction of population living in cities is changed only by time and by a
delayed function of the urban-rural productivity gap.
Beltran del Rio clearly demarcates areas where he feels his structural
understanding is wea:<. The final section in Beltran del Rio's dissertation
begins 'In the process of finding answers to our original questions. some new
ones have arisen out of the answers found and some have reappeared in clearer
form. out of the incomplete attempts to answer them. 023 He then lists a series
of fundamental questions that his research has raised, questions about the
Mexican monetary system and about the distribution of supply. demand, and
investment among various production sectors. The dissertation closes with a
brief conceptual outline of an investigation Beltran del Rio would like to make
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into the redistribution of wealth as a new policy approach to reducing Mexico's
severe income inequalities.
In the third category of conclusions, Beltran del Rio uses the model to
forecast how the economy will perform under two contrasting policy scenarios.
The first scenario, the slow hypothesis:
.. .is an undiluted extension, for the full [presidential] term, of the austerity
period imposed by the government since its inauguration in December 1970. Its
aims are the control ...ofinflation and the severe deterioration of the balance on the
current account. Its main tools are fiscal restraint, lower growth of internal credit
and external debt, and import controls.24
The second scenario, the quick hypothesis:
.. .fully extends the position of high employment and growth expressed
by... [the] Minister of National Wealth from 1972 onwards... The policy
measures here are easier fiscal and credit policies, but continuation of price and
import controls.25
Beltran del Rio presents detailed forecasts for these two policy alternatives
in tabular form. However, his verbal descriptions of simulation results never
imply that the exact figures should be taken too seriously. He always rounds off
output numbers and verbally places much more emphasis on trends than on
exact results. For example, the main conclusion drawn from these tests is:
... that it is not possible to introduce effectively the [government's] new income
distribution objective via employment and fast output growth without sacrificing-
...external and internal price stability... On the other hand, the preservation of
stability (with the traditional 6-7% growth) leads to deterioration of the
unemployment problem, given the extremely rapid pace of labor force growth ... 26
The behavior of the model system under the two policy sets can be
summarized as followsY
1. For 1971 and 1972, under both scenarios, there is an economic
deceleration followed by a revival and a steady improvement in the balance
on current account.
2. After 1973, the two scenarios diverge. The slow hypothesis gives GDP
growth of6-6.5%, the quick hypothesis, 7-7.5%.
3. Slow growth reduces the external deficit; fast growth increases it.
4. Slow growth stops inflation; fast growth keeps it going at 1970-1971 rates.
5. Slow growth increases idle productive capacity; fast growth keeps it
constant.
Neither policy set has much effect on the distribution of income or
unemployment or migration.
On the average, the urban worker will have at least 7.5-8 times more real capital to
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work with than his rural counterpart in both cases. The effects of the continuation
of the productive gap will be to maintain a steady migratory flow to the urban
centers ... , with the consequent pressure on city facilities, enlargement of the
'belts of poverty' around metropolitan areas, and growth of urban employment
and underemployment. 28
I. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
Mexico V is written in FORTRAN. Once its coefficients have been estimated,
one six-year simulation costs approximately $3 to run.29
J. IMPLEMENTATION
Mexico V's forecasts are delivered regularly to its 50-odd sponsoring
institutions and to the general public through publication in Mexican
journals. The model's purpose is to indicate what is likely to happen in the
near future, not to recommend what policies to use. Given the model's
non-policy intent, it cannot be 'implemented' in the sense that we have been
using that word.
As a proxy for implementation, we should consider the extent to which
Mexico V's prognostications are heeded, but here again we are in trouble. It is
always difficult to tell who pays attention to what, and there is no means of
assessing the extent to which anyone acts on the basis of Mexico V's forecasts.
There are, however, a few indicators that suggest that the model's impact is
not negligible. First, the model's sponsors continue to give Wharton EFA's
Mexico branch economic support. A few of the sponsoring institutions have
been sufficiently impressed with MexicoV that they have begun using its
forecasts as exogenous inputs to planning models of their own. Second,
Mexico V has a virtual monopoly on forecasting the behavior of the Mexican
economy. There is no directly competitive source of economic forecasts, and
so it is almost unavoidable that Mexico V will gain a wide audience. Finally,
Mexico V is well situated to attract the attention of decision makers in Mexico.
Coming from the Mexican business community and having friends within it,
Beltran del Rio is in a favorable position to gain confidence in business and
government circles. Moreover, he speaks and writes with a clear-headed,
practical tone that is very effective in communicating his thoughts and his
model's results.
K. DOCUMENTATION
Beltran del Rio's doctoral dissertation describes MexicoV in depth and at
length (600 pages). Although it is lengthy, Beltran del Rio's dissertation is a
convenient document with which to work. Readers are greatly aided by a
prevailing orderliness, which is apparent in a subject index, careful tables of
contents and figures, a fully alphabetical listing of systematically-chosen
variable acronyms, and carefully arranged and labelled equation listings.
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In his dissertation, Beltran del Rio describes not only his model and the
reasoning behind its construction, he also gives a long, perceptive verbal
account of the real-world situation it represents. Relationships that Mexico V
makes quantitative and explicit are first described qualitatively, with refer-
ence both to their histories and their present states. The real-world situation
is emphasized throughout the documentation, leaving it one of the most
concrete model presentations we have encountered.
Mexico V has been described in a number of places other than Beltran del
Rio's dissertation. 30 Regular communiques to model sponsors update model
forecasts. A paper describing the model's history of predictive success and
error was prepared (in Spanish) after Mexico V had experienced five years of
use as a predictive tool. 31
All told, MexicoV is one of the best documented of our case studies,
matched only by Picardi's documentation of the SAHEL models, also a
Ph.D. dissertation. MexicoV has had the added advantage of continued
sponsorship over a period of several years. (Two years elapsed between the
model's first use in forecasting and completion of Beltran del Rio's
dissertation.) Academic standards, ample time for preparation and revision.
and an interested audience in the policy community all seem to have been
factors that helped Beltran del Rio produce a high-quality description of his
model.
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CHAPTER 12
CHAC: Optimizing Mexican Agriculture
A. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
CHAC is part of an experiment by the World Bank and the Mexican
government to explore the usefulness of multi-level linear programming as a
tool for planning. The full experiment consists of three models: DINAMICO,
an economy-wide model; ENERGETICOS, which simulates the energy
sector; and CHAC, which covers annual crops in the agricultural sector.
(CHAC is the name of a Mayan rain god.) All three are optimization-based
models. DINAMICO and ENERGETICOS are dynamic; that is, they are
optimized over time. CHAC is static and represents agricultural activities
within a single year. The three models were to be linked hierarchically to attain
a detailed representation of the interactions between the energy and
agricultural sectors within the full economy. However, inconsistencies among
the three models prevented the linking.
In the following discussion we shall consider only CHAC, the largest, most
expensive, and 'probably the most innovative'] of the three models. We chose
CHAC, not only because of its size and originality, but also because it has been
used separately from the other two models by the World Bank and the Mexican
planning authorities.
From its beginning in 1969 CHACwas ajoint venture of the World Bank, the
Secretaria de la Presidencia of Mexico, and the Banco de Mexico. The Mexican
government and the Banco de Mexico contributed not only funding and data,
but also professional assistance in constructing the model.
The CHAC project had high-level sponsorship from within the Mexican Ministry
of the Presidency, and some of the Mexican contributors at the technical level are
well trained in quantitative economics ... CHAC would never have been built,
much less implemented, without the close professional collaboration and
sponsorship of the Mexican government. 2
CHAC was ready for full-scale experimentation by 1971; the following year a
World Bank modeler joined the Mexican Ministry of the Presidency to
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demonstrate the use of the model and to establish it as a policy tool within the
Mexican government. The government and the World Bank continued to use
and improve the model through 1974, when the World Bank formally withdrew
from the project. The model was left in Mexico under the care of a
newly-formed commission charged with co-ordinating the policies and
programs of the various agencies dealing with agricultural matters. The
formation of this commission was partially inspired by CHAC, which vividly
demonstrated the interdependencies of different decisions and actions within
the agricultural sector. J
B. PURPOSE
The initial aim in constructing the agricultural model, CHAC, was to formalize the
major aspects of micro-level and sectoral decision-making ... The sector study has
also been designed to serve both the Mexican government's interests in analytic
tools for planning sectoral policies, and the World Bank's interest in the
methodology of project appraisal techniques and in general policy planning
models. 4
In other words, the model had two clients. One was the Mexican
government, which formulates general agricultural policies (such as public
investment in irrigation or in agricultural research, pricing of agricultural
products, external trade and internal land tenure constraints), and through
these policies to improve the economic welfare of the country. The other client
was the World Bank, which wanted to assess the impact of a potential
investment in a particular project (such as a dam, tubewell, or canal lining) and
compare it to the likely outcomes of other possible investments. One client was
considering policies at the level of the total agricultural sector. The other was
weighing specific local investment proposals. Both wanted to know the
possible effects of their actions on local conditions and on the economy as a
whole.
CHAC was designed to avoid the pitfalls of 'the usual approach to
agricultural policy planning' ,5 which involves setting individual target outputs
for each commodity and then figuring out how much fertilizer, land, labor, and
other inputs will be required to meet all targets. In contrast, CHAC was
intended to: 6
1. Permit sector-wide aggregation of individual commodity production
processes, to assess the effects of policy not only on individual production
goals, but also on total-system goals such as full employment.
2. Generate efficient resource allocation across the agriculture sector as a
whole, which could require raising some product or input prices and
lowering others; therefore all products and inputs should be considered at
once.
3. Take account of total constraints such as balance of payments, which could
require varying mixtures of domestic and imported supply of each
commodity.
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4. Include intercrop substitution possibilities on both the demand and supply
side.
According to its authors:
CHAC is designed to be addressed to questions of pricing policies, trade policies,
employment programs, and some categories of investment allocation. It is not
particularly well suited for analyzing agricultural research and extension programs.
crop insurance policies, or credit policies. 7
C.METHOD
To accomplish all these purposes and to please both the model's clients, the
CHAC team had to construct a model that contained local and regional detail
as well as total-sector and total-economy consistency. They went about this
task by organizing the model in a geographical hierarchy. There are 20
submodels, each representing a particular climatic district in Mexico. These
20 districts are aggregated into four geographical regions which are then
aggregated into the agriculture sector as a whole. The three-level model
CHAC was intended to be linked to the total-economy model DINAMICO, to
make a consistent representation of the system all the way from district
harvesting decisions to foreign exchange balances. This final link was made
only informally, however. The CHAC and DINAMICO models were run
separately, and information from each was used as exogenous input to the
other, with the modelers intervening. 8
CHAC is a behavioral simulation model, describing how farmers and
consumers will react to various policies, use various resources, and respond to
various prices in a given year. It is a linear programming model, but the
optimization procedure is not used in the usual way, in order to select that set of
policy options that will maximize a precisely-defined objective function.
Rather, optimization in CHAC is used as a mathematical device to represent
the behavior of a competitive market.
Like all optimization models, * CHAC consists of:
1. Activities-decision variables or choices of action; the unknowns whose
values the model is to determine.
2. Constraints-restrictions on the values that the activities may take.
3. An objective function-the quantity to be minimized or maximized by
varying the activities within the range allowed by the constraints.
In CHAC the activities consist of farmers' production decisions, import-
export decisions, domestic consumers' demand decisions. and decisions about
the supply of input factors such as labor and land all for 33 different products.
The constraints in the model include world market prices (which restrict
import-export decisions), market clearance (for each crop domestic supply
plus imports must equal or exceed domestic demand plus exports), land and
* The general characteristics of optimization models are reviewed in Chapter 2.
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water limitations, availability of labor, capital and other inputs, and credit
balances.
The CHAC model is very detailed and very large; there are about 1,500
constraints and 3,500 activities. The model is solved for one year only. This
could be a year in the future, however, if forecasted values for model
parameters are used.
quantity bought/sold
Figure 12.1 CHAC objective function
The objective function is described by the modelers as the sum of consumers'
and producers' surpluses, which is to be maximized. The meaning of this
quantity can best be understood by reference to Figure 12.1. This figure shows
simplified supply and demand curves for one product. These curves are the
aggregate result of the production and consumption decisions of millions of
people in the Mexican economy, and the task of the CHAC model is to
determine what these curves will be and where they will intersect. The central
assumption of the model is that the producers and consumers within the system
will act individually in such a way that in the aggregate they will maximize the
hatched area-the sum of the producers and consumers' surplus (more
accurately the sum of the areas in 33 similar and interdependent figures, one for
each crop). According to the theory of competitive markets, when this area is
maximized, prices will equal marginal costs, and the market will be in
equilibrium.
This objective function can be altered to include monopoly behavior, or
constraints can be added to represent government interference in the free
market, but the model is usually run as a free market because the CHAC
modelers feel this is the most accurate representation of the Mexican
agricultural system.9
If that explanation of the objective function, which is the way the modelers
explain it, is too abstract for those who do not see the world through a free
market paradigm, the objective function can also be described simply as the
total net revenue (receipts minus costs) of the agricultural sector, which is to be
maximized (see Figure 12.2).
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A basic requirement of any linear programming model is that the equations
representing the objective function and constraints be linear. Thus CHAC's
constraints all follow a linear format similar to the following, which is the
general equation for the commodity balance constraint for one crop.
Y, Xl + Yz Xz + .
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This equation simply states that total domestic sales plus exports cannot exceed
total production plus imports; consumers cannot buy what has not been pro-
duced or imported. According to the inequality assumption, the opposite
could occur; production could exceed consumption.
While the constraint and all others are linear, the model does not depict
a totally linear world. For example, there are many different production
+
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activities Xj (each with an associated yield parameter Y j ) for each crop. A
farmer in one district may be able to choose among 20 different ways of
growing beans, each using a different amount of land, labor, and fertilizer,
and each producing a different yield. When they are all added together, the
farmers' supply responses in choosing how much of each kind of cropping
technology to use for each crop are in fact highly non-linear.
The requirement of linearity leads to a particularly difficult problem in the
objective function, which is shown in algebraic form in Figure 12.2. The
first term in this function is the sum over all crops of the price of each crop
times the demand for that crop. But the modelers wanted to include the
assumption that demand depends on price; in fact, the demand for one crop
depends not only on the price for that crop but on the prices of other crops
that might be substituted for it (consumer demand for wheat depends on both
wheat price and corn price). If demand D is some function of price w, then
the first term of the objective function is not linear; it is a complex function of
D, and linear programming search techniques cannot be used to find the
maximum.
The CHAC modelers avoided this problem through the process of 'grid
linearization'. Each non-linear demand curve is approximated by a series of
linear segments, each of which is associated with a constant parameter
indicating the price at which that level of demand will occur. Each such
segment is a separate activity in the model equations, and the optimization
procedure then solves for the combination of demand activities with
associated prices that maximizes the objective function. The grid linearization
procedure requires the creation of many long lists (vectors) of price
parameters and demand activities, but it allows the essentially non-linear
functioning of the market to be approximated in a linear format.
The CHAC modelers have managed by a number of such mathematical
devices to make a linear programming model that represents the behavior of
producers and consumers as essentially interacting and non-linear. The main
reasons for going to this trouble were:
1. The modelers believed that real-world relationships are non-linear.
2. The search procedures for finding the optimal point of a linear program-
ming model are much more efficient and convenient to use than any
non-linear search procedures.
The reason for wanting to optimize in the first place was that economic
theory has shown that this is one way to find the equilibrium point of a
competitive market. But it is not a very usual way, nor is CHAC a very usual
application of linear programming. The market is normally represented either
by solving simultaneous supply and demand equations, or, if the dynamics are
of interest, by simulating independently the decisions of producers and
consumers. And linear programming is usually employed to find the optimal
set of policies open to an identifiable policy-maker, rather than, as in CHAC,
as an abstract heuristic device. One of the chief advantages of linear
programming-the sharp delineation of goals, policy choices, and assump-
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tions about constraints-is in fact not realized in CHAC, where the objective
function is a mathematical artifact, the activities represent not the policy
choices of government but the daily choices of farmers and consumers, and
the actual policy variables are embedded within the constraint equations.
Why did the CHAC modelers choose a linear method to represent a
non-linear system, an optimization method when their purpose was not to
optimize, an abstract and static rather than literal and dynamic method for a
purpose that required visualizing a system's response to many different kinds of
policy inputs? The CHAC documentation never answers this question. We can
only assume that in this project, like many others, the modeling method came
before the problem. A crack team of linear programmers saw a novel way to
use their technique and proceeded to do so most skillfully, without stopping to
ask whether it was, in fact, the most appropriate tool for the problem at hand.
The CHAC modelers show great ingenuity in wriggling out of a number of
mathematical straightjackets in order to apply their linear optimization
technique to a non-linear non-optimization problem. However, each dramatic
escape moves the model to a higher level of abstraction, farther removed from
everyday understanding of real farmers and consumers. The final model is
difficult to communicate, understand, or evaluate. What does the model really
assume, implicitly and explicitly, about consumer behavior? What kinds of
information and actions at what places and when would be necessary for the
real market to achieve equilibrium in the way it does in the model? Would
differentials in income distribution, or bottlenecks in factor supply, or stocks
held over from last year make a significant difference in the system's behavior?
Who in the system really sets prices, how long does it take the price-setters to
act, and what information do they take into account? Are these questions even
relevant ones to ask about this model?
Thus CHAC is a map of reality constructed from symbols and concepts
remote from ordinary experiential knowledge. The modelers discuss it in
language that refers more the formalisms of their method than to the real
system they are representing:
Notice that by the concavity of w, no more than two of the n selling activities appear
at positive intensities in an optimal solution. Through this formulation, the demand
function can be transformed into a welfare function w, and this can be approxi-
mated as closely as desired without adding additional rows to the linear program.
The approach is readily extended to two or more products. For products in which
the demand function is separable, there is one commodity balance and one convex
combination constraint per product. For the case of product groups, there is one
commodity balance per product and one convex combination constraint for the
entire set of selling activities in the group. III
D. BOUNDARIES
CHAC calculates as endogenous variables the mix of production methods used
for 33 short-cycle crops in 20 geographical districts. The crops are the leading
Mexican annual crops in terms of production value; the list begins with maize,
cotton, and sugar cane and ends with lima beans, garlic, and flaxseed. I I For
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each crop the model calculates supply, demand, price, imports and exports
(when applicable), and use of inputs. Agricultural inputs considered in the
model include, on a seasonal basis, machinery, draft animals, chemical inputs,
purchased seeds, and credit. Labor migration and employment are calculated
from labor input usages. Various sources of labor, including farmers' own
labor, hired labor, and dryland farmers hiring themselves out during slack
seasons, are represented. Water is differentiated by source; canal irrigation,
gravity irrigation, and reservoir irrigation are accounted separately. Prices of
inptus that are available in limited quantities (land and water) are endoge-
nously generated. Prices of inputs in 'perfectly elastic' supply (chemicals and
capital) are exogenous. World market prices for traded commodities are also
exogenous.
All exogenous inputs are in the form of constants in the constraint equations
or objective function. There are 80,000 of these constants, most of which
represent input-output relationships for the 2,345 different cropping
activities. The model's constants can be grouped into three sets:
1. Policy choices.
2. Numbers that the modelers perceive as time-variant and hence update
when they solve the model for a future year.
3. Numbers that the modelers see as invariant.
The set of constants representing policies is extensive. It includes factor-in-
put pricing levels, trade policies, credit allocation, wages, and farm-size
controls. Constants that are updated for future-year solutions include size of
labor force, impact of technology on yields, rate of GNP growth, and ability of
the export market to absorb agricultural products. The model treats as
invariant such factors as spatial price differentials for crops, coefficients
governing elasticities of demand, and the equivalent labor contributed by wives
and children.
CHAC does not represent anything outside the agricultural sector except the
demands for agricultural products and the prices of industrial inputs to
agriculture. The non-agricultural portion of the Mexican economy is represen-
ted in CHAC's co-model, DINAMICO, and thus is completely omitted from
CHAC. CHAC's representation of the agricultural sector is incomplete. Only
short-cycle crops are represented-livestock, orchards, forestry, and fishing
are not included. Population attitudes, risk, political factors, education,
measures of the quality of life, degradation of the environment, and weather
are all excluded. Many of these exclusions are reasonable, given the short time
horizon of the model. The boundary diagram for CHAC is given in Figure
12.3.
E. STRUCTURE
The constraints in CHAC operate on three levels: the 20 agricultural districts,
the four regions, and the total national agricultural sector. These levels do not
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Figure 12.3 CHAC boundary diagram
operate hierarchically in the programming sense; individual optimization
decisions are not made at each level. The model is optimized as a whole. The
three levels serve only an organizational purpose; different constraints are
enforced at each level.
At the national level the form of the market is determined (monopolistic or
competitive) and commodity balances are enforced. Market demand is
calculated at the national level, except for a few crops where separate regional
markets are differentiated. Consumer prices are determined nationally, but
producer prices are specified by district to represent transportation cost
differentials. Of the 33 crops, 21 are assumed to be traded on the world
market, and any export or import policies are imposed at the national level.
Also at this level are the constraints on agricultural use of machinery, credit,
and improved seeds.
The four regions of the model are used to specify constraints on hired labor,
chemical inputs, and draft animals. The total number of landless laborers for
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each region is given exogeneously (landed laborers, or farmers, are specified
by district). If any region demands more labor at some season than it can
supply, interregional migration can result. Regional wage differentials are
maintained.
Land, water, and farmer-labor constraints occur within each of the 20
districts, where the production decisions are made. Land constraints are
specified monthly. Length of time land is required for a certain crop may
depend on the availability of machinery to speed up the processes of plowing or
harvesting. Water is available as 'gravity water' (from reservoirs, delivered
through canals) or as privately supplied well water, depending on the district.
In some districts, gravity water availability is subdivided into as many as four
zones of varying efficiency, depending on length of canals and their state of
repair.
The 2,345 production activities farmers can choose from can be thought of
as 'packages' of inputs required to produce a given output. Not all activities are
available to all districts; for example, tropical crops cannot be raised by farmers
in the temperate districts, and in one district, called Culmaya, farmers can
choose among only 16 of the model's 251 possible ways to grow corn. Two
corn-production activities are shown for illustration in Table 12.1. All the
production activities in the model reflect cropping techniques and yields that
have actually been observed in the various districts, not necessarily the
biological-maximum or the best-management choices.
One district-level model, known as BAJIO, was developed in more detail
than the others in order to study investment choices and distributional effects in
more detail. 12 The BAJIO model distinguishes four different farm types
(large and small, irrigated and dryland) to approximate (with landless laborers)
five income classes. The model also includes three different levels of farm
management skill and a wider variety of cropping technologies. BAJIO can be
run independently or as one of 20 districts embedded in CHACo
Of course, it is impossible to make a causal structure diagram for a static
optimization model such as CHACo The closest we can come to a Reference
Structure Diagram is shown in Figure 12.4. The model is essentially one
enormous agricultural production function, with market demand as an
important input. It is a narrow deep look at one aspect of a developing
economy, rather than a broad, shallow depiction of the total system.
In CHAC all 3,500 activities are very literally a function of all others since
they are all simultaneously determined in such a way as to maximize the
objective function while staying within the constraints. To sort out what that
means with respect to the implied relationship of any variable to any other is
impossible. The explicit model assumptions, the constraints, are generally
self-evident. For example, the model contains 348 equations that specify that
land use within a given month and district shall be less than or equal to the total
land available. The important structural assumptions are not these, but are
implicit in the choice of the activities, the objective function, and the
optimization procedure itself.
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Table 12.1 Two CHAC Cropping Activities. (Note: These particular numbers do not
necessarily typify the actual production statistics in the EI Bajio region in any given
year. The model contains many other technological choices for producing corn in El
Bajio.) Table supplied by R. D. Norton.
Sample coefficients for corn production in EI Bajio (all figures are on a per hectare
basis).
Yield (tons)
Purchased seeds (pesos)
Fertilizer (pesos)
Pesticides (pesos)
Miscellaneous costs (pesos)
February labor (man-days)
March labor (man-days)
April labor (man-days)
May labor (man-days)
June labor (man-days)
July labor (man-days)
August labor (man-days)
September labor (man-days)
October labor (man-days)
November labor (man-days)
Machinery inputs (days)
March irrigation (thous. m3)
April irrigation (thous. m3)
May irrigation (thous. m3 )
Draft animal inputs (days)
Short-term credit (pesos)
February land (ha)
March land (ha)
April land (ha)
May land (ha)
June land (ha)
July land (ha)
August land (ha)
September land (ha)
October land (ha)
November land (ha)
Management inputs
Rainfed
Cultivation
1.2
50
198
40
44
0.2
0.6
0.8
4.2
7.6
1.5
5.5
3.4
0.07
355
0.08
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
0.75
Irrigated
Cultivation
3.5
55
615
78
112
7.0
12.5
10.5
16.5
9.0
15.0
0.2
1.6
1.4
1.4
16.8
899
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0
• See text of Chapter IVA in Goreux-Manne l for an explanation of management inputs and their
units.
The central structural hypothesis of CHAC is that Mexican producers and
consumers behave in the aggregate as competitive-market theory says they
will. This theory requires a series of stringent assumptions about how the
Mexican economy operates. Among these assumptions are: 13
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1. The economic system operates through the interaction of producers and
consumers (and government policies tested in the model)-no other set of
actors has appreciable economic impact.
2. The interactions of individual producers and consumers aggregate to
equate price with marginal cost (which produces Pareto-optimal utility
maximization) .
3. Supply and demand adjust within a year to balance each other via price
mechanisms; there is no significant time lag between production, sale, and
consumption of a commodity.
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4. Producers and consumers operate with perfect information-producers
know which production activities are available to them, what each will cost,
what yield it will give, and what price it will sell for; consumers know the
relative prices of all commodities and quickly adjust their buying habits to
them.
5. Agricultural prices will not have a significant effect on consumer income or
income distribution; demand curves will stay stable as food prices change
within a given year.
6. All these conditions will continue to hold under different government
policies concerning agricultural imports and exports, factor pricing, interest
rates, etc.
F. DATA
One could not expect complete documentation of all data for a model with
80,000 non-zero coefficients, and the published accounts of CHAC contain
only general descriptions of the ways in which all these numbers were gathered.
The majority of CHAC's coefficients represent the many different cropping
activities available to farmers in each district. These coefficients were partially
available from official sources, especially from the Secretaria de Recursos
Hidraulicos for irrigated districts and the Secretaria de Agricultura y
Ganaderia for tropical and rainfed districts. 14 These statistics were only a
beginning, however. The major part of the CHAC effort was filling in the holes
in the official sources and making the numbers consistent:
Collecting and verifying information on this scale is plainly a formidable task ... In
Mexico much of the information already existed, although not in a coherent form.
Since, at its lowest level, CHAC can be regarded and used as a giant adding
machine, the consistency of microeconomic information could readily be checked
against macroeconomic information. For example, when coefficients of inputs of
water are applied to the various crops and the areas on which they are actually
grown, the total requirements should match what is known about the overall use of
water. Inconsistencies were found. As a result, field trips to parts of Mexico were
taken in order to check the validity of the coefficients and in some cases establish
new ones, about two man-years were spent on assembling the data available,
verifying them, and putting them in a format suitable for use in the model. 15
The most difficult numbers to estimate probably were not the relatively
straightforward land-yield agricultural data, but the numbers representing
human choices such as the allocation of family labor, the willingness to accept
risk, and consumer demand decisions. The modelers provide little explanation
for how these numbers were obtained; they point them out as the most difficult
and uncertain parts of the model.
G. TESTING
CHAC's nature demands that the model be subjected to extensive tests. The
model's central free-market hypothesis is not proven. Thus the model should
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undergo validity testing to ascertain how well its behavior duplicates that of the
system it is representing. Since the model contains 80,000 parameters, extensive
sensitivity testing is called for, even though many of the parameters come from
field observation of production processes and are probably fairly accurate. As
the model was built both to demonstrate a modeling technique and to explore
policy strategies, it would be appropriate for CHAC to be the subject of much
methodological experimentation as well as being used for numerous policy tests.
However, CHAC is relatively expensive to test because of its size and
complexity. It costs $50-100 per solution at commercial computer rates. 16 The
modelers have reduced the cost to this level by devoting considerable attention
to programming efficiency, and they have reduced it even further by creating
smaller, more aggregated versions ofthe model for use in testing. For example, a
model entitled PACIFICO was constructed using data from only five of the 20
production districts covered in CHAC. Another more aggregated version,
CHAQUITO, includes all 20 production districts but treats input requirements
on a seasonal basis, whereas CHAC uses a monthly basis. And BAJIO, as we
have already mentioned, represents only one district but in even greater detail.
PACIFICO has been used for methodological tests where structure is
important. CHAQUITO has been used for policy tests in which it is necessary to
include the whole of Mexico but not essential to have CHAC's degree of detail.
Even with the use of smaller versions of the model, however, CHAC's testing
remains a demanding, complicated process.
Very few testing results have been published and little has been said about the
model's general validation. When the modelers mention validity, it is always
with regard to some very specific result. CHAC's employment estimates are
closely comparable with survey-based employment figures from Guatemala and
Peru. 17 Shadow prices from the model are compared with actual factor prices to
check the reasonableness of the production assumptions.
The correspondence between the dual of BAJIG and the actual land prices in EI
Bajio constitutes a strong validation. It means that, at least in the aggregate, the
technology set for each farm class provides an aPRropriate description of the process
of transforming factor inputs into final outputs. x
Some parameter sensitivity and structural sensitivity tests have been
conducted. For example, the competitive equilibrium formulation in the
objective function has been changed to a monopolistic equilibrium formulation
(but the concept of equilibrium has not been tested). Sensitivity of the model's
most uncertain parameters, such as farmer's reservation wage and price
elasticities of demand, have been tested. I') Moreover, many methodological
experiments, especially experiments with the model's computational structure,
have been tried. The aim of such experiments has been to improve
computational efficiency without loss in accuracy.
The bulk of CHAC's testing has been policy testing. The policy tests that have
been conducted with CHAC are too numerous to describe fully here. Among the
policy instruments that have been varied in model tests are interest rates,
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changes in foreign exchange premiums, changes in wage levels, subsidies on
pesticides and fertilizer, and supply controls. 20 As many of these policy
levers can be applied on a district-specific and/or crop-specific basis, the
number of possible choices is astronomical. In general, the choice of tests to
be conducted has been made according to specific questions asked by the two
model clients.
Although an enormous amount of information is generated by each test run
of CHAC, much is highly abstract and not easily translated into non-technical
language. When the modelers conduct a test, they gain information about the
geometry of the constraint-bound region within which the optimization takes
place. Knowledge of this region's form gives them a useful general under-
standing about how the optimum point is likely to respond to changes in
constraint parameters, and thus a 'seat of the pants' feeling for how the model
works. Unfortunately, this feeling is almost impossible to communicate to
others who have not shared the experience of running the model. Attempts at
explanation tend to degenerate into impenetrable jargon. As a case in point,
the following description of experiments designed to explore capital-labor
substitution was published in a technical journal:
... first, the locus of equilibrium points shows a greater degree of factor substituta-
bility than the isoprofit curve. In other words, the isoprofit curve underestimates
the degree offactor response in the sector as a whole; this is the relevant point for
the formulation of agricultural policy. Secondly, both curves have elasticities
which vary substantially over the different segments and in some cases they are
not even convex ... The non-convexity rises from the fact that CHAC is a model
with multiple products and multiple factors and the 'isoquants' are projections of
a multi-dimensional hyperplane Euclidian two-space. The following question
arises from these results: if in fact the process analysis production model is a
reasonable representation of reality, how useful are substitution parameters
which are estimated by a) imposing on the data a production model which
includes the implicit assumption of constant elasticities of substitution; and b)
utilizing a production function of two factors and one product?21
H. CONCLUSIONS
Although CHAC is a static model, it has been used in a quasidynamic mode
by running it for two different years, 1968 and 1974. The 1968 run used actual
data for that year; the 1974 run used forecasts for income growth rate and its
effect on demand, for investment activities occurring within the period, for
world market conditions, and for technological improvements in production.
These two runs were carried out with and without policy intervention to
provide at least a short-term dynamic glimpse of the response of the model
system to various sorts of government policies.
The 1968 run with no policy changes already provides a wealth of interes-
ting and detailed conclusions about the Mexican agricultural sector as repre-
sented in CHACo Perhaps most striking are the employment estimates: taking
into account seasonal fluctuations, only about 2.4 million man-years of
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employment are provided for an agricultural labor force of 5.2 million
persons. 22
The seasonality may be summarized by stating that 18% of the labor force cannot
find even one month's employment at a marginal productivity equal to the current
wage. 44% cannot find more than three month's employment at that productivity,
and only 27% are so employed on a full-time basis. 2.
The emphasis the modelers put on this result, and their apparent surprise,
indicate that the extent of rural employment had not previously been measured
by any other method.
Another set of 1968 results concerns comparative advantage in international
trade. Table 12.2 shows the CHAC-calculated marginal gains or losses for
several exported crops. The table suggests several policies with regard to
export taxes and quotas; for instance, that corn exports should be strongly
discouraged, and that aggregate crop exports could be taxed up to 4% without
making export activities unprofitable. 24
Comparison of 1974 results with 1968 with no government policy changes
shows agricultural output growing much faster than agriculture-sector income,
a behavior common to most developing countries. It also shows agricultural
employment growing more slowly than the labor force; in other words, a
worsening of the already astounding 46% sectoral unemployment rate.
Tests of policies to improve this situation indicate, as might be expected, that
only small changes can be made over such a short time period, and that any
policy that improves one part of the system makes another part worse. For
example, the greatest effect on employment of all policies tested comes from a
doubling of the interest rate. This change increases annual employment growth
from 2.8% to 3.1 %, but it also has a strongly negative effect on production
and raises consumer prices. Table 12.3 gives a qualitative picture of some of
the trade-offs indicated by CHAC policy tests.
The general conclusion drawn by the CHAC modelers is: 'The agricultural
employment problem is fairly intractable ... '. 25
Mexican agriculture is beginning to have to face the problem of relatively low
growth rates of farm income and employment which occur in a sector constrained
by the growth of domestic demand and of export demand ... The problem is no
longer simply how to increase production. It is, rather, how to bring about
structural changes which will lead to an expansion of domestic demand. These are
the real second generation problems of the Green Revolution, and Mexico will
have to confront these problems before most other developing countries. 26
This conclusion is quite similar to that of Beltran del Rio derived from the very
different model MexicoV, and it has also been voiced by numerous analyses
using mental models. And just as Picardi's model did not include the sorts of
radical structural change that might have solved the Sahel nomads' problem,
neither MexicoV nor CHAC includes the massive changes on either the
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Table 12.2 Estimated profitability of selected Mexican agricultural products in
international trade (1967-69). Reproduced from Goreaux and Manne! by permission
of North-Holland Publishing Company
Crop
Strawberries
Sesame
Cantaloupe
Peanuts
Tomatoes
Watermelon
Potatoes
Cotton fiber
Cucumber
Pineapple
Green chile
Beans
Sugar cane§
Grain sorghum
Cottonseed
Oats
Safflower
Wheat
Rice
Corn
Soybeans
Tons Tons Assumed Marginal
exported exported export Marginal cost of
in base In pricet profits production
period' CHAct (pesos/ton) in CHAC in CHAC
(pesos/ton)
16,930 21,200 3,680 2,240 1,440
8,300 16,600 3,981 2,200 1,781
45,051 45,051 2,003 1,420 583
4,150 8,300 2,500 1,170 1,130
38,107 38,107 1,200 900 300
41,842 41,842 1,135 740 395
26 10,000 1,200 690 510
318,877 318,877 5,767 670 5,097
30,752 70,000 7,960 420 370
9,613 9,613 400 140 260
16,700 25,100 748 130 618
66,400 99,600 1,846 100 1,746
7,967,628 7,967,682 68 20 48
2,140 566 -50 616
416 -160 576
387 -290 677
7,724 1,550 -380 1,930
153,258 600 -460 1,060
137 750 -4<i0 1,210
979,455 623 -4RO 1,103
ROO -<i70 1,470
, Base period defined as 1967--69 average.
t Arbitrary export bounds imposed in CHAC for this solution in order to derive marginal
valuations. For crops governed rigidly by international quotas, formal or informal, these bounds
are set equal to the actual quantities exported.
:j: This is an average farm gate price (less than Lo.b. price). The export prices are notional in
some cases, but there is sufficient information in the table to recalculate marginal profits on the
basis of different prices.
§ Sugar cane exports and prices are expressed in cane equivalents, although the export product is
refined sugar.
demand or supply side (in distribution ofincome or land, for example) that might
result in productive employment for Mexico's rural labor force.
Another kind of policy test was done for CHAC's second client, the World
Bank, to examine the effects ofspecific investment projects such as canal-lining,
tubewells, and land-leveling (which increases the efficiency of irrigation water
by allowing it to be applied more uniformly). These tests were run with the more
detailed district-level model BAJIO (but aggregated from one-month to
three-month factor availabilities; hence BAJITO) embedded in CHAQUITO.
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Table 12.3 Qualitative impact of selected policy changes in CHACo Reproduced
from Goreaux and Manne L with permission
Instrument
Target
Producers'
income
Consumers'
surplus
Employment
Exports
Budget
Production
Foreign
exchange
premium
++
+
++
++
Interest
rate
change
++
+
n.a.
Wage
change
++
n.a.
Chemical
subsidy
+
++
+
++
Water
tax
+
Supply
controls
++
++
n.a.
Key; ++ strongly positive
+ positive
strongly negative
negative
n.a. not applicable
The conclusions seem to have been surprising. Tubewells were calculated to
be the most profitable investment, and the optimal allocation was to small
dryland farms when wage rates were high and to large dryland farms when
wages were low. Land-leveling was intermediate in profitability and canal-lin-
ing, the project that was actually being considered at the time, was 10west.27
Numerous other experiments were tried, and again some of the results
surprised the modelers.
An apparent anomoly in the results is of some interest. This illustrates the
difficulties of applying a priori reasoning to determine the direction of changes in a
model as complex as CHAQUITO. Product prices can be no lower, and in fact
increase when the premium on foreign exchange is increased from zero to 30%. Yet
investment in water declines slightly when this premium increase is made ... The
reason for this was a switch in comparative advantage between BAJITO and
another district submodel in CHAQUITO in the production of onions for export.
This is a crop which happens to respond particularly weJJ to being grown on levelled
rather than on unlevelled land. 28
I. COMPUTER REQUIREMENTS
CHAC, like all large linear programming models, is extremely demanding of
computer hardware and software. Like the other short-term, detailed
implementation models described here, CHAC occupies considerable compu-
ter space and takes considerable time to run. CHAC has undergone significant
modification to make it operable on Mexican computer facilities. It probably
would be difficult to transfer to a new system, but as CHAC is not terribly
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useful to people outside Mexico, non-transferability is not a serious problem.
CHAC-type models are being built, however, under World Bank sponsorship
for such countries as Iran, India, Tanzania, and Brazil. 29
J. IMPLEMENTATION
CHAC has an unusually successful implementation history, according to its
makers. The model began as an experiment in 1970 to test the usefulness of a
method. The experiment was so successful in the view of the Mexican
government, that one of the principal members of the World Bank modeling
team was invited to work in the Ministry of the President to continue model
development and to 'assist in making concrete applications to Mexican
agricultural policy questions'. 30 While being developed under the Ministry of
the Presidency, CHAC began to be used for policy analysis. Model analyses of
specific issues began to appear in official policy papers, as well as in
formulation of general policy plans. 3'
Over time, the model's development has become progressively more
independent of World Bank technical staff support. Simultaneously, the
model's institutional grounding in the Mexican government has increased.
Moreover, CHAC's success has attracted the attention of international
agencies outside the World Bank such as the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization.
Within Mexico, the CHAC modelers claim to have had an influence on both
specific agricultural sector policy decisions and on the policymakers' general
understanding of agricultural sector operation. At the general understanding
level, CHAC has fostered an awareness ofthe potential (or lack of potential) of
various policies for stimulating employment in agriculture. Specific applica-
tions are numerous and varied. A clear-cut example of CHAC's influence on
policy strategy is that of export policy. CHAC indicates that there is a great
variation in the profitability of different export crops. Model conclusions on
this score have had a direct influence on the Mexican government's agricultural
trade strategy and have led to, among other things, stepping up exports of
sesame and black beans. 32
CHAC's implementation successes are the result of good management,
fortuitous institutional circumstances, and the sort of short-term, detailed
output that policymakers seek. Throughout its development CHAC has han
the advantage of having 'well-trained personnel in high positions in the
Mexican government who were willing to sponsor and interpret the work'.J3
The working procedure used was:
... based on continuous interaction between policymakers, agricultural specialists,
and those working with the model. This permits better identification of problem
areas and appropriate modifications of the model to address very particular
problems. 34
Having the model address questions of specific concern helped to provide a
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focus for policy discussion and allowed the model to 'become a flexible, vital
part of the decision-making process' .35
K. DOCUMENTATION
CHAC was developed in an international planning agency (the World Bank)
and then gradually absorbed by a national policymaking agency (the Ministry
of the President). Communication channels between modelers and planners
were of the sort usually found in in-house consulting situations. The modeling
staff meet with planners to find out what questions they are asking. They
perform the indicated analyses and report back, either verbally or through
memos, reports, and other forms of internal communication. In CHAC's five
years of existence it has undoubtedly generated many filing cabinets full of
documentation, only a small proportion of which has been published. Much
basic information is stored at the World Bank in the form of publicly accessible
notebooks full of linear programming tableaus, basic assumptions, and data. 36
The published documentation on CHAC is fragmented and, for the most
part, quite technical. One book of papers on CHAC and its companion models,
DINAMICO and ENERGETICOS, was published in 1973.37 In addition, a
number of papers on CHAC have appeared in technical journals.
The available papers describing CHAC deal by and large with specialized
aspects of the model-its database, the decomposition algorithm used, the way
the linear program was structured, application of the model to hydrological
questions, etc. Many aspects of the model are not publicly documented. For
example, no systematic description of CHAC's sensitivity testing is available.
Moreover, non-technical summaries of basic model assumptions or plain-lan-
guage description of how the model operates have not been written.
The style in which CHAC has been documented makes it somewhat
accountable to the government agency within which it is used and perhaps
more accountable to the technical community of linear programmers.
However, outside these circles there is little to promote understanding of how
the model works. The technical language used in published papers describing
CHAC effectively removes the model from examination by anyone other than
a linear programmer. A person who does not automatically think of the world
in terms of consumers' surplus, reservation wages, shadow prices, and
indifference curves must accept its basic assumptions on faith or not at all. And
one wonders whether even its makers can truly envisage simultaneous
interdependencies within a 3,500 by 1,500 matrix. As is the case with many
detailed, short-term, implementation-oriented models, CHAC is a black box,
producing impressive and useful-looking information by a process that is not
quite comprehensible.
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PART IV
The State of the Art
If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could then
better judge what to do, and how to do it.
Abraham Lincoln
John Maynard Keynes, writing one of the very first critiques of a computer
model (one of Jan Tinbergen's first econometric models) said: 'The worst of
him is that he is much more interested in getting on with the job than in
spending time in deciding whether the job is worth getting on with'. 1 Is the
job of computer modeling worth getting on with? Has any useful and
enduring knowledge that was not otherwise attainable come out of such
models? Is computer modeling a demonstrably effective means toward
understanding complex social systems? Is that understanding sufficiently
enduring that it can tell us something about the social systems of tomorrow as
well as those of yesterday? And if there is any such understanding, has it been
used deliberately, and successfully, to make the world better in any way?
In this part of the book we will be concerned with evaluating computer
models; seeing how they differ from and what they can contribute to our
mental models, to allow us to predict or design the systems we live in.
We will leave to Part V the question of prescription: what, if anything,
should be done to improve the art of computer modeling. First, we need to
make as clear a statement as possible about the state of that art.
So far we have presented the nine models one by one, with little
cross-referencing or comparison one to another. To begin this evaluative
section of the book we will go back and look at them as a set, cutting through
them in several different ways to expose facets of their contents, different' ...
as the view of the interior of an orange obtained by slicing it horizontally is
from the view of it obtained by slicing it vertically'. 2
In Chapter 13 we will focus on the content of the models. We will see what
the models have taught us about the process of industrialization as a whole
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and about five processes that accompany/cause industrialization: population
growth; production and allocation of economic output; technical change;
migration and labor allocation; environmental pollution and resource
depletion. In Chapter 14 we will go back over the five theoretical advantages
of computer models listed in Chapter 1:
1. Rigor.
2. Comprehensiveness.
3. Logic.
4. Accessibility.
5. Testability.
and see to what extent these advantages are actually realized in the nine
models. In Chapter 15 we will look at the implementation of the
models-have they been used, and if so how, and with what results? Is the
world any different because of their existence?
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. J. M. Keynes, 'Professor Tinbergen's Method', The Economic Journal, XLIX,
(195),559, September, 1939.
2. R. Ackoff, 'The Future of Operational Research is Past', J. Opl. Res. Soc., 30, 96,
1979.
CHAPTER 13
Model Content: The Process of
Industrialization
The nine models, and indeed most large-scale social-system models, are all
concerned with explaining some aspect of the dominant social process of this
century-the transition from traditional, agricultural societies to modern,
industrial ones, with all the cultural changes this transition implies. There are
many possible definitions of and measurements f0r what is usually called
'development', but what we shall call industrialization. It is the subject of
continuous research, discussion, and policy intervention. Industrialization is a
complex, gradual, and all-encompassing process, far from understood, even by
those societies that have experienced it most fully.
Industrialization is most often characterized by its surface attributes. It
seems to be a slow evolution of a society from a pre-industrial state with
properties such as:
• Technical and social change barely noticeable from generation to genera-
tion.
• Material comforts achieved primarily through human services.
• Childbearing throughout most of females' reproductive years.
• Experience of infant mortality in nearly every family.
• Geographical mobility limited to a few square kilometers; social mobility
almost non-existent.
• Cultural homogeneity and cohesiveness.
• Utilization of primarily renewable sources of materials and energy; energy
use rate 5,000-10,000 kilocalories per person per day.
• Local or regional self-sufficiency; political and economic decentralization.
• Information storage mainly mental: information transfer mainly verbal.
To, or at least through, an industrial state with:
• Significant change, especially in technology, within one generation.
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• Material comfort achieved primarily through machine services.
• Childbearing through a minor part of female reproductive lifetime.
• Almost no experience of infant mortality.
• Geographic mobility over thousands of kilometers; some social and
economic mobility.
• Cultural heterogeneity and divisiveness.
• Utilization of primarily non-renewable sources of materials and energy;
energy use rate over 100,000 kilocalories per person per day.
• Local and regional interdependency; political and economic centralization.
• Information storage and transfer through print, computers, and telecommu-
nications.
Other attributes may easily be added to this list.
Partial as it is, a list such as this raises many questions about whatever process
so thoroughly transforms a society. Why does industrialization occur at all, and
why does it vary so greatly in time of onset and rate of progress? Are all the
attributes linked inextricably together or could some be encouraged and others
discouraged? Can one society help or hinder the process of industrialization in
another? Is an industrialized society sustainable over the long term or likely to
evolve or collapse into some other social form? In short, how does this process
start, what makes it end, what does it lead to, and how can it be controlled while
it is proceeding?
Many thousands of volumes have been written presenting models, mostly
verbal models, of industrialization. We cannot hope to compare the nine
survey models with all the verbal, mental, and mathematical models that have
preceded them, especially not comprehensively, since the models, like the
real-world process, are complex and multidimensional. Instead, we shall look
here at five widely-noted processes within social systems that seem to affect or
be affected by industrialization. They are:
1. Population growth.
2. Production and allocation of economic output.
3. Technological change.
4. Rural-urban migration.
5. Use of natural resources.
These might be described as key indicators of industrialization; processes of the
social system that seem somehow to be centrally involved or thoroughly
changed in industrial development. Each interacts with all the others.
Comprehension of the causes and consequences of industrialization must
probably include at least some understanding of these five processes and their
interactions.
Of course other processes that we will not mention here are also deeply
embedded in the phenomenon of industrialization-for example, value
change, international trade, the role of the family, the role of money and credit
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and of the government. We have limited the discussion to these five processes
of an industrializing system primarily because they are included in most of our
models. Value change, in contrast, is included in only two of them, and only
partially. Monetary flows can be found in only one model, international trade
in three, and family structure in none. Government in nearly all the models is
exogenous.
We shall note how each process is represented in each of the nine models,
comparing the representation to the model purpose and indicating its
influence, so far as we understand it, on the model conclusions. We would like
to compare the models' representations to the 'real' process, but this is not
possible, since models are intended to be simplifications, not 'reality', and
since we have only our mental models, not 'reality', for comparison. Thus the
'real-world' referents in this discussion can be just two things; the industrializa-
tion process as perceived by the authors and the readers of this book, and that
subset of the perceived process that might be relevant to the purpose of the
model. To keep these referents in mind, we shall begin each section with a brief
description of our own mental models of the indicator in question, and we shall
remind ourselves regularly of each model's purpose.
A. POPULATION GROWTH
1. Mental models
The size and structure of the human population respond to changes in the
economic system through three basic mechanisms-births, deaths, and
migrations (migrations will be discussed later). Multitudinous factors affect
births and deaths-biological capability, social norms, economic pressures and
opportunities, government inducements or propaganda, technologies of birth
and death control, and environmental quality, to name just a few (see Figure
13.1). Industrialization affects nearly all of these factors. Better health services
change biological capabilities, industrial work patterns change social norms,
some kinds of economic pressures increase while others decrease. All these
factors are filtered through the decision processes of individual families, and
the millions of family responses add up to aggregate birth or death rates, which
then change the size and attributes of the population, which then change the
process of industrialization. The most general result seems to be a reduction in
both birth and death rates, which has been labeled the demographic transition
(see Figure 13.2).
The population size defines the level of need for various kinds of economic
output, from food to education to housing. Population also provides a primary
input to economic production-labor, with its various attributes of location,
skills, and strength. The size, distribution, attributes, and relative power of
different population subsets also affect the distribution of economic output
through market demand and/or political pressure. And in general, as the
population grows, the per capita share of everything declines.
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Figure 13.1 Interactions between population growth
and industrialisation
Populations also exert subtle dynamic effects on societal development
through biological aging. A population's size and attributes have a glacier-like
inertia, gradually advancing or receding as birth cohorts steadily age together
over the length of the human lifetime. Only rare events such as famine, war, or
sudden mass migration can change a population's characteristics suddenly.
Normally a population's size, sex ratio, abilities, health, norms, and well-being
are a slowly-evolving, living record of important events in the social system
over the last 80 years or so. For example, the effects of the First and Second
World Wars on births, deaths, sex ratios, expectations, and physical
capabilities are still discernible in the populations of most European nations.
And the baby boom in the United States in the 1950s will continue to have
social impact past the year 2015, when the large baby-boom cohorts reach
retirement age.
Thus the population is enmeshed in the industrialization process, as partial
determinant of economic demand and production, as an aggregate of actors
responsive to economic conditions, and as a stabilizing, inertial element,
slowing down and smoothing out the rate of change. It is not surprising that
everyone of the nine models incorporates population in some way, and that
some of them contain very detailed and sophisticated demographic sectors.
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2. Computer models
The representations of population in the nine models fall into four basic
categories, as illustrated in Figure 13.3. The simplest possible way to include
population in a model is to make it exogenous (either constant or exogenously
driven by a constant growth rate) and to keep track of its size only, not its
attributes. The two most short-term models in our survey, CHAC and
MexicoV, do this.
CHAC uses an exogenous, aggregated population estimate in calculating
consumer demand for agricultural commodities. It also uses rural population
statistics for four geographic regions as labor constraints. Since CHAC is
static, it does not need any population change assumptions. When CHAC is
run for a hypothetical future year, population extrapolations are made
exogenously. If these extrapolations are considered uncertain, alternate ones
can be tested.
MexicoV, with a two to ten year time horizon, generates total population
size exogenously with a fixed net growth rate:
N(t) = NG·N(t_l)
where N(t) is the number of people in year t, N(t-l) is the number in the
previous year, and NG is the constant net population growth rate. The
population is not broken down into age or sex categories. Urban and rural
populations are distinguished in order to calculate urban and rural labor
force. The only reason for even this much detail is to generate differences in
rural and urban labor productivities. Neither labor force has an effect on
productive output. The total population size is used in the model only to
provide a denominator for such social indices as GNP per capita and dispos-
able income per capita.
Although these exogenous population functions are extremely simple, they
are appropriate to the purposes of CHAC and MexicoV. Assessments of the
immediate return on investment in irrigation equipment, or short-term pre-
dictions of aggregate economic variables, do not require a detailed population
representation. Over the short time horizon of these models, population size
can safely be considered constant or changing at a regular rate.
However, in verbal descriptions of both CHAC and Mexico V, the modelers
express great concern about Mexico's employment problem and about exces-
sive rural-urban migration. The modelers are unable to deal with these
population-related problems, not only because of the simple population
functions they use, but also because of the short-term focus of the methods
they chose. The modelers limited their investigations to the immediate,
population-independent questions that were of primary concern to their
clients. By doing so, they gave up the opportunity to investigate the longer-
term problems that they themselves clearly felt were important, perhaps not
only important in themselves, but also relevant to the short-term problems
the clients were trying to solve.
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Figure 13.2 Demographic transition in industrialized and industrializing
countries. Reproduced with permission from D. H. Meadows
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Figure 13.3 Population functions
Since the natural dynamics of populations unfold over decades, one would
expect the longer-term models to represent population change processes in
more detail. Three of the models, RtF, TEMPO, and KASM, take the next
step upward in complexity. They keep fertility and mortality exogenous but
capture the inertial effects of changing age structure through detailed age
disaggregation.
In KASM the use of exogenous fertility and mortality rates most likely stems
from the relatively short (five to 15 years) time horizon of the model and from
an agricultural-ministry client with no jurisdiction over population matters
(although this ministry might have been interested in the relationship between
food sufficiency and mortality, which is not included in the model). Population
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in KASM influences only economic demand and agricultural labor supply.
Disaggregation into 180 different age and sex groups does not seem necessary for
this purpose. The population sector of the model has been used independently,
however, to provide detailed population projections for Korean planning
agencies. For this purpose the disaggregation is probably appropriate, but
endogenous fertility and mortality assumptions might also have been
appropriate.
The Rtf modelers were directed by the client to explore two population-
growth scenarios, the two-child and three-child families, to see whether
population growth rates should be considered of national concern. Population is
used in the model as one determinant of the final demand for the 185 different
industrial sectors and thus indirectly to generate resource consumption and
pollution. The model deals with an industrialized country, where future fertility
and mortality shifts are likely to besmall. Familysize is the focusoftheclient, and
it is considered manipulatable by government policy, although the mechanisms
of manipulation are not explicit. Therefore the exogenous population growth
assumption is probably appropriate to this model's purpose. Again, however,
the detailed age and sex disaggregation does not seem necessary.
TEMPO also has a primary focus on population and was sponsored by a
population-based client. It is an educational model, with the purpose of making
governments worry about and take steps to reduce rapid population growth.
TEMPO represents the effects of population on consumption and employment,
but not the feedback of economic development on population. Fertility and
mortality change internally only as a result of migration from rural areas to urban
areas, where the fertility and mortality of migrants are assumed to adjust
instantly. An exogenous policy can also decrease fertility by the simple process
of allocating money to family-planning programs. The population is disaggre-
gated by five-year age increments, by sex, and by modern- or subsistence-sector
labor participation.
When the TEMPO model was made, its simple, one-way causal hypothesis
was well-suited to the task of the model and to the state of knowledge about
population dynamics. The message that new babies consume immediately but
do not produce for 15-20 years was a revelation to many people who had never
thought about such things before. The possibility that money spent on reducing
birth rates might result in faster economic growth than money spent on capital
plant was an intriguing new idea. But as a pioneering hypothesis should do,
TEMPO spawned criticism, further observations, and further hypothesis that
eventually went beyond the notion that population growth affects but is not
affected by economic development. Partly because of TEMPO's existence and
accessibility, the demographic sophistication of governments and of computer
modelers developed beyond TEMPO's exogenous population assumptions.
Four of the models, LTSM, BACHUE, SOS, and SAHEL, do contain
theories about how populations respond to the economy as well as about how the
economy responds to the population. Three of these models, LTSM,
BACHUE, and SAHEL, incorporate the theoryofthe demographic transition.
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In its simplest form industrialization itself is assumed to cause the demog-
raphic transition. As societies industrialize (as measured, usually, by GNP per
capita), first death rates and then birth rates decrease. More sophisticated
versions of the theory attribute the demographic changes to specific aspects of
industrialization such as greater labor mobility, which breaks up the extended
family, or higher levels of education and rationality, or changing costs and
benefits of children. I
In LTSM the death rate is decreased by higher per capita income and by
exogenous government investment in services. The birth rate responds to
education, to employment of women in modern economic sectors, and to an
exogenous, cost-free government birth-control policy. The exact mechanisms
by which these factors are supposed to impinge on families and change their
health or decisions about reproductive behavior are not specified. The aggregate
fertility rate responds instantly and linearly to an increase in education,
employment, or population policy, but education and employment cannot be
instantly generated. Education is accumulated by the aging population cohorts,
depending on government service expenditures during the school-age years.
Employment depends on capital plant in the modern economic sectors.
One of the motivating forces behind the LTSM model was a desire to update
TEMPO by including the demographic transition theory. The result of doing so
is to make this model more equivocal than TEMPO about the deleterious effects
of population growth, and also to indicate the inherent slowness of any
population response that has to proceed, as LTSM has assumed, through the
diffusion of education and employment.
BACHUE contains a more detailed demographic transition theory. Here as
in LTSM the death rate is reduced by higher income (a surrogate for better
nutrition and health care). Since BACHUE keeps track of income distribution,
it is the only model ofthe nine that can distinguish the difference between income
rising only for the rich classes or primarily for the poor classes, with obviously
different effect on mortality rates.
Fertility in BACHUE is a linear function of four factors: female labor
participation rate (R), percentage illiteracy (I), life expectancy at birth (LE),
and the percent of the population employed in agricultural activities (EA). The
coefficients of the equation are derived from regressing gross reproduction rate
(GRR) on these variables over a cross-sectional sample of 47 developing
countries in 1969. The resulting equation is:
GRR(t) = 4.67 - 0.006 x R(t-1) + 0.1063 x I(t-1)
- 0.0446 x LE(t-1) + 0.0059 x EA(t-l)
The theory behind this equation is that female participation in the labor force R
increases the opportunity cost of children and thus lowers fertility. Illiteracy I
and agricultural labor fraction EA are proxies for, respectively, education and
the benefits of children as contributors to family-based economic enterprises.
Life expectancy LE is a proxy for the assumption that parents compensate in
their fertility for high risk of losing a child.
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There are 150 demographic categories in BACHUE to keep account of age,
sex, location, and education. The disaggregation seems justified in this case,
since the model is aimed at questions of employment and income distribution.
Population, with all its attributes taken into account, determines economic
demand and provides both skilled and unskilled labor for modern and
traditional jobs in rural and urban locations.
The BACHUE team has used the model to explore both the indirect effects
of economic policies on fertility and the direct effects of fertility-reducing
policies. Their conclusion is that population growth is quite sensitive to
economic changes. This result should not be surprising, given the relatively
strong coefficients in the fertility equation, its linear form, and the absence of
any significant delays in the assumed reproductive response of the population
to socioeconomic change. On the other hand, the BACHUE modelers
conclude that fertility changes do not have a dramatic influence on economic
conditions. With an assumed 24% decline in fertility, after 25 years total
population is only 9% less than it would otherwise have been, and per capita
income is 5% more. Fertility decline seems to make income inequalities worse
for the first 30 years (due to less demand for food and a decline in agricultural
terms of trade) and then increasingly better. Again, the small and slow impact
is to be expected, since fertility reduction changes at first only the cohort of age
0-1. Only as this cohort and succeeding ones age will a difference be noted in
the welfare of the whole system.
In modeling the Sahel population, Picardi was concerned with only one stage
of industrialization. The population is uneducated, homogeneous, and locked
into a simple cultural system that is not assumed to evolve into industrial
complexity even over the very long time horizon of this model. Picardi
represents the death rate as responsive to two factors-food per capita and
exogenously-introduced health services. This is a Malthusian hypothesis that is
probably reasonable for this population living at near-subsistence level. For his
birth rate equations, Picardi combines two assumptions that sound like
hypotheses about the psychological aspects of population processes, but are in
fact mechanistic demographic-transition correlations similar to those in LTSM
and BACHUE. 'Cost of children' rises as per capita wealth rises, and after a
time lag, this reduces fertility. 'Need for children' is a function of the death
rate; it expresses the hypothesis also seen in BACHUE that societies
experiencing high infant mortality respond with high fertility, to insure that
some children will survive. Picardi assumes a longer delay between mortality
change and fertility response than does BACHUE.
SAHEL is the only model in our sample that is likely to produce a population
decline. (The five models with exogenous populations could exhibit a decline if
it were designed into the exogenous driving functions, but in no case is a
decreasing population ever tested.) Pastoral families produce children (and
allow their cows to produce calves) according to their own rational best
interest, which is assumed to favor reproduction, given their personal
economic circumstances and their perceived costs and risks of childbearing.
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The aggregate consequence of these individual decisions is supported by a
commonly-shared, erodable resource base, the grazing range. Since the
individual reproductive decisions are taken with regard to individual needs
rather than the condition of the common resource base, the range can become
overloaded with people and with cattle, at which point it deteriorates, reducing
both populations through enforced outmigration or starvation. Aid policies
that reduce death rates through human or animal health services hasten the
tragedy by allowing the nomads to achieve their reproductive goals more
rapidly.
Although this model assumes the demographic transition, it also assumes the
transition can be interrupted or even reversed, if resource limits become
effective before it is achieved, or if economic growth does not keep pace with
population growth. The long lag assumed for fertility response, the limited
options for economic expansion, and the presence of erodable physical limits
make a significant dynamic difference between the behavior of SAHEL and
the other demographic-transition models LTSM and BACHUE.
The remaining model, SOS, pictures population growth as a goal-seeking,
self-correcting process. Population growth proceeds uninterruptedly unless a
significant number of consumption goals go seriously unmet for a relatively
long period. In that case the birth rate falls and the death rate rises until the
goals are again achieved. This population response is assumed to be a last-ditch
effort, occurring only after a number of other responses such as resource
substitution, shifting investment allocations, public expenditures, and even
reduced material goals, are tried. This formulation amounts to a clear
hypothesis about social value priorities; fertility and mortality goals are
superordinate to other social goals and are changed only when material welfare
falls so Jow that survival becomes the predominant concern. This assumption
has little effect on the model behavior because under most conditions the
model (with U.S. parameters and a 30-year time horizon) does not operate
within the range of material dissatisfaction that would call forth population-ad-
justment mechanisms. In the few cases where it does, the modelers dismiss the
results as 'not credible'.
3. Summary and commentary
The nine models contain statements of four basic hypotheses about population
growth, each of which suggests different policy responses, and each of which is
expressed vociferously in the world's policy debates:
1. Population growth takes place independently of socioeconomic events.
Population is something to be predicted and adapted to, not something to be
viewed as subject to social policy.
2. Population growth has a major and negative influence on economic growth
and on resource use and pollution generation. Social policy should be
aimed at reducing population growth rates.
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3. Population growth has a minor effect on economic growth and probably a
positive one. It is responsive to economic growth and will stabilize when a
sufficient level of industrialization has been reached. Policy should
concentrate on social welfare and economic development, not on the size or
growth rate of the population.
4. Population growth is an integral part of the socioeconomy, affecting
industrialization and also responding to it, with a lag and in pursuit of
individual rather than social goals. Population growth can have a positive or
negative effect and be stabilizing or destabilizing, depending on the
response lag times and on the nature of the individual goals. Social policy
should aim to incorporate population growth by changing the goals of
individuals and the information upon which they base their decisions, so
that they respond to total social welfare rather than short-term individual
needs.
Note that these are hypotheses, expressed in the structure of the models, not
conclusions derived from them. Each modeling group began with one of these
hypotheses and then constructed a mathematical device that calculates detailed
deductions that follow from the hypothesis (and from hypotheses about other
indicators that will be discussed later). Note also that there is considerable
evidence from the real world supporting each hypothesis; otherwise no
modeling group would have found it plausible enough to include in its model.
In particular, the observed pattern of the demographic transition could be
viewed as perfectly consistent with all four theories. Only the fourth hypothesis
is truly holistic and derived from systems theory. It is sufficiently general to
encompass the previous three, and if it is not stated carefully with reference to
specific, observable real-world events, it is so general that it is not falsifiable. It
is the only one of the theories so conceptually complex that it probably requires
a computer to work out its deductive consequences.
The models cannot prove or disprove any of the four competing hypotheses;
they can only grind out their detailed implications. By doing so, the models do
contribute considerably to understanding of population change processes. Six
of the models, for example, provide an elaborate account of population aging,
which permits the inertia of population change to be represented quite
accurately. While demographic accounting is not a new or difficult concept, it is
virtually absent from mental models, which cannot keep track of many
population categories at once and which seriously underestimate the slowness
of demographic change. Several of the models have emphasized that policies
intended to affect total population attributes, such as education, must be
maintained consistently over a period of at least 30 years before much change
can be detected, a realization that is usually absent from public policy statements.
The computer has also been used to keep track of the net outcome of
simultaneously-occurring but countervailing trends. For example, while the
BACHUE and SAHEL models contain the assumption that falling mortality
may eventually induce a decrease in fertility as parents compensate less for
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expected infant deaths, they also record the fact that falling mortality
immediately and certainly raises the population growth rate. Thus unless
parents overcompensate when mortality is high and undercompensate when it
is low, reducing infant mortality cannot possibly reduce net population growth
rate and will almost certainly raise it. Of course, mortality reduction can be
defended on other grounds, but it cannot logically be defended as a
population-leveling mechanism. The fact that it is often defended in this way2
suggests that many mental models do not keep both the positive and negative
effects of reduced mortality in focus at the same time.
The accounting capabilities of computer models can be helpful under some
conditions but distracting or even misleading under others. The basic dynamics
of population aging can be captured with as few as four population categories. 3
Few of the models really require the degree of precision their highly
disaggregated population sectors can deliver. A model with tens or hundreds of
population categories but exogenous birth and death rates is simultaneously
oversimple and overcomplicated. The simplicity of birth and death rates that
do not respond to happenings elsewhere in the socioeconomic system cannot
justify the detail of an age-sex-Iocation disaggregated population. At best
such a model is simply confusing. At worst it contains the very sort of
inconsistencies that one is trying to avoid by making a computer model in the
first place. If the fertility and mortality of real populations do change
continuously and significantly in response to economic and environmental
happenings, and if the resulting changes in the population then further
influence the economy and environment, then no exogenous forecast can
properly take into account these back-and-forth relationships. Even if a very
clever mental model provides the exogenous forecast and if every other
assumption in the model is correct, the model behavior cannot be realistic.
Nearly all of the models remind us forcefully that as the denominator of a
fraction such as GNP per capita or food per capita goes up, the value of the
fraction goes down, which is useful to keep in mind. Two models give the
impression that spending money on family planning will automatically,
linearly, and instantaneously produce a lower birth rate. Three assume that
investments in education, in employment-producing capital, and in urban
development are indirect (and slow) ways to reduce fertility. Only one modeler
points out that reduction of death rates too rapidly might threaten the resource
base or retard development. No model suggests any use of information,
examples, incentives, or ideas to affect fertility decisions, although Picardi
raises the issue in his articles.
In formulating their hypotheses, the computer modelers have nearly all
avoided including imprecise, uncertain, sociopsychological factors and even
some quite certain but semiprecise biological factors (such as the effect of diet
on mortality). Exploration of the actual human decision processes that result in
aggregate shifts in fertility or mortality is limited to a vague, nearly tautological
cybernetic theory (SOS).
Mental models can supply many more hypotheses about the causes and
control of population growth than any of these computer models. Folklore and
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everyday experience are full of roughly accurate theories about attitudes toward
children, about the role of social norms, about reasons for accepting or rejecting
family planning, about the ways that different economic situations affect family
reproductive decisions. A few governments have formed successful population
policies on the basis of such mental-model theories. China and Singapore seem
to have achieved lower birth rates, and Hungary has promoted and achieved a
higher one, all by affecting the information, costs, and benefits perceived by
families as they make their reproductive decisions. 4 The nine models in this
survey are less complete (although more detailed in an accounting sense) than
the verbal models used by these governments or the qualitative observations
contained in any modern textbook on population.
B. PRODUCTION AND ALLOCATION
The production of goods and services and their allocation between current
consumption and investment in the future are at the heart ofthe industrialization
process, and they are also, not surprisingly, at the heart of all nine models. In
fact, the central concern of economic modelers since the field began has been
how to formulate mathematical functions that capture the processes of
production, consumption, and investment.
We consider all three functions together here because, as we shall see, they
form logically-inseparable patterns in the models. Certain types of production
functions require matching investment and consumption formulations for
mathematical or methodological consistency.
1. Mental models
If an unprepared observer from another planet or another century were to
observe modern industrial production processes and then describe what he saw,
he would almost certainly mention large mines extracting materials from the
earth, enormous buildings emitting smoke or steam, high temperatures, much
noise, streams of vehicles carrying materials, finished goods, and workers to and
from the factory, great stockpiles of products at various stages of completion,
and machines routinely performing tasks that require incredible strength or
precision or co-ordination. If he described agricultural production from start to
finish, he would certainly mention soil, sun, water, seeds, machines of many
sorts, fertilizers, pests and pesticides, storage bins, driers, and processors, and,
above all, farmers, farm communities, and families. He would conclude that
production in an industrialized society is a complicated, multistep operation,
each step requiring numerous factors all to be present at the right time and place.
He might also notice oppressive, boring working conditions, illicit dumping of
noxious wastes, and differences in living standards between workers and bosses.
Of course these are only the surface sights, sounds, and smells of the
production process, and they indicate only a fraction of what is really going on. A
knowledgeable businessman would speak of stock and future markets,
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management decisions, investments, credits. cash flows. rates of return,
advertising, research and development; all inconspicuous parts of production,
but constituents of an information system that is just as vital to production as
materials, labor, or factories. A biologist might describe agricultural produc-
tion in terms of information too--the development of the genetic potential of
the seed, a gradual biochemical process of absorption of water and soil
nutrients, conversion and storage of solar energy, help or hindrance at each
stage from external events such as weeding, watering, and the codevelopment
of insect communities. Each of these information-based descriptions would be
just as involved as the first. sensory one, and still incomplete.
All of these descriptions so far have been biased by the modern assumption
that production takes place in organized factories and that products go through
markets where cash is paid for them. It ignores the vast unorganized productive
processes of the world-bread baked in households, tools made by farmers,
home gardens, owner-built houses, hand-sewn garments-which may, for all
we know, actually amount to more product (especially if it is measured in
human utility) than that which is officially accounted.
Production depends in part upon past investment decisions that have
accumulated in present trained employees. stockpiles, technical knowledge,
capital plant, and habits. The output of production is conventionally divided
into two conceptual categories; consumption goods (bread. snowmobiles,
novels) which are produced for their own sake, to yield satisfaction or utility or
pleasure, and investment goods (seed wheat, tractors, shop manuals), which
will be used for further production in the future. According to many
development theories, the crux of industrialization is the decision to allocate
productive output less to immediate consumption and more to investment in
the means of future production. Every primitive society with the wisdom not to
eat its seeds knows that more consumption in the present will reduce the rate at
which output can be expanded in the future. Thus the societal decision about
how much to save and how much to spend must be one of the pivotal
determinants of the process of economic development.
How are consumption and investment decisions made in real economic
systems? In some they are determined through centralized planning in a state
controlled economy. None of the countries represented in our survey models
operates entirely in that way. although in all cases the government does a
sizable amount of investing, financed by enforced reductions in consumption
known as taxation. In most models these public investments are represented
exogenously; they are some ofthe most important policy decisions to be tested.
In the private sector. however. consumption and investment, like population
growth, are the results of millions of separate mutually-interacting decisions.
Consumers look at their disposable incomes, their desires, the stocks of things
they already have, their credit balances, the items for sale. prices, and
advertising appeals, and somehow decide whether, when, and what to buy.
Corporate leaders look at their inventories. their plant capacity utilized, their
credit balances, their competitors, their sales records. and probably a hundred
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other things, and decide whether to defer maintenance, to maintain their
capital, to expand, to go bankrupt, or to start up a whole new enterprise.
Financiers presumably get as much information as possible on as many new
ventures as possible, and bankroll the ones with the highest potential rate of
return, or the quickest payback, or the lowest risk, or the most persuasive
advocate.
Probably the greatest mystery in this process is how all these decisions affect
each other. Corporate decisions about wages obviously change consumers'
incomes, which influence consumption habits, which in turn alter inventories,
prices, sales patterns, and bank deposits and thus come back to corporate
decisions about wages. If all the orders consumers and investors decide to place
add up to more steel or trucks or wheat than suppliers have on hand, there are
stockouts, delivery delays, tight credit, price rises, and other means of
distributing the shortage and adjusting the intentions of society to the current
constraints of the economy. Just to complicate things, neither the decision to
consume nor the decision to invest will necessarily result in an instant or
predictable change in supply or demand at the marketplace. Consumers may
stick to old habits even under new conditions or they may not have accurate
information about new conditions, and they may take months to decide upon
and obtain financing for major purchases such as automobiles or houses. It may
take many years to construct a large modern productive installation such as a
paper mill or a nuclear power plant, and when such an installation comes
on-line it may not produce exactly the amount it was intended to produce at the
cost it was assumed it would cost. How to make a clear, consistent model of
buying and selling, investing and saving, micro- and macro-level events, is an
unsolved problem for both mental modelers and computer modelers, in spite of
all the mathematical sophistication of the discipline of economics.
2. Computer models
The models in our survey represent production, consumption, and investment
through four basic mechanisms (see Figure 13.4)
1. Demand-driven. Production is determined by economic demand, which is
defined as consumption plus investment. If one knows what determines
consumption and investment (population, income, and interest rates, for
example), then one automatically knows production.
2. Market-driven. Production, consumption, and investment are determined
simultaneously through the price mechanism; aggregate decisions are such
as to maximize profit and consumer utility within the physical and financial
constraints of the system.
3. Supply-constrained. Production is limited by one or more scarce factors,
usually capital and/or labor. Consumption is determined by population
and income. Investment is whatever is left of output after consumption has
been subtracted.
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Figure 13.4 Production functions
4. Goal-seeking and resource-converting. Production is the process of
converting raw materials into useful goods; it is limited by resources as well as
capital and labor. Consumption and investment are regulated to minimize
the gap between some desired state and the actual state of the system.
The simplest approach is the one we have called 'demand-driven'. The basic
assumption in these models is that economic demand is likely to be the most
limiting factor in the entire production process. If market demand is present, all
the factories, materials, energy, and labor to satisfy it will be forthcoming,
without delay.
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This formulation appears most clearly in Mexico V, which contains three
production functions, for the primary (agriculture), secondary (manufactur-
ing), and tertiary (service) sectors:
primary output = 1.54792 + 0.17425 (private consumption)
+ 1.15516 (agricultural exports)
secondary output = -4.16634 + 0.63336 (total investment)
+ 0.35448 (total consumption)
tertiary output = -2.06446 + 0.59023 (tourism and border exports)
+ 0.57309 (total consumption)
This model is obviously not meant to be a literal representation of the
production process. If the capital stock in this system were suddenly halved,
secondary output would go down by a small fraction (because investment is
partially determined by capital), and the other outputs would be unaffected.
An interruption in labor, energy, or material flows would have no effect. Of
course, it would be illegitimate to make such changes in this model; it is
designed not to investigate major discontinuities, but to predict in the short
term the gross characteristics of the economic system operating in a smooth,
undisturbed way. The relationships in the three equations above have been
derived from the behavior of the Mexican economy over the past several years;
if the underlying causes of this behavior continue to pertain for the next few
years, the model is useful for its purpose.
In MexicoV consumption and investment are determined in four separate
equations:
private consumption = f(disposable income per capita/lagged)
public consumption = f(taxes)
private investment = f(capital, rate of change of GOP/lagged)
public investment = f(taxes, public banking credit, rate of change of
public debt)
All these functions are linear, all correlations are positive, and all coefficients
are estimated from historical data. These four quantities are added to
inventory changes and foreign exchange balance to determine GNP. The three
output equations are added to produce GOP. No necessary connection is
introduced between output, consumption, and investment, except for the
connection enforced by the parameters derived from the historical values of
these quantities in the real system.
Although this approach is not satisfying in that it adds little to our causal
understanding of Mexican economic growth, it is at least scrupulously honest
when applied as carefully as Beltran del Rio has applied it. The modeler does
not pretend to know all the desires, expectations, and dissatisfactions that drive
the economic system. Instead he establishes statistical relationships between
measurable elements as they have existed in the past, and then assumes that
those relationships will continue in the future. For short-term forecasting this is
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not a bad procedure. But such a model is not useful if policy changes are to be
tested, particularly if the policy focus is on consumption or investment. For
example, one cannot test the effect of interest rates or depreciation credits on
private investment, nor the effect of oil import restrictions on production.
Three longer-term models also use a demand-driven production function but
a far more complicated one. These are the three models that represent the
production process with an input-output matrix-RtF, BACHUE, and the
non-agricultural sector of KASM. Again the basic assumption is that final
demand is the limiting factor in total output, but now both demand and output
are disaggregated into many industrial sectors, with all interindustry flows
taken into account. The relationships between the monetary values of inputs
and outputs are constant, unless an exogenous forecast shifts them, as in RfF.
But in general these models take a snapshot of the interindustry flows in the
productive system as it actually operated over a database year and enlarge this
picture, swelling each part proportionately as the economy grows.
Although input-output models can be used to represent accumulation of
investment into capital stocks and then the influence of these stocks both on
production and on further investment, none of the models in our survey do this.
Thus in these models allocation questions do not arise. Output is always
enough to fill both investment and consumption needs. BACHUE is a partial
exception to this rule in that an upper limit of growth rate of the economy is
imposed (7% per year). Ifdesired consumption and investment increases come
to more than this, both are scaled down proportionately.
The behavior pattern generated over time by a demand-driven production
function depends only upon the way demand is formulated. In RfF final
demand is determined by exogenous forecasts for population growth,
government spending, and GNP. These forecasts are all based on steady
exponential growth, and therefore the productive system dutifully produces
more each year than the year before. In KASM and BACHUE final demand is
a function of income, which is derived from the production of the year before.
Since more demand produces more output, which generates more income,
which creates more demand, this formulation also produces regular exponen-
tial growth of production. The only way economic growth could be slowed or
interrupted in any of these models is by the population growing so much faster
than output that per capita income is decreased. But in fact the parameter
values in the models do not permit this to happen. None of these models could
generate a business cycle or any other irregular economic behavior, unless it
were deliberately included in exogenous driving functions.
The makers of BACHUE and KASM see their models as general policy
tools, and RtF was supposed to provide a picture of the long-term resource
situation in the United States. For these purposes, especially for depicting
possible changes in resource use, energy sources, and technology over the next
30 years, less complicated but more complete representations of the
production process would probably have allowed more exploration of
alternative policies, and might even have produced different results. And for
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general planning purposes, some inclusion of the allocation process and of
capacity constraints seems essential.
In two models, CHAC and the agricultural part of KASM, demand brings
forth production only indirectly, through the free market. Increased demand
for a good raises the price, which may cause profit-maximizing suppliers to
produce more. But there are also physical constraints that may inhibit supply.
Furthermore, higher prices may feed back to decrease demand. Demand in
these models is a function of population and income as well as the relative
prices of the commodities demanded (see Figure 13.4). Prices influence
farmer's decisions about the various output activities they might participate
in, and therefore, together with input costs and resource constraints, they
influence supply. Demand, supply, and price are calculated simultaneously so
as to be mutually consistent with each other. Both models provide an
exhaustive survey of many of the physical factors needed to produce
agricultural commodities (land, labor, water, fertilizer, machines, credit) and
they constrain the system not to use more of any input than is actually
available.
As a static model, CHAC cannot deal with long-term investment decisions;
it is concerned primarily with investments in annual inputs such as fertilizers
and in the effect over a one-year period of some permanent public
investments such as canal linings (which are exogenous). Farmers' short-term
investments come out of the simultaneous-equation solution; they are made
so as to produce that amount of total supply that will balance the market at
the point that maximizes producers' and consumers' surplus. CHAC's
consumption function for each commodity depends upon income and price,
with some possibility of substitution of one commodity for another.
KASM, as a longer-term model for an agricultural client, contains quite a
detailed representation of investment in the agricultural sector. The optimiza-
tion program that represents farmers' production decisions distinguishes
between various forms of capital, such as machinery, buildings, livestock, and
working capital. Investment decisions are made under a 'cautious profit
maximization' assumption and are constrained by availability of capital and
credit. Numerous government policies can affect investment through releas-
ing credit constraints, providing new investment choices, or controlling the
prices of input factors. Lags between investment and production and lags in
technological diffusion are explicitly represented.
Neither of these models represents literally the human decisions by which
production takes place, prices are set, and investment and consumption
decisions are made. They are abstract representations of what economic
theory presumes the aggregate result of many individual decisions must be.
The models cannot answer the very important question of whether the real
system actually operates according to this theory (or perhaps under what
conditions it does and does not). They also cannot explore or even raise
questions about changing the system's behavior through affecting the micro
decisions that add up to macro behavior.
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The remaining four models (LTSM, TEMPO, SAHEL, and SOS) are not
demand-driven but supply-constrained. Production is calculated as a function
of the availability of critical inputs, and then demand (investment plus
consumption) adapts in some way to the available supply.
LTSM is a model for labor-surplus economies; and therefore labor is not
included as a limiting factor of production. The modern production sectors in
the model are represented with a Harrod-Domar production function:
output = capital/capital-output ratio
The eight capital-output ratios for the eight industrial sectors, indices of all
sorts of technological and managerial factors, are specified exogenously. Each
one includes an automatic technological improvement factor. In the traditional
(agriculture) sectors,
output = land x yield per unit land
Yield is a function of capital and annual inputs with no diminishing returns.
Input usage automatically increases as agricultural production increases and
vice versa.
In TEMPO labor as well as capital is considered a potentially limiting factor.
The modern sector contains a Cobb-Douglas production function:
output = f(capital, labor, technology)
with technology growing exogenously and exponentially. In the subsistence
sector output is only a function of labor, and diminishing returns to this labor
are assumed.
Both LTSM and TEMPO are concerned with the investment-consumption
trade-off, which they represent by generating output, subtracting consumption
from it, and assuming the remainder, if any, is investment, which is then added
to the capital stock (a constant depreciation fraction is subtracted). In TEMPO
consumption is a linear function of population and GNP, plus exogenous
government spending. In LTSM consumption is the product of population and
per capita consumption, which rises at a rate depending on the rate of increase
ofper capita national income. These simple formulations result in a tendency of
capital to grow exponentially and a tendency of population growth to slow
capital growth by draining output into consumption. They also capture the
necessity for consumption and investment to balance output in physical terms
(only in a monetary sense can one consume or invest something that hasn't yet
been produced).
For broad-brush portrayals of long-term economic development as it seems
to have occurred historically, these supply-constrained economic sectors are
probably adequate. Depending upon their parameters, they can produce
almost any behavior from economic stagnation to rapid growth. Both models
are slanted toward rapid growth by their cost-free, ever-increasing technology
assumptions, and LTSM is further biased by its absence of diminishing returns.
These formulations sketch out only very general relationships among
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population growth, consumption, investment, and economic output. They are
too simplified, rigid, and aggregate to provide either accurate predictions or
useful policy tests.
All the production functions discussed so far measure both inputs and output
of the productive process in monetary units. Only two models, SAHEL and
SOS, try to express the fact that production is a physical process that transforms
resources into material goods and services and that generates wastes. In these
models, production can be limited not only by capital or labor, but also by the
cost or availability of resources. These models also differ from the others in that
they picture consumption and investment as goal-directed feedback processes,
proceeding according to explicit social priorities and decision rules.
The SAHEL model depicts a simple production system with only two
products: milk, which is a function of the number of living cattle and the main
source of food; and beef, which is obtained by killing cattle and which is traded
for other kinds of food and for material goods (called 'wealth') produced
outside the pastoral system. The model is a literal simulation of the generation
of soil fertility, the growth of forage, the nutrition and reproduction of cattle,
and their sale or harvest by humans. The production process is biological, and
the feedback-based model captures its essence, including the inherent delays in
the gestation and growth of cattle. Great swings of increase or decrease in
production are possible.
The trade-off between consumption and investment could scarcely be more
starkly obvious than it is in this simple pastoral system. Acquisition of wealth
requires killing cattle, the capital stock that produces both the daily output of
milk and the increase in the stock itself. A build-up of stock for the future
obviously requires deferral of consumption in the present. The social structure
that governs this allocation process is traditional and tribal, and it is modeled
explicitly. Four goals are specified:
1. Desired milk per capita.
2. Desired non-milk food per capita.
3. Desired wealth.
4. Desired social infrastructure (a measure of buffering capacity, or herd
maintained as security against uncertain weather conditions).
The latter two goals are assumed to be variable, the former two constant.
The actual amounts of milk, wealth, non-milk food, and social infrastructure
are compared to the goals, and the area of greatest deficiency dominates the
decision about how much of the herd to slaughter each year. This rather simple
four-goal system can produce very complicated behavior patterns, as social
priorities shift in response to the changing environment. And the representa-
tion of these goals and the decisions they produce requires some bold guesses
about cultural preference in the Sahel nomad society.
In SOS House and Williams attempt to construct a generic production
function, applicable to any production process at any time. They begin with an
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equation that seems to make cash flow the most limiting factor in production:
output = (funds available for output) * (cost/unit output).
Funds available for output in each productive sector are a function of past
output, but with a toll taken for maintenance, for expansion, and for pollution
clean-up. Because funds available for output are increased by past output, the
system is capable of exponential growth in production. This growth can be
interrupted, however, by the other factor, cost/unit output. This cost is
defined as:
cost/unit output = (cost per unit resource) * (resource per unit output)
With this equation any factor of production can become limiting to output.
Resource per unit output is a compendium of labor, land, energy, and
materials associated with each productive sector. It obviously incorporates
many technological assumptions. As production proceeds the resource base
may become saturated (if the resource is renewable) or depleted (if the
resource is non-renewable), and in either case the cost per unit resource rises.
The model system adjusts for this by using less resource per unit output, but
only up to a limit; SOS does not permit physical output to be manufactured
from nothing. Rising resource costs can eventually stop and sometimes even
reverse the exponential increase in output.
The SOS model does not express the allocation problem clearly in terms of
consumption vs. investment. Instead, the operating funds available for output
are divided by the adjustment-set 'brain' of the model into fractions allocated
to normal production, expansion, pollution dean-up, and maintenance. The
division proceeds according to prespecified social goals, thresholds, and rules
for which strategies to try under what conditions. This mechanism is interesting
in a design sense, for exploring the dynamic effects of different adjustment
rules in a resource-constrained system. But it is difficult to relate the all-wise
central allocation mechanism in the model to the primarily decentralized and
uncoordinated mechanisms by which those decisions seem to be made in a real
market system.
3. Summary and commentary
Each of the four basic hypotheses about production and allocation used in
these models arises from a very different view of economic activity and leads
naturally to a different set of policy recommendations.
The demand-driven models are propelled by the positive feedback loop of
more production causing increased income causing higher consumption
causing more production. If the parameters of the model are such that this loop
is dominant (which is true for the four demand-driven models in our survey),
the model will generate sustained exponential economic growth. Policy
measures can only affect the rate of this growth. They can increase it by
increasing demand, which in these models means either consumption or
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investment. Consumption can be increased by expanding either population or
income, income usually having a larger effect. Investment can be increased
most easily by public spending.
The market-driven models contain the same dominant positive feedback and
therefore also generate growing economies. The growth in these models can be
erratic, however, as the two negative feedbacks through price equilibrate
supply and demand. These models would support the same policy conclusions
as the demand-driven ones-increase demand to increase price to increase
profits to increase production. But the market-driven models also suggest
other places for policy inputs, including price regulation, cost controls, supply
regulation through import and export policies, and government purchasing.
The supply-constrained models can also generate smooth exponential
growth but through a different positive feedback loop; more production gives
more output gives more investment gives more capital gives more production.
This loop can be seriously weakened if consumption drains output away from
investment, and so these models, at least theoretically, could also produce a
stagnant or even a declining economy. The policy conclusions from these
models are the reverse of the demand-driven ones. Do not encourage
population growth or increases in demand for consumer goods; they will
reduce investment and slow economic growth. Rather, strengthen the growth
loop by building up capital, decreasing the capital-output ratio, encouraging
investment, and discouraging consumption, especially through controlling the
population.
The resource-conversion models can produce almost any economic develop-
ment pattern, including cycles, steady growth, steady decline, or a growth
phase when resources are abundant followed by a reversal as resources become
expensive. The sorts of policies these models suggest include control of
population growth, conservation of resources, monitoring of the resource
base, long-term planning, and, especially, alteration of the goals, rewards, and
priorities that influence individual consumption decisions. Most of these
policies could not be derived from or even represented in any ofthe other three
categories of economic models.
Active academic debates and sometimes violent political disagreements
have been sustained by these different economic theories for decades. Very
little effort has been put into honestly and critically disproving any of the
theories or identifying exactly when and where one might be operational and
another not. The computer models are sufficiently complicated, incommensur-
able, and one-sided that they do not clarify the debate. They accurately reflect
the fractured state of understanding of modern economic systems; they do not
suggest either strikingly new ways of looking at the system so as to clear away
the clutter, or crucial tests to sort out conflicting theories.
Like the demographic models, these economic models under their compli-
cated surfaces are surprisingly simple, even compared with most mental
models of the production process. Except for the agricultural models, their
production functions contain two or at most three input factors, nearly always
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measured in monetary units. One can obviously learn something about
production from looking only at the money flows it engenders, but one must
also miss a lot that way. Two things that are apparently easily missed are raw
materials and energy, which are absent from seven of the nine production
functions.
I wonder what has happened in all these studies to material inputs. If they are
omitted because of the lack of required data, we have an answer, even if to my mind
a regrettable one ... It seems to me that a production function is supposed to explain
a productive process, such as the making of potato chips from potatoes (and other
ingredients), labor, and capital. It must take some ingenuity to make potato chips
without potatoes. 5
Another input to production that is systematically omitted is the complex of
information, skills, institutions, and management techniques needed to make a
modern productive process run.
The primary causes of extreme poverty are immaterial, they lie in certain
deficiencies in education, organization, and discipline. Development does not start
with goods; it starts with people and their education, organization, and discipline.
Without these three all resources remain latent, untapped, potential. .. We have
had plenty of opportunity to observe the primacy of the invisible factors after the
war. Every country, no matter how devastated, which had a high level of
education, organization, and discipline, produced an 'economic miracle'. In fact,
these were miracles only for people whose attention is focused on the tip of the
iceberg. The tip had been smashed to pieces, but the base, which is education,
organization, and discipline. was still there.n
To the extent that any of the models represent such factors, it is in the form of
education that reduces popUlation growth or increases labor productivity. In
general the models reflect the implicit assumption behind many development
aid efforts of the past few decades; paper mills, nuclear reactors, aluminum
smelters, or higher incomes, grafted onto societies such as Ethiopia, Bolivia, or
Burma will not only produce as much as they would in a developed economy,
but they will form the self-increasing capital base that is required for economic
'take-off'. None of the models is capable of representing, much less suggesting,
policies to influence the social, technical, organizational, and entrepreneurial
characteristics of the people. None of them recognizes the very existence of
informal, household-based production, or represents industrialization as a shift
of more and more productive functions from the household to the organized
economy.
The greatest problem with the production functions of these models is not
that they have omitted one or another factor of production. Including social
and organizational factors, there are so many that no understandable model
could include them all. Nor need they all be included, because at any time most
of them are safely in excess, so that variations in them would have no effect on
the production process. But it would seem to be crucial to economic planning to
understand shifts of the productive system from one limiting factor to another,
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both as the industrialization process evolves and as neighbouring economies
and the environment change. Demand might indeed be the most limiting factor
of production at the beginning of industrialization, when potential consumers
are too poor to express their wants in the market place. As the economy
develops, capital may become most limiting, then, perhaps skilled labor, then
inexpensive energy, and finally maybe demand again, when consumers
become too nearly saturated with material goods to want more.
Economists have traditionally been concerned with one such shift, between
labor and capital. The primary theories they use to explain productive-factor
shifts involve optimization in a series of perfect markets. These theories need
to be amended and extended, to include many factors simultaneously, to
acknowledge backlogs, bottlenecks, and hiring and construction delays, to
represent imperfect markets, incomplete information, and management goals
more complex than minimizing cost or maximizing profits. These and other
changes will begin to capture the complex productive factor shifts that are
already in progress or soon will be; from manual to fossil-fuel to renewable
forms of energy, from supply to demand and back again, from heavy capital to
technological finesse, from productive capital to environmental-protective
capital. The most adventurous models in our survey, such as SOS, have begun
to try to describe these changes. In doing so they are unquestionably on the
leading edge of economic theory, and well over the edge of any firm database.
The same criticism can be applied to the representations of the allocation
decision. The models, for all their apparent complexity, are extreme
simplifications of the allocation process. The most explicit and literal model,
SAHEL, is applicable only to a society with one form of capital, four forms of
consumption goods, relatively homogeneous distribution, and a rigid, tribal
decision-making process. The most detailed and sophisticated allocation
representations are the optimizing models, which rest entirely on the
free-market, invisible-hand assumptions that are at best questionable, and at
worst totally inapplicable to increasingly centralized modern productive
systems. Few of the models provide any insights or even any hypotheses about
the social motivations, struggles, or roadblocks that result in the accumulation
and maintenance of a stock of skills, information, and productive capital or
about the needs, goals, and urges that motivate people to buy things or to save
for the future.
To be fair, there are few other models, mental orformal, that provide a clear
picture of the social allocation process. The investment and consumption
functions are the Gordian knot of economics. Some individuals, families, or
firms may be able to describe accurately how they form their intentions to
invest or consume, but how do these intentions become aggregated and
matched against actual productive output? How do shortages get distributed,
what second-choice options do investors or consumers follow if their first
choice is unavailable, how long is the delay between intention and actual
consumption or investment? What information is really available at the time
investment and consumption decisions are made? To what extent do
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consumers or investors simply seize the first acceptable opportunity that comes
along? The division of the problem into production, consumption, and
investment may not even be a useful one, since most kinds of output, once
produced, are in fact already either in the form of consumption goods or
investment goods. Perhaps more attention should be paid to the role of unsold
inventories and consumers' stocks of goods-in-use as determinants of
production, sales, and investment. 7
Real understanding of the allocation mechanism must involve a progression
from individual decisions to aggregate expressed demands to adequacy or
inadequacy of supply and back to individual actions and new decisions. This is
clearly a systems-theory problem; one that requires a holistic, interdisciplin-
ary, and quantitative approach. It does not seem to be solvable by mental
models, by reductionism, or by scanning annual summations of macroecono-
mic money flows. Imaginative computer modeling should be able to shed some
very much needed light in this area.
C. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Technology could be defined as the application of scientific knowledge to
practical processes, or as the physical relationship between inputs to
production and outputs, or as the general ability of a society to solve problems
through readjustments in hardware, or as the continuous substitution of more
abundant resources for scarce ones. However it is defined, technology is one of
the most obvious factors that distinguishes an industrialized society from a
non-industrialized one. Technological transfer is probably the most often-
suggested and implemented form of development aid. A theory of industriali-
zation might be expected to include an account of where technological change
comes from and how it spreads.
1. Mental models
Technology is clearly a product of human ingenuity and effort, sometimes
occurring by chance (as in the discovery of vulcanized rubber), but more often
by a deliberate search for a solution to a specific problem (as in, for example,
the development of contraceptive pills, stainless steel, or lunar landers). A
successful technological development seems to require both an adequate base
of general knowledge and an investment to work out the practical application
of the knowledge. For example, lack of general knowledge seems to be
preventing a technological cure for cancer, while sustained fusion power
generation may require more design and development but perhaps no more
basic scientific knowledge.
Thus the first appearance of a technological change seems to require:
1. A perceived problem.
2. A sufficient understanding of the system to suggest a technical solution.
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3. Enough resources, manpower, and time to test the solution, scale it up to an
appropriate size, and work out the details of its application.
At this point the further diffusion of the change depends on a number of factors
such as economic cost, social acceptability, government support, marketing,
the natural turnover rate of physical capital, and 'side effects'. After the
societal adoption of a new technology, one would expect to see changes not
only in the resource mix or input-output relationships in the problem area most
directly affected, but also perhaps in physical or social relationships throughout
the society. The automobile not only solved the immediate problem of
personal transportation, but also affected labor relations, government
expenditures, air quality, city design, political power structures, international
trade dependence, and hundreds of other relationships in the socioeconomic
system.
Beyond these fairly obvious generalities, mental models of technology tend
to be fragmented, diverse, and intricate, because so many aspects of society
have been influenced by so many different technological changes. There is also
a foundation of nearly religious mystification in our mental models-technol-
ogy is either the magic force that can solve all problems or the source of all evil.
Specific technological developments historically related to industrialization
include the printing press, the power loom, antibiotics, radio, the computer,
the transistor, nuclear power, DDT, miracle rice, offshore oil drilling, and the
intercontinental ballistic missile. How can any model of industrialization
ignore such vital changes, yet how can a model hope to account for future
technological developments? For above all, technological change is an
open-ended evolutionary process, and evolutionary processes seem to be most
difficult of all to simplify, generalize, or predict. The interrelations between
technology and society may be the aspect of industrialization where mental
models are most inadequate.
2. Computer models
The nine models in our survey approach the representation of technology in
more than nine different ways, since some of them include technological
change, implicitly or explicitly, by more than one mechanism. The models can
be distinguished by whether technology is included as a general concept or a
series of specific changes, by whether side effects, costs, and time delays are
included, and by whether future as-yet-unproven technologies are allowed.
The grid in Figure 13.5 summarizes the technology representations in the
models, organized by degree of aggregation and by boundary. In this
discussion we will proceed across the rows of this grid, first taking up the
constant-technology models, then those with technology exogenous, then
those with technology endogenous.
Mexico V, as a short-term econometric model, says least about technology of
any of our models, and needs to say least, given its purpose. Technology does
not appear explicitly anywhere in the model; the productive process is related
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Figure 13.5 Technological change functions
to economic demand rather than technological inputs. Of course, the
technological state of development of Mexico is implicitly embedded in all the
parameters of the 40 behavioral equations of the model, which were derived
from historical data. Therefore Mexico V is in a sense a technological
statement, and when it is used for forecasting, it states that there will be no
change in technology.
Since CHAC is a static model, it obviously does not contain any
representation of long-term technological change. Yet CHAC is unquestion-
ably the most technologically detailed model in our survey. One might
summarize the entire model by stating that it is:
1. An array of the technological options currently available to Mexican
farmers-2,348 such options.
2. A theory about which options will be chosen under which conditions.
CHAC is not intended to spin out a path of technological development over
time, therefore it is not concerned with where those 2,348 options came from
or what new ones might appear five years from now. However, the model can
generate almost any set of choices from among these options for a given year,
depending on economic factors and government policies. Therefore, although
CHAC is a constant-technology model in terms of evolution of options over
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time, it does not assume that the Mexican agriculture economy will respond to
policy changes with one fixed choice of technologies.
CHAC's theory of technological selection is that of free market operation,
possibly overlaid with government policies. Each farmer is aware of the
technological options open to him (not all 2,348-geographical district, type
of land, and availability of irrigation limit the choices actually available to any
one type of farmer) and of the potential costs and benefits of each. The options
are selected by working through simultaneous consideration of supply and
demand curves to find the point of market equilibrium. This is a theory of what
the aggregate result of technological choices (and consumer response) will be; it
does not suggest what the farmers' actual decision process is. It does imply,
however, some sort of profit maximization based on accurate information at
the farm level.
The two other models that assume constant technology are the industrial
submodels of BACHUE and KASM. In both cases these are input-output
models of interindustry flows. The technical coefficients in the input-output
matrix represent what each industrial sector actually bought from and sold to
each other sector in one database year. Both models hold these technical
coefficients constant, implying no change in the relationship between inputs
and outputs throughout the time horizon of the model. For KASM, with
a 5-15 year horizon and a central interest in agriculture, where technical
changes are represented in detail, the assumption of constant industrial
technology is probably appropriate. For BACHUE. with a longer time horizon
and a concern with general planning, it is more dubious, as the modelers
themselves recognize. They justify their decision to simplify in this area as
follows:
There is considerable uncertainty as to the relationships between demographic
factors and output growth as a whole, particularly in relation to issues such as
natural resource availability, facility of structural change, and the rate and nature
of technical progress. Without substantial additional research, we considered it
unwise to develop this area. 8
Of the models with exogenous and variable technology, TEMPO and LTSM
are the most aggregated and therefore the simplest. Both contain government
policies that might be considered technological, such as family planning and
health care, as well as exogenous automatic technological improvement
functions built into their production equations.
TEMPO's governmental technological policies include health care, family
planning, and education, which can be varied at the option of the model user.
Health care expenditures influence mortality in the model, family planning
influences fertility, and education influences the quality and quantity
(productivity and participation fraction) of the labor force. The costs of these
improvements are accounted for through a government budget model. A
constant cost per pupil enrolled is assumed, and also a constant cost per
family-planning acceptor up to a certain total acceptance rate, above which the
322
cost per acceptor rises linearly with the acceptance rate. The expenditures on
these government services, or the setting of targets that then determine the
expenditures. are up to the user.
TEMPO also contains strong assumptions about technology in its production
functions. Production is disaggregated into two sectors, subsistence and
modern. In the subsistence sector output is a function only ofsubsistence-sector
population,
GPS
(gross product,
subsistence sector)
X*PS~-l
(subsistence
population)
where x andy are constants andy is less than one. Thus in the subsistence sector,
the tools with which labor works are relatively unimportant, technology does not
change, and there are diminishing returns to labor.
In the modern sector, however, output follows a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
GPM
(gross product
modern sector)
(technology
change rate)
(capital) (employed
educated labor)
(employed
non-educated
labor)
The contribution of educated labor is higher than that of non-educated labor
(v> w). Technology in this function grows exponentially with time at the rate Q,
which is set in TEMPO's 'Developa' runs at 1.5% per year. Thus any given
combination ofcapital and labor is presumed to produce an output that increases
in value by 1.5% each year, automatically and at no cost.
This aggregate, exponential technology term is quite common in macroecono-
mic production functions. It arises from the widespread empirical observation
that ordinary Cobb-Douglas functions (Y = zKUL V) have consistently underes-
timated the actual growth of production over time. Output predicted by the
equation has typically faIlen short of real output, and the gap has increased
roughly exponentially with the length of the forecast period. One could imagine
several possible explanations for this observation. For example:
1. The mathematical form Y = zKU L V may simply be inappropriate to describe
the relationship between capital, labor, and output in modern economies.
2. Relative prices of inputs and outputs may change over time so that monetary
measures of flows of inputs and outputs give no indication of the underlying
physical relationships.
3. The equation may leave out one ormore of the factors of production that are
systematicaIly being substituted for capital and/or labor.
The inclusion of an exponential technology term in the Cobb-Douglas
equations is equivalent in choosing the third of these explanations and assuming
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that the missing factor is general 'know how', which is applied across the
economy to allow more and more efficient use of capital and labor. The
resulting production function seems to have good short-term predictive ability
for many economies over many historical periods. But its explanatory value is
less clear, and its scientific value is nil, since it is such a vague hypothesis that it
is difficult to falsify. Technology is not defined in such a way that it can be
independently measured. Other factors of production, such as energy, might
logically be the mysterious missing factor. And other production functions can
be shown to fit historical data equally well. 9
Is the assumption of an exponentially-growing aggregate technology
consistent with TEMPO's purpose? If the purpose is limited to demonstrating
the effects of faster or slower population growth on an economy, simplicity is
important, and this technology assumption is probably as good as any.
Whether the technology growth rate Q is set at 2.5%, 0, or even -1.5%, the
model's main conclusion, that slow population growth is better than rapid,
would probably still hold. However, if the model's purpose is expanded to
include economic planning, continued extrapolation of an exponential
technology function is probably much too simple an assumption.
LTSM contains a similar combination of exogenous technology functions
expressed both in policy options and in production equations. Of the five main
exogenous policies in the model, three have technological implications-land
reclamation (irrigation, drainage, etc.), allocation of investment among
sectors, and population policies (family planning). Land reclamation is carried
out at a cost to the agricultural investment allocation. Other investments have
costs in terms of output, but no significant delays. The population policy is
cost-free and immediately effective.
The LTSM model uses a modified Harrod-Domar production function for
each of the eight non-agricultural economic sectors:
output (t) = output(t-l) + investment(t-l) *
incremental capital-output ratio(t)
The incremental capital-output ratio is an aggregate expression of the
technological relationship between capital and product. It is specified
exogenously and is assumed to change over time, usually incorporating a
simple exponential technical progress assumption.
In the agriculture sector of LTSM technical progress is represented more
explicitly. Here output is the product of land area and yield. Land area is
increased by exogenous reclamation policies and decreased by construction
activities. Yield is a function of investment in intensive (not land-related)
capital and in material inputs (fertilizer and pesticides). Intensive capital
investment comes from the exogenous investment allocation policy. The rate
of increase of material inputs is a function of the rate of change of net
agricultural output, which then causes a further increase in material inputs in
the next period. The result of these assumptions must be a steady exponential
increase in output, caused by an ever-growing amount of fertilizer and other
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annual inputs. Thus technological improvement in LTSM's agriculture sector is
assured.
Three other models, SAHEL, RtF, and KASM, assume exogenous
technology changes, but in these models the exogenous technologies are much
more specific than the disembodied general production-enhancers of TEMPO
andLTSM.
The nomad population of SAHEL can be given technological assistance in
the form of human health care, veterinary medicine, or tubewells, at any time
in the simulation, at the discretion of the model operator. The effects of these
changes are to decrease human and cattle death rates and to increase the forage
available and the time spent by the nomads in the Sahel. These three simple
interventions seem to be sufficient to model the historical technological
changes experienced by the Sahel's people. Whether they are sufficient to test
all the changes that can realistically be expected in the future depends upon
one's mental model. Picardi in his computer model wanted to test these
particular changes alone. Therefore he made no provision for testing the
impact of solar electric generators, miracle forage legumes, bovine growth
hormone, or any other new technology in the Sahel region.
RtF as a 185-factor input-output model of the U.S. is as far removed from
the Sahel model in method and concern for technology as a model could be. As
might be expected from a model of a sophisticated society with a 30-year time
horizon and a focus on resources, technology is the central issue of the RtF
model. The input-output matrix expresses the actual technologies practiced in
the database year (1968) as recorded in roughly 35,000 streams of purchases
from each of 185 industrial groups to each other group. The technological
coefficients of 1968 are then extrapolated into the future by a large number of
exogenous assumptions, some general and economy-wide, and some sector-
specific. Examples of general technological assumptions in the model are:
• Labor productivity will increase in all sectors at 2.5% per year (equivalent
to the automatic exponential technical improvement in TEMPO and
LTSM).
• The best available technology of 1968 in any area will become the average by
the year 2000.
• No technical change will cause a shift in patterns of consumer demand; only
population and income growth will influence final demand.
• Current technological trends will continue; there will be no dramatic
breakthroughs or slowdowns.
• The historical relationship between GNP and energy use will not be
changed.
In addition to these general assumptions, thousands of assumptions specific
to certain industries and processes are included. For example, over the time
horizon of the model polyvinylchloride pipe gradually replaces iron pipe,
aluminum is widely substituted for copper, electricity is increasingly generated
325
by nuclear reactors, and artificial sweeteners are used in place of sugar.
Furthermore, the relationships between production in each sector, resource
use, and pollution generated must be predicted exogenously as inputs to the
model. This is done by sector by sector through equations such as the following:
Demandresource r = Lbft[Xil + IiI]
where XiI is the total output of sector j in year t; IiI is the total import purchase of
sector j in year t; bil is the amount of resource r used per unit of output of sector j
in year t.
Pollution = (1 - b/<)La;~Xil
type k i
year t
sector i
where b/ is the economy-wide treatment efficiency of abatement processes for
pollutant k in year t; at is the amount of pollutant k generated per unit of
product j in year t; XiI is the total output of sector j in the year t. The coefficients
in these equations can be changed to test pollution abatement or recycling
policies.
Thus the RfF model draws an amazingly detailed picture of the technological
development of an economy over time. The number of technological
statements, all exogenous to the model, can be calculated roughly as:
+
35,000
x 30
1,050,000
185
x 24
technical coefficients
years of simulation
technical coefficients
resource-use coefficients (one for each industrial sector)
resources
4,480
x 30 years of simulation
+
+
134,400
185
x 13
2,405
x 30
72,150
72,150
1,328,700
resource coefficients
pollution-generation coefficients
pollutants
years of simulation
pollution-generation coefficients
pollution abatement coefficients
exogenously-specified coefficients
KASM contains an entire submodel called CHANGE to represent
technological change in agriculture. KASM also contains an optimization
submodel, similar to but less detailed than CHAC, which generates farmers'
decisions about how much land to plant in each crop each year. CHANGE
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produces the information needed for that submodel: the cropping technologies
available from year to year, the yields they will give, the factor inputs they will
require. Thus CHANGE is a crop-specific, factor.-specific, dynamic model of
technological development in agriculture.
The primary forces that alter agricultural technology in CHANGE are
exogenous government policies. The development costs of these technologies
are also exogenous. The policy instruments that can be represented and tested
include the following:
1. Policies related to land and water development:
a. Land and water improvement:
(i) Multipurpose, large-scale, land development projects.
(ii) Large-scale irrigation projects for paddy.
(iii) Small-scale irrigation projects for paddy.
(iv) Paddy consolidation projects.
(v) Paddy drainage projects.
(vi) Low productive paddy improvement projects.
(vii) Upland irrigation projects.
(viii) Upland consolidation projects.
b. Land reclamation:
(i) Tideland development projects.
(ii) Upland development projects.
c. Pastureland improvement program.
d. Policies on agricultural land conservation.
2. Policies related to biological technology development (crop-specific):
a. Research program.
b. Guidance program.
3. Policies related to price controls:
a. Product price policy (crop-specific).
b. Factor price policy (factor-specific).
4. Agricultural finance policies:
a. Credit program.
b. Interest policies.
When a set of policies is chosen from this list and entered into the model,
CHANGE then represents the diffusion of knowledge about each new
technological option. The optimization component FRESAL then calculates
its actual adoption. Since this part of the model falls into the category of explicit
endogenous technology representations, we will return to it later, after
discussing implicit technological change models.
In TEMPO, LTSM, and BACHUE technology changes implicitly through a
process that does not at first seem to be technology-related-rural-urban
migration. We will describe the assumptions that cause this migration in the
next section. The result of it in these three models is to transfer laborers from a
rural, traditional working environment to an urban, modern one. In other
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words, the models set up two different technological worlds and create a
societal technological shift by moving people from one of these worlds into the
other.
In TEMPO a new migrant to the city leaves a traditional-sector production
function where labor is the only factor and his marginal contribution is small
and diminishing. He enters (if he is hired) a modern productive system where
his contribution is exponentially increasing. Furthermore, he immediately
begins experiencing urban fertility and mortality rates. Even if he is not
employed in the city, his absence raises marginal la~or productivity in the
traditional sector, and his transfer to the city decreases the birth rate.
In LTSM labor is not explicitly included in the production functions. The
effect of migration into the hired-labor (urban) sphere is to remove pressure
toward the acquisition of labor-saving capital. Large numbers of urban
unemployed in this model depress wages and favor labor-intensive processes.
Thus rural-urban migration slows down the rate at which modern industrial
technology is adopted. Presumably a labor shortage would do the reverse, raise
wages and encourage accumulation of capital, but LTSM represents a
labor-excess society where this effect is never observed.
BACHUE contains a more disaggregated labor sector than either TEMPO
or LTSM, and the distribution of workers is intricately connected with the
operation of the economic system. Migration occurs not only from rural to
urban areas, but among economic sectors so as to equilibrate wage
differentials. Shifts in location and type of employment determine income
distribution, which determines final demand, which determines output. Thus,
although BACHUE assumes constant technical coefficients in its input-output
matrix, its economy evolves toward a more modern technological mix by the
growth of modern productive sectors at the expense of traditional ones.
Only two models contain explicit and endogenous theories about how
technology changes. One theory, that in SOS, is aggregated and general; the
other, in KASM, is particularized and specific.
Technology in SOS is embedded in all the decision rules by which the societal
'brain' reacts to the non-fulfillment of goals. For example, if production of
copper is insufficient to meet demand, SOS contains instructions that initiate
technologies to exploit new copper reserves. If these reserves also run low, the
model will turn on technologies that allow aluminum to be substituted for
copper, and will also specify how far that substitution can proceed in each
productive sector. If pollution builds up beyond a tolerable level, resources are
allocated to technologies that abate the pollution. In other words, in this model
technology changes in response to perceived problems. The model assump-
tions include the problem threshold that will generate each technological
response, the time delay, and sometimes the cost of the response, and the
extent to which that response can be applied, after which, if the problem
persists, a different and stronger kind of response is tried. Thus the model can
generate 'future' technologies, responses that we have not yet seen to crises
that have not yet occurred. Of course the general specifications of these
328
technologies must be programmed into the model in advance, but their time
and degree of application depend on events in the simulated economic system.
A general theory of adaptive technology like that in SOS is obviously suited
to imaginative testing. What if we assume that any material can be substituted
fully for any other or that no material can completely replace another? What if
the point of adoption of recycling is raised or lowered? What if the delay times
for shifting to new production methods are increased or shortened? Questions
like these can be explored, at least in a general way, in the SOS model, and the
logical conclusions and limitations of the technology-will-save-us theory,
expressed in strong, weak, or moderate forms, can be displayed. Since this
theory is a very common and controversial component of mental models, it is
most helpful to have an explicit, testable version of it. Ideally such a computer
model could move the discussion from an uresolvable debate over whether
technology will or will not save us to a set of more operational questions about
to what extent materials must be intersubstitutable or at what rate production
processes will have to change in order for the productive system to avoid
unpleasant futures.
We have already mentioned KASM's technology representations under two
categories; the constant technical coefficients of its industrial sector, and the
long list of agricultural technologies that can be tested exogenously as inputs to
the CHANGE submodel. We have yet to describe KASM's major endogenous
assumptions about technology; the assumptions by which the new technologi-
cal options provided exogenously by the government become assimilated into
the daily habits and choices of Korean farmers. Of all the models, this one is
most explicit about the process of technology adoption.
A new technological possibility, such as a new type of rice with a 30% higher
potential yield, is exogenously assumed, along with the factor inputs required,
such as land type, fertilizer level, and labor. 'Adoption' of this particular
technology is defined as acceptance of it as a factor to be entered into the
farmers' decision submodel (called FRESAL). Thus adoption does not mean
planting 100% of the potential land area with the new variety, but rather
acceptance by 100% of the farmers of this rice variety as one to be weighed
against other crops in the annual allocation of land to various crops.
The diffusion of adoption of the new rice variety is assumed to be basically
sigmoid-shaped as shown in Figure 13.6. That is, any innovation is assumed to
be adopted eventually, and the only questions are how quickly and over how
oreo of
odoption
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of odoption
time ~
Figure 13.6
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much land area. The point at which the curve levels off, the maximum area of
adoption, is determined by the amount of land suitable for the new crop (for
example it may only grow on irrigated paddyland) and by known regional crop
specialization preferences (a region specializing in rice-growing will adopt a
new rice variety over more of its suitable land than a new mulberry variety).
The rate at which the adoption process approaches the maximum area is a
function of public investment in promoting it (the extension budget) and of the
intrinsic profitability of the new variety. Both of these factors are entered
exogenously. It is assumed that the actual productivity gain at the farm level is
less than at the experiment station, and that the gain drops as the area of
adoption increases (because the better farms adopt first).
Thus the diffusion component of CHANGE keeps track of the extent to
which any exogenously-introduced structural improvement is available to
farmers in a given year. This information is then used, along with policy
variables concerning credit and support prices, and input from other model
sectors on product factor prices, to calculate the combination of factor inputs
that will be chosen by farmers for each crop in each year. Given this
combination of inputs, CHANGE uses its production function equations to
calculate the expected yield of each crop in each region that year. This
information is the primary output of CHANGE. It is fed to FRESAL, an
optimization model, where expected yields, prices, and other information are
used to determine how much land farmers will actually allocate to each crop.
This decision is then recombined with the yield functions in CHANGE to
compute the final production of each crop.
This complicated series of mathematical operations amounts to an extremely
detailed account of technical change in agriculture. But the underlying theory
is fairly understandable. Technological change is initiated by government
decision and investment in various well-defined development options. The
options are of two basic types:
1. Land and water resources, which become available after a delay but once
available expand production permanently.
2. Biological technologies, which are represented by new input-output
relationships, and which diffuse slowly (but inevitably) into the decision
options of farmers. Farmers react to the various options according to
rational economic optimization rules.
These farmer decisions can be further influenced by government through
policies that release credit constraints or alter factor or product prices.
3. Summary and commentary
Virtually all the models in our survey represent the effects of new technology,
not the causes. In only one model do technologies originate endogenously as
specific responses to specific problems.
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In some of the models technology is simply constant. In others it rains down
magically to improve all productive processes exponentially and without cost.
In most of the models specific technical changes appear suddenly from
somewhere outside the system. Two models assume that new technologies are
adopted and spread only as a function of their direct economic payoffs. One
modeler has concluded that the effects of all technologies he has tested are bad
for the system; in all the other models technologies produce only good. In only
two models does technical change cost money or take time. No model explicitly
relates technical change to the age structure or turnover rate of the capital
plant. The representations of technological side effects, especially social and
environmental ones, are minimal in all the models.
These limitations are common in mental models; in fact every person
probably thinks of technology in each of these ways at different times and for
different purposes. Our culture has obfuscated the word 'technology' so that its
meaning is more related to faith than to hardware or human effort. Many policy
decisions are made on the unspoken assumption that technology will not
change, or that it will surely change so that production becomes more and more
efficient, or that whatever problem turns up will eventually get solved.
Technology is seen as something that happens to a society, not something a
society chooses, and something that is intangible and ephemeral, not
something that is embedded in the structure of machines or the education of
people. Technological side effects are nearly always underestimated.
Yet each person's actual experiences with specific technical changes provide
plenty of anecdotes that complicate any such simple picture. Hardware
adjustments, costs, and delays are obvious, and they are crucial to any theory
of technical adaptation, since they determine whether the adaptation can keep
up with the rate of appearance of new problems and whether the solution of
problems through technology can be afforded. Side effects, including social,
psychological, and environmental ones, are also obvious and particularly
important to the process of technological diffusion.
While fairly simple models of technology, constant or exponential, general
or specific, costly or cost-free, may be sufficient for most everyday decisions,
they are not very satisfying as bases for long-term social policy or for
understanding of the process of industrialization. They provide no clue as to
why the technological rain falls in some places and not in others, or why the
most economically efficient technology is not uniformly adopted everywhere,
or why some widely-recognized technology-related problems like hunger or
cancer remain unsolved. They do not explain the observation that some
societies have experienced internal technological innovation with industrializa-
tion (the U.S., most of Europe), some have exhibited innovation without
industrialization (ancient China), some have industrialized rapidly with much
of their technology adopted from outside (Japan, Taiwan), and some are slow
to industrialize despite the availability of technology from outside (most of
Africa). In fact, virtually everyone of the technological hypotheses in the
models can be put into one of two categories: either so vague and tautological
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that it is nonfalsifiable, or so easily falsified that it cannot be a useful basis for
understanding or for policy.
We have no alternative theories of technology to put forward here. We can
only point out that the current theories are far from adequate and thus that
some startling new way of looking at technology is probably needed. For
example, all the technology representations in our models are either monetary
or physical; there is little to suggest that technology originates in the minds of
humans. A few verbal models of technological-social-psychological interaction
have been suggested. For example, E. F. Schumacher describes village-level
intermediate technologies not only as improvements in the traditional produc-
tive processes, but also as inducers of new thought patterns, self-confidence,
logic, and ingenuity. 10 Perhaps a theory of technology as information,
combined with a theory of how the mind uses and generates new information,
incorporated into a model of the physical expression of technology in capital
plant, will be necessary before scientific understanding of industrialization can
be achieved.
D. MIGRATION AND LABOR ALLOCATION
We have mentioned the theory that industrialization is fueled by the
investment of deferred consumption into capital for expanding future
production. This theory could be augmented to say that industrialization can
happen only when workers leave the farm and come to the city to operate the
capital that is accumulating from deferred consumption. According to this
theory an optimal development process will generate rural-urban migration at
just the rate the growing capital plant of the cities can absorb workers; not so
slowly that the machines stay idle, and not so rapidly that unemployed migrants
pile up in urban slums. Whether rural-urban migration is a cause of
industrialization, an effect, or both, the two processes are certainly closely
associated. Non-industrialized societies typically have a population that is 80%
rural, while most industrialized countries are 80% or more urban.
A theory of rural-urban migration is usually related to a theory of labor
allocation; an explanation of how workers find jobs, and especially how they
shift jobs in an economy that is changing its labor needs. Shifting jobs within
one location is not quite the same as moving from one location to another,
especially when one place is a traditional homestead and the other is a growing
city. The decisions that lead to rural-urban migration involve more than just
shifting jobs, because life is more than just work. Therefore a labor allocation
theory may be part of a migration theory, but it is typically not all of one. As we
shall see, some of the nine models contain theories of labor allocation but not
migration, some contain migration representations but not labor allocation,
and some contain both.
1. Mental models
What causes people to move from one job to another and from one place to
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another? Sociological theories of migration usually contain three types of
explanatory factors:
1. A 'push' from the place of origin due to unsatisfactory conditions like
unemployment or low wages.
2. A 'pull' to the destination from some perceived attraction of the city such
as better jobs or bright lights and glamor.
3. 'Intervening obstacles' that might prevent migration even in the presence of
destination-pull and origin-push; such factors as separation from relatives,
transportation costs, or simply fear of strange places. 11
The concepts of push, pull, and intervening obstacles involve unmeasured
values and perceptions as well as some tangible quantities such as wages,
distances, or costs of living. And all three concepts can be applied to
job-change decisions as well as location-change decisions.
'Push' and 'pull' must enter into the decisions of an individual to migrate or
change jobs through some complex set of impressions about what the places of
origin and destination are like relative to each other. This set of impressions has
been termed 'relative attractiveness' ,12 a potential migrant's mental
compendium of how the perceived home village and the perceived city
compare along all the dimensions of importance to him or her. It could include
such factors as jobs and wages, cost of living, pleasantness of environment,
personal contacts, and presence or absence of discrimination. Each person's
perception of the relative attractiveness of home versus any potential
destination is probably different, because each person would define
attractiveness differently and would have unique perceptions of various places.
Because it is based on perception, the relative attractiveness upon which a
migration decision is based might change, even if neither of the places being
compared actually change. For example, a radio program or personal report
might provide new information to the potential migrant. Actual changes in
either origin or destination will probably change most people's assessment of
relative attractiveness, though perhaps only after some delay. The perception
delay is probably much longer for the place of destination than for the place of
origin.
The perception of a difference in relative attractiveness may not necessarily
result in a decision to move, because of intervening obstacles, which might also
be defined as the inverse of mobility or predisposition to migrate. This might be
influenced by such factors as age, education, self-confidence, class, race,
commitment to property or family, bulk of personal possessions, and ability to
purchase a bus ticket or rent a moving van. Any group of people probably could
be classified along a mobility spectrum; some would be willing and able to
move at the slightest hint of a gap in relative attractiveness, most would have to
perceive quite a gap before they would leave, and a few simply would not
move, even if their home were threatened by a Mongol invasion. Both
statistical studies and common sense indicate that young, educated,
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middle-income, or propertyless people are more mobile than old, uneducated,
poor, or landowning ones.
The ideas of relative attractiveness and mobility can comprise at best only a
beginning of the theory needed to explain the great wave of migration that
accompanies industrialization. For one thing, they are micro-theories. They
may shed light on the behavior of individuals, but they are not easily
aggregated into whole populations or easily related to other aspects of the
industrialization process. How do population growth and technical change
affect migration rates? How does a population with primarily agricultural skilIs
become aware of and fitted for industrial employment? Why in recent decades
have migrants flooded into urban areas much faster than the rate at which jobs
or even basic urban services have been provided?
Furthermore, relative attractiveness and mobility are static concepts. Even if
one could measure relative attractiveness and mobility for a given population
at a specified place at a certain moment and thereby explain the migration flow
at that moment, one would have to go on to understand how that migration
itself could in the future change the attractiveness of both origin and
destination and the mobility of the population so as to affect future migration
flows.
2. Computer models
The nine computer models vary greatly in the comprehensiveness and
sophistication of their migration and labor alIocation functions (see Figure
13.7). The simplest formulations, which we shalI discuss here first, occur in
SAHEL, which contains an origin-push emigration function and no labor
alIocation function, and in RfF and KASM, which contain exogenous
migration and labor alIocation functions. CHAC and the agricultural part of
KASM have essentialIy nothing to say about migration, but contain fairly
complex labor alIocation mechanisms based on market equilibrium theory.
SOS is also uninformative about migration, but extends the market theory to
include non-equilibrium modes. Mexico V is not concerned with labor
alIocation at alI, but contains a first attempt at a fulI, dynamic
relative-attractiveness theory of rural-urban migration. And finally, the three
models TEMPO, LTSM, and BACHUE have fulIy-linked, dynamic,
non-equilibrium theories of migration and labor alIocation, including many of
the effects of these processes on other parts of the system, such as capital-labor
substitution, income distribution, and human fertility.
The SAHEL nomad society has not evolved much division of labor, so a
labor alIocation process is not necessary. SAHEL represents only the origin of
the migration stream and therefore contains only half of a migration theory.
The nomads are assumed to move to and from the Sahel region depending
upon the food supply there, relative only to the basic subsistence need of the
population. It is assumed that when food per capita in the Sahel is higher than
subsistence, there is a very slow net migration into the region. As food per
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capita drops toward subsistence, the inmigration rate approaches zero, and if it
falls below subsistence, the population begins to outmigrate at an increasingly
rapid rate. The migration response is not instantaneous, but is a function of the
food levels of the last three years, exponentially smoothed. This is a simple
origin-push model. It says that the nomads will prefer to stay in the Sahel no
matter what the conditions in neighbouring territories, and that the only
conditions under which they will leave are those of desperation, when the
choice is between migration or starvation. Given that choice, they will leave,
regardless of whether starvation may also be awaiting them at the destination.
Despite the simplicity of this hypothesis, it seems to duplicate the actual
behavior of the Sahel nomads during the drought of the early 1970s. An
origin-push model is probably appropriate for a society with rigid, tribal habits,
low aspirations, and very little information about the outside world.
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RfF is concerned with an industrialized country whose rural-urban shift is
presumably completed. It does not distinguish urban and rural populations.
Labor is allocated among the 185 sectors of the input-output matrix according
to exogenous value-added assumptions for each sector. The economy as a
whole is assumed to grow at such a rate as to maintain essentially full (96%)
employment. Thus labor is allocated smoothly to where it is needed, and the
economy automatically absorbs all the workers that may appear. Problems of
urbanization, labor allocation, and unemployment cannot be explored at all
with this model. Given that the purpose of the exercise was to advise a
population commission on the economic and environmental effects of different
rates of population growth, the choices of aggregation and emphasis in this
model seem inept. On the one hand, the computer can print out with precision
the apparent number of workers and the wage rates in any of the 185 productive
sectors in any year. On the other hand, it can say nothing about the influence of
population growth on job availability, on patterns of urbanization and thus
distribution of pollution, or on wages and hence technical or capital-investment
decisions.
In KASM three kinds of migration are distinguished. First, military service
takes a significant number of 20-24 year old males out of both urban and
rural labor pools. The exact number is specified exogenously. Second, net
emigration out of Korea is also exogenous to the model. It is assumed to be
drawn entirely from the non-farm population. Third, rural-urban migration
takes place, usually exogenously, although at the option of the user it can also
be made a function of the labor demand-supply gap in the non-farm
economy-in other words as destination pull. In either case a total rural-urban
migration figure is calculated, and then it is apportioned among age and sex
categories according to weighting factors determined from historical migration
patterns. For all three of these migration functions the degree of detail and the
amount of data required seem unnecessary for the purpose of the model and
disproportionate to the simplicity of the exogenous causal structure.
Like RfF, in its non-farm economy KASM allocates laborers to the sectors of
the input-output matrix just as they are needed according to the exogenous
value-added coefficients. KASM allocates farm laborers through an
optimization routine simulating farmers' profit maximization decisions in a
free market. Two labor constraints appear in the program, one for peak-season
laborers and one for the rest of the year.
CHAC represents a country with very rapid rural-urban migration, but the
model represents only the agricultural sector of the country and only for one
year. Therefore rural-urban migration is omitted from the model. CHAC does
calculate seasonal rural-rural migration of landless laborers and of owners of
unirrigated farms during the dry season. Four regional labor pools are
specified. Within each region labor is distributed and wages calculated as part
of the simultaneous solution of the model's optimization equations. If there are
excess laborers in one region, they can be hired into another region for a higher
wage. When the model is run for some year in the future, assumptions about
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rural-urban migration, like other population assumptions, must be made
off-line to set up the labor constraints for that year. CHAC provides a detailed
account of the shocking rate of rural unemployment in Mexico, but it offers no
information about its causes or cures.
The labor allocation by optimization in both KASM and CHAC differs
sharply from the input-output allocation in RfF, in that labor can be a limiting
factor to production or, alternatively, labor can be unemployed if other factors
are limiting. Farmers are assumed to shift their planting schemes in response to
labor shortage (as well as shortage of other factors) to make most profitable use
of the workers available. In KASM, where the optimization model is
embedded in a dynamic simulation model, further adjustments can be made in
subsequent years-wages can rise or fall, or investment in machinery can
substitute capital for labor where there is economic benefit in doing so.
SOS, like RfF, the other model of the United States, is not concerned with
rural-urban distribution and is not disaggregated along rural-urban lines. It
does contain a theory of net immigration or emigration into or out of the
country, however. Under 'normal' conditions, when the U.S. employment rate
is 95% or more, it is assumed that there will be a net immigration of 0.2% of
the U.S. population every year. If the employment rate drops, the immigration
rate decreases until, at 90% or lower, it becomes net outmigration. This
formulation is equivalent to the origin-push assumption of SAHEL, except
that unemployment rather than starvation is the source of the push.
SOS contains quite a detailed theory of labor allocation among the industrial
sectors; it is, as one might expect, a cybernetic, feedback-based theory. The
SOS population is divided into four age cohorts: 1-17 (immature), 18-24
(young adults), 25-64 (working adults), and 65+ (retired). Each of these
cohorts is further divided into six functional partitions:
1. In education.
2. In institutions.
3. Non-workers.
4. In training.
5. Paid workers.
6. Unpaid workers (housewives).
These 24 population groups must be allocated to satisfy the labor demands of
twelve productive sectors. Each sector contains a technical matrix specifying
for 20 different factors of production how much of each factor is required per
unit of output of that sector. Labor is factor 18. Each year the desired output of
each sector is calculated, which, when multiplied by the matrix, gives the total
requirement for each factor, including labor. If the total labor available is not
sufficient for the demand, production is reduced in that year. In the next year
corrective measures begin to take effect; wages in the sector rise, and as a result
labor is transferred from other sectors or from the unpaid labor population, or
some other more abundant factor of production is substituted for labor, or
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demand for the product of that sector is reduced. The corrective measures may
take some time, and they may not be sufficient. This formulation differs from
the one in Rtf and KASM-non-farm, in that labor does not automatically and
instantaneously appear where it is needed. It is similar to CHAC and
KASM-farm in that it contains the same three basic adjustment mechanisms
that they do: a shortage of labor can bring about:
1. More labor supply.
2. Less labor demand through production cutback.
3. Less labor demand through substitution of some other factor.
The difference is that in SOS the adjustments are not instantaneous or optimal.
The labor market in SOS need not ever be in equilibrium.
Mexico V is too aggregated to need a labor allocation function. It does not
specify different economic sectors, nor does it represent labor as a factor of
production. It does, however, have a rural-urban migration function,
primarily because Beltran-del-Rio perceived migration to be a dominant trend
in Mexico, one that he wanted to explain. He mentions as facts of concern to
him that urban labor productivity is five times rural, that a Mexican urban
worker has eight times as much capital to work with as does his rural
counterpart, and that the population shifted from 43% urban in 1950 to 58% in
1968. The rural-urban distribution does not affect anything else in the model,
except itself, through a feedback to be described in a moment, and, partially
and indirectly, the inflation rate.
According to Mexico V the fraction of population in urban areas can be
forecast by the equation:
ratio of urban to total population = a + b*time + c*(gap
between urban and rural productivity) distributed lag
The lag is distributed over three years. The gap between urban and rural
productivity is defined as the urban productive capacity per urban person
minus the rural productive capacity per rural person, where productive
capacity in each place is a linear function of the capital stock. Note the use of
time as a driving factor in this equation and also the fact that migrants respond
to potential productivity, not the actual capacity utilized or the actual
employment rates.
This migration formulation amounts to two negative feedback loops (Figure
13.8). Over a long enough time span they should operate in the model to
equalize urban and rural productivity (or perhaps to keep urban productivity
lower than rural because of the 'time' term in the migration equation). The real
system, however, seems to be behaving in the opposite way-the productivity
gap is widening in favor of the urban population. According to the Mexico V
hypothesis, this can occur only if urban capital is growing at a rate faster than
migration can occur.
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Beltran del Rio also includes in his labor participation equations an implicit
hypothesis about the demographic attributes of migrants. The urban
participation rate (% of eligible workers actually working) in the model
decreases as urban capital increases and as idle capacity decreases. In other
words, more jobs are correlated with a lower percentage of the labor force
working. The reasoning given for this surprising correlation is that more urban
capital and higher capacity utilization stimulate the flow of rural-urban
migrants, who are the poorest families with the lowest ratios of workers to
dependents. As these migrants come to the city, the ratio of workers to the total
population falls. 13 Beltran del Rio came to this conclusion after reviewing the
historical evidence; from 1950 to 1968 in Mexico, during the period of rapid
capital growth, urban labor participation fell from 31.9% to 27.3%, while the
rural labor participation rate rose from 31.6% to 37.1%.
The problem here is a classic confusion between correlation and causation.
What probably happens is that the number of jobs increases employment
directly, as it logically should, but because migration is influenced by more
factors than jobs alone, in-migration overbalances this effect and increases the
labor pool even faster (Figure 13.9). A model derived from historical data will
catch only the net effect, outlined by the heavy arrows in the diagram above,
which indicates that capital decreases employment. But in Mexico migration
has proceeded quite independently from urban job availability and must be
responding primarily to some other factors. These factors could be
overpopulation, poverty, and desperate lack of opportunity in rural areas.
339
The remaining three models, TEMPO, LTSM, and BACHUE, contain
interlinked theories of labor allocation and migration, with explicit
consideration of the characteristics of both origin and destination and of the
mobility of potential migrants. We will discuss them in order of increasing
complexity, starting with TEMPO.
The net rural-urban migration flow in TEMPO is a function of the ratio of
income of the uneducated modern population to the income of the subsistence
population. The equation is:
migration = m,*Rm ,* subsistence population
where
W * modern gross product / subsistence gross productR=-------=------:...----
uneducated modern population subsistence population
In this equation W is the wage income share of the uneducated modern labor
force (the exponent of uneducated labor in the Cobb-Douglas production
function), m, is an initialization constant, and m2 expresses the sensitivity of
the subsistence population to changes in the modern/subsistence income
ratio. Thus m2 summarizes in one constant value mobility and perception
factors such as cost of migration, cost of living, cultural preferences, etc. If
m2 = 0, net migration is simply a constant proportion (m\) of the subsistence
population, regardless of conditions in either origin or destination. If m2 = 1,
the proportion migrating varies directly with the income ratio. Typically in the
model m2 lies between 0 and 1. Total migration calculated from this equation
is then distributed across age and sex groups by exogenous weighting factors as
in KASM.
This formulation causes migration to increase if the subsistence population
increases, or as the modern sector output increases from some other factor such
as technology. Migration decreases if the subsistence sector output increases,
or if unemployment in the modern sector increases. Relative attractiveness is
summarized by the single index of average income differential. Mobility is
capsulated in the constant m2 and the age-sex weightings. Migration responds
without delay to income changes, and migrants instantly adopt the fertility and
productivity of the urban uneducated population.
The feedback structure of this migration hypothesis is similar to but more
explicit than that of MexicoV (see Figure 13.10). As rural-urban migration
proceeds, it begins to choke itself off by diluting the wage income of the urban
sector and raising the relative income of the remaining rural population. These
two inner negative loops should work as in Mexico V to equalize incomes in the
two sectors, at which point migration stops.
The two outer positive loops of Figure 13.10 are not in MexicoV. They
express the positive contribution of the population to per capita income
through labor. Since in TEMPO labor in the subsistence sector is subject to
diminishing returns and uneducated labor in the modern sector has relatively
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low productivity, these outer positive loops are not very strong. The entire
migration structure is dragged along by technology and capital increases in the
modern sector, which exponentially raise incomes and thus spur rural-urban
migration.
Labor allocation in TEMPO is fairly simple, since there are only two
productive sectors, subsistence and modern, and three types of labor,
subsistence, uneducated modern, and educated modern. The primary
allocation is the migration formulation just discussed, which shifts uneducated
workers between subsistence and modern employment. The educated
modern labor pool is determined by government educational spending as it
accumulates in the age structure of the population. Labor participation rates by
age, sex, and educational status are constant and exogenous. Educated labor
force employment is assumed to be a constant fraction of the educated labor
force available. The fraction of the uneducated labor force actually employed
depends on the capital-labor ratio. As the amount of capital per laborer
increases, the fraction of laborers employed increases asymptotically up to
some maximum employment level. The incremental capital-labor ratio
depends on the amount of unemployment, so that in a tight labor market
capital additions create fewer jobs than in a period of high unemployment. This
is a shortcut method for representing the effect of wages on labor-replacing
capital without actually bothering to represent wages.
LTSM contains migration and labor allocation functions somewhat similar to
those in TEMPO. The major difference is in the greater disaggregation (ten
economic sectors, seven in the hired-labor sphere, and three in the family-labor
sphere). The LTSM rural-urban migration equation is:
migration, =
rural population,
migrationt_l * -----=----=-----
rural population'_l
gravity multiplier,
* gravity multipliert_l *
productivity
differential
multiplier
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The gravity multiplier occurs again in BACHUE (in fact the LTSM modelers
adapted it from BACHUE). It expresses the idea that migration between two
places is more likely to occur when the populations of both places are about
equal than when either one place or the other has a great excess of people. The
gravity multiplier is:
(rural population) x (urban population)
total population2
It attains its highest value (0.25) when the two populations are equal and is
zero if the population is totally rural or urban.
The productivity differential multiplier in LTSM's migration equation is a
function of the rate of change of net product per laborer in the hired-labor
sector compared to that in the family-labor sector. The concept of relativl:
attractiveness therefore is, as in TEMPO, dependent upon output per person
(not per employed laborer). LTSM's migration theory is different from
TEMPO's only by the addition of the gravity multiplier and by the formulation
of all relationships in terms of rates of change.
LTSM is a model of a labor-surplus economy, and therefore the labor
allocation problem is not so much how to distribute workers where they are
needed as how to distribute unemployment among workers of various sectors.
The change in employment in the seven hired-labor economic sectors each year
is proportional to the change in the amount of capital in each sector. The
proportionality factor, called the incremental employment-eapital ratio, may
decline if the unemployment rate declines; that is, if labor ceases to be
abundant and cheap, capital will become less labor intensive. The change does
not occur in the reverse direction; high unemployment does not cause the
substitution of labor for capital. In the modern agriculture sector the
employment-eapital ratio may be negative. Within the urban and rural areas it
is assumed that labor instantly becomes available to whatever economic sector
needs it; across the rural-urban boundary migration has to take place first. In
the family-labor sectors employment is not calculated; it is assumed that all
available labor is absorbed, and therefore labor productivity is relatively low.
LTSM thus raises the interesting question of why in areas of chronic labor
surplus economies still proceed inexorably in the direction of increasing capital
intensity instead of labor intensity. Unfortunately, instead of attempting to
explain this puzzling behavior, LTSM simply assumes it.
As might be expected of a model made by and for the International Labor
Organization, labor allocation and migration are central components of
BACHUE. The theories behind these components are rich in detail. Migration
is calculated both from rural to urban areas and vice versa and is disaggregated
by age, sex, education, and marital status. A series of exogenous mobility
assumptions determines the propensity to migrate in each direction for
individuals in each class. Educated people are highly likely to move from rural
to urban areas but not the reverse, single persons are more mobile than married
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in both directions, etc. These migration propensities are then multiplied by a
relative attractiveness indicator, the ratio of destination to origin income for
jobs of the skill level that matches each education category. The entire
migration function is then multiplied by a gravity multiplier as explained under
LTSM. Thus BACHUE contains three sorts of inputs to migration: a detailed
series of micro-level mobility assumptions, a macro-level assumption that
relative attractiveness is determined by income, and the gravity multiplier.
BACHUE's intricate labor-allocation mechanism distributes laborers
among five urban production categories and four rural ones. It begins by
calculating labor participation, that part of the population in rural and urban
areas that are willing to be employed. Labor participation is not exogenous as it
is in many of the models, nor does it depend solely on economic variables such
as wages. The BACHUE modelers believe that labor force participation is
primarily sociologically determined and that anyone who really needs a job will
get one, although it may be in a relatively unproductive traditional sector.
Virtually all male household heads are assumed to work. Other family
members tend to work more if they are educated, more if the family is in a
lower income decile, more if modern-sector employment is available, more if
the household head is operating a traditional, family-based enterprise, and
more if there are not many children to be cared for.
The labor force calculated according to all these factors is then allocated to
economic sectors by a three-step process. First the total valued added (labor
cost) of each sector is calculated in the economic part of the model. The shares
of value added that go to the entrepreneur/profit receiver class, the skilled
workers, and the unskilled workers are also determined-they are assumed to
follow the historical patterns of other countries at different stages of
industrialization. These calculations result essentially in a money pool to be
divided up in the second step among the workers in each class (which has
already been determined in the labor participation calculation). The division
gives the mean income sector by sector for each group. In the third step
intercategory labor migration and rural-urban migration proceed in response
to income differentials and in directions that tend to equalize them. An
exogenously specified elasticity indicates how much labor movement will occur
for given wage differentials between each pair of categories. These elasticities
contain numerous socioeconomic assumptions: it is easier to move from
modern to traditional sectors than vice versa, it is difficult to move into the
self-employment profit-sharing class, it is easy to move from one area of skilled
employment to another. Because of the different elasticities, the delays in the
migration flows, and assumed standard and accepted wage differentials
between various categories of jobs, labor migration flows never come close to
equalizing incomes. As in SOS, the system is always moving in the direction of
equilibrium but never achieving it.
3. Summary and commentary
More than half the modelers in our survey mention unemployment and
migration as major forces and major problems in the countries they are
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modeling. Five of the models, however, contain no representation of
migration or labor shifts, or make them exogenous, thereby leaving the
theorizing to mental models. Others allocate labor smoothly according to the
needs of an input-output table or an optimizing program. These models
record the fact that labor re-allocation takes place, but they offer no clear
reasons why it takes place. nor can they deal with any of the problems
associated with delays or insufficiencies in the response of human workers to
the changing needs of the productive system, or vice versa. One model
represents a delayed, imperfect, problematic response of labor force to
shifting economic needs. Three models attempt to capture management
decisions about labor-capital substitutions. No model deals explicitly with
household decisions about labor-leisure substitutions, although BACHUE
does so implicitly.
The concept of relative attractiveness is contained in four of the nine
models, but only one aspect of relative attractiveness, income or its surrogate
labor productivity, is taken into account. No model contains an explicit
hypothesis about the information people have access to before deciding
whether to migrate, especially the imperfections in that information. In
several cases the coefficient relating relative income to migration flow is
inelastic, allowing a large income gap between city and country to persist. But
no account is given of why it is inelastic.
The representations of migration and labor allocation in TEMPO, LTSM,
and especially BACHUE are fairly complex and probably come about as far
as social understanding of this interface between economic structure and
family decision-making has progressed. Few of the models can explain or
even reproduce some of the greatest mysteries of the labor allocation process;
why migrants continue to come to the city when unemployment is high, why
the urban-rural income gap persists in the face of this high unemployment,
why the migration and labor absorption process seems to have proceeded
relatively smoothly in the history of the now-industrialized nations but is
going so roughly in the now-industrializing ones. 14 The only policy advice one
could deduce for governments concerned about too-rapid urbanization would
be to raise incomes or install capital in rural areas, a conclusion most people
can reach via mental models.
On the positive side, several of the models recognize the importance of
migration as a subtle influence on other aspects of a developing economy.
Migration is a rapid, effective, individual response to economic problems or
opportunities. It is usually more obvious and promising, and therefore more
often elected, than other possible responses, such as changing one's personal
habits or values, or attempting to improve the environment at the place of
origin. When this individual response is aggregated into significant migration
flows, it has multiple effects on the place of origin, the place of destination,
and on the migrants themselves. Some of these effects can be surprising.
Migration can dilute or confound regional development policies, transferring
costs and benefits to regions or types of people quite different from the ones
for whom they were intended.
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The models in the survey, especially BACHUE, have fulfilled a valuable
function in identifying migration as an integral and insufficiently understood
process in industrialization, a process that can divert apparently
straightforward policy efforts and produce unexpected results. Insofar as
modeling is a progressive field, this discovery should inspire further
experimentation, observation, and hypotheses about the role of rural-urban
migration in industrializing economies.
E. ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
An industrialized society is built not only from capital, labor, and technology,
but also from petroleum, iron, soil, water, sunlight, and the services of
natural processes that recycle nutrients and carry away wastes. Healthy,
functioning natural systems are a form of real economic wealth, although not
a form that is easily measured in monetary terms.
Industrialization in the past did not seem to be related to resources or the
environment in any simple way. Abundant coal and iron reserves were
obviously instrumental in the mechanization of Britain. The United States
certainly based its industrial growth on virgin forests, prime soils, and
plentiful mineral deposits. Current industrialization in Venezuela and Saudi
Arabia is clearly related to petroleum. But other countries like Japan,
Switzerland, and Hungary industrialized without great domestic resource
endowments, and resource-rich countries like Brazil and India have been late
to develop industrially. So the availability of cheap, nearby resources seems
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the earliest stages of
industrialization.
However, the maintenance of an industrial society once it has developed
certainly requires immense, continuous flows of resources. And the cost of
maintaining a 'natural capital stock' that yields a steady output of resource
goods and environmental services can become a significant fraction of the
expense of running an industrial system. In other words, a growing industrial
society puts an increased burden on its natural support systems, and there are
diminishing returns to the utilization of those systems. At some point natural
resources rather than capital or labor can become limiting factors of
production.
1. Mental models
Economists tend to see an industrial society as a circular and complex flow of
money, rather like the circulation of the blood through the many branches
and capillaries of the human cardiovascular system. If resources are in this
picture at all, they are coupled to and driven by the flow of money. Faster
money streams will induce larger resource streams. The physical origins of
these resources, and the environmental sinks to which they flow once they are
used are not really very much in focus.
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Ecologists are more likely to see a process akin to the digestive system; an
open-ended transformation of energy and materials from low-entropy
concentrated deposits in the earth, through refining processes, into
manufactured goods, and finally into scattered, high-entropy waste deposits,
with a continuous dispersal of respiratory by-products at every step along the
way. This one-way flow of materials through the human society is linked to all
the great circular flows of materials through nature; the hydrologic cycle that
moves fresh water from the sea through rain onto the land and back to the sea,
the nitrogen cycle that restores soluble nitrogen as a nutrient for plants in the
soil, and all the other cycles, driven by solar energy, that move and regenerate
the materials necessary for life. If one views the human society as a pipe,
attached to the finely tuned cyclical natural system, removing materials in
virgin form at the one end and spewing them forth degraded and sometimes
poisonous at the other, one asks quite different questions and worries about
different problems than does one who sees the environment as an inert, infinite
background that yields up resources in response to the circulation of money.
Clearly both the economic and ecological views are partially correct.
Economic activity may not create resources that were not already there. but
only scientific knowledge and labor and human-produced capital can make
resources like undersea petroleum or enriched uranium accessible and useful.
Intensive farming may deplete the nutrients in soil, but it also may replenish
them. Increasing use of fossil fuels may make more minerals or tresh water
accessible, and it may, at the same time, create acid rain or COrinduced
climate change. An industrializing economy and its natural environment
interact with each other in thousands of different ways; the economy may
exhaust or enrich the environment. the environment may support or limit the
economy. Because of the immensity of the environmental system and the
technical changeability of the economic one, decades or even centuries may
pass before the consequences of their mutual interactions are revealed.
2. Computer models
A complete representation of the role of natural resources in the process of
industrialization would require a model of the entire ecological system as well
as the economic one. Such a model would be hopelessly complex, even if
knowledge of both systems were sufficient for it to be made. The modelers in
our survey have handled this difficult area in four basic ways (see Figure 13.11).
1. Three models simply do not include resources or the environment.
2. Three models represent the impact of some resource constraints on the
economic system, but not the impact of the economy on the resource base.
3. One model contains assumptions about the impact of the economic system
on the resource base, but not the reverse.
4. Two models attempt to close the feedback loop and represent both the
effect of the economy on the environment and vice versa.
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Figure 13.11 Resource and environment functions
MexicoV contains no hint of environmental factors, and resources do not
appear in any form in its production equations. Monetary values of exports of
lead, copper, gold, silver, and zinc are calculated in the foreign exchange
sector, but all of these are determined exogenously. It is implicitly assumed
that no environmental or resource factor, including land, water, or domestic
supplies of exported metals, will significantly affect the Mexican economy over
the time horizon of the model. Since the time horizon is so short, this
assumption is probably appropriate.
BACHUE and TEMPO also contain no explicit representation of any
environmental factor. They do contain implicit recognition of resource
limitations, however. In the subsistence sector of TEMPO the production
function exhibits diminishing returns to labor, which is an indirect way to
represent the effect of a fixed supply of land. Presumably the rate at which
labor productivity diminishes could be adjusted for countries with more or
fewer land resources. BACHUE also recognizes land limitations in its labor
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productivity assumption. It sets an upper bound of 2% per year on the rate of
growth of labor productivity in agriculture. This limitation is much less strict
than TEMPO's; it is not an absolute limit but a statement that the combined
effects of land development and yield increases can gradually overcome natural
limits but cannot double the limits more than once in 35 years.
The three models that represent resource limitations to production explicitly
(but not the effects of production on resources) are all agricultural: KASM.
CHAC, and LTSM. In KASM and CHAC agricultural resources are
represented in detail, land of various types in various geographical locations,
water from natural rainfall, tubewells, and canals. These constraints are
assumed to be increased at a cost, by exogenous investment in land
reclamation, irrigation networks, etc. They are not decreased by anything.
Erosion, water pollution, disintegration of irrigation facilities, and salting of
soils through improper drainage are not included. CHAC is sufficiently
short-term that mechanisms of environmental degradation can safely be
ignored. KASM with a IS-year time horizon is on the borderline.
LTSM assumes no water constraint but does include land in the agricultural
production function. Land under cultivation can be increased by government
reclamation (apparently at no cost) and reduced by construction activity. Land
is not really an effective limiting factor, however, because yield per unit of land
is exponentially and automatically increased without limit by material inputs
(fertilizer).
None of these models represents plant genetics, insect communities, soil
quality, or the use of solar or fossil-fuel energy in agricultural processes.
KASM and CHAC include fertilizers, insecticides, and machinery as factors of
production, but do not follow the effects of fertilizer run-off, insecticide
resistance, or machinery-induced soil compaction. The dependence of modern
agriculture on petroleum, both directly through machinery and indirectly
through fertilizers and other petrochemicals, is also absent.
The RtF model is the only one of the nine that attempts to calculate in great
detail what resources are used by industrial production and what pollutants are
generated. The output of each of 185 industrial sectors is translated by
exogenous coefficients into usage rates for 19 minerals and 13 types of
pollution. The mineral use coefficients are derived from 1976 data relating
resource quantities consumed to dollar values of output for each industrial
sector. Coefficients for future years are altered by exogenous technical change
assumptions that we have already discussed.
Only short-lived pollutants, such as sulfur oxides and airborne particulates
(as opposed to long-lived pollutants such as heavy metals and some pesticides,
industrial chemicals, and radioisotopes) are considered. Therefore pollutants
do not accumulate in the model; the amount present at any time is assumed
equal to the amount generated in that year.
Each pollutant is discharged, by another set of coefficients, to the three
receiving media, water, air, and land, and the total national pollution load in
each medium is further broken down into geographic regions; water pollution
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into 22 water resource regions, and air pollution into 95 metropolitan areas.
A wealth of different pollution abatement policies can be tested and their
costs compiled. There is also no representation of the long-term dynamics of
the receiving media; no toxic build-up in groundwater, no acid rain, no
climate change, no soil erosion.
All these calculations of resource use and pollution generation are based on
the basic input-output model that recursively generates dollar flows in the 185
industrial sectors over time. They are tacked on after each year's economic
activities have been calculated, and they have no effect on any future year's
activities. If resources become depleted, the economy goes on using them
anyway. Pollution abatement costs are made a function of the amount of
pollution generated, but these costs do not affect labor productivity, or
capital investment, or final demand for various kinds of industrial output.
Resource substitution and improved abatement technologies are assumed,
but these are programmed before each model run begins. Thus aluminum
may be assumed to be gradually substituted for steel, but the extent and rate
of substitution are not related to the cumulative amount of aluminum or iron
consumed or to prices of aluminum and iron or to the rate of turnover of
capital stock. Air pollution may be assumed to be reduced by the use of
catalytic converters on automobiles, and the use of platinum may also be
assumed to be increased by the manufacture of the converters, but the
abatement coefficient cannot be made a reactive function of the amount of air
pollution actually present in the nation's cities, and the shift in platinum
consumption will proceed regardless of the availability of platinum.
Furthermore, the increase in abatement is not necessarily related to the
increase of platinum use; the two exogenous assumptions are completely
independent and nothing but the watchfulness of the person who makes them
guarantees that they will be consistent with each other, or with the other
million or so such exogenous assumptions.
At the other extreme, the human population in the SAHEL model is
assumed to live on just one resource, cattle. The cattle in turn live on one
resource, the forage plants of the Sahelian region, and the plants live on the
nutrients of the Sahelian soil. All three resources in this chain are constantly
renewed, but not necessarily at the rate the nomads choose to use them. The
SAHEL model contains an explicit representation of the level of each
resource and the rates at which it is renewed or depleted.
The cattle level is increased by calf births and decreased by natural deaths
and by slaughter for tribal economic purposes. As cattle increase, they
increase the rate of forage utilization. Forage is measured not in absolute
units, kilograms of biomass, but in units of production potential, the number
of kilograms that can be produced per hectare per year. Thus forage
production potential represents seeds, roots, buds, and other regenerative
plant parts that are present on the range, modified by amounts of rainfall
(exogenous). If the forage utilization rate exceeds the production potential,
the production potential falls (seeds and roots are being consumed). If the
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production potential exceeds the utilization rate, the production potential rises
until it reaches the maximum potential allowed by the range soil.
The condition of the soil is also measured in units of potential production
(kg/ha-year). As long as forage utilization does not exceed the potential
forage production rate, soil condition increases until it reaches its maximum. If
forage utilization becomes excessive, soil condition deteriorates at a rate that
increaties more rapidly the higher the forage utilization intensity gets. A lower
soil production potential (nutrients and soil structure) decreases the forage
production potential (seeds, roots, and buds), which further unbalances the
ratio between forage consumption and forage regeneration, unless cattle are
removed from the range.
As long as consumption exceeds the potential of the biomass to regenerate,
the system erodes through three feedback mechanisms, which occur at
different rates: the potential of the soil to support plants decreases, the
potential of the plants to regenerate themselves decreases, and the stock death
rate increases. The third of these mechanisms, stock deaths, if it occurs rapidly
and strongly enough, can halt the erosion by removing the consumption
pressure on the system. The behavior of the model depends on the balance
between these three feedbacks: if the third one is weakened through human
intervention, so that veterinarians or feeding programs prevent the sudden
decrease of the cattle population, the whole system can enter a destructive
behavior mode that takes decades to unfold.
Scientifically this is an important, and clear hypothesis. The model is rich
enough to suggest leading indicators, parallel systems that have already run
their course, and other detailed observations that might allow it to be tested.
SOS also contains links in both directions between the human economy and
the natural ecosystem. In contrast to the simple SAHEL system, here the
economy is a complex, fully-industrialized one, and the resources are
accounted for in relatively great detail. In fact this model is the only one in our
survey that takes on the task of quantifying the carrying capacity of a modern
industrialized society. Carrying capacity is defined by ecologists as the level of
population that can be sustained indefinitely by the environment at a given
living standard and set of technologies. The SOS modelers have attempted to
capture all the intricacy of that concept. For example:
1. At any time the carrying capacity is determined by the most limiting factor
needed to sustain the population. For instance, it would make no difference
how abundant food might be, if oil were scarce, or vice versa. Adding more
nitrogen to the soil would not increase yields if in fact calci um were the most
limiting factor.
2. The carrying capacity is dynamic. The levels of the various environmental
resources, relative to the population's need for them, change constantly.
Therefore the most limiting factor may shift from resource to resource over
time. One that is safely in excess today may become the critical
determinant of the carrying capacity tomorrow. The relative abundance of
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food vs. oil may depend on weather fluctuations; the relative abundance of
nitrogen vs. calcium may depend on the type of crop grown.
3. The shifts in relative abundance of the many resources that define the
carrying capacity are complicated by the fact that their availability may
depend on each other (oil is needed to grow food; nitrogen availability in the
soil may be linked chemically with the calcium concentration) and on the
response ofthe population to its perception of relative abundance (food and
oil may be substituted for each other by shifting the balance between labor
and capital; the demand for nitrogen-requiring crops may be increased and
the demand for calcium-requiring crops may be decreased, or vice versa).
In spite of the complexity of these ideas, the SOS simulation of the dynamic
interaction between the population and its carrying capacity is conceptually
rather simple. Twenty different resources necessary to production are
accounted for. Someofthem, such as petroleum, are non-renewable; their levels
steadily decline as the model economy uses them, but larger pools are assumed
available at progressively higher costs. Other resources, such as wood, are
assumed renewable; their stocks are increased each year by regeneration rates,
which mayor may not balance their consumption rates. Still other resources,
such as clean air and water, are not modeled as stocks; instead their levels of
pollution are accumulated as outputs of the productive processes and,
simultaneously but not necessarily equally, reduced by expenditures on
pollution control.
Each productive sector is presumed to operate by a formula indicating the
inputs of each resource needed to produce one unit of output. If any of the 20
resources is inadequate for desired production, the output of that sector is
temporarily cut back to the amount permitted by the most limiting resource.
Then various adjustment mechanisms are called upon to bring the economic
demand and the resource capacity into agreement. The production formula may
be shifted so as to use less ofthe scarce resource. New, higher-cost reserves ofthe
resource may be tapped. Recycling may be instituted, if possible. Demand of the
population for that product may be reduced by out-migration or deaths. None of
these processes is presumed to occur immediately, and each is assigned a cost.
Although the basic idea of adjustment through feedback in this model is
straightforward, its actual representation requires a heroic set of detailed
assumptions. For each productive sector one must specify not only a starting
recipe for its inputs, but also the range over which that recipe may vary; to what
extent any resources may be substituted for any other, if the need should arise.
For each resource, the modeler must enter a complete list of how much of it is
available at successively higher cost levels, at what rate it is naturally renewed,
and to what extent it can be recycled. For the whole society, the preference
function for adjustment mechnisms must be postulated; how much substitution
will be tried before recycling begins, what cost will be paid before demand is
decreased, to what extent production goals will be sought at the expense of
pollution-control goals.
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Given all these data requirements, it is not surprising that the SOS modelers
simplified their model relationships as much as possible. They maintained
linear relationships between inputs and outputs and between degree of
adjustment and costs of adjustment, although they knew that the real
relationships were not linear. 15 They also ignored the interrelationships among
resources; the possible dependence, for example, of fish or wood renewal rates
on the cleanliness of air or water, or the necessity of energy resources for the
refining of mineral resources. And of course many kinds of resources and
pollution were simply not included.
3. Summary and commentary
Simplified though it is, SOS is by far the most comprehensive of the nine
models in its treatment of resources, which is to say that none is very
comprehensive. Although fertilizer is represented as an agricultural input in
five of the models, not one of them suggests that fertilizer does anything more
in the environment than increase crop yields. Fertilizer is spread on the earth
by the millions of tons annually, but none of these models represents where it
comes from or where it goes. Not one of the nine models recognizes energy as
an economic input with significantly different properties from materials or
capital or cash. None accounts for the buildup of solid waste in an economy or
the cost of dealing with that waste, none keeps track of the flow of organic
nutrients from soil to produce to sewage to water bodies, only one mentions
that land can erode, only two that mines or oil wells can be depleted. Only two
of the models even come close to recognizing the most generally-accepted
physical law of the universe, that matter and energy are conserved, that they
cannot appear out of nothing or disappear into nothing.
We can imagine three excusable reasons for the uniformly cursory treatment
of environmental systems in these models. The first is that the purposes of the
models did not require anything more; resources and environmental services
were simply irrelevant to the question being asked by the modeler. MexicoV
and CHAC are probably the only models with such a limited time horizon and
purpose.
A second reason might be that the modelers were so dedicated to simplicity
and transparency that they deliberately chose extremely crude environmental
representations in order to keep their models understandable. This
explanation might suffice for TEMPO, but otherwise the simplest
environmental assumptions occur in the most complex models (like
BACHUE, KASM, and CHAC) , whereas the general-understanding models
that are most intended to be transparent (like SOS and SAHEL) in fact go
farthest in representing natural systems.
A third reason for omitting the environment from socioeconomic models, a
reason less excusable but at least understandable, might be a deficiency of
theories or data about natural systems. One cannot put into a model what one
does not know. However, currently available information about
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environmental systems, while far from perfect, is certainly more empirically
grounded, more comprehensive, and more precise than information about
social systems. The fields of ecology, hydrology, geochemistry and agronomy
contain a wealth of information about the matters that intersect human
economic activities, and much of that information is carefully quantified and
even computer coded. 16 The imbalance between ecological and socioeconomic
hypotheses in these models must be due to some other reason than an imbalance
between ecological and socioeconomic knowledge.
If there is no excusable reason for the underrepresentation of the environment
in the models, we can imagine several inexcusable reasons. However, in defense
of the computer modelers, we must remember that the sophistication of mental
models about environmental matters is also very limited, and that until very
recently concepts of resources and environmental services were almost never
apparent or even welcome in public policy. Some of these computer models have
clearly gone beyond mental models, in keeping track of several environmental
constraints simultaneously (KASM, CHAC), in attempting a detailed account
ofthe environmental impact of a modern economy (RfF, SOS), and in exploring
the very long-term effects of current policies on ecological stability. (SAHEL).
F. CONCLUSION: LESSONS ABOUT INDUSTRIALIZATION
In Table 13.1 we summarize what we believe to be the broad and total hypotheses
about industrialization, the combinations of all the specific ones contained
within each model. We also list the major conclusions or deductions that result
from those hypotheses.
Before we go on to discuss the usefulness and scientific quality of these nine
messages about industrialization, we should make some disclaimers about Table
13.1. It contains only our own rather baldly-stated summaries of the outstanding
model assumptions and conclusions as they have entered and informed our own
mental models. The statements we most readily picked out are, of course, those
most consistent with or opposed to our own paradigm. The model makers
themselves might perhaps choose other statements as most memorable, and
they would certainly express them with more detail and precision. It is also likely
that the modelers learned more from constructing and testing their models than
they communicated in their documentation, and that we absorbed. General
lessons are more easily derived from the longer-term, more transparent models
such as SAHEL and TEMPO than from the shorter-term, more detailed models
such as KASMand CHACo We may have seriously perverted the purposesof the
latter models in seeking to gain basic understanding from them, since they were
primarily intended to provide specific, situation- and parameter-dependent
advice, rather than lasting knowledge.
However limited the list in Table 13.1 may be, it is an honest compilation ofthe
primary messages about industrialization that the nine modeling groups were
able to communicate to two interested colleagues. Therefore it is some
indication of the scientific content of the models.
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To begin with the hypotheses, they constitute a remarkably diverse list.
These models put forth a number of interesting ways of looking at the
development process explored to a depth and detail far beyond what mental
models could do. In some cases the major theory of one model directly
supports or contradicts the major theory of another, but generally they are such
different views of the world that they are impossible to compare, contrast, or
even discuss using the same kinds of words or measures. Like the various
modeling paradigms they employ (and partly because of them), these models
focus on incongruent aspects of the world. Only a few of them can be used to
shed light on each other or to suggest real-world tests that could resolve the
policy arguments implied by their conclusions. The TEMPO-LTSM-
BACHUE series can be discussed as a comparable set and perhaps SAHEL
and SOS can as well. The others stand alone. Anyone who attempts to draw
together all the models, to summarize their main areas of disagreement, or to
suggest general tests to distinguish their validity finds the task frustratingly
unstructurable. One cannot even find a common set of concepts or symbols
with which to work.
Perhaps because of this incommensurability, the modelers themselves have
made very few attempts to assess their theories in the context of other possible
theories, whether formalized as mathematical models or not. Only Martos and
Beltran del Rio have seriously discussed the possibility that there might be
other ways of looking at the world besides the ones represented in their models.
Martos justifies his choice of a capital-constrained economic hypothesis as a
contrast to the demand-constrained one he sees in most other models. Beltran
del Rio statistically tests several major competing hypotheses about
macroeconomic structure. The TEMPO-LTSM-BACHUE modelers are very
conscious of their contrasting demographic hypotheses, but have built their
economic theories and chosen modeling techniques in such different ways that
even their demographic hypotheses cannot be compared. The other modelers
have simply thrown their theories into the wind, as if there were no other
theories already there.
In spite of this diversity and incomparability, the range of hypotheses
represented in these nine models is in some ways very narrow. With few
exceptions, they assume that industrialization will and should proceed
everywhere as it has in the West, that the important policies are those carried
out at the level of national government, that the important variables to keep
track of are measurable in monetary terms. They view governmental action as
an external plan or a one-time event, rather than as a process that is itself an
integral part of the system. They deal mainly with the concrete, objective,
physical, or monetary aspects of an industrializing society, not with
information, ideas, goals, motivations, institutions, politics, power,
oppression, or subjective perceptions.
Little formal use of information theory or of disciplines other than
economics and demography is evident. There are surprisingly few applications
of cybernetics or systems theory, few overt attempts to relate system behavior
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Model
SAHEL
RtF
SOS
TEMPO
LTSM
Table 13.1
Major hypotheses
Human economic and reproduc-
tive decisions are closely inter-
linked with the resource base that
sustains human activity. Human
decisions are based on material
and cultural goals and on short-
term information about the con-
straints of the resource base.
The pollution generated and re-
sources used by an industrial
economy are linear functions of
the monetary value of the output
of that economy. The monetary
value of economic output is a
result of economic demand. Eco-
nomic demand is generated by
past output, moderated by varia-
tions in the population and
formation of families.
A growing industrial system has
numerous material goals
arranged hierarchically. If a goal
is not met, there are numerous
adaptive responses, both technic-
al and social, to correct the
situation. These adaptive re-
sponses take time, cost some-
thing, and have partiallimita-
tions.
The output of the economy can
be allocated either to investment
or to consumption. A growing
population forces the allocation
more toward consumption.
Same basic assumptions as TEM-
PO, with the addition of feedback
from rapid economic growth to
reduce population growth. Also
strong assumptions about possi-
ble productivity increases in agri-
culture.
Major conclusions
A lack of information about the
long-term state of the resource
base will cause instability or even
destruction. Policies that are sin-
cerely designed to aid the system
may make it worse by making
individual destabilizing decisions
more effective.
Economic growth in an industrial
society places more of a burden
on the resource base than does
population growth. Reduced
population growth may help con-
serve resources, but its effect is
partially countered by the fact
that each person then has a higher
income and thus demands more
resources.
Because of the delays, costs, and
limitations of its adaptive
mechanisms, the industrial sys-
tem will not achieve its goals
smoothly or optimally. Long-
term planning and reduction of
material desires improve the be-
havior of the system.
Rapid population growth can re-
duce the rate of economic
growth. Investment in family
planning can have as positive an
influence on material living stan-
dards as investment in the eco-
nomy.
Investment in agriculture can be
even more effective in raising
living standards and employing a
labor surplus than investment in
industry. To some extent there is
a trade-off among the goals of
raising industrial output, raising
agricultural output, reducing un-
employment, and reducing
population growth. Single poli-
cies to achieve one goal may
interfere with the achievement of
the others.
Model
BACHUE
KASM
Mexico V
CHAC
Major hypotheses
A society's aggregate behavior
arises from the detailed responses
of various income classes to eco-
nomic conditions. Fertility,
migration, labor participation,
and productivity all depend on
the education, income, and
opportunities available to diffe-
rent classes.
The agricultural economy is
largely driven by exogenous
population growth and distribu-
tion, industrial factor prices, and
government-initiated investments
and new technologies. Farmers
make cropping and allocation
decisions by optimization. New
technologies diffuse smoothly and
sigmoidally. Markets operate
essentially freely.
The macroeconomy is best repre-
sented by annual accumulations
of various sorts of money flows.
The relationships among these
flows will continue to be in the
near future exactly what they
have been in the past. The main
determinant of economic output
is economic demand.
Market prices, supply, and de-
mand are determined simul-
taneously so as to maximize the
sum of producers' and consumers'
surplus. Farmers make decisions
by a process of risk-avoiding
optimization. The agricultural
economy is essentially indepen-
dent from the industrial eco-
nomy.
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Major conclusions
Poverty, unemployment. and in-
come inequities are deeply persis-
tent problems, solvable only by
determined, major efforts applied
consistently over long periods.
Policies intended to aid one eco-
nomic or geographic sector may
in fact aid another by diverting
streams of migrants or workers in
unexpected ways.
Active government policies and
new technologies can increase
agricultural output and smooth
commodity price fluctuation, but
the correct policy to produce a
given result is usually not in-
tuitively obvious and may have
unintended side effects.
The Mexican economic system
does not behave either like a pure
free-market or a pure Marxist
model. Central macroeconomic
policies can enhance total econo-
mic growth, but only by increas-
ing national debt and inflation.
These central policies have
almost no effect on the endemic
problems of rural poverty and
too-rapid urbanization.
Seasonal unemployment in agri-
culture is much greater than
aggregate data would indicate
and not easily countered. The
most effective investments in
agricultural capital and most pro-
fitable crops to raise for export
are not those that government.
aid, or market institutions have
intuitively selected.
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to structural assumptions. Holistic conclusions seem to have appeared in spite
of, rather than because of the efforts of the modelers. The variables,
categories, and ways of describing the system are traditional and familiar,
shaped more by standard disciplinary thinking than by the particular purpose
of each model. One gets the impression that these modelers believe that
human socioeconomic activities actually exist in traditional, separable,
physically-distinct categories (production, investment, consumption-
employment, labor participation, labor productivity-marginal returns to
labor, to capital, to technology), rather than as a magnificent, throbbing,
incredibly diverse but integrated whole that could be logically divided in
many different ways to obtain many different insights.
So there is a general lack of creativity, and a predominant use of safe,
conventional limited theories. But within that arena these models bring
together a lot of ideas and keep track of an amazing number of interactions.
Surprising and thought-provoking results can emerge, as can be seen in the
list of model conclusions in Table 13.1. All these major conclusions seem to
us plausible, useful, and probably generalizable. Few of them can be said to
be widely-shared knowledge, regularly used as a basis for policy. Many are
statements of uncertainty or impossibility: the system is so complex that it
does not behave in the way we would expect; the reasons for its behavior are
deeply imbedded in the system's own structure and are not changeable
quickly or by minor readjustments of current policies; it is difficult to find
policies that will satisfy all goals simultaneously. Few of these major
conclusions arise from anyone of the industrial indicators we have
discussed-population, production, and the like. Rather they result from the
assumptions that have been made about how each indicator is linked to all the
others. They are truly holistic conclusions, unlikely to be perceived by
looking at any part of an industrializing system in isolation. These models do
ilIustrate the potential of systematic modeling as a practice that can direct
one's attention to the interconnections within complex systems and to the
meaning and importance of those interconnections.
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CHAPTER 14
Model quality: Advantages of Computer
Models
So far we have looked at the contents of the nine models-what hypotheses they
contain and lessons they lead to about distinct aspects of industrialization such as
population and production. We have found a few truly creative hypotheses and
some attempts to use the computer to test hypotheses against real-world data.
Primarily, however, we have found familiar, and quite simple ideas, not very
different from the ones in mental models. The primary contribution of the
models has been in linking those formulations, in calculating the details of their
combined workings, and perhaps in making clearer which aspects of social
systems are, and which are not, well understood.
No one has ever claimed that computers are sources of brand-new knowledge
or that computer modelers have been trained to be bold innovators or critics of
the social order. Everything that goes into a computer model must, after all,
come from a mental model. Instead of looking at the substance of these computer
models and expecting to see something new, perhaps we should look at the
modeling exercises as processes and see how they have contributed to the
precision, communication and testing of old ideas. If computer models simply
expose and clarify mental models and force them to be more explicit and more
complete, they will contribute immensely to the quality of public debate and the
process of decision-making.
We will proceed one by one through the five advantages we cited earlier for
computer models. They were rigor, comprehensiveness, logic, accessibility, and
testability. To what extent do these models actually illustrate these advantages?
Can they be said to excel or supplement mental models along these dimensions?
A.RIGOR
The first potential advantage we claimed for computer models over mental
models was that computer models must be rigorous, organized, and precise.
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Computers are notoriously unforgiving. Before any results at all can be
produced, every item in a model must be defined exactly. No item can be
defined twice. Each computational rule must be specified. A single minor
mistake can either prevent the model from running at all or cause it to produce
obvious nonsense, such as a negative population or an income growth rate of
10,000% per year. The indisputable fact that each of the nine models has
actually been run on a computer means that each meets the computer's high
mechanical standards for precision and consistency. A precise and
internally-consistent statement about society should certainly be superior to
the vague, inconsistent ones in people's minds.
In some senses computer models clearly do excel in rigor and consistency. A
mental model can easily put together a plan that depends on using 150% of the
available agricultural land or three times the earth's known oil reserves,
without detecting any problem. A properly written constraint in a linear
program would prevent this from happening. Even if planners do remember
that producing more fertilizer will require more fertilizer plants, more
petroleum, more trucks to haul the petroleum, more refineries, and therefore
more steel, they are unlikely to be able to calculate how much more steel with
anything approaching the thoroughness of an input-output matrix. Inherent in
the various modeling paradigms are practices and mathematical devices that
enforce certain kinds of consistencies almost automatically, and these
consistencies reflect real-world certainties that are vitally important in
determining how social systems work.
The models described here illustrate many times over the valuable
contribution enforced orderliness can bring to the understanding of social
systems. The KASM team, trying to collect Korean data with which to
construct a model, almost immediately uncovered a faulty data-reporting
process that local and international statisticians had previously either ignored
or been unaware of. The same team produced a set of consistent demographic
forecasts superior to any others available at that time. In fact nearly all of the
models described here contain detailed and useful demographic components.
It is a trivial task for a computer to remember how many nine-year olds there
were last year and to move them into the ten-year old category this year,
removing those who died or migrated away. It is not so trivial for a person to
keep mental track of 80 or so age categories.
Another example of rigorousness and consistency is CHAC, which contains
a fascinating catalog of 2,340 ways Mexican farmers actually grow crops, and
which can generate various combinations of these cropping activities, all of
which are guaranteed not to require in the aggregate more land, labor, water,
fertilizer, or machinery than can be found in Mexico. Picardi's SAHEL model
also performs some useful consistency-maintaining functions. It does not allow
the nomad's cattle stock to increase faster than the normal fertility of cattle
would permit, it does not allow the herd to grow past the size the grazing land
can support, it keeps track of the fact that more cattle will eat more forage and
thus reduce the supportive capacity of the land, and so forth. Similarly, the RfF
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model reminds us of a set of interlinked factors that tend to be forgotten in
verbal debates; a slower rate of population growth will reduce resource
demand because there will be fewer consumers, but this effect may be offset by
increased resource demand because each consumer is likely to have a higher
income.
However, organization, precision, and rigorousness can be deceptive. Every
modeler knows that the computer's ability to produce numbers with six to
twelve digit precision should not be taken as a sign that one really knows
anything about the system that precisely. But the temptation to produce such
apparent scientific certainty is almost impossible to resist. For example,
Beltran del Rio is under no illusions about the availability or accuracy of data
on Mexico's economy. Yet he applies sophisticated statistical techniques to fit
his structural hypotheses to observed data, and he enters the results into his
model like this:
( ;:~~~~:~~~) = 0.68591 - 0.12852 (u;::~~~~~r) + 0.00301 ( u~~l~~ )
rate productIvlty,capaclty
To his credit, Beltran del Rio does not read his model output to the sixth
significant digit; the conclusions he draws are strictly qualitative.
Spurious precision model input, which is neither required nor utilized in
model output, is a common tendency, to be observed to some extent in RtF,
LTSM, BACHUE, and particularly in KASM, Mexico V, and CHAC. The
outputs of these models are generally described in qualitative terms with many
disclaimers about taking precise quantitative values too seriously. Yet great
care is taken to estimate input parameters as exactly as possible-probably
even more exactly than possible.
Over-emphasis on precision is not only time wasting, it can be misleading. It
can disguise the shaky knowledge base upon which the model is built. One can
start with a series of guesses about the 50 year future of population growth,
economic growth, and technical advance, as the RtF model does, and then use
a 185 x 185 matrix of uncertain coefficients to produce a detailed, internally
consistent, extremely precise picture of a future economy. The wealth of detail
can distract one's attention from the fact that the entire structure depends on
the unrigorous, imprecise mental model that generated the initial exogenous
forecasts.
This sort of unbalanced rigor is commonplace in our survey models, many of
which combine some detailed, organized, accurate representation with some
astonishingly simplified guesses or omissions. KASM has 180 population
groups and 19 agricultural commodities, but no feedback from nutritional
sufficiency to death rates, or from urban conditions to migration rates, or from
industrialization to birth rates. The RtF model keeps track of inter-industry
flows through 185 industrial sectors but does not alter those flows when
resource reserves become depleted. BACHUE distributes the output of 13
economic sectors over 40 income groups but relies on mental models to forecast
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investment. CHAC combines an immensely sophisticated description of
farmers' cropping activities with simplistic assumptions about perfect
competition, perfect information, and society-wide market balances. It is very
easy for clients and even modelers to be seduced by the elaborate output graphs
from these models and to forget the controversial theories and imprecise
guesses upon which they are based.
If the drive toward precision had no effect other than to waste modelers'
time, it would be a tolerable quirk of the profession. If it did nothing more than
deceive model clients about what modelers really know, a bit of client
education could reestablish a proper degree of skepticism. But the quest for
precision generates a worse problem than either of these, the problem that has
most hampered the contribution of modeling to new knowledge in the social
sciences. The need for the appearance of rigor fosters uncritical use of the
neatly catalogued data in standard statistical sources, and discourages
utilization of less precise but perhaps more pertinent sources of information
about the way systems function. A modeler can easily find age and sex data for
a population in an official census, so considerable time is spent constructing a
population model disaggregated into 180 age and sex categories, even though
the original purpose of the model does not require such information. The
model purpose may require a representation of the long-term response of the
population's fertility and mortality to economic or environmental changes, but
the modeler finds no official data on such things, especially not for all 180 age
and sex categories. Professional colleagues will be scornful of any hypotheses
that are not backed by statistical fits to data. Therefore the modeler is likely to
leave important factors of the system out of the model or to make them
exogenous.
The complaint we have put forth in the last few paragraphs should not be
taken to imply that rigor is not a major advantage of computer modeling. We
believe that it is one of the main advantages, but one that accrues primarily to
the mental model of the modeler alone. We have found that the frustrating
exercise of setting down what we think we know about a system in precise and
internally-consistent language has two marvelous effects. First, it forces us to
clarify our thinking enormously. Second, it makes us very humble about how
much we actually know. We wish every policy-maker could be put through the
exercise.
But we find that model-induced clarity and humility very hard to transfer to
anyone else. The best lessons of rigor remain with the modelers, with the
thoughtful ones anyway. And that result-learning on the part of those who
build the models-falls far short of the claim that the modelers can deliver
precision and rigor to the policy process. And, as another critic of modeling has
said, there is no guarantee that the exercise of modeling educates even the
modeler:
There is a popular illusion that confronting a computer with one's ideas enforces
rigor and discipline, thereby encouraging the researcher to reject or clarify fuzzy
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ideas. In the very narrow sense that the human must behave exactly like a
machine in order to communicate with it, this is true. But in a more useful sense,
the effect is the opposite; it is all too easy to become immersed in the trivial
details of working with a problem on the computer, rather than think it through
rationally. The effort of making the computer understand is then mistaken for
intellectual activity and creative problem solving. 1
In summary, computer models do tend to be more rigorous, organized, and
precise than mental models, and this rigor is useful, especially for the modelers'
own learning. But often the apparent rigorousness is simply an elaborate
accounting structure built upon an uncertain mental model'. And nearly always
the drive for scientific-looking precision leads to misallocation of modeling
effort and omission of some important aspects of real social systems.
B. COMPREHENSIVENESS
Computer models can contain and process more information than mental
models can. They can combine many mental models, cross disciplines, and
provide a more complete view of the world.
All these computer models, even the simplest, keep track of a number of
items far beyond the capability of the human mind. Several of the models
served as research hubs, bringing together interdisciplinary teams of people
who combined insights about many different aspects of social systems. A
formal model, within which different assumptions can be expressed in a neutral
language, can be a key integrating factor in cross-disciplinary conversations.
KASM utilized agricultural economists, macroeconomists, demographers, and
agronomists from both Korea and the USA. CHAC brought together a similar
team of Mexicans and Americans, and BACHUE and LTSM intended to
create interdisciplinary research efforts in several different countries. The
SAHEL, BACHUE, and SOS models truly transcend disciplines, trying to
provide holistic, systematic descriptions of self-contained systems and creating
new theory as well as data-accounting. KASM and BACHUE also combine
several different modeling paradigms.
Most of the models provide some meeting ground for two fields, economics
and demography, that are not very often contained simultaneously within
single mental models. Two models represent the effects of various
population-growth scenarios on the economy (TEMPO and RtF). Four others
take the greater step of closing the economic-demographic feedback loop by
including the effects of economic change on the population growth rate
(SAHEL, SOS, LTSM, and BACHUE). Although the theories used to close
this loop in the models are extremely simple, any attempt to keep in focus both
sides of this feedback process is a concrete step toward understanding the
process of economic development. Verbal arguments in the field of politics too
often favor only one or the other side of the economic-demographic feedback
('If those people had fewer children they would be better off' vs. 'If those
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people were better off they would have fewer children'). In this respect the
computer models are certainly more comprehensive than many mental models.
While the capacity of a computer to hold and synthesize information favors
comprehensiveness, it is still a finite capacity, and the mental capacity of the
people who must program, check, and interpret computer models is even more
limited. Modelers understandably strive for mathematical simplicity, which
sometimes can get in the way of model comprehensiveness. Most of us visualize
relationships in our social systems as diffuse, non-linear, delayed, and often
sharply discontinuous. But these nine models are predominantly linear,
instantaneously adjusting, and continuous (especially RfF, Mexico V, CHAC,
and parts of BACHUE and KASM).
This oversimplicity is not strictly necessary; many mathematical tools are
available to deal with non-linearities or discontinuities. But simple equations
are especially necessary if a model is intended to be very detailed. Linear
matrices can be inverted, no matter how huge, and linear constraint spaces are
more easily optimized than non-linear ones. Thus mathematical convenience
forces a trade-off between comprehensiveness (inclusion of much mental-
model knowledge) and complicatedness (inclusion of lots of categories of
population or output or resources). In order to preserve complicatedness,
comprehensiveness is usually sacrificed.
Human minds are full of information about how people make decisions and
how constraints, goals, expectations, fears, hopes, hates, and loves influence
the workings of the social system. But little of that information is contained in
computer models. Of the nine in our sample, only SAHEL, SOS, and
BACHUE make a concerted attempt to represent 'soft' social processes. The
BACHUE modelers gave up that attempt when they ran across data
deficiencies. The SAHEL and SOS modelers lost considerable credibility by
going ahead without the data.
Thus these computer models are not truly comprehensive; they are strangely
silent about aspects of social systems that everyone knows to be important, but
that no one has yet included in data banks.
In short, computer models are in some senses more complicated and detailed
than mental models, but they are rarely as complete and comprehensive.
Qualitative, motivational factors tend to be systematically omitted, as are
physical factors for which there are few standardized data (pollution, erosion,
energy, household production). The theories underlying the models are
unsophisticated, and individual relationships are often simplified for
mathematical convenience. Though the models can and do link together more
factors than mental models can, there are mathematical and scientific biases
limiting what actually gets linked.
C. LOGIC
We have claimed that computer models can draw error-free conclusions from
their assumptions, a feat that mental models are generally incapable of
performing, especially when there are many assumptions.
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Probably the only way of ascertaining whether this is true of the nine models
would be to check every individual equation and to perform numerous
computer tests. Only four of the modeling groups have published their
equations, although program tapes could probably be obtained from four
others. But a program with 80,000 parameters or 1,500 main equations is
inherently uncheckable. The probability of a mistyped decimal point or
algebraic sign, of an accidentally inverted ratio or of garbled numerical digits,
must be very high for the massive programs in our sample. And the probability
of detecting such a mistake is nearly zero. Of the nine models, probably only
TEMPO and SAHEL are transparent and intuitive enough to be thoroughly
checked for mechanical mistakes.
The problem of mechanical mistakes is compounded by the ingenious way
modelers can rationalize them. We once personally demonstrated this ability
with a relatively small model of about 200 equations. One erroneously-typed
decimal point escaped our attention for several months. During that period the
model output showed some significant wobbles that had no effect on the
general model conclusions (fortunately), but that showed up clearly on the
output graphs. With great ease we were able to explain how these wobbles were
generated by a particular combination of the model's assumptions. Our
explanation was entirely specious but very plausible. It took a critic from
outside our group to find the typing error; we never suspected that there was
one. 2
This example illustrates a difficulty that is harder to deal with than just the
probability of typographical errors. Not only may there be errors in the process
of translation from verbal assumptions to mathematical equations to typed-in
symbols stored in the computer's memory; there may also be errors in the
interpretation of the symbols that come out the other end of this process. The
computer does not deliver a sweeping conclusion, summarizing the
accumulated wisdom inherent in the model assumptions. Rather it produces a
stack of paper, sometimes several inches thick, covered with numbers. These
numbers must be examined, organized, compared, and digested before any
meaning can be extracted from them, and this process is conducted by people
using fallible, biased, and illogical mental models.
There may be several errors of interpretation in our sample of nine models
that we as critics did not catch because our own mental models are similar to
those of the modelers. One we did catch, because of a bias opposing that of the
modelers, was Rtf's conclusion that further population and economic growth
could be supported in the United States by the known resource base. In fact the
model results indicated severe problems. The high-growth scenarios seriously
depleted not only domestic but world reserves of most resources over the next
30 years, in spite of the model's sanguine assumptions about technological
development. The modelers interpreted their results with an optimism derived
from their mental models, not their computer model. The Population
Commission sponsor further warped the message by advocating slower
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population growth with no mention of economic growth, although the model
had indicated that economic growth placed much more of a burden on
resources than population growth. Even if all the assumptions in this model
were reasonable and correctly entered into the computer, which is doubtful,
the conclusions drawn from it were not error-free.
We should mention some good examples under this category, because good
examples certainly do exist. There are several cases of real learning from the
computer models, cases where the modelers expected one output, received
another, and after careful rechecking of both mental model and computer
model, decided that the mental model had been in error.
Picardi probably did not expect to find that aid programs in the Sahel were
counterproductive, and probably did expect to discover with his model some
relatively simple policies that would permanently improve the lot of the Sahel
nomads. He can now explain his results with a fairly compelling logic based on
intuitively-understandable interlinkages in the Sahel system. This explanation
is derived from a mental model that has been 'educated' by working with a
relatively transparent computer model.
Similarly, House and Williams deliberately designed the SOS model to
demonstrate all the effective adaptation mechanisms of modern society, but
the resultant model system did not adapt effectively. The system's response
delays, and the costs of the adaptive responses, were what their mental
modelers had not adequately accounted for. (Jay Forrester says that most
people underestimate system response delays by a factor of about three.)
House and Williams conclude by recommending significant changes in the
system, which reflect an understanding quite different from the 'nothing to
worry about' attitude with which they started.
The BACHUE modelers received several surprises from their model.
Projects designed to help rural areas in fact distort migration streams and end
up helping urban areas instead. Education proves to be a much less effective
change agent than had been expected. Income distribution is distressingly
resistant to change.
We do not mean to imply that all these unexpected conclusions are
necessarily correct simply because they were unexpected, nor that conclusions
that are expected are likely to be wrong. The correctness of any conclusion
depends upon the accuracy of the assumptions that went into it and the
reliability of the translation process that communicated it to and from the
computer. We have already indicated that there are several problems at each of
these stages. But these examples do indicate the potential of computer
modeling to enhance the limited reasoning power of the human mind and to
strengthen the logical chain from assumptions to conclusions.
Thus computer models are definitely capable of proceeding in a logical,
error-free fashion from assumptions to conclusions and of generating
information that is unlikely to come from mental models. However, errors can
easily be introduced either in the process of translating the assumptions into
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computer language or in the process of interpreting numerical output. The
probability of such errors multiplies rapidly as models become more detailed
and complex.
D. ACCESSIBILITY
Computer models are explicit and open to criticism in a way that mental models
can never be. They can be examined, revised, and corrected; each assumption
can be tested against the real-world.
As outsiders who have attempted to understand the nine models on the basis
of their written documentation, we should be in a good position to assess this
claim. From our personal experience with these models, we must conclude that
the record is decidedly mixed.
To begin with the good examples, SAHEL is clearly documented, and we
felt we could understand it thoroughly. Part of this accessibility may have been
due to the fact that we share the paradigm of this model, but its structure is so
simple and its documentation so non-technical that we suspect anyone could
review it rather easily. Another excellent example is TEMPO, a small model
with a simple structure, carefully described in both words and algebraic
equations. This model is so clear that it has drawn criticism; both LTSM and
BACHUE were made to correct and expand it. In fact these three models, and
the Coale-Hoover model that preceded them, provide a fine demonstration of
modeling as a progressive science. Each set of modelers commented upon,
criticized, and elaborated the model that came before. The entire chain of four
models is notable for the efforts ofthe modelers to document their work clearly
and honestly.
Four of the nine models (SAHEL, SOS, TEMPO, MexicoV) present
easily-available technical documentation sufficient to permit the model to be
reproduced and run on virtually any computer. Two models (SAHEL,
TEMPO) are simple enough and described clearly enough that a non-technical
reader can understand most of their assumptions and the logical flow that leads
to their conclusions. Three models (LTSM, Mexico V, SOS) are sufficiently
simple in concept that their major assumptions can be assessed one by one,
although it is difficult to see the over-all structure. The verbal documentation
of SOS manages to make a relatively straightforward set of assumptions seem
unnecessarily complicated. Four of the models (RtF, BACHUE, KASM, and
CHAC) can only be described as mind-boggling, despite significant efforts by
the BACHUE and KASM teams to provide clear documentation.
A look at the characteristics of these four inaccessible models will reveal
some reasons why the computer models are not always as explicit as they
should be. First, all of these models are detail-rich to the point where the forest
is almost totally obscured by the trees. The modelers themselves cannot
comprehend all the interactions that must have led to a certain result, and
therefore even those who have invested considerable effort in documentation
have not been able to make themselves clear. It is extremely doubtful that any
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member of these modeling teams really understands what the model does and
why, and therefore it is not surprising that the documentation does not convey
a clear picture.
When a very complicated model is combined with a tight deadline, and no
particular emphasis on documentation, as in the RfF case, the result is
complete inaccessibility. The modelers cannot explain how the model
produced a given output, nor can they repeat their own experiments on the
computer. This model is no more explicit or accessible than a mental model.
Probably it is less so.
CHAC, RfF, Mexico V, and parts of KASM and BACHUE suffer from
another problem that hinders model accessibility. None of these models
attempts to simulate real-world happenings directly. Each is instead a
mathematical abstraction designed to produce a certain result that is assumed
to be typical of the real system, but that result is achieved through a mechanism
totally different from the one operating in the real system. The modelers do not
believe in a great optimizing program in the Mexican sky, nor do they think the
US economy presents a vector of final demands which gets cranked through a
matrix to produce economic output. These non-behavioral models are
impossible to understand intuitively, because they do not operate in the same
way our intuition tells us the real system does. One must either be able to
reason through the abstract mathematical properties of the model system
under a variety of circumstances and then compare those properties with the
real system's, or else one must take these models as black boxes. The
simulation models (SAHEL, TEMPO, SOS, LTSM, parts of BACHUE, and
KASM) attempt to replicate decisions, stocks, and flows in roughly the same
way that most people represent them in their mental models, and thus they are
intrinsically more open to investigation and criticism.
A final obstacle to critical understanding in nearly all these models is that
their most important assumptions are implicit. Problem definition, choice of
method, boundary, and selective omission of facts about the system being
modeled are the most essential assumptions of any model. These assumptions
are almost never documented, not because modelers wish to hide them, but
because they are largely unconscious of them. As we have discovered in
compiling this book, considerable training and effort are required to ferret
them out. There are undoubtedly crucial implicit assumptions within each of
the nine models that we have not yet discovered, in spite of the fact that we
were actively looking for them.
In other words, computer models are indeed more accessible to criticism
than mental models. But important parts of all these models are in fact not
explicitly stated. In some cases the modelers themselves do not understand
even the explicit parts of the models and are unable to explain them to others.
The problem of model communication is most difficult when the model is
complicated and when its structure is not causal or behavioral. Most of these
models are accessible to thorough criticism, if at all, only by a limited and
specially trained group of people.
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E. TESTABILITY
The claim was that computer models can easily be tested, to explore their
sensitivity and validity, to probe alternate assumptions, to tryout policies that
would be difficult to try in the real world.
We should distinguish in this discussion between two kinds of testing,
methodological testing and policy testing. Methodological testing is
undertaken to learn something about the model: where it is sensitive, whether
it can replicate historical developments, how it reacts to certain kinds of pushes
and pokes, what causes it to go beserk. This kind of testing is designed to
explore the strengths and weaknesses of the model as an analogy of the real
world, thereby giving the modeler some idea of how much confidence to place
in the model results. Ideally, after thorough methodological testing has
provided understanding of the range of the model's credibility, policy testing
then begins. The model system is subjected to different exogenous policy
inputs to see how it will respond, or the internal structure of the model is
altered to see how a differently-designed system would behave.
The two doctoral-thesis models, MexicoV and SAHEL, provide the best
examples of methodological testing. Picardi, aided by a software package that
makes experimentation cheap, quick, and easy, did extensive sensitivity
testing, varying all the uncertain parameters in the model as well as the
unpredictable exogenous variables such as rainfall. He also explored the
model's behavior under varying time horizons and extreme conditions. Beltran
del Rio took the rare and painstaking step of testing different structural
theories. Real structural testing of this sort may have been tried with other
models, but if so, it was not reported.
Comparison of these two models with the others in our sample leads to the
conclusion that graduate students are held to much higher standards of
methodological testing than full professors or professional modelers. Most of
the models received (or reported) only desultory and unimaginative testing.
TEMPO and LTSM should have been relatively easy to test, but the
experiments actually reported are minimal. This is especially surprising, given
that each of them contains highly uncertain assumptions, for example those
about the effects of exogenous family planning programs on fertility.
SOS was run under a variety of different assumptions (zero population
growth, slower response to scarcity, etc.) but only as a generic system with
hypothetical parameters-no attempt was made to relate the results to the
behavior of any real system. CHAC, RtF, and KASM received very little
methodological testing. These three models approach the size where testing
becomes prohibitively expensive, which is unfortunate because models of this
size also contain an especially large number of assumptions that should be
tested. RtF is driven by uncertain exogenous forecasts, which should be varied
both singly and in combination. Even if this model could be run inexpensively
and its output interpreted easily, it would take years to test its robustness to all
its exogenous inputs. But since running the model was not cheap, interpreting
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one run took several days, and there was a client deadline of one year,
methodological testing was foregone almost entirely.
Eight of the nine models pass the validity test of fitting historical data or
behavior to some extent (SOS never tried). None of the modelers seemed to
derive much confidence from this test alone. We suspect that most models can
pass it so easily that modelers have come to regard it as a ceremonially
necessary but far from sufficient reason to believe in a model. Other arguments
for model validity vary widely; an appeal for the intuitive reasonability of each
individual assumption (Picardi), comparison with the results of other models
(BACHUE), formal summary statistics (MexicoV), and examination of the
dual variables generated in the solution of a linear program (CHAC). From
their discussion of model results, one has the impression that the modelers have
all developed a feeling in their bones about how literally to believe what parts
of their models, but these feelings are communicated only indirectly, by the
fact that some results are discarded while others are made much of. There is no
objective, quantitative, or agreed-upon method for establishing confidence in
a model or for reporting on the degree of confidence the modeler himself feels.
When it comes to policy testing, the best examples are models made in close
collaboration with an interested client. CHAC and KASM were run through a
variety of interesting policy variations, both as complete models and as various
combinations of components (although they were given little methodological
testing). The more academic or pedagogic models SOS, SAHEL, TEMPO,
and RfF were not really subjected to the pressure of providing answers to
practical policy questions.
When the policy tests were dictated by actual clients, they almost all involved
watching an existing system react to exogenous inputs (What would be the
effect of a...two-child or three-child family? What happens if we line canals in
BajlO Province? Suppose we shift the support price of rice relative to that of
wheat?). Policy clients, not surprisingly, seemed much more interested in
modifying parameters than in exploring redesigns of system structure. Only the
(academic) SAHEL model was used to simulate the effects of change in the
structure of the internal decision system. (What if the herd size were adjusted
in response to the condition of the range?).
The ways that policies are represented and tested are some of the best clues
to the biases of the modelers and clients. Favored policies are represented with
wondrous efficiency. In LTSM investments in agriculture produce immediate,
significant output increases with no diminishing returns. In TEMPO family
planning expenditures bring down birth rates promptly and linearly. Policy
tests are also revealingly asymmetrical. More rapid technical change is tested,
not slower technical change. More investment in agricultural research and
extension, not less. Various positive rates of exponential economic growth, not
zero or negative rates. More fertilizer, not less. More labor productivity, not
less. More government, not less.
In summary, it seems that computer models are flexible in theory, but in
practice they are seldom subjected to thorough testing and experimentation.
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Tests tend to be weak, marginal, unsymmetrical, and very biased. In part this is
due to oversized models whose complete testing would be impossibly
expensive and tedious. It is also due to a general lack of imagination,
motivation, training, client pressure, and agreed-upon methods for testing.
F. CONCLUSION: ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT
We have had several good things and many bad things to say about computer
models as inputs to human decision-making. Although computer models
certainly could surpass mental models along at least the five dimensions we
have discussed, they do not always do it. The models typically hide extremely
simple theories under heaps of numerical gadgetry. Their methodological
paradigms constrain creativity and limit comprehensiveness as often as they
lead to insight. Computer models are hobbled by their very bigness and
impenetrability. By limiting themselves to things for which numerical data are
available, they ignore much of the real-world. There are exceptions to these
sweeping judgements, of course. The achievements of these nine models are
substantial enough to illustrate the exciting potential of the field. But at the
same time they are disappointing enough to make us wonder why the field is
falling so short of its potential.
Since we have been fairly critical in this chapter, we should take some time to
defend the claim that the models do have value. To see that value, we should
remember what we are left with if we choose to reject computer modeling
altogether. The alternative to computer modeling is not absolute truth, but
mental modeling. Like the schools of formal modeling, mental models are
useful for some purposes and unsuited for others. They are most applicable to
short-term personal decisions, where a single person's base of experience is
most relevant. They contain much information about subjective human
factors, values, goals, aesthetics, motivations. They are superbly handy; they
operate quickly and cheaply, and they will always be used for urgent decisions
and those that do not justify a major expenditure of time or resources.
However, mental models are incapable of analyzing truly complex
interactions, they are often willfully resistant to testing or change, they are
unexaminable, and logically fallible. In many instances, mental models are just
plain wrong, and not notably open to improvement.
The sorts of problems mental models are best at solving are probably less and
less important in the world-because mental models are solving them. The
problems that persist tell us where mental models consistently fail, and where
formal models, perhaps improved over any we know about now, are the only
hope. These are problems that span more than one person's expertise,
problems that involve many interlinked factors, problems that concern
complex non-linear aggregations of people and things. Russell Ackoff has
termed such problems 'messes'. 3 Examples of messes are poverty and hunger,
ecological destruction, the nuclear arms race, international interdependencies,
and the processes of urbanization and industrialization.
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Each of the modeling efforts we have described here has contributed
something to understanding such messes.
1. SAHEL is a crisp, uncomplicated, and fresh conceptualization of an urgent
short-term problem with long-term intractable causes. It demonstrates the
interconnections between an ecological system and the values of a human
culture. It resulted in a clear and unexpected policy message.
2. RtF coupled population growth, pollution generation, and resource use in a
detailed, quantitative way for the first time. It also spawned an extremely
comprehensive side study on technological forecasting. The question it
raised and addressed is vital and was legitimized by the very fact of being
computerized.
3. SOS is full of original hypotheses that raise important questions about
societal control mechanisms. Of all the models, it is the one that most shakes
up old patterns of thinking and forces one to take a long-term holistic look at
industrial systems.
4. TEMPO broke new ground at the time of its conception by integrating
demographic and economic concepts. It also was transparent enough to
convey a clean and powerful message, and to serve as the foundation of
several succeeding models.
5. The LTSM modelers set an excellent precedent in candidness of model
documentation. They also closed the economic-demographic feedback while
preserving the essential simplicity and comprehensibility of their model.
6. BACHUE is the only one of our models to incorporate a dynamic theory of
income distribution or even to focus attention on the vital issues of labor,
wages, and distribution. It is also one of the few models in the survey to
attempt to include both the numerical precision of statistical inference
techniques and the concepts of causality and feedback.
7. KASM is based on both extensive fieldwork and regular contact with the
policy world. It has probably gone farther than any of the other modeling
efforts in melding academic theory with pragmatic policy concerns. The
KASM modelers also coupled several different modeling approaches in a
creative way, and took on the pioneering task of institutionalizing a model
within a Third-World government.
8. Mexico V provides our best example of systematic and open-minded theory
testing, one ofthe clearest model documentations, and a pure application of a
single modeling technique to exactly the sort of problem it is best able to
handle.
9. CHAC gives us not only a meticulous assembly of field studies on Mexican
cropping techniques-an assembly that could be useful for numerous other
models and purposes-but also an example of a modeling technique pushed
to its maximum through a series of ingenious mathematical innovations.
But the rigor, comprehensiveness, logic, accessibility, and testability with
which these things might have been accomplished has fallen short of the
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potential that is intrinsic to the tools of computer modeling. The tools do have
their faults, as the nine models occasionally iIlustrate. But the main problems
come from the way human beings, embedded in social structures, are using the
tools. We wiII have considerably more to say about that in the prescriptive part
of the book. First, we need to take on one last evaluative task-to assess
whether and how the models were actually used to solve problems in the real
world.
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CHAPTER 15
Implementation: Changing the World
A tremendous amount of time, money and ingenuity was expended in creating
the nine models described in this book. What was the return on that
investment? Have the models in our survey changed anything in the world?
Beyond employing modelers and using computer time and producing thick
reports, did the use of the modeling process have any effect on reality? If there
was an effect, was it an intended, deliberate one, or an accident? Did it make
things better or worse? And most important, can either modelers or clients do
anything to improve not only the quality of computer models, but the
effectiveness of their impact? Can whatever nuggets of truth that do come out
of computer modeling be implemented more usefully in the prediction, design,
or management of complex systems?
We will begin here with a quick summary of the implementation record of
the nine models, after a digression on the difficulty of reviewing
implementation records. We will discover that we do not know and can never
find out the total effects of these models on the world. The effects we can
discover cannot easily be judged either good or bad. However. we can see just
enough of what happened in these nine modeler-client-worJd systems to draw
some tentative conclusions.
The main conclusion is that few of the models produced exactly the results
they were intended to produce, but they did create some unintended and
sometimes surprising side effects. That is, modeling clearly has an impact on
the operation of social systems, but not an impact that is controlled or
especially intended by anyone, modeler, sponsor, or client. We will then raise
the question of why the process of modeling is apparently so difficult to aim.
We will provide some tentative answers, which will be developed into
prescriptions in the last part of this book.
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A. THE EVALUAnON OF MODELS AND OF POLICY:
A NECESSARY DIGRESSION
The literature is full of judgements about the usefulness of computer modeling.
The judgements seem to be of two types. On the one hand many people
observe an increasing number of solemn-looking, sharp-talking modelers
present near the seats of power; some ex-modelers have even moved into the
seats of power. Books and articles about models appear and, occasionally,
are widely read. Models are cited to prove a point, modelers are called to
testify in congresses and courts, and newspapers interview modelers for
pronouncements on this or that current event. Millions of dollars flow from
clients to modeling institutions. Those who view modeling through these
surface clues are likely to conclude that all those busy modelers must be having
a huge impact on policy, and this is generally viewed with alarm. Among the
viewers-with-alarm are many modelers, who are quite convinced that all other
modelers are insinuating themselves successfully into the policy process, and
who are not heartened by this trend.
On the other hand an even greater number of people, including some
modelers and most policymakers, agree that the surface bustle is there and
increasing, but believe that the modeling process has little actual effect on the
way important decisions are made. Very few modelers claim that their own
models have had significant impact, except when they are writing funding
proposals or posturing before other modelers. Clients say that modelers are
mildly tolerated, used as ways of postponing decisions, hired to reinforce a
conclusion already reached, or viewed as diverting court jesters, but they rarely
shape or influence an actual policy. These people agree that modeling has had
little or no effect, and they disagree about whether that is bad or good.
These judgements are based on an intuitive feel for the situation, usually
based on a small sample of actual modeling projects and a large desire to
believe that modeling is or is not important in the world. Like most judgements
people make in evaluating most social change efforts, they are formed quickly
and easily, and they reveal more about the judge than about what is being
judged. Evaluation of any political process, food stamps, zero-base-budgeting,
promotion of nuclear power, or commissioning a computer model, is a
slippery, tricky task. Before we attempt to do it for these nine models, we
would like to look at the task itself-to consider what things we would really
need to know about a model to assess its impact accurately.
Here is an idealized list of what we should include in a complete assessment
of a model's effect on reality.
1. The modelers' and clients' and evaluators' goals
Evaluation by definition involves comparison of actual results to some
standard or goal. However, there are so many goals floating around in any
human endeavour that no single one presents itself as the obvious measure by
which to judge a model. Confusion of goals is one of the chief causes of
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disagreement in policy evaluation. Each person in a modeling project has at
least one goal for it; the goals of different people need not (seldom do) agree.
The modeler, the sponsor, and the client may be trying to achieve disparate and
even conflicting purposes. Is a model a failure if it serves the modelers' and
sponsors' goals but not the clients'? Or the clients' and not the modelers'?
To complicate things further, most people have more than one goal. For
example there may be:
1. The stated goals-the ones listed in the research contract or the model
documentation; the ones mentioned when the model is described to
outsiders. (To make a planning tool for ministry X, to increase general
understanding of problem X, to reduce the cost of program X.)
2. The personal or institutional goals-rarely stated, but very important; the
immediate close-to-home results that each person is expecting from the
project. (To write a PhD thesis, to support one's graduate students, to
appease a boss who wants some action on the issue, to justify a budget
increase.) These goals are rarely stated, but with a little empathy one can
infer many of them.
3. The wild hopes and fears-the creeping thoughts in the back of one's mind
that form one's dreams and nightmares, not seriously believed, but subtly
influential in shaping how the project is done. (To be summoned to give a
personal briefing to the head of state, to avoid being the laughing-stock of
one's profession because of a stupid mathematical error, to work out a
methodology that will be used by everyone, to avoid giving advice that turns
out to be dead wrong, to win a Nobel Prize.) Wild hopes and fears are
seldom verbalized, even to oneself, and are hard to guess, but they are
there.
4. The life goals-the very basic, deep ideals and hopes about where one is
going, how one can make a difference, how this project is integrated with
one's values, one's loyalties and one's worldview. (To raise everyone's
awareness of the importance of population growth, to demonstrate that a
woman can be rational and hardheaded, to destroy class distinctions, to
show how a political scientist can contribute to economic analysis, to gain
some legitimacy for system dynamics.)
Of course only the stated goals are directly accessible to an outside evaluator
(and sometimes, as we have discovered, not even those-some models have no
clearly stated goals). The others must be inferred, and if this were not enough
of a tangle, the evaluator must also be aware of his or her own goals in all these
categories and how they affect the evaluation. For example, in our own view
the world has major problems, the present situation is intolerable, and great
changes are welcome and necessary. Therefore we automatically approve of
models that shake things up and suggest major changes, and we are less
interested in modelers who are only aiming at minor adjustments. Notice that
our bias leads us to compare the model's effect on the world to our standard,
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not to the modelers'. Watch for that throughout this chapter (we have tried to
restrain it until the end of the book, where we let it go full force and with due
warning).
2. The extent to which goals were reached
For those models with stated goals, this should be ascertainable. The SAHEL
study was to provide an input to aid policy to the Sahel. Did such a policy
appear and did it reflect the findings of the model? KASM was built as an
on-line planning tool for the Korean government. Was it ever used that way?
Did the World Bank follow CHAC's advice about whether to fund canal linings
or tubewells? These questions can be answered, at least qualitatively, by
looking at some process, person, law, or institution.
Quantitative assessment of the extent to which the model achieved stated
goals is far more difficult. How much of an input to a decision must a model
make to justify its creation? Is a useful planning tool one that is consulted daily,
yearly, or just once? Is a model used regularly for very small decisions more
successful than a model used once to shed some light on a major policy?
The extent to which unstated goals were reached is a matter of pure
speculation, since we cannot even be sure of the goals. We can see the effects of
the modeling projects, however, on the careers and institutions of modelers
and clients and therefore infer something about personal and institutional
goals.
3. The cost of reaching whatever goals were reached
Direct costs in terms of money, human effort, computer time, and travel are
measurable, though seldom mentioned in model documentation. Much more
difficult are opportunity costs and the possible costs of reaching the same goal
another way. What would have happened if the money and professional hours
spent on modeling had been devoted to some other purpose? How would the
decision or policy process have gone if there had been no formal modeling?
What results could have been obtained in two hours with a hand calculator?
Most of these questions of the 'what if?' sort can be answered only by indulging
in wild speculation or entrenched preconceptions.
4. The unintended, unforeseen impacts
As we shall see, this is a big category, containing both positive and negative
items. The positive side effects of a study are sometimes easy to see, especially
since modelers are eager to point them out. Scattered information can be
gathered and organized in a way that is useful to others beside the original
client. Data collection procedures can be improved. Related studies can be
stimulated, to copy, correct, or extend the initial one. A striking new idea can
percolate through a society, eventually transforming many decision processes.
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Modelers can become recognized for their astuteness and knowledge of the
system and put into policymaking positions themselves (modelers regard this as
a positive outcome).
On the negative side, impacts can be more subtle and hard to trace. A model
may dwell on accepted theories and available data and draw attention away
from crucial matters that do not fit conventional ways of looking. Successful
implementation of a short-term model may enhance a policymaker's tendency
toward short-term thinking, when only a long-term approach would be
effective. The existence of a modeling study may delay a decision that should
be made promptly, or may reinforce a decision that is totally wrong. The results
of the study or the way it is done may offend someone and create personal
enemies for the modeler or client, or for the field of modeling.
The task before us in assessing the impact of the nine models is something
like assessing, five years after they were written, the effect of Adam Smith's
The Wealth of Nations or Marx's Communist Manifesto or, perhaps more
accurately, some work of equal ambition that has now disappeared without a
trace. What we need is the ability to follow a social system for 20 or 100 years
with complete omniscience and with an understanding of how the system would
have gone without the modeling project. What we have, of course is far short of
that.
We are two people looking from one moment in time. We can see a few
results, both intended and unintended, ofthe models, but many have occurred,
if they did occur at all, in countries, cultures, and institutions far away from us,
both geographically and culturally. Where it looks like nothing happened, we
may not have waited long enough or looked in the right place.
Even the positive evidence we can find about what a model accomplished is
usually second- or third-hand, reported to us almost invariably by a source with
an axe to grind. We have had much more rapport with and co-operation from
modelers than from clients, and so our evidence is biased in the modelers'
favor. Our dependence on reports of others sometimes leaves us with
apparently simple 'facts' that are so contradictory we cannot know what to
believe. Consider, for example, the following descriptions of the SAHEL study
in Africa:
Sandy Rotival, the UNDP representative in Niger, calls the study an 'insult' to the
Nigerois and says, 'At the same time that this country was fighting for its survival,
MIT was carrying out a $2 million planning exercise and telling them how to
organize themselves. The government officials resented it, but considered it part of
the price they would have to pay for American aid. The graduate students MIT sent
to Niger know almost nothing about the country, and since they could not speak
French very well, they knew little more by the time they left. American AID
personnel, for whose benefit and enlightenment the study was supposedly being
written, had to take them around and interpret for them'.
Laura MacPherson, one of those AID employees, says that'A lot of bright-eyed,
overpaid graduate students and young professors came to Niger to learn about the
drought from people-us-who had only arrived in the country a few months
earlier. We had to waste a tremendous amount of time talking to them and
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interpreting for them ... '.
The head of AID's agriculture program in Niger, Jim Livingston, says, 'The
project must have been a vehicle for a graduate thesis. It did not come close to
fulfilling the contract, and at least a dozen glaring errors rendered it useless. AID
instructed me to throwaway the preliminary report and not to consult it.'
The MIT contract with AID was $1 million, not $2 million ... Most of the
government officials we interviewed were cognizant of organizational and
jurisdictional problems, and government officials in the seven departments we
interviewed in Niger were receptive to our efforts and welcomed the chance to
discuss the long-term prospects of their development plans.
Niger was visited by MIT's principal investigator and several other senior staff
members. Niger was visited after six months of intensive study, including briefings
in Washington, New York, Paris, and several field trips to countries including
Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Upper Volta, and Senegal ... Four of the five MIT people
who visited Niger spoke French fluently. At no time did any AID personnel
interpret for members of the MIT project.
The comments of Jim Livingston betray the underlying problem. The fact that
Mr Livingston made no effort to read the final report says little enough for his
initiative as head of AID's agriculture program in Niger.
The hallmark of a good bureaucrat is to do what he is told. In fact, Mr Livingston
was ... an unwitting dupe of an unofficial AID policy to discredit the MIT project
in order to bury the final report so that it could be later used in bits and pieces to
AID's advantage. 2
We are underlining the difficulties of evaluating model implementation not
to provide an excuse for ending this chapter abruptly here (though we seriously
considered doing so), but to establish a sufficiently humble and skeptical mood
for the job we are about to do. Past judgements about the effects of any social
interference, including computer models, have been too quickly and firmly
made. So little is understood about social policy, so few of the necessary facts
about any policy process can be assembled, so many information sources are
subjective and self-serving, that no perturbation of the social system, whether
computer-generated or not, can be fully traced and evaluated. It is because
social systems are so bewilderingly complex that mathematical models are
turned to in the first place.
B. THE IMPLEMENTATION RECORD - AS WE SEE IT
The nine models that are the subject of this book are a sample taken from the
leading edge of social-system modeling. They are not standard shipping-route
optimization models used daily in the operations department of a large
industry, nor are they trouble-shooting models taken on by a consulting firm to
solve some nagging organizational problem. 3 These models are addressing the
long-term problems of the economic development of entire nations, or they are
trying to provide short-term predictions and guidance for decision-making at
the national level. They take on issues in the arena of the public sector and of
high-level politics. No decision-making arena needs a systems viewpoint more
than this one, but no arena contains more obstacles to admitting such a
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viewpoint. These models have been tested in the toughest of all possible
implementation environments.
In Part III we included the implementation history, insofar as we know it, of
each model. Rather than repeat these histories, we recommend that the reader
go back over just those sections of Part III. Here we will confine ourselves to
sweeping generalizations.
The nine models certainly support the contention that model-making has an
effect in the world. Like the expanding circle of ripples from a stone thrown
into a pond, waves of influence have radiated out from each modeling project,
changing people's ideas, decisions, occupations, and reputations. Some of the
waves damped down sooner than others, some expanded beyond our range of
vision, others cut across each other in complicated patterns. TEMPO spawned
LTSM and BACHUE. Ridker borrowed a model from Almon and then
another from House. A Nigerian model became a Korean model and then
inspired a Common Market model and an international trade model. Each of
the nine models was prominent enough in the worlds of policy or modeling to
come to our attention and to provide lessons about modeling for this book.
Three of the models, KASM, MexicoV, and CHAC, were used by policy
clients roughly as their makers intended them to be used, at least for a short
time. These are the models in our survey with the most limited stated purposes
and the shortest time horizons. Their stated goals are directed toward the
detailed-implementation end of the policy spectrum. They are based on the
operating paradigms and criteria for success already familiar in the policy
world. The modelers were in relatively close contact with the clients
throughout the development of the model, and they put significant attention to
communicating, promoting, and institutionalizing their work. However,
KASM and CHAC never were embraced as general planning tools used in an
on-going way, as their makers had hoped, and as far as we can tell, when their
makers and promoters left, they fell into disuse.
TEMPO pleased its USAID sponsor very much, but its effect on its Third
World clients is a subject of controversy. This model is an instrument for
conveying a strong view from one culture to another. The implementation task
is inherently very difficult. The TEMPO staff put much more effort into
simplifying the message and transmitting it effectively than into the formation
of the model itself, and according to at least some onlookers, what they did
worked.
LTSM and BACHUE were received with some indifference by their clients.
They are policy-formulation models, containing a few revolutionary new
messages hidden within the concepts and methods of conventional wisdom.
They were made in one place for implementation in another and much more
effort went into modeling than into communication. (That is more true of
LTSM than of BACHUE, but for BACHUE there is much more to
communicate.) These models may have changed some minds, certainly
educated the people who made them. but they were not actively or regularly
consulted at high levels of government. as their modelers had hoped.
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The three longest-term models, SAHEL, Rtf, and SOS, produced messages
that questioned current policy and suggested whole new ways of looking at
things. They were also made at some distance from the intended point of
implementation (in the case of SOS there was no intended point), and the
clients were not at all involved in the modeling process. The clients actively
dumped these models and in the case of SAHEL and Rtf tried to suppress
communication of their findings. In all three cases the modelers finally came to
view the general public as their clients and wrote articles and editorials to
communicate their findings.
Looking just at the stated goals and the direct effects of the models, we could
label KASM, MexicoV, CHAC, and TEMPO as partial implementation
successes and all the others as failures. If we then try to find the simple,
universal formula that accounts for these successes and failures we will have a
difficult time.
Documentation, for example, is vital for scientific purposes but seems to
have little to do with implementation. CHAC was used roughly as it was
intended, but it was never adequately documented. MexicoV was documented
beautifully and also well used. KASM was described in writing only after its
period of greatest impact; SAHEL was always clear and accessible and never
used.
Models made in academic institutions were both effective (Mexico V,
KASM) and ineffective (SAHEL) in accomplishing their stated goals, and the
same can be said for in-house models (effective-CHAC, ineffective-SOS) or
models made by professional consultants (effective-TEMPO,
ineffective-Rtf). Both complex and simple models have found favor
(complex-CHAC, simple-TEMPO) and disfavor (complex-BACHUE,
simple-SAHEL). No particular modeling technique seems to bring an
inherent advantage in implementation, nor does any particular size of budget
or type of client.
One would think that promptness would be important, since the policy world
moves at a distinctly faster pace than the world of scholars and analysts. But
Ridker and Picardi both met rigid one-year deadlines with indifferent
implementation success, while the TEMPO and KASM models dragged on for
years with at least partial success. CHAC was done rather quickly and
implemented, BACHUE took years and was not implemented.
But our judgement so far is based only on success in stated goals, which is a
narrow, rigid definition of success. The tasks the modelers chose vary
enormously in difficulty. It was one thing to convince the World Bank that
tubewells are a more profitable investment than canal linings, using the bank's
own assumptions about how economic systems work and its standard criteria
for profitability. It would have been an achievement of a different order of
magnitude to get USAID officials to extend their time horizon to 200 years,
think in feedback loops, adopt ecological stability as a dominant value, and
admit that their past aid expenditures in the Sahel had been counterproductive.
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Picardi would have had to do more than adopt the tactics of the CHAC team to
have achieved his goal.
If we expand our view to include personal and institutional goals, all of the
modelers and most clients did very well indeed. Beltran del Rio and Picardi got
their doctorates. MSU paid its graduate students and its overhead expenses.
USAID justified an expanded Sahel budget. CHAC was awarded a prestigious
prize in the field of operations research. The Korean Ministry of Agriculture
and Fisheries improved its database and analytical capabilities. MIT kept many
people employed for a year, the Presidential Commission received a thick,
authoritative report, the Bank of Mexico got some forecasts that were probably
as good as any others available.
All the modelers are still professionally active, indeed thriving. Most have
moved up to bigger projects with better funding, and some have even entered
the hallowed halls of policymaking. They claim that their understanding and
subsequent analyses have benefitted from lessons learned in doing these nine
models. Nearly all the models sired living progeny, similar studies carrying on a
method, a part of a model, or a central question. Analysts in many different
parts of the world talk about 'a CHAC-type model', or 'updating TEMPO'.
Each model generated, on the average, a set of written materials stacked one
foot high, not counting computer output. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
briefings, testimonies, conference papers, and workshops were given to spread
the ideas and the findings from the models. None of the models generated an
earth-shaking new idea, but many of them picked up new ideas in the air, made
them precise, consistent, and concrete, and weighted them with the authority
of computer code and prestigious institutions. Who knows how many minds
were struck by TEMPO's message that population growth can inhibit economic
growth? Surely many people read and heeded Picardi's analysis of the Sahel
commons, or the U.S. Population Commission's statement that resources will
be adequate and pollution controllable, or the BACHUE team's plea for
economic equity. All the models pointed out the interconnectedness of
apparently separate things, and reminded society of how partial everyday
understanding is.
On the other hand, none of the modelers appears to have succeeded very
well in achieving what we might infer were life goals. There is still plenty of
misery, poverty, and industrial chaos in the world. None of the systems with
which the models deal (Sahelian nomads, the U.S. economy, the nations of
Egypt, the Philippines, Mexico, etc.) seem to be working with notable
smoothness or efficiency, by anyone's standards. Korean agriculture is
thriving, but probably not because of KASM. It would be difficult to argue that
any of the systems addressed by the models are behaving measurably
differently than they would have behaved had the models never been made.
None of the modelers has won a Nobel Prize or been asked to take the helm of
any major political entity. None of their names is a household word.
In summary, there seem to be several grand conclusions that leap out at us as
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two evaluators, writing from our own point of view at this time in history.
1. The models had many different effects that we can see and probably even
more that we cannot see.
2. The effects that we can see correspond only occasionally and partially to
the stated goals of the modelers, sponsors, and clients.
3. The personal and institutional goals, so far as we can guess them, seem to
have been met-at least no person or institution seems to have been hurt by
association with the modeling projects.
4. Wild hopes and fears probably did not materialize-nothing very wild
happened at all.
5. The models improved or changed the visible functioning of the world, only
marginally, if at all, even the functioning of the parts of the world the models
were directed toward.
6. The main impact was on a vital but unmeasurable part of the system: the
world of ideas. The models legitimated, publicized, opposed, or made
concrete some major old or new ways of thinking about the systems we live
in. They enhanced the mental models of the modelers. They were clear
reminders that the world is complex. They contributed to the debate; they
did not end it.
C. SOME HYPOTHESES
Theories about why models do not regularly or predictably achieve the stated
goals of their makers, much less change the world, are easy to find. The
modeling literature, classroom lectures, conference workshops, and
professional gossip are full of them. If we ignore the subtleties of the discussion
and look for the essence, we can find six basic hypotheses. We state them here
in their most extreme and blunt form, to clarify them and to keep everyone
awake.
1. Policymakers as boors
Making models for politicians is casting pearls before swine. The policy world is
irrational or even systematically corrupt. Clients just want to hear what they
already think; if you tell them anything else, they will force you to distort it or
else fire you. Even well-meaning bureaucrats are locked into an overwhelming
system of non-functional subdivisions and short-term parochial interests.
There is no room in that system for a long-term, cross-disciplinary, whole
system viewpoint. The tool is terrific, but the world is not ready for it.
Advice to modelers: You have three options:
1. Prostitute yourself.
2. Avoid the politicians, make the general public your audience and learn to
exist on very little money.
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3. Go into a more promising profession.
Advice to clients: Be a hero, fight the system, defend modeling and create new
niches for it. If this causes you to lose your job, that job was not worth
having. Go into a more promising profession.
2. Modelers as clowns
Modelers are ignored because they deserve to be. They are starry-eyed
idealists with no understanding of how the world really works. They create
mathematical monsters that require continuous feeding with zillions of
senseless numbers and large flows of money. They never address vital issues.
Modelers talk a fancy language that makes everyone else feel inferior, but
when you press them for a translation, they never tell you anything you did not
already know. By the time they finish studying something, no one else cares
about it any more. The tool is awkward and useless, an expensive toy but not a
serious policy instrument.
Advice to modelers: Speak plainly, listen to someone else now and then, spend
some time in the policy world so you learn how things really are. Meet
deadlines. Work on your client's problems, not your own. Stop being so
pretentious. If you cannot do those things, go into a more promising
profession.
Advice to clients: If you must deal with modelers, treat them like children. Do
not expect much of them, and keep them firmly in line. Tell them exactly
what is expected of them, make them report back regularly, be sure they're
working on your problem, cancel the contract if a deadline is missed or a
word of jargon is spoken. Audit their accounts carefully.
3. Supermodeler
It takes a remarkable set of scientific and technical abilities just to make a good
model. It takes a different set of skills, in communication and interpersonal
relations, to sell that model and see that it is used properly. Only very
extraordinary people are born with all these skills. If you are not born with
them, you can never acquire them. The tool is just too tricky to be used by
ordinary people.
Advice to modelers: Be honest: Do you have what it takes? Are you a
supermodeler? If not, go into a more promising profession. Or, if you have
some of the qualities necessary for excellent modeling, team up with people
whose abilities compliment yours.
Advice to clients: Hire only supermodelers or superteams.
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4. The two cultures
Modelers and clients live in totally different worlds, see different things,
respond to different pressures. In each world are basically honest and gifted
people trying to do a good job. Each side has useful insights into policy; each
can benefit from working with the other. The main problem is learning to
communicate from each world to the other. We are not talking about a tool, we
are talking about a subtle process of human communication.
Advice to both modelers and clients: Be patient. Listen carefully. Empathize
with the other side and respect its needs and problems. Have a beer together.
Go back and forth between the two worlds so you can experience both.
Educate policymakers in modeling techniques, or hire modelers to in-house
policy positions, or find a good translator who can interpret each side to the
other.
5. The learning curve
Computers have been around for only 40 years, and social-system modeling has
been seriously attempted for only a decade or so. Modelers have all they can do
to work out the technical and scientific side of their job. Clients have not yet
learned to use this powerful tool. Both sides are learning quickly, but a
revolutionary social technology like this one cannot be expected to develop
instantly or smoothly. After all, medicine was practiced for hundreds of years
before its cure-kill ratio began to exceed 1.0. Especially if modeling is a subtle
process of human interaction, not a tool, it will take time to develop.
Advice to modelers and clients: Be patient. Keep trying. Learn from your
mistakes and communicate your knowledge to others. Look for little tricks
and techniques that will hasten the learning process. Be bold. Nothing
ventured, nothing learned.
6. No problem
The only trouble with modeling is that most people lie about why it is being
done. The grand statements about revising policy and improving
understanding are just smokescreens to gain public acceptance and funding.
The real objectives are the personal and institutional goals of the participants,
and those goals are being achieved brilliantly. Modelers get to play with their
equations, clients bask in the scientific aura of the computer. Everyone enjoys
the game. In the few cases where modelers and clients have been truly intent on
solving a policy problem, the problem has been solved and the solution
implemented. The methods, communications, abilities of modelers,
intelligence of clients are all capable of doing the job. Both modelers and
clients can get whatever they want from the modeling process. So far, all they
have wanted was to make a model.
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Advice to both modelers and clients: You're doing fine. Be sure you express
your real goals clearly, at least to yourselves, because those goals, even if
only subconscious, are the ones that will be realized. The rest of the world
would benefit if you could bend those goals more in the direction of solving
social problems.
Following normal-science procedures, we would now muster evidence to
prove any or all of the above hypotheses. That would not be difficult to do.
Each of them captures part of the truth. The nine case-study models illustrate
all of them to some extent. There are boorish clients in the world, and clownish
modelers. There are gulfs between the two worlds, and lessons to be learned.
Probably every person in the field views it from each of these hypotheses at
different times and in different situations.
If we examine these theories with an eye to di:Jproof, we find them all close to
unfalsifiable. We have no independent way to measure a modeler's superman
qualities, or the intrinsic corruptness of a client, or the modeler/client
system's real intent. We can easily blame an implementation failure on
insufficient learning or weak wills or the modeler/client communication gap,
and thereby explain everything and nothing. In fact, these theories are not
scientific hypotheses at all; they are selective filterings of the truth, put forward
to justify past results.
A more fruitful path would be to ask not which hypothesis is true, but which
is potent in the sense of producing desired results. Social systems, unlike
natural systems, are affected by hypotheses-the hypotheses are themselves a
part of the system. These six ways of looking at the modeling/policy system
are not only explanations but also to some extent causes, shapers of reality,
self-fulfilling prophecies. Some of them can be immediately dismissed as
barren and unhelpful.
Consider, for instance, the intrinsic unworkability of a relationship between
a modeler operating with hypothesis 1 (clients are boors) and a client with
hypothesis 2 (modelers are clowns). If a modeling project even got started, it
might go something like this:
Modeler
Here I am, ready to bring the light of
systems analysis to the beclouded,
dismal world of policy.
I am going to make a model to show
you why policy X is best.
Client
Here comes another one of those
pointy-headed modelers.
I already like policy X. Maybe you
could make a model to sell policy X to
agency Y. They're always blocking
me, and they like this computer stuff.
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This guy is a jerk, but I really need a
contract to keep my staff together.
I will need a staffof 20, 6,000 hours
of CPU time, and $100,000 for travel
and overhead.
Now I am going off to make the
model. You won't understand this
part, so I'll just deliver the report in
January.
(time passes)
Sorry for the delay-we had software
problems, and we had to wait for the
new quarterly economic accounts,
and to tell the truth, the model didn't
compile until last Thursday.
Notice that in this case it has been
necessary to impose restrictions on
the market response, which has
forced the aggregate value of
production to differ significantly from
its full equilibrium level along the
unrestricted response surface.
The upshot of it all is that policy X is
not as beneficial as we thought. In
fact, it's counterproductive.
If they were going to ignore us, why
did they hire us in the first place?
Policymakers are impossible boors.
I need all the help I can get pushing
policy X.
Well, at least that will justify my
budget increase request. Can you
spend it all in this coming year?
Good, don't bother me until then.
What did you say your name was?
Getting plain language from a
modeler is like getting blood from a
turnip.
Garbage in, garbage out.
I knew this would never work. Why
did I hire them in the first place?
Modelers are irresponsible clowns.
And so both initial hypotheses are strengthened. The only result ofthe whole
effort is that both modeler and client get to be right about each other's
deficiencies.
'Policymakers are boors' and 'modelers are clowns' can be eliminated as
fruitful hypotheses. The 'supermodeler' theory is also basically nihilistic and
unconstructive. It feeds elitism, it fails to specify any selection mechanism for
identifying supermodelers, and it leaves no room for improvement-no hope
for merely mortal modelers to become super.
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So we are left with three hypotheses-'learning curve', 'two cultures', and
'no problem'. The 'learning curve' and 'two cultures' theories (which are not
very different from one another) suggest that there are techniques and
guidelines one might look for to hasten the learning process and to bridge the
worlds of policy and modeling. (We will list some of these guidelines in the next
section.) The 'no problem' analysis is cynical as we have stated it--everyone is
just trying to satisfy narrow, personal goals. But it can be inverted into a
positive hypothesis-modeling can already be used effectively to help complex
systems perform better. Modelers and clients can achieve just about any goal
they choose. The main trouble so far has been the expectation that modeling
cannot be very useful in solving real problems.
Most important, all three theories remind us that useful modeling, like useful
policymaking and, indeed, any other creative and serviceable human activity,
is an on-going, ever-changing experimental process, which can always be
improved.
So now it is time to talk about improvement.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. T. Clarke, The Last Caravan, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, p. 182,1977.
2. A. C. Picardi, letter to T. Clarke, May 4,1978.
3. For examples of the successes and failures of operations-level modeling, see M.
Greenberger, M. D. Crenson, and B. L. Crissey, Models in the Policy Process, New
York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1976.

PART V
Prescriptions
The most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the
objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge of
these laws actively to change the world.
Mao Tse Tung
On Practice
When a field that occupies hundreds of highly-trained individuals, that
disburses millions of dollars of public money, and that delivers authoritative
statements about matters of political concern operates for years below its
potential, people notice. Furthermore, people begin to come up with all sorts
of advice about how to improve matters. The advice ranges from 'forget the
whole effort' to 'fund and support this promising effort so that it can
demonstrate its real potential'. Here we collect, sort through, organize, and
comment on the many prescriptions the field of social-system analysis has
accumulated for itself.
Chapter 16 is a compendium of the suggestions for improvement that the
analysts themselves have come up with. It contains a good deal of excellent
advice, which, if the analysts would actually take it, would probably
transform the usefulness, efficiency, accuracy, insight, and implementation
success of the field. Unfortunately, the striking characteristic of the practices
advocated in this chapter is that modelers say them, but rarely do them.
In Chapter 17 we look more deeply into this interesting phenomenon of
excellent advice that nobody follows. We probe the philosophical base of the
very idea of social-system modeling in order to see what deep social beliefs
and self-images hold social-system modeling in such a relatively impotent
state. What we uncover raises questions not only about society's shared
beliefs about computers and modeling, but also beliefs about science, social
science, and policymaking-and therefore about society itself.
Any examination of the paradigmatic base of a profession, much less a
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whole society, is a dangerous exercise. Exactly to the extent that it is
successful in touching and questioning the unexamined base of a society's
self-image, it can generate bewilderment, resistance, outrage, and rejection.
These reactions have to be evoked and withstood if any real change is to take
place, either in the practice of a profession or in the progress of a society. We
are strengthened in our attempt to get to the very bottom of the social system
of modeling by the fact that others are searching there too--many of whom
we quote in Chapter 17. The awakening profession of social-system modeling
is already undertaking its own self-examination and is, we think, strong
enough to use whatever it discovers not for its own invalidation, but for its
own transformation.
CHAPTER 16
An Inventory of Suggestions for
Improvement
Modelers know very well that the current state of modeling could be better.
Dozens of them have written cogent articles and books deploring various
practices and making constructive suggestions for change. We have compiled
here a list of the major complaints and suggestions that we have been able to
glean from the voluminous literature of model criticism. We shall embellish the
list with numerous direct quotations, because the modelers' own words express
better than our paraphrasing could the frustration, uncertainty, and urgency
many of them feel. Where we could not resist, we have added our own
comments to the list (identified by parentheses around them). The list is rather
long, so we will use little space justifying each item on it. Most items have been
amply illustrated by the nine models that are the focus of this book.
For organizational clarity we have aggregated the complaints and
suggestions about modeling into three categories:
1. Knowledge problems-difficulties with the theories, data, and concepts that
computer modelers have to work with.
2. Institutional problems that arise from the way modeling is funded, housed,
and received by the outside world.
3. Practice problems generated by the everyday activities of the modelers
themselves.
Many of the items in this inventory are controversial and some are
contradictory. We have tried to indicate the places where there is clear
disagreement within the profession. We expect that the list itself would
generate heated discussion within any group of modelers about the worth and
priority of each suggestion. We ourselves do not endorse all the suggestions, as
we will make clear later. The purpose of including this list at all is not to put
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forth a manifesto of what should be done, but to indicate the state of thinking
within the field of modeling about how modeling practice can be improved.
A.KNOWLEDGEPROBLEMS
Complaint: Data are inadequate
As more complex systems are addressed and as the time dimension of
decision-making is extended into the future, data become a major limiting factor. I
Problems presented by both census and operational data are that models demand
higher levels of accuracy than one has come to expect from census data, and that
operational data are rarely collected in standard units, for comparable areas, at
comparable times, etc., even within the same city, to say nothing of between
cities. 2
Suggestions for improvement:
1. Governments, businesses, universItIes, or research institutes should
assemble bigger, more standardized data bases.
'Data, data everywhere but not an item to trust.' Under the pressure of wanting
to know more and more about our society and because of the seeming ability of
our science and scientists to absorb the information and translate it into usable
form, data collection activities have increased steadily for decades. The
problem with these mounds of data is that they often cannot be used together
since they are not calibrated or even documented. Until standards are set in the
data collection area, this issue will continue.3
But on the other side:
Funding of data banks should be carefully evaluated in light of the United
States' experience which indicates that exhaustive data fathering without a
specific problem or objective in mind is largely inefficient.
2. Model funders and modelers should recognize the necessity of allocating
more resources to data gathering within each modeling effort.
One outstanding feature which runs throughout all [large-scale modeling]
efforts is the level of resources typically devoted to the collection of data and
preparation of this data for use in analysis. It has been the experience of this
consultant, for example, that a minimum of20% of the cost of applying land use
models will be directly associated with data collection, while in the case of standard
travel analyses 45% to 50% of the cost is likely to be incurred before any real
analytical efforts can be made. The nature of these data requirements severely
limits the range of situations to which models may be applied. Only when a
major study is undertaken or when there is clearly an on-going need for
analytical capability, will the level of resources available be adequate to support
an application of models requiring large input data bases. 5
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3. Modelers, social scientists, or mathematicians should invent new methods
for signalling or recovering from data insufficiencies.
I (believe) that the fact that some social mechanism is difficult to model is no
valid excuse for ignoring it altogether, because this amounts to introducing the
assumption that the mechanism has no influence whatsoever. Almost any
educated conjecture about such a mechanism seems to be better than ignoring
it. However, this does not necessarily mean that the best procedure is to hide
such a conjecture away in a computer model algorithm and to act as if the
uncertainties no longer exist ...
As one possibility I would suggest the use of flags to signal unusual conditions
during simulations ... During the model construction phase, one would not
attempt to make any model of hard-to-quantify, unquantifiable, or ill-known
interrelations, but only to specify under what conditions these might come into
play, thus specifying appropriate flags instead of dubious causal interrelations.
During subsequent simulations, if, and only if, a flag is to be waved, the
situation and the circumstances will have to be studied more closely in a variety
of ways unrestricted by the paradigm of quantitative modeling. 6
4. Modelers should use sampling and surveying techniques especially designed
for the purpose of each model.
Sampling enables data to be collected with a particular problem in mind, while
still maintaining a desired level of precision. In fact, some authorities believe
that the 'only known technique for gathering data at reasonable cost is a
scientifically designed and executed sample survey'. 7
5. Modelers should document more carefully data used within each model, so
that they can at least build on each other's data accumulation efforts.
Problems with data are bad enough without having to reinvent the wheel. We
should not only support each other by sharing what data we have unearthed, we
should also perhaps clarify where we have rejected unacceptable data or
searched to no avail, to save each other some digging.88
6. Modelers should use whatever information is available, including
qualitative and intuitive information.
If, in order to provide answers for the future, we require information about the
past that is not directly available, an informed guess concerning the past is still
likely to improve our perception of the future. Hence the absence of formal data
about any element in a system should not lead to omission of an estimate for that
element or to the abandonment of the system. Such a negative approach,
carried to its logical conclusions. would lead to the abandonment of most-
some might say all-social science research. This is not to understate the
problem of inadequate and inaccurate data that plagues social scientists. But it
is hardly a reason for ceasing to try to organize what information we have into a
coherent framework. 9
7. Modelers should use mode!s to test sensitivity to variations in uncertain
parameters, in order find out which data are most critically needed.
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With respect to lack of data and/or knowledge of relations, the essential point is
to admit that, with or without models, every society has to take decisions
involving these factors. In this sense, besides experts' judgements for defining
plausible relations, it is important to study deeply the model sensitivity with
regard to these variables and to present a spectrum of runs under different
hypotheses, covering the range of their variation. 10
Complaint: Social theories are inadequate
We assumed that demographers would have developed a causal model to account
for temporal changes in age-specific birth rates, economists would have developed
models explaining business cycles, transportation engineering would have models
to account for energy consumption per person per year ... , and epidemiologists
would have developed models to account for age-specific mortality rates as
functions of pollutant concentrations ... We expected that the only tasks facing
systems modelers would be to discover these models as off-the-shelf immediately
usable items ... We discovered that the submodels we needed from the specialist
disciplines were simply not available ... 11
Suggestions for improvement
Modelers should be sources of theory, not mechanical assemblers of other
people's theories.
If modelers are forced to wait for theory to be developed by other scientists, the
time required for model development will increase. This problem may be resolved
by encouraging modelers to stimulate and guide other groups in the scientific
community to develop the theory necessary for model development. This is all the
more appropriate since the ability of the model development process to identify
gaps in theoretical knowledge is a widely recognized one which could be better
exploited. 12
Complaint: Modeling tools and methods are inadequate
An attack on the problems of air pollution, urban renewal, vocational
rehabilitation, or criminal justice involves investigating a 'system' that has grown
without conscious design, the goals of which may be obscure and conflicting, and
doing this in a situation in which authority may be diffuse, overlapping, and
possessing different sets of goals. Data collection is difficult; the act of investigation
may even bias the data. Linear programming, queueing theory, statistics, and the
computer are still enormously useful here, but this is usually true for segments of
the problem and not for the central question. 13
Suggestions for improvement
Modelers should think more and wield tools less.
In disciplines with a long intellectual tradition, the introduction of new tools usually
opens up lines of research that were previously inaccessible. In newer fields, on the
other hand, we often witness the phenomenon of "new toolism", a disease to which
operations researchers and systems analysts seem to be particularly predisposed.
Those affected by this disease "come possessed of and by new tools ... and they
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look earnestly for a problem to which one of these tools might conceivably
apply.,,14
B. INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
Complaint: Funding for modeling is inadequate and misapplied. It is too
irregular, too tied to short-term political needs, trying to buy too much for too
little. The expectations offunders are inflated.
Typically, respectable but hopelessly inadequate amounts of money (in relation to
the goals of the project) are awarded to conduct a large-scale, totally innovative
research program of great complexity on a strictly 'crash' basis, with the further
proviso that public policy should be demonstrably and positively affected by the
time that grant is terminated or soon thereafter ... Those staff members who do
reveal themselves as having the capability to be productive in such an environment
will soon be confronted with tremendous incentives to leave because of the
uncertainty of future funding and because of the great demand for their services in
other, more stable institutional settings. IS
Suggestions for improvement
1. Governments, businesses, and foundations should increase their total
budgets for modeling, and especially for building up a sustained effort to
accumulate, house, and update models.
There must be support for sustained modeling endeavours so that, over a period
of time, there are maintained and available a number of well-understood,
well-respected models that can be applied solely or in combination to a wide
variety of policy issues. We would not have these models housed and cared for
in a government-controlled model shop, but in universities, research centers,
and especially mediating institutions that form bridges between the research
and political worlds. The models would be alive and continuing in the sense that
they would be used repeatedly, kept up-to-date, and modelified as needed. In
effect, they would become institutionalized. 16
2. Model funders should emphasize basic, not applied, research.
Basic research and knowledge is lacking. The majority of the MSGs (models,
simulations, and games) sampled are living off a very slender intellectual
investment in fundamental knowledge ... The 'image' of research needs
refurbishment among funders and builders in the professional community.
Research appears to be so stigmatized that one can scarcely acknowledge
sponsorship of a pure research project without bracing for criticism. The need
for basic research is so critical that if no other funding were available, we would
favor a plan to reduce by a significant proportion all current expenditures for
MSGs and to use the saving for basic research. 17
3. Policymakers should educate themselves about modeling and have more
realistic expectations.
Policymakers need to become better informed about models and more realistic
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about what models can and cannot do. They must be more willing to accept their
own part of the responsibility for the disappointments, and they must take the lead
in seeing to it that a healthier environment for policy modeling is created. HI
4. Modelers should make models that require less support.
Instead of having large teams working on a 'crash' basis, over a very few years,
with a rented computer, on very complex data-rich models, without a
permanent organization, without long-term funding, and without adequate
budgets for publicizing research findings, we should have small teams (of about
four persons) working on a steady basis, over many years, with a purchased
computer, on simple process-oriented models (with minimum data banks), with
a permanent organization, with long-term funding, and with most of the budget
devoted to communicating research findings to policymakers and the public in
language they will understand. 19
Complaint: Academic structures discriminate against systems analysis and
interdisciplinary problem-oriented research.
An adequate reward and accountability system for faculty engaged in
interdisciplinary work has not been devised by most universities, and most faculty
participate (in such work) at the risk of professional advancement. 2o
Suggestions for improvement
Universities and agencies that fund academic research should establish reward
structures and departments for interdisciplinary research and teaching in
systems analysis.
(Recommendations to the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering.) A study should be undertaken to determine how the
university reward system can be made more conducive to interdisciplinary and
applications-oriented research. The issues of academic advancement and monetary
and professional compensation for the risks associated with such activities should
be examined. Institutional mechanisms to encourage interdisciplinary and applied
research should be formulated. 21
C. PRACTICE PROBLEMS
Complaint: Models are overcomplicated
Although there are dangers in oversimplifying the model, it generally pays to be
simple. Complicated formulas, or relationships so involved that it is impractical to
reduce them to a single expression, are likely to convey no meaning at all, while a
simple relationship may be understood. A major error may invalidate the more
complicated expression, and yet, in the general complexity of the formulation, pass
unnoticed. In uncomplicated expressions, serious error is apt to become obvious
long before the computation is complete, because the relationships may be simple
enough to reveal whether or not the behavior of the model is going to be reasonably
in accord with the intuition. The most convincing analysis is one which the
non-technician can think through. 22
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It is a trait of modelers and nonmodelers alike to throw in everything at once when
they do not understand a problem; odds are that somewhere in the jumble are the
parts to the explanation. The trouble is, nothing is learned from such an exercise,
and future problems receive the same treatment. 23
The evident preference for large, all-machine models and simulations is
questionable on several grounds ... Large models are usually complicated,
expensive to build and use, take extended periods to operate and interpret, and are
the least scientifically defensible. They quickly begin to suffer from the
disorganization created by changes in purpose and personnel, bad documentation,
gaps in l0,pic, and problems of database preparation, maintenance, and
validation. 2
Suggestions for improvement
1. Funders should resist financing large models.
We recommend that standards for approving the construction of large-scale
MSGs be much more stringent than for smaller projects. We believe that
large-scale MSGs tend to lack the capability of handling scenarios and other
hard-to-quantify elements. Funds would be better spent on the basic research to
acquire that capability than on the premature construction of large programs. 25
2. Modelers should define carefully the exact problem they are studying and
use that problem definition to simplify the model.
It is a serious pitfall to attempt to set up a model that treats every aspect of a
complex problem simultaneously. What can happen is that the analyst finds
himself criticized because the model he has selected has left out various facets of
the situation being investigated. He is vulnerable to these criticisms if he doesn't
realize (that) ... the question being asked, as well as the process being
represented, must determine the model. Without attention to the question, he
has no rule for guidance as to what to accept or reject; he has no real goals in
view and no way to decide what is important and relevant. He can answer
criticism only by making the model bigger and more complicated. 26
We have found the following study process to be effective ... A substantial
fraction (up to Y4) of the project period is spent in defining the problem on the
presumption that no matter how good the analysis, the results will be of little
importance if the problem is irrelevant. The decisive choice of problem focus
should not be made haphazardly prior to the study, but be an important part of
the project. 27
3. Modelers should approach complex problems from the top down, rather
than assembling pieces from the bottom up.
Often the top-down approach is a good way to start simple. The top-down
process starts with representations of the market, company operations, and so
forth, joined together in a very rough aggregate, the kind of broad-brush picture
seen from the top of the company. Later, if more detail is required, some
variables can be disaggregated and the description enriched. By using this
approach, the planner has a working model at all points--a great advantage.
The reverse-the bottom-up approach-requires tedious acquisition of data
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and modeling by product line, division, market area, and so on ... and ultimately
combining these to reflect the corporate picture. But the working model emerges
quite slowly; it fre~uently ends up being difficult to debug and too detailed for the
purposes intended. 8
The predominant modeling strategy is to decompose the problem into a set of
subsystems, and further reduce each subsystem into its components until each
component is recognized as a segment of some discipline that can be understood by
an individual. Once all segments are understood by their respective disciplines, the
pieces of the model can be integrated upward and the total model used for analysis.
The decomposition strategy has a tendency not to address the primary issue, since
'adequate understanding' is never achieved and models never are integrated. 29
Complaint: Models do not correspond sufficiently with the real world.
Modelers omit many important real-world factors.
Contrary to being an instrument of innovation, the systems approach is essentially
reactionary. By defining problems in terms accessible to the tools, systems analysis
has encouraged systematic neglect of facets and variables which could be crucial in
both their generation and amelioration. In most social problems, even those
attributable in large part to technology, aspects amenable to technical treatment
are likely to be less important than those which are culture-bound, value-laden,
and honeycombed with a political power network. 30
Suggestions for improvement
1. Modelers should focus more on the problem and what is relevant to it than
on what is measurable or what can be accommodated within any particular
technique.
It is easy for an analyst to become more interested in the model than in the
problem itself ... A great pitfall of ~uantitativeanalysis is to quantify and model
what we can, not what is relevant. 3
2. Modelers should be wary of inappropriate substitutions of measured
quantities for difficult to measure ones.
Ultimate goals tend to be obscure and intangible. The most common pitfall is to
substitute something that can be measured, no matter how appropriate. Thus
we find cost used to measure effectiveness (expenditures per pupil, for example,
used to measure the effectiveness of public school education), the response time
used to measure the effectiveness of ambulance service for health care, and the
rise in the ~rice of narcotics to measure effectiveness of ways to reduce flow of
narcotics. 3
3. Modelers should be open to a variety of structural hypotheses. They should
test not only alternate parameters, but alternate model structures.
The modelers can best contribute to the task of 'getting the problem right' if he is
prepared to work with many alternative models rather than with a single model
and a set of 'data'. Insistence on a plurality of model structures should not
be regarded as a demand for a preliminary phase in the modeling process which
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will later be replaced by a 'correct' model structure. Structural pluralism must
be an essential feature of any modeling exercise which claims to improve our ability
to deal with real-world problems ... However closely a forecasting model seems to
reproduce a historical situation, however obvious the assumptions embodied within
the model, and however necessary those assumptions seem to be to both the users
and the constructors of a model, its adequacy as a basis for forecasting can be
asserted only after it has been confronted with alternative models. 33
Complaint: Modelers do not build on each other's work. There is no scientific
accumulation of experience and wisdom because such experience is not
recorded or transferred to others or subjected to open criticism.
The lack of documentation in the two cases is shocking. In large part
documentation of the projects was ignored in the headlong rush to get an
'operational' model. Progress is unnecessarily impeded by the lax or non-existent
account of the problem-solving process. How many times must we reinvent the
wheel?34
Documentation is one of the most neglected aspects of modeling and simulation,
partly because it is largely non-creative and therefore uninteresting ... Most
workers find documentation distasteful because it is part of the cleanup
operation. 35
Professional standards for model building are non-existent. The documentation of
models and source data is in an unbelievably primitive state. This goes even (and
sometimes especially) for models actively consulted by policymakers. 36
Suggestions for improvement
1. Funders should enforce documentation standards.
If ... a sizable portion of payment for a contract were to be withheld until
documentation standards had been met, think what might happen: more,
better, and more useful documentation; more carefully executed models; a
written testimony of the problem-solving process in many locales; better
communication and education; and in time, perhaps, models that can be
understood and eventually put to use. 37
Before undertaking model development, the modeler and user should agree
upon the definition of the problem to be modeled, as well as the scope of the
project in terms of available resources. The modeler and user should also define
an acceptable level of model validity and precision. Finally, documentation
standards or guidelines should be established ... To ensure the process of
model development as described, funding should be made contingent upon the
satisfactory completion of each phase of model building. 38
2. Modelers should plan to allocate half the resources for any modeling effort
for documentation and communication.
For the sake of discussion, let's say that as much money should be spent on
documentation as on the model itself; this is a rule of thumb that many computer
software producers currently employ. If one concedes that the process of
problem-solving is more important than anyone product, doesn't it then follow
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that as many resources should be devoted to recording the process as to developing
the product? ... In any future expenditure of public funds for computer-based
research, at least one half of the total expenditures should be earmarked for
documentation. 39
3. Journals should enforce documentation standards and should ensure that
the equations for all published results are accessible, so the results can be
duplicated by any interested researcher.
Only those models accompanied by evidence of adequate validation and
documentation should be published. This evidence should be available for
professional review and user evaluation.40
4. Governments or professional societies or universities should establish a
library or clearing house for models, programs, and subprograms.
The idea of a 'clearing house' for modeling information is such a natural one that
it has been suggested by many simulationists and others ... For instance,
services could range from simply cataloging model names and sources for
further information to completely checking out, documenting, and certifying
models. Methods could vary from card files to computer storage and retrieval,
while the cost might be borne by the users or granting agencies. 41
Most respondents favored the idea of developing more standardized routines
and procedures for modeling. They saw this as a means of cutting costs and
development time, and possibly as a means of increasing standardization and
compatibility across models ... Principal points in the arguments against such
development were:
It is unnecessary, because such routines are already being produced ...
The diversity of models means that general routines need much modification
to apply them. The variety of computer equipment would require multiple
versions of routines ... Changes in the state-of-the-art ... would require con-
tinuous updating.
Packaged routines would tend to limit the flexibility of models, and might
inhibit the creativity of model developers. 42
(Our own reaction to the idea of maintaining libraries of model pieces to be
picked up and assembled by other modelers is that it will enhance all the
problems of mechanicalness, overcomplexity, irrelevance, and rigidity that
have been discussed here. It would be equivalent to maintaining libraries of
prefabricated images for painters or paragraphs for writers.)
5. Funding agencies should allocate funds for communication among
modelers.
Several alternative actions by a funding agency could stimulate communication:
a) Require that any newly funded project have the principal investigators spend
several days at each of several existing projects to identify common areas of
interaction.
b) Identify major topics that are central to most regional environmental modeling
efforts and fund semi-annual workshops to maintain interaction among
researchers.
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c) Increase communication of new Ph.Ds working in this field by holding
special workshops for this group, since they appear to be the major forces in
most modeling efforts. 43
Complaint: Models are poorly tested and seldom evaluated.
Many capabilities built into these devices have not been subjected to validation.
Not only is their empirical basis dubious or admitted to be lacking, but few efforts
are being made to collect missing or questionable input data or to execute
sensitivity analyses according to an appropriate experimental design. The lack of
sensitivity analysis is related to deficiences in estimating the validity of input
parameters. Neither of these matters seems to be taken seriously. There is a less
than 50/50 chance that a sensitivity test will be done, and when it is done, there is
frequently no record of the outcome. 44
Suggestions for improvement
1. Governments or funders should establish clear standards for model
validation and evaluation.
Validation standards were seen, on the positive side, as a means of avoiding or
discarding bad models and enhancing the credibility of good ones. The main
advantage ... would be the greater uniformity of criteria. and thus perhaps
more even and comparable results.
But validation standards also brought forth the strongest arguments against
'government intervention in scientific matters'. The need for uniformity in such
standards would make them either too vague to be effective, or inapplicable
across all models. Further, they might inhibit good developments that would
conflict with the standards, and possibly curtail support for exploratory efforts.
Finally, it was argued that a model should only be as good as its use requires, and
that only the user can determine appropriate standards. 45
2. Modelers or funders should give models to an independent evaluation
agency for testing.
What we ... propose ... is the development of a new breed of researcherl
pragmatist-the model analyzer-a highly skilled professional and astute
practitioner of the art and science of third-party model analysis. Such analysis
would be directed toward making sensitivity studies, identifying critical points,
probing questionable assumptions, tracing policy conclusions, comprehending
the effects of simulated policy changes, and simplifying complex models
without distorting their key behavioral characteristics. 46
A modeling review process including independent modelers, users. and
individuals with experience in interdisciplinary research should be required. 47
To appraise a system and discover its value, good analysts obligate themselves to
consult people with an adverse opinion ofthe worth ofthe system, largely because
they know how hard it is to get a scientist or engineer to display much ingenuity in
tearing down a technically brilliant design he has been working on for years.4~
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3. Modelers should test each part of the model against the world, not just the
summary output.
The most rigorous method of validation is detailed comparison of model
outputs against historical or experimentally measured outputs of the real system
when the model is presented with the same inputs as occurred in the real system.
To be effective this method must be applied to small sections of each model or
submodel, rather than to the model as a whole. Otherwise, when it comes to
correcting the discrepancies that are sure to be present at first, it will be difficult
to know which equation or numerical value, amongst a bewildering array,
requires amendment. If the model is validated by comparing the behavior of
each small section with the behavior of each corresponding section of the real
system, then there will be no possibility of juggling the model of one part to
overcome what is really a deficiency in the model of some other part. 49
4. Modelers should test their results against the real world, rather than against
a set of artificial rules or formulas.
If a model or mathematical formula were used to indicate which proposal to
select, the proposers' emphasis would soon focus on how to make his design
look good in terms of this analytic definition, not on how to make it look good
against reality-a much harder problem.
C. J. Hitch, while Assistant Secretary of Defense, made this last point with an
analogy. Another kind of problem that might be encountered with an
analytically based contract would be 'rule beating'. An analogy can be found in
the case of some of the handicap rules drawn up by yachting organizations. The
intent of these rules is to allow the owners of often greatly dissimilar sailing
yachts, basically designed for cruising, to compete against each other on an
equitable basis. The rules are generally empirical in nature, and take into
account such factors as the dimensions of the hull, the amount of sail area, and
so on ... However, once such a rule is established, the serious competitor has a
considerable incentive to study it very carefully when he is considering a new
yacht ... There have appeared some fairly unconventional yachts, designed not
in the usual way, but in a way specifically tailored to beat the rules. From a
practical point of view, these yachts are freaks; nobody would have designed
such a thing or wanted to own one save for the existence of the rule. 50
5. Governments or professional organizations should certify not models, but
modelers.
Consider an analogy with the doctor, who is certified and must take
responsibility for all events of consequence to his patients. A master-modeler
qualification might be made to assume similar stature and symbolic meaning. At
a minimum, attention would be redirected to the execution and appraisal phases
of the sequence. There is something quite chilling about the present practice of
allowing inexperienced or substantively unqualified persons to write computer
programs that ostensibly will help make public policy. 51
This very long menu of modelers' own proposals for ways to improve
modeling is simultaneously encouraging and exasperating. On the encouraging
side, it contains some sincere self-criticism and some clear calls for increased
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responsibility on the part of modelers as well as everyone else. On the
exasperating side, most non-modelers will quickly spot the self-serving items
on the list, as well as the absence of any totally cynical comments of the sort
occasionally heard from outsiders.
KnowLedge probLems would be an ideal excuse for modelers to pass the
blame for poor modeling onto other scientific fields. Yet a surprising number of
the specific suggestions within this category dealt with things modelers should
do to improve the knowledge base or to work effectively within its constraints.
While nearly every modeler grumbles about the quality of the data at times,
and very real data problems do exist, we suspect that few modelers would
identify available information as the main limitation to the development of
modeling as a field (though they might see it as the main problem with their
current models). Computer modelers have yet to utilize fully all the
information, theories, and tools that are already available. The knowledge
base is the new material with which modeling must be done. If the modelers
stop blaming it and develop creative strategies to deal with it as it is, they will
expand and improve it, in the very process of working around its deficiencies.
Virtually all of them know that, and they are already working to overcome
knowledge problems.
InstitutionaL probLems, like knowledge problems, are safe conversational
territory because they seem to be beyond the modelers' own areas of
responsibility. There are real problems here, some of them totally independent
of modelers' own actions, and some ofthem at least partly traceable to the early
history of interactions between modelers and the institutions that have
surrounded them. Whatever their causes, modelers seem to realize that
institutional problems, like knowledge problems, are for the short term
unchangeable. Their list of suggestions includes challenges for modelers to
work as constructively as possible within institutional constraints, thereby
building up a record of co-operation and productivity that can bring about a
more friendly environment for modeling in the future.
No modeler, of course, has suggested that modelers may not be trying to be
helpful at all but may only be interested in money, power, or personal
advancement. Or that the tools of modeling are inherently elitist, mystical, and
dehumanizing, bound to corrupt anyone who touches them. Or that the whole
exercise is so mathematically constrained and artificial that it can never be of
real use. Modelers are unlikely to think that way. But in several decades of
social experience with these quantitative tools, very few other people have
reached such cynical conclusions either. Most everyone senses a potential to be
released, and most prescriptions are for improvement, rather than for
discarding tools altogether.
D. GUIDELINES, FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH
Since this book is based on the assumption that the field can be improved,
primarily from inside and by its own practitioners, let us pass quickly on to
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some positive guidelines for that improvement. These guidelines can be viewed
as an enhanced summary of the long preceding list, ordered a bit more
logically, reshaped to keep the complete modeler/client system in focus, and,
of course, structured to emphasize the aspects of practice that we, the authors
of the book, see as most pivotal to realizing the full potential of the art of
modeling. If there is any accumulated wisdom in the field, this is it.
Having a list of guidelines is about as useful as having a sign saying 'think' on
the wall. It cannot force one to think, or tell one how to think or sound an alarm
when one has stopped thinking. At best it can wake one up occasionally and
remind one of what to check or question when a model is going wrong.
It is important to emphasize that the list is of guidelines, not rules. Making a
model and putting it to work in the world is a matter not only of
mathematics-it is far more than exercise in human relations. There seem to be
very few absolute rules about hunan relations. But we can think of four
statements that seem to be basic enough to be cast as rules (the more tentative
guidelines are coming in a minute):
1. Do what is appropriate. No guideline is equally applicable in all situations,
and the practices most useful in one modeling task may not be useful in the
next one. Any excellent human endeavour is done from an awareness of the
current situation, not from a formula. The most important task is to stay
awake.
2. Plan the implementation along with the model. Successful implementation
is rarely, if ever, laid on the end of the technical job. It should be designed
into the project from the beginning, and, of course, altered appropriately
as the modeling adds to system understanding. The use of the model should
be the focus of attention all through the project.
3. Respect all parties to the relationship. Anyone in a position to commission a
model or to make one can be assumed to have enough intelligence,
sincerity, and survival skills to be worthy of respect. Respect can rarely be
summoned out of nothing; if one gives it a fair chance to develop and it does
not, a model may be completed, but it will not be implemented as planned,
at least not by that client, and no other client owns it. If either client or
modeler treats the other more as an object than as a person, the project
probably cannot be effective.
4. Support the needs ofall parties. Modelers and clients exist in a buzzing world
of short-term needs and pressures, jobs, families, bosses, students, budgets,
secretaries, degrees, publications, and telephone bills. If each party has
some understanding of and sympathy for the personal and institutional
needs of the other, the project can be designed to meet, or at least not to
increase, those needs, while still achieving the central task that is the point
of the exercise. These 'overhead' considerations are not luxuries that add to
the expense of the project. As we have seen, they will be achieved in any
case. They are necessary costs of doing business. Every corporation has
discovered that. Designing the project so the modeler can get a publication
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and a secretary out of it, while the client can get a travel budget and a stellar
presentation for the boss, will guarantee enthusiasm, attention, and maybe
even a job well done. If there are no personal rewards or if there is a
significant threat of personal risk, the job is not likely to be done at all.
The guidelines listed below are applicable in varying degrees to different
kinds of modeling tasks. They are more useful where there is a clear problem
and an obvious client than where the job involves spreading a totally new idea
to many people. Where there is no clear client, the modeler's job is much more
difficult. He or she must summon the personal energy to step out of the
modeler's perspective and assume the guiding, critical role that these
guidelines assume the client can fill-Qr adopt a wise, knowledgeable person or
group to fill in the gaps left by the absence of a real client.
The guidelines have been compiled from the preceding list, from our own
personal experience, from conversations with all sorts of modelers, and from
what seems to have worked in the nine case studies. It deals not only with the
primarily scientific suggestions in the previous compendium, but also with the
bureaucratic reality within which models must be implemented. Guidelines are
listed for both modelers and clients; obviously the system works best when both
sides are working in the same direction. All guidelines should be freely used or
discarded, as warranted by the situation.
Guidelines for effective modeling
1. Modeler: Don't be hungry.
Client/Sponsor: Avoid hungry modelers, and do not keep modelers
hungry.
Modelers who have arranged their lives and their groups to depend on the
'contract at any cost' are simply not free to follow the rest of these guidelines
with attention and care. Unworkability in the modeler/client relationship
often begins with the necessity to keep a group together and pay the rent, which
results in hurriedness that rules out negotiating or carrying out the modeling
process properly. There are many institutional reforms and thoughtful gestures
from clients that could help modelers relax from insecurity about future funds.
There are also many ways that modelers could manage their work and their
needs to use funds more efficiently.
2. Modeler: Work only for the person who can actually implement results.
Client/Sponsor: Never hire a modeler for someone else's problems.
Many excellent models fail to be implemented because the person who could
really use them never sees them. Many others fail when their personal
benefactor loses power or is transferred suddenly to Botswana. Modelers
should beware of very mobile clients and of powerless ones. Clients should
refrain from undertaking a study directed at policy levers they do not control.
406
They should not start a project if they do not expect to be around at its
conclusion, and they should involve enough people from their own organi-
zation to guarantee continuity, should an unforeseen bureaucratic rearrange-
ment arise.
3. Modeler: State your own biases openly and be aware of the client's
biases.
Client/Sponsor: State your own biases openly and be aware of the
modeler's biases.
Biases are inevitable and they are most troublesome when they are hidden. It
is probably a good situation when client's and modeler's biases do not match,
because each can check the other, as long as both are more interested in
learning about the world than they are in being right about their biases. Both
parties need to see differences of opinion as opportunities for learning, rather
than arenas for winning. Client/modeler relationships based on both sides
trying to prove the same point are dangerous-they are likely to result only in
propaganda, not analysis.
4. Modeler: Take time to define the job precisely and completely.
Client/Sponsor: Take time to define the job precisely and completely.
During the period when the problem is being defined and operational
procedures are being worked out, there is strong pressure to begin modeling,
to show something is being accomplished. Resist this pressure. All aspects of
the project should be specified as clearly as possible beforehand, from the
problem definition (see below) to the budget, the deadlines, the
documentation standards, and the institutional goals and constraints of both
modeler and client. Patience and openness are essential here-expectations
of the modeler/client relationship are formed at this stage and shape the
progress of the rest of the project.
5. Modeler: Insist on a clear and significant problem definition.
Client/Sponsor: Deliver a clear problem definition for a problem that is
worth solving.
Probably the single most important cause of modeling failure is the
temptation to model the whole system, instead of one specific problem.
General purpose models are never finished and rarely useful. Keep talking
and probing until the real problem becomes clear-a problem whose solution
would make a significant difference to the client. Just as it is easy to model too
much, it is also seductively easy to choose a trivial, easily-modeled problem
instead of the one the client really has. For the continuing application of
interest and support, the problem must be worth solving. The exercise must
count, or it will not be done well.
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Problem definition takes longer than almost anyone has patience for. Many
modelers say a quarter of the project effort is required for clear definition of the
exact question being asked, its measurement, its boundaries, and the policy
levers of interest.
6. Modeler: When stuck, look again at the problem definition.
Client/Sponsor: Keep the modeler's sight on the defined problem.
Modeling efforts often succumb to a slow, creeping drift, away from simplicity
and toward complication, away from what is important and toward what is
mathematically tractable, away from unconventional viewpoints and toward
established wisdom. At each little decision point-whether to include a
variable, to disaggregate, to update the parameter estimation-the guiding
question should be 'would it help solve the problem?' Problem definitions may
need to evolve and be altered as the investigation proceeds and learning takes
place. But the criterion for decision should always be what will most help
real-world decisions, not what the modeler will find easy or fun or what the
client will find harmless or uncontroversial.
7. Modeler: Match the method to the problem, not vice versa.
Client/Sponsor: Hire a modeler whose method matches your problem.
Do not let the modeler warp the problem because of mathematical
necessity.
Entirely too many modeling projects become irreversibly derailed by the
wrong method. Most modelers go around fitting the world to their favorite kind
of matrix, optimization routine, or spaghetti diagram. Modeling techniques
used appropriately, are powerful conceptual aids. Misapplied, they can be
more distorting than fun-house mirrors. The modeler must be aware of and
open about his or her methodological filters. It would help if the client were
also aware of the inherent biases and limitations of different methods.
8. Modeler: Expect the problem to be solved and commit yourself to doing
whatever it takes to solve it, including taking risks.
Client/Sponsor: Expect the problem to be solved, and let the modeler do
whatever it takes to solve it, including making mistakes. Be committed
yourself to the problem's solution, and be ready to take your own risks.
If either modeler or client feels doubtful about the project, it should not be
started. Expectations ofthis sort are too likely to be self-fulfilling. On the other
hand, false starts, experiments, and revisions should be expected, as an
inevitable part of the learning process. The mysterious human quality called
commitment cannot be summoned at will, but its presence or absence can
easily be detected. The commitment will be easier to find ifguideline 5 has been
followed and a truly significant problem has been chosen.
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9. Modeler: Experience the system.
Client/Sponsor: Share your experience of the system.
The client usually knows more about the system than the modeler and can
arrange site visits, data availability, interviews with key personnel, and the
time of in-house staff. The modeler should participate in as much of the system
as possible to build up a base of information, empathy, and understanding.
Watch the real decisions being made in the system, and notice what
information is available at decision points. Get a physical hands-on sense of
how things work. Talk to people. Listen to the client, who usually has a good
sense of what is connected to what. (We have known modelers to tend
warehouses, mine coal, milk cows, take heroin, and join logging crews in order
to learn about the systems being modeled.)
10. Modeler: Include the client in the modeling process.
Client/Sponsor: Allocate your own time and that of your staff to following
and participating in the modeling process.
This recommendation not only enhances implementation by building the
client's understanding and ownership of the model results, it also helps keep
the model on target and ensures that it includes the client's knowledge of the
system. A client who is not willing to commit institutional time and attention to
the modeling process is not sufficiently interested in the problem to make it
worth modeling. Experienced consultants state that the most important
guarantee of modeling success is the interested participation of the client in the
modeling process.
11. Modeler: Have a rough model operating quickly (within one month).
Client/Sponsor: Insist on a rough model operating quickly.
The initial model can be very crude, with little detail and with parameters that
are only guessed. It should be only a basic sketch to show how the pieces will fit
together. The purpose of a rough prototype model is to sketch out the scope of
the problem and to provide a discussion instrument for the comments of the
client and other reviewers. It assures that what the modeler plans is what the
client wants and expects. It also requires keeping the model simple and adding
complexity only slowly, with the client's understanding and agreement.
12. Modeler: Use a level of detail just necessary to capture the problem and to
communicate to the client, no more.
Client/Sponsor: Do not insist upon detail just because you are used to
seeing it.
Many clients, perhaps because they know the system details intimately, ask for
detail-rich models. Many modelers are good at disaggregating and are pleased
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to respond to client pressure. And many models end up so full of detail that
they are untestable, undocumentable, incomprehensible, and useless. Avoid
unnecessary clutter. The appropriate degree of detail/or the problem may not
be the one that the client, the modeler, or the data-collectors have ever thought
of before.
The traditional categories through which a system is viewed may obscure
rather than illuminate a problem solution. Logically cutting through the system
a new way may simplify the model and suggest new solutions (though it may
also complicate data-gathering).
13. Modeler: Design the model to generate the client's usual criteria for system
performance and validity.
Client/Sponsor: Make very clear your usual criteria for measuring system
performance and model validity.
The client may be more interested in profitability or budget balance or general
trends in market share than in 95% confidence levels or quality of life or
achieved x-square ratings. In some cases the cause of the problem may be
wrong criteria, in which case the uselessness of the old criteria still needs to be
demonstrated. Model design should respond to client concern and to the most
real, direct, and measurable indices possible of system performance.
14. Modeler: Describe the model in terms the client can understand.
Client/Sponsor: Insist on model descriptions you can understand.
A sure sign that a modeler does not understand his own work is his inability to
communicate it. Clients, trying to appear sophisticated, are too often reluctant
to keep questioning until they really understand, and so they tolerate muddy
explanations. A model that cannot be described is very rarely implemented.
Modelers, speak clearly. Client, do not accept work you do not understand.
15. Modeler: Document your model with scientific precision and
completeness.
Client/Sponsor: Understand, support, and finance the modeler's
obligation to document the work.
For proprietary information, urgent or in-house work, or very specific
trouble-shooting this guideline is obviously inapplicable. For large public
issues, and for long-term, generic or exploratory work, however, it is essential.
All results should be replicable, by the original modeling group and all
others. Lessons learned, mistakes made, and tasks unfinished should also be
mentioned. Just as sponsors of scientific work accept unquestioningly the
obligations of supporting not only the performance of the experiments but
also their publication, so should the sponsors of social-system modeling.
The resources required for proper documentation are usually under-
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estimated-they often are equal to the time and money required to make the
model in the first place.
16. Modeler: Design policy recommendations with a clear understanding of
real-world constraints and possibilities.
Client/Sponsor: Do not underestimate the real possibilities for change.
Things are easier to change in models than in organizations. As effective
policies emerge from the model, they will be met by institutional resistance to
change-probably the more effective they are, the more threatening they will
appear. The modeler must remain aware of the difference in difficulty of firing
someone in his model versus actually firing someone. The client should be able
to envision acceptable ways of carrying out changes that really will improve the
performance of the system. More can be changed, more easily, than most
people's mental models will admit.
17. Modeler: Test the model carefully and completely.
Client/Sponsor: Ask hard questions of the model and support its testing,
even though mistakes are revealed.
Modelers, better to find problems yourself than have them revealed by critics
or, worse, by the real system not behaving the way you said it would. Do
whatever you can to cause the model to break down or explode. Set different
initial conditions, double and halve all parameters, push exogenous variables
to extremes-not because these conditions are realistic, but because they will
reveal faults in the model. Make all policy tests symmetrical-if you test the
effects of more of something, also try less of it. Give the model to a relentless
ideological critic for testing, if you really want to find its weaknesses. Clients,
be patient with all this testing-not doing it is ultimately likely to cost more than
doing it.
18. Modeler: Stay with the project long enough to assist attainment of results.
Client/Sponsor: Use the model and modeler as aids to promote change.
Bringing about change is hard work; it requires patient, persistent, repetitive
explanation. And as model findings are explained, new questions will arise and
new tests will be thought of. The modeler should remain available, if the need
arises, to explain results, to test options, or to find out why the real situation is
not behaving as predicted.
Nearly every experienced modeler knows guidelines like these and probably
could add to the list. Most modelers also have a good inner sense of which ones
apply when-and they know that most of them apply most of the time. But
very, very few modelers actually do find themselves practicing all that they
preach, even though the preaching is totally sincere. The modeling literature
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has contained lectures about documentation for years, but the state of
documentation is still atrocious, and pressure from funding agencies seems to
work only sporadically. Every standard econometrics textbook warns against
taking R 2 or other summary statistics too seriously as a measure of model
validity. But practicing statisticians still spend more time juggling summary
statistics than they do devising more imaginative ways of judging their models.
Modelers declare the goals of simplicity and transparency at virtually every
professional gathering. Then those same modelers give incomprehensible
presentations of their own gargantuan models, expressing pride in how many
more factors are represented than are in the models of their competitors.
Modelers intone to themselves over and over that the client should be involved
in the modeling process, but they really prefer to have technical conversations
with each other. And very seldom in practicing or teaching modeling do
analysts investigate seriously the question of which methods are best applied to
which types of problems. The nine models described in this book illustrate
clearly the degree to which the guidelines are put into practice.
If people consistently give themselves good advice and systematically ignore
it, something is wrong at a deeper level than can be touched by simple
guidelines, resolutions to reform, or pressure from funders. The vast majority
of the problems of modeling are embedded firmly within the rational,
well-meaning, regularly reinforced habits of modelers. All the suggestions for
change that have been expressed clearly and compellingly, in some cases over
many years, have had no effect for very good structural reasons.
Like all complex social entities, the system of systems analysis will not be
changed through one simple technical fix, or through exhortation, guilt, good
resolutions, or new and better ways of doing the same old things. The system
will only improve by radical redesign, primarily redesign of the goals, rewards,
punishments, values, and self-images of those within it. To discuss that, we
need a whole new chapter.
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CHAPTER 17
The Transformation of Modeling
Unfortunately, the polite guidelines of the previous chapter will not suffice.
They probably would, if this were a discussion of a normal academic field gone
slightly astray while the real-world system is thriving. But the field of
social-system analysis is not normal and not yet even very academic. It is far
astray. And the systems it studies and tries to serve-large-scale complex social
systems-are in deep trouble.
The Sahelian nomads Picardi modeled are threatened not only with
individual starvation, but with ecological degradation and cultural extinction.
The Mexico of CHAC and MexicoV has 40% rural unemployment, a
population growth rate that is still above 2% per year, massive poverty, severe
water shortage in its arid zones, and, in spite of its petroleum resource (perhaps
because of it) one of the greatest foreign debts of any nation. The United
States, the subject of the RfF and SOS analyses, is facing serious erosion on
40% of its arable land, toxic-waste pollution of its groundwater, and acid rain in
its eastern ecosystems. Meanwhile it is adding to an arsenal of tens ofthousands
of nuclear weapons, while 14% of its people live below the poverty level and 3
million have no housing.
On the earth as a whole, 28 people die each minute of starvation, 21 of
them children. In that same minute, $1 million are spent on armaments, and
40 acres of tropical forest are leveled. At least one species of life becomes
extinct every day. The net annual production rates of nine of the twelve great
ocean fisheries have collapsed to a small fraction of their original potential.
Enough nuclear weapons have been accumulated to release the explosive
power of 5,000 Second World Wars all at once.
All of these system problems, and more, are persistent. They go on in spite of
the most sophisticated scientific establishments, communications systems,
satellites, models, and databases the world has ever known. And at the same
time, a field that has real promise of raising the global level of understanding
and of giving human beings a perspective from which they might be able to
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untangle their self-tied knots, that field itself is persisting in its own perverse
behavior:
• It concentrates on easily-quantifiable parts of the system, not important
parts.
• It devotes tremendous labor, both in data-gathering and computation, to
achieving small increases in precision, meanwhile doing little effective
testing for general accuracy.
• It assumes and reinforces the social structure that is the cause of the
destructive behaviors, rather than raising questions of long-term goals,
meaningful social indicators, or system redesign.
• It produces complicated black boxes that outsiders must take on faith-it
does not share its learning effectively with users-in fact it is condescending
to users.
• It proceeds from the paradigm that the future happens and at best can be
foreseen, rather than from the paradigm that the future can be chosen and
designed.
• It rarely sets its sights high enough to demonstrate its most unique
contribution-its ability to focus attention on systems as wholes and on
long-term evolution.
• Many of its efforts are not credible, not used, and not even documented so
that others can learn from mistakes.
If a system is behaving badly, consistently, over a long time, and in spite of
many variations in surrounding conditions, then something more than
marginal tinkering is required to bring about improvement. Something within
the system itself must change, to a new structure that brings forth a new
behavior.
Computer modelers often reach that conclusion about the industrial, social,
and economic systems that they model. It is interesting that they have been less
able to see it within their own system; the system of institutions, tools, and
individuals that produces computer models. We have pointed out many ways in
which that system underperforms. The modelers themselves recognize and
complain about underperformance. They describe the better ways they could
all behave, to be more effective. Then they don't behave that way. Clearly
there are systematic, structural reasons why they do not. But there the
conversation stops.
In human systems talk of change nearly always generates resistance. Few
people in a system, no matter how much they complain about it, welcome any
real change in it-it is so much more pleasant to put up with the faults one is
habituated to, than to try something new and lose the comfort of old habits.
Even the complaining is habitual and comfortable.
So computer modelers, like all people, are reluctant even to contemplate
deep structural change in their own system; change that can produce whole new
kinds of behavior; change that goes far beyond better documentation or clearer
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problem definition. In this chapter we are going to contemplate such deep and
thorough structural change. We will use the word transformation to referto it, to
emphasize that we are talking about something different from what most people
mean by the word 'change'.
By transformation we do not mean a massive effort that forces a lot of people
to do difficult things against their very nature. We do not mean a listoftasks to be
carried out, new job descriptions, or people to be hired or fired. A
transformation, as opposed to a change, is not even a process that can be charted
in advance, or laid out in foreseeable operational steps. Transformation issuch a
subtle restructuring of the system that the guidelines of the previous chapter, and
other constructive behavior we may not even have thought of, will flow forth
naturally, as that which is appropriate and easy to do. A transformation is a
release of possibilities and capabilities already within the system. It evolves
effortlessly from the system itself; it is not imposed from outside and it does not
follow a plan made in advance.
One of the problems of talking about system transformation is that the very
concept of it is foreign to western industrial culture, and particularly to the more
scientific side of that culture. Though most people have experienced somesort of
transformation in some area of life, few of them have recognized and
acknowledged it or formed a category in their minds in which to store the
experience. Everyday conversation does not point out or reinforce its existence.
Transformation does not fit well into the modern paradigm; and so its possibility
is generally denied. Social change, if it is even viewed as possible, is envisioned as
effortful, violent, painful, or carried out according to a plan enforced by some
people on other people. If that is the only concept of how things can change, it is
no wonder that change is resisted.
The central thesis of this chapter is that what we allow ourselves to think of as
real and possible shapes our language, our expectations, and our behavior,
which then brings forth the structure of our social systems. Transformation
begins with thinking differently, thinking in such a way that new expectations,
behavior, and system structure naturally follow. Ifcomputer modelers can think
of transformation as a possibility, if they can learn the principles of creating it,
and if they can bring about a transformation of their own profession, they will
have done more than reform social systems analysis. They will have found and
demonstrated a key, maybe the key, to solving the problems of social systems.
In this chapter we will present and expand on that central thesis: the system of
systems analysis performs the way it does because of the deep paradigmatic
assumptions society and the modelers themselves make about that system. The
system can only be changed ifthe assumptions are changed. Then we will look at
what some of those assumptions are. In particular, we will examine the three
prevailing social assumptions about computer modelers that we think actively
hold in place much of the perverse behavior that the modelers themselves
complain about. The assumptions are:
1. Computer modelers are and ought to be much like scientists.
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2. Computer modelers are and ought to be something like policymakers.
3. Computer modelers are not and ought not to be quite fully human beings.
Investigating these assumptions and their consequences will, of course, lead us
into society's assumptions about scientists. policymakers, and human beings.
We are about to enter dangerous territory here. Trying to see clearly the
paradigmatic base of the society we ourselves belong to is, as the Buddhists say,
like trying to see the lenses of one's own eyes, or like trying to bite one's own
teeth. We may not succeed in removing our self-identities from the exercise
sufficiently to carry it out fully-but we think we can at least begin.
To the extent we succeed, we face a larger danger, which is that societies
never appreciate having their foundation assumptions laid out for
examination. What we suggest here, if it is really on target, will be easy to
dismiss as unreal, impractical, simplistic, or subversive. The best measure of its
success will be the mental discomfort it induces in the reader, especially if the
reader is a computer modeler. If there is no negative reaction to the ideas put
forth here, then we have not gone deep enough.
So now that everyone has been duly warned, let us proceed.
A. THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF SYSTEM STRUCTURE
As far as science can tell so far, things in the physical world are what they are
and do what they do, whatever people happen to think about them. The
behaviors of physical objects are objectively dictated by the laws of science.
Human opinions, beliefs, hopes or prayers about them have absolutely no
influence. People once had to struggle and die for that idea, but now it is so
commonplace that we think it without even being quite aware that we think it.
It is part of the shared social paradigm of the industrialized world. Like many
paradigmatic assumptions, because it is so deeply grounded within us, we tend
almost unconsciously to apply it not just to the part of the world for which it
seems to hold-physical objects-but also to human beings and to social
systems.
The behavior of human beings, in contrast to physical objects, depends to a
very great degree upon what they themselves and those around them think.
And the structure of social systems depends to an equally great degree on what
the mass of human beings in the system have been thinking, about themselves,
about nature, about the meaning and purpose of individual and societal life,
about what is possible and what is not. A society preoccupied with death,
grounded in mysticism, and believing that inequality is the natural order of
things produces pyramids and priests, pharaohs and slaves. A society that
defines the good in material terms, that is grounded in rationality, and that
believes in individual merit with equal opportunity produces factories and
scientists, elections and supermarkets. The human-produced physical system,
the industrial plant, the technologies, the institutions and hierarchies, all are
the historical accumulation of whatever the shared social mindset, tempered by
the laws of physical possibility, has brought forth.
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The importance of social paradigms in shaping system structure is not a new
idea, but it is certainly not commonly agreed upon. It is a subject of
controversy, and the argument covers many different points of a spectrum. At
one extreme is the belief that people and societies are as deterministically
propelled by the known physical laws as billiard balls. At the other extreme is
the notion that even the second law of thermodynamics will capitulate to a
sufficiently powerful individual or group application of mind and intention. It is
not hard to find people running their lives contentedly and fairly effectively
from almost any point on the spectrum.
We are not writing this chapter from either extreme, but we are much closer
to the side believing in the formative and transformative power of shared
mental concepts than is popularly accepted in our own society. We happen to
be firm believers in the second law of thermodynamics. But we cannot ignore
our own direct experience of system transformation, brought about by thinking
about something in a completely different way. Examples of such
transformation on the individual level include alcoholic treatment programs,
techniques of the best athletic coaches, and teachings of the Zen masters.
Examples on the social level include, in the United States, such extensive social
transformations as the American revolution, the end of slavery, and the
achievement of basic civil rights by blacks and women.
Social systems evolve from a shared mindset, and are constrained or altered
by the nature of the physical world. A system cannot be changed unless minds
are changed, a system cannot be destroyed unless ways of thinking are
destroyed, and if ways of thinking do change, nothing can keep the physical and
social system from changing to be more consistent with the new shared 'reality'.
Here are some others who have expressed the same thought in different
ways:
To tear down a factory or to revolt against a government ... is to attack effects
rather than causes; and as long as the attack is upon effects only, no change is
possible. The true system, the real system, is our present construction of systematic
thought itself, rationality itself, and if a factory is torn down but the rationality
which produced it is left standing, then that rationality will simply produce another
factory. If a revolution destroys a systematic government, but the systematic
patterns of thought that produced that government are left intact, then those
patterns will repeat themselves in the succeeding government. There's so much talk
about the system. And so little understanding. I
It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world,
however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced,
constructed objectivity ... The objectivity of the social world means that it
confronts man as something outside of himself. The decisive question is whether he
still retains the awareness that, however objectivated, the social world was made by
men-and therefore can be remade by them ... Typically, the real relationship
between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer of a
world, is apprehended as its product ... Human meanings are no longer
understood as world-producing but as being, in their turn, products of the 'nature
of things'. 2
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If the system of computer modeling is consistently producing results that are
too complicated, poorly explained, unimaginative, irrelevant, or unused, there
must be something in the way participants in that system construct their
'reality' that leads them to go on behaving in that way. So the task is to discover
how computer modelers think of themselves and how the world thinks of them.
How does that thinking produce the sorts of behavior that we have described in
this book? And what other ways of thinking might produce different behavior?
B. COMPUTER MODELERS AS SCIENTISTS
The most obvious image society has of computer modelers and computer
modelers have of themselves is that they are, or should be, scientists. Modelers
of social systems, like most social scientists (note the very name social
scientists) appropriate as much as they can of the trappings of the established
physical sciences. They aim for precision to many decimal points, for
specialized jargon, for complicated-looking journal articles, for statistical
'proof' of validity, for mathematical rather than verbal languages. Their main
tool is the computer with its mystique of all-knowingness. They have picked up
nearly every surface characteristic of the physical scientist except the white
coat.
The references to science that figure so prominently, for instance, in the official
definitions of operations research are not so much methodological indications as
they are ideological props. They attempt to increase the collective confidence of a
group of new disciplines striving for academic and social recognition. 3
But real science is not a set of techniques, journals, formulas, or anything
else detectable by the senses. Those things are the physical attributes generated
by the mindset of real science, and that is what science, like every human
institution, primarily is-a mindset, a way of thinking. When practiced by a
master, it is a tremendously powerful method of fixing one's attention on the
physical world and asking questions framed so precisely and cleverly that a
useful answer is bound to emerge. Science is, quite simply, the scientific
method, the relentless iteration of induction and deduction, of precise
hypothesis-formation and careful experimentation.
The aspect of science that computer modelers have almost totally failed to
adopt is the scientific method. There is some question whether they should,
given that they are dealing with social as well as physical systems. Later in this
chapter we will qualify and amend any impression we may leave here that the
scientific method is the only key to modeling success. But we do think that
elements of the critical thinking required for scientific investigation would
greatly further social-system modeling. It is worth looking a bit deeper into
what practicing real science means, to see what difference it might make if
computer modelers thought of themselves as people who use the scientific
method, instead of people who act on the surface like scientists.
420
The scientific method starts with a very directed question. The question
depends on the accumulation of answers so far, on a very clear appreciation of
what is known and not known. The success ofthe whole investigation depends on
questions poised exactly on the boundary of the unknown, and on the clarity and
pointedness of those questions.
Computer modelers, as we have seen, are particularly bad at asking clear,
single questions. Many of the models described here are the equivalent of the
biologist entering the laboratory and asking 'what is life?'. There is an implicit
attempt, probably stemming somehow from the image of the computer as
omniscient, to be able to answer all questions at once. The infant science of
social-systems analysis attempts to be, and is expected by its clients to be,
instantly authoritative and comprehensive, as scientists are believed to be. But
the best of real scientists do not pretend to be experts at everything. They are
content to ask one question at a time, and to be extremely clear about what the
limits of their knowledge are.
After meticulous selection of a pointed question that is consistent with the
actual degree ofunderstanding, two other attributes ofthe scientific method are:
1. The generation of multiple hypotheses.
2. The design of experiments to disprove hypotheses.
In an excellent article, directed toward physical scientists, who themselves often
forget to practice science, John Platt describes these two attributes:
Our trouble is that when we make a single hypothesis, we become attached to
it ... The conflict and exclusion of alternatives that is necessary to sharp inductive
inference has been all too often a conflict between men, each with his single Ruling
Theory. But whenever each man begins to have multiple working hypotheses, it
becomes purely a conflict between ideas ... In fact, when there are multiple
hypotheses which are not anyone's 'personal property' and when there are crucial
experiments to test them, the daily life in the laboratory takes on an interest and
excitement it never had, and the students can hardly wait to get to work to see how the
detective story will come out. 4
Platt describes the dangers of failing to focus on disproof of hypotheses with the
story of a theoretical chemist, who explains to his class:
'And thus we see that the C-C1 bond is longer in the first compound than in the second
because the percent of ionic character is smaller.'
A voice from the back ofthe room said, 'But Professor X, according to the table,
the C-C1 bond is shorter in the first compound.'
'Oh, is it?' said the professor. 'Well, that's still easy to understand. It's because the
double-bond character is higher in that compound.'
To the extent that this kind ofstory is accurate, a 'theory' ofthis sort is not a theory
at all, because it does not exclude anything. It predicts everything, and therefore
does not predict anything. It becomes simply a verbal formula which the graduate
students repeat and believe because the professor has said it so often. This is not
science, but faith; not theory, but theology. Whether it is hand-waving or
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number-waving, a theory is not a theory unless it can be disproved ...
In chemistry the resonance theorists will of course suppose that I am criticizing
them, while the molecular orbital theorists will suppose I am criticizing them. But
their actions ... speak for themselves. A failure to agree for 30 years is public
advertisement ofa failure to disprove. 5
Computer modeling, like most of social science, is imbued with single
hypotheses with which individuals and even whole nations are identified.
When one's self or nation is deeply identified with any hypothesis, there can be
no serious attempt at disproof, and, as Platt says, disagreements can go on
forever. The Malthusian hypothesis is still a source of controversy after 200
years. The hypotheses of Karl Marx, of Adam Smith, of John Stuart Mill have
generated 100 years of conflict with no convergence in sight, and now these
hypotheses are built into social-system models.
A final characteristic of the physical sciences that computer modeling has yet
to adopt is the sense of community and of the shared endeavor to build
accumulated understanding of the world. Instead of viewing themselves as
Lone Rangers, striding forth to bring knowledge to the world single-handed,
scientists absorb almost unconsciously a sense of themselves as contributors to
a long-term, slow, communal endeavor. Most of them are content to add one or
two small bricks to the mighty edifice of scientific understanding. Among many
constructive behaviors that this communal view induces are two that are
notably absent from computer modeling:
1. Painstaking documentation, so that the whole community can share in every
advance.
2. Community self-policing with stringent rules for replicability, criticism,
testing, and evidence.
A common excuse for the absence of rigorous testing in the social sciences in
general, and computer modeling in particular, is that there is no opportunity
for experiment in social systems. Aside from the fact that only one of the
several characteristics of science listed above involves experimentation, the
physical sciences themselves have not all depended upon a laboratory for their
success:
It is frequently said that economics is not penetrable by rigorous scientific analysis,
because one cannot experiment freely. One should remember that the natural
sciences originated with astronomy, where the mathematical method was first
applied with overwhelming success ...
It is also frequently said that in economics one can never get a statistical sample
large enough to build on. Instead, time series are interrupted, altered by gradual or
abrupt changes of conditions, etc. However, if one analyzes this carefully, one
realizes that in scientific research as well, there is always some heterogeneity in the
material and that one can never be quite sure whether this heterogeneity is
essential. The decisive insights in astronomy were actually derived from a very
small sample: the known planets, the sun, and the moon ...
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The chances are that methods in economic science are quite good, and no
worse than they were in other fields. But we will still require a great deal of
research to develop the essential concepts-the really usable ideas. I think it is in
the lack of quite sharply defined concepts that the main difficulty lies, and not in
any intrinsic difference between the fields of economics and other sciences. 6
What would computer modeling be like if its practitioners sought sharply
defined concepts, pointed questions, multiple hypotheses, disproof, and
gradual communal accumulation of knowledge-that is, if they chose to
identify themselves with the disciplines and responsibilities of science, rather
than just its authority and privileges? That is hard to tell, but most likely, of
course, it would resemble the world of the physical sciences at an earlier
stage. By no means does every physical scientist practice these disciplines and
responsibilities, but a sufficient number do, with sufficient community
dedication to rewarding real excellence, and with clear enough standards of
excellence, that there is undisputed forward progress.
As just one example of computer modeling in a scientific context, we would
like to tell the story of a modeler hired to join an interdisciplinary team of
chemists, biologists, and engineers, who were engaged in an aquaculture
project. (We would like to supply a similar story of a purely social-system
application, but we do not know of any). The team was using dozens of
upright, cylindrical tanks full of algae and a single species of algae-eating fish,
and trying to discover a feeding and management program to produce rapid
fish growth at low cost. Policy variables included stocking densities, feeding
programs, aeration and mixing, and cleaning schedules-far too many
options to test in all possible combinations in the real system.
The modeler began simply by creating, with the team, a diagram of the
interactions in the entire system. This diagram was a first sketch, very
incomplete, but it already was a useful vehicle for communication among the
scientists. The chemists could point to the importance of nitrogen compounds
in the water, the biologists could include the various bacteria that colonized
the detritus in the tanks, and all could see how their particular interests
interacted in the system with all the others and, most important, with the
growth rate of the fish. This discussion, before anything was computerized,
already raised new questions and suggested new experiments.
A simple computer model was up and running quickly. As it took shape, it
began producing results that surprised everyone. Many of those results were
wrong. They arose from the combined incompleteness of the mental models
of the project team, and they could easily be disproved by data from the real
tanks. Each time this happened, everything had to be rethought, and usually
new things had to be measured that were previously thought unimportant.
The bacteria in the tanks emerged as an important factor in controlling the
water chemistry. The algae as a food source came to be viewed as less
important. Whole new experiments rarely had to be initiated, but on-going
experiments had to be monitored in entirely different ways as understanding
increased.
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Over a period of two years the model suggested new observations to be made
in the real system, which led to corrections in the model, which then produced
new results, more measurements, more corrections. All the time the computer
model of the system was evolving, the mental models of the team were also
becoming more complete, encompassing more aspects of the system, and
greatly raising the level of communication across disciplines. Eventually the
model was at a level that everyone trusted and understood. It duplicated
observations in the real tanks in an impressive way. At this point the model
could finally be used to suggest effective management techniques for increasing
the growth rate of fish.
This was a system with only a few interacting species (fish, algae and several
bacteria), with only incoming sunlight and the chemistry of oxygen, carbon,
and nitrogen to monitor, and with a large but finite number of management
possibilities. The desired outcome was measurable and non-controversial. The
final model was about as big as the intermediate-size models in this book. It
took two years of tight coupling back and forth between observations of the
system and observations of the model before enough convergence was
obtained for the model to become credible, useful, and used. During this time
the yield in the fish tanks steadily went up. Everyone involved in the process
considered it a great success.
If there is any lesson in this example for social-system modeling, it should be
to make everyone more humble in aspiring to a high degree of understanding of
entire economic systems coupled with entire ecosystems, where there are
multiple goals, some of them conflicting, some of them unmeasurable.
Another lesson is in the position of modeler-as-scientist in this endeavor. He
was not in the objective stance of an experimenter in a laboratory, not caring
how the experiment comes out. He had a clear goal for the system. He was
learning about the system and trying to influence it simultaneously and he was
totally embedded in the process, not above or outside it. He used the model to
draw multiple hypotheses from the disciplinary experts, to integrate them, and
to suggest what observations to make on the system to disprove them. He was
subjected to the discipline of comparing his model results, in detail, with
real-system behavior almost daily.
The process described here uses the tools of critical scientific thinking, but it
is not value-neutral science. In the aquaculture example, and in social system
modeling, the system is being interfered with to produce a desired outcome
while the modeling proceeds. The process is not a distant wielding of expertise
with no involvement in the situation. It is, rather, what Donald Schon calls
'reflection-in-action':
The practitioners' moves also function as exploratory probes of their situation.
Their moves stimulate the situation's backtalk, which causes them to appreciate
things in the situation that go beyond their intial perceptions of the design ... The
exploratory experiment consists in the practitioner's conversation with the
situation, in the back-talk which he elicits and appreciates ...
The inquirer's relation to this situation is transactional. He shapes the situation,
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but in conversation with it, so that his own models and appreciations are also
shaped by the situation. The phenomena that he seeks to understand are partly of
his own making; he is in the situation that he seeks to understand. 7
Or, to take a more prosaic analogy, not from the world of science, but the
world of craftsmanship:'
Sometime look at the novice workman or a bad workman and compare his
expression with that of a craftsman whose work you know is excellent and you'll
see the difference. The craftsman isn't ever following a single line of instruction.
He's making decisions as he goes along. For that reason he'll be absorbed and
attentive to what he's doing even though he doesn't deliberately contrive this. His
motions and the machine are in a kind of harmony. He isn't following any set of
written instructions because the nature of the material at hand determines his
thoughts and motions, which simultaneously change the nature of the material at
hand. The material and his thoughts are changing together in a ~rogression of
changes until his mind's at rest at the same time the material's right.
The mindset of physical science that would transform computer modeling is
not the mindset of precision and certainty, or of distance and uninvolvement.
Rather, it is the intellectual discipline of question-posing, hypothesis
generation, and searching for disproof, and the recognition that one is part of
a community of seekers and experimenters, all practiced from the position of
'reflection-in-action', involvement with the social system, and caring about its
evolution. That way of thinking would make modelers more scientific, in that
they would make more rigorous use of the scientific method, and less
scientific, in that they would allow themselves to be subjective actors within
the system, expressing values and working for their chosen results.
But social-system modeling is poised between two worlds-that of science
and that of policy. The current view of computer modeling contains images
not only of scientists, but also of policymakers. These images also bring forth
their resultant actions and behaviors, and they too need to be examined.
C. COMPUTER MODELERS AS POLICYMAKERS
Most social-system models are not much used for policy, at least in the way
they were intended to be used. But even if these models were made in a way
that caused them to be more welcomed and used by policymakers, we are
afraid they would not make much difference. Computer models of social
systems, the ones described in this book and most others as weU9 are made
and interpreted well within the confines of conventional political wisdom. For
example:
• They reinforce the idea that the important decisions in the world are made
at the national level. By making national policies exogenous, they imply
that national policymakers (only) are free from the rest of the system,
above it, and able to do what they want. They rarely depict the ways that
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national policy is itself embedded in and driven by the system. or the
possibility that national-level policy levers have little effect on anything.
• They depict the populace as lumpish raw material. the source of labor and
consumption, partially moldable by policy, never initiating anything, or
exhibiting any creativity or will, or exerting any power.
• They continue to generate, display, and thereby legitimate as social
indicators standard money-flow measures, rather than focusing on physical
stocks or distributional equity or basic human needs or any non-monetary
and non-material measure of welfare.
• They accept implicitly the West's definition of 'development'. They assume
the world will and should evolve along the paths the industrial cultures have
taken, rather than questioning the desirability. feasibility. or sustainability
of those paths. They never picture societies where jobs do not have to be
'created', where work enhances human dignity. where environments are
whole and pleasing, where people have roles other than consumption, where
human variability is appreciated and encouraged.
• They concur with the economists in calling some results of industrial activity
'products' and others 'externalities'. They draw conventional boundaries
that bypass questions about where natural resources come from or where
pollutants and discards go. They do not attempt to represent the costs of
production to the wholeness of human communities, to individual identities,
to ecosystems, or to the stability of the international order.
• Above all, computer modelers endorse the cynicism of their culture, the idea
that human nature is basically flawed, that people will never act sensibly.
that society must be founded on the assumption of immorality. They treasure
up selective evidence of unworkability, not noticing that they are surrounded
at every moment by people who are decent. caring, co-operative, and
contributing.
The primary offering that the analysis of complex systems could bring to
policymaking-a questioning, total-system, long-term perspective on
things--is least demonstrated by the field so far. Instead of questioning the
present policymaking mindset, computer modeling has in general adopted that
mindset and legitimated it. (There are exceptions, of course, induding a few of
the models in this book.)
There are many assumptions within the world of social policy that need to be
challenged, some of which computer modeling is especially suited to take
on-such as the assumption that focusing on the short term will also serve the
long term, or the assumption that maximizing the welfare of particular parts of
a society will benefit the whole society. The reason that computer modeling is
used more often to promote such assumptions than to test them probably stems
from another very deep belief. It is the assumption, which also can be traced to
the physical sciences, that social systems are ordered, knowable, and
controllable, and that political leaders must be able to order, know, and control
them.
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The political leader, as depicted by the media, by history books, by myths
and legends, and by every other means with which society describes itself,
knows the answers. Leaders are expected to be firm, to act unswervingly, and
to be right. It is not acceptable for a policymaker to admit not knowing, to try
experiments, or to decide that the appropriate solution yesterday is no longer
appropriate today. The political belief system does not admit the possibility of
problems without knowable and permanent answers. And yet much of the
world, at least the social world, is made up of exactly such problems:
The physical sciences and mathematics are concerned exclusively with convergent
problems ... When they have been solved, the solution can be written down and
passed on to others, who can apply it without needing to reproduce the mental
effort necessary to find it ... The true problems of living-in politics, economics,
education, marriage, etc.-are always problems of overcoming or reconciling
opposites. They are divergent problems and have no solution in the ordinary sense
of the word. They demand of man not merely the employment of his reasoning
powers, but the commitment of his whole personality. Naturally, spurious
solutions, by way of a clever formula, are always being put forward; but they never
work for long because they invariably neglect one of the two opposites, and thus
lose the very quality of human life. In economics, the solution offered may provide
for freedom but not for planning, or vice versa. In industrial organisation, it may
provide for discipline but not for workers' participation in management, or vice
versa. In politics, it might provide for leadership without democracy, or again, for
democracy without leadership. 10
Donald Michael has speculated on the source of the idea that the world is
knowable and controllable, and on some of its consequences:
As the beliefs of the Age of Enlightenment were promulgated and disseminated,
ascribing to science and technology unlimited ameliorative power to free
humankind from its constraints, males were most exposed to these beliefs through
their activities in industry, business, and government, under circumstances that
demonstrated their utility and, hence, their validity ... Males came to embody
these beliefs, practicing them when they could and affirming them always. In such a
heady atmosphere of successful efforts to control (in part 'successful' because those
who were victims rather than beneficiaries of technological control were routinely
ignored or discounted), there was every reason to suppose that the same worldview
and definition of competence would hold true under any and all societal
circumstances: a competent person could, through information, gain the
knowledge needed to discover the causes and effects of the human condition and to
control them.
Under such norms errors became failures and these are evidence of
incompetence: they demonstrate a failure to apply correct knowledge and through
it to exercise control ... Operating by this definition of competence, one's
self-image is closely tied to and tested by successfully exercising control. Besides
seeking to demonstrate ability to control it is also very important to deny to one's
self and surely to others evidence that one is not in control ...
In today's world information increasingly demonstrates that things aren't going
as intended. The result is ... (that) there is retrenchment by those who would
control, an effort to deny their impotency by more intense efforts to control. J I
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The image of the oracle, which knows the future, though its origins are
pre-scientific, is still dominant in the modern social world-view. The oracle's
knowledge is no longer ascribed to gods and spirits, but to science, rationality,
and the computer. There is still no doubt that such knowledge is possible, and
that leaders are to be judged by the extent to which they possess and act on it.
Computer modelers have unthinkingly absorbed this view of policymakers as
unerring controllers. By their very presence they reinforce that view. They
either bring with them into the association with clients, or adopt from the clients,
the self-image of competence through certainty. And if you must appear
knowledgeable to be credible, you must have all-inclusive, complicated models,
you must deliver numerical answers with many significant digits, and you will not
be eager to test your model very openly or thoroughly. You will leap into the
detailed implementation stage of management when in fact you have almost no
general understanding. You will certainly not challenge the conventional way of
seeing things, because your own image of certainty depends upon the degree to
which you uphold your client's image of certainty.
Donald Schon characterizes this way of thinking as the 'Model I' theory of
action.
An individual who conforms to Model I behaves according to characteristic values
and strategies of action. His values include the following:
-Achieve the task as I define it.
-In win/lose interactions with others, try to win and avoid losing.
-Avoid negative feelings, such as anger or resentment.
-Be rational, in the sense of 'Keep cool, be persuasive, use rational argument'.
Among the strategies by which he tries to satisfy these values, there are the following:
-Control the task unilaterally.
-Protect yourself unilaterally, without testing to see whether you need to do so.
-Protect the other unilaterally, without testing to see whether he wishes to be
protected.
When the several parties to an interaction behave according to Model I, there are
predictable consequences. The behavioral world-the world of experienced
interpersonal interaction-tends to be win/lose. The participants in it act
defensively and are perceived as doing so ... And individuals tend to employ
strategies ofmystery and mastery, seeking to master the situation while keeping their
own thoughts and feelings mysterious. 12
Mystery and mastery, win/lose, knowledge and control, the claim to have
found convergent solutions to divergent problems-all these are attributes of
the social image of policymaking, and all have been absorbed into the self-image
of computer modelers, like any advisors to the policy-making process.
Another way of thinking, one that would transform not only modeling, but
also social policy, begins with letting go of the main assumption-that social
systems are basically known and can be controlled. A simple admission of
society's actual degree of ignorance about itself may produce at first a somewhat
sickening dizziness, with the loss of foundation of certainty upon which social
428
self-identity rests. But it takes only a short time to begin to see the course of
action that then becomes possible. It is a shift from certain, forceful leadership
to honest, experimental redesign.
At present, the tendency is to hold out hope that a specific project ... will provide
the much-desired answer. A more productive strategy might be to devise questions,
techniques, and procedures that shift the focus of attention away from particular
solutions and over to the difficulty of the problem itself ... Redefining innovation
efforts as experiments ... removes the onus of having to produce the answer, and
frees us to focus attention on appraisal of the current experiment. A distinction
between trapped and experimental administrators drawn by Donald Campbell
illustrates the point. The former 'have so committed themselves in advance to the
efficacy of the reform that they cannot afford honest evaluation' and the latter
'have justified the reform on the basis of the importance of the problem, not the
certainty of their answer, and are committed to going on to other potential
solutions if the one just tried fails'. 13
What if uncertainty were accepted and shared as our common condition and
acknowledged by leaders rather than being denied by them in order to sustain the
belief that certainty is attainable through their vision and judgement? Surely we
can tolerate much more uncertainty when we have others to share it with ...
Neither we ourselves nor our associates, nor the publics that need to be involved
if they are to learn to make responsible demands, can learn what is going on and
might go on if we act as if we really had the facts, were really certain about all the
issues, knew exactly what the outcome should/could be, and were really certain
that we were attaining the most preferred outcomes. Moreover, when addressing
complex social issues, acting as if we knew what we were doing simply decreases
our credibility ... Distrust of institutions and authority figures is increasing. The
very act of acknowledging uncertainty could help greatly to reverse this worsening
trend ...
Actions intended to affect something would be based on shared and
acknowledged ignorance that must accompany any body of knowledge. And it
would reduce the need to act over-cautiously and conservatively out of fear of being
caught-out in a mistake, of being unable to control. Accepting this ignorance and
its associated vulnerability would reduce the need for those defensive,
self-protecting, interpersonal and political posturings that make it so hard to act
responsibly and compassionately.·
If modelers, instead of seeing themselves as scientific adjuncts to the policy
process, could shift to seeing themselves as experimental, and even
compassionate, their practice would be turned inside out. They would be free
of having to make complicated models in order to stave off the worst possible
criticism, that of not knowing. They would no longer be boxed into personal
and institutional situations where they dare not be wrong. They could
participate in experiments, publicize and learn from their mistakes, work
closely and honestly with people, communicate clearly.
To us the saddest result of the 'Model I' pattern of knowing and controlling is
that the technique of computer modeling becomes distorted, with great effort,
into a tool for the impossible tasks of predicting, optimizing, and prescribing,
rather than being used for what it actually can do best. Modelers are bold to the
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point of hubris about their abilities to do what in fact they cannot do, while
being humble to the point of blindness about their truly great potential as
contributors to the processes of social experimentation and design. Models
could be used to develop social visions far more internally consistent than those
generated by mental models alone. They could point the way to critical,
decisive experiments, and actively test social theories at far less cost than the
costs of imposing those theories in ignorance and arrogance upon the whole
society. They could be used to search for imprecise policies that are robust
against uncertainties rather than precise policies that try to optimize something
that is not understood. Perhaps most important, they could simply serve as
communication devices in which different, partial, mental models of the social
system could be expressed and integrated.
The self-image that can replace the idea of the policymaker as omniscient
controller is that of the policymaker as an interactive, responsive social
designer, where the designing is an experimental and democratic process.
We have in our hands the potential to create a blossoming of human culture-an
Eden on earth and in the minds of men. Will we be able to do it? Can we find the
will to do it? For me, this is a design problem ...
'Design', as used here, implies not only beauty, well formed for use, but includes
also the factor of human shaping for positive ends. Good design is one of the most
critical needs at this point in human history-good design not only by those who call
themselves designers, which will not suffice, but also by society at large. We need a
general awareness of the need of good design in all elements of life and the
encouragement to all people to take part. The finest design for society will not be
one worked up by specialists, but one designed by the people themselves to fit their
needs. Planners and designers are needed, but only to help, not to pre-empt the
work of creating a new society. IS
Seeing computer modeling as an aid to social exploration and design rather
than certainty and control is perfectly consistent with seeing computer
modeling as a tool for the practice of the scientific method. But we believe that
even these two ways of seeing are not enough. The focus of the modeling
profession needs to be shifted from technical and rational abilities (which are
still very much necessary) to another set of abilities. Some of them have already
been named in the discussion so far: compassion, humility, vulnerability,
honesty. All of them are simple human abilities. They are barely visible in the
old self-image of the computer modeler, but they are critical to the new one.
D. COMPUTER MODELERS AS HUMAN BEINGS
The published accounts of computer modeling, including this book so far,
contain almost no recognition of the individual, personal, quirky humanity of
computer modelers. The modelers' own self-descriptions of their work, and
our presentation ofthe models in Part III, which is written in traditional mode,
talk about everything except the personalities of the modelers. The avoidance
ofthis issue is striking when you begin to notice it. We would find it hard to talk
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about the work of a painter or a novelist without some sense of the cultural
context and personal idiosyncracies of the person behind the work. It would be
important to know about his or her health, relationship with parents or spouse,
age at the time of the work, degree of integration or rebellion with society,
psychological stability. But it is taboo to want to know these things about
computer modelers (or scientists, or, to a lesser degree, policymakers).
And yet, even in our outsiders' descriptions here of the modeling work and in
the short technical quotations from the modeling groups, some sense of who
the modelers are as people does manage to come through. We submit that the
unacceptable topic of the humanity of modelers is, in fact, always being
addressed in an implicit way, and that we all know it is of utmost importance.
People who make computer models of social systems are part of that very
powerful group who define society to itself. Their activities within the system
affect the system. To be responsible for the fact that their models are at least
partially reality-shaping and legitimating, modelers have to be, in addition to
good scientists, good people. They have to be open, wise, empathetic, and
self-insightful, all traits for which they have received no training and for which
they have not been selected.
Now to be the kind of person who truly accepts his responsibility as that of creating
certain kinds of temporary realities requires knowledge of and access to self far
beyond that possessed by most people in this society. It requires such knowledge
and access because being a creator and participator in temporary myths in a
turbulent world lays very heavy personal demands on the systems person and the
planner. I will mention two requirements: living with uncertainty and embracing
error.
The experience of uncertainty, as I am using the word, is not that dealt with in
economics or decision theory. I mean psychological uncertainty: the uncertainty
that arises when you know that you do not know; when you know that there is no
honest way to put a number on something, no subjective probability to be assigned.
It is the uncertainty that comes when you realize that you do not understand your
situation well enough to be in control of it. All one can do is live in it and learn from
it and try to create possibilities and see what happens to them as one goes along,
whether they add to one's life and the lives of others or they do not. But living this
way, especially as a professional using the systems approach ... calls for a special
sense of self-worthiness.
Error-embracing is the condition for learning. It means seeking and using-and
sharing-information about what went wrong with what you expected or hoped
would go right. Both error embracing and living with high levels of uncertainty
emphasize our personal as well as societal vulnerability. Typically we hide our
vulnerabilities from ourselves as well as from others. But if we are going to create
and live in temporary myths, we must understand our repressed fears and anxieties
about being vulnerable and learn to live with them and use them creatively. 16
The myth that prevents being the sort of person described above is the myth
of analysts as objective and impersonal. The myth, or way of looking, that will
bring forth a new behavior is the self-image of analysts as individual human
beings who know how to use rational tools, but also know their non-rational
selves.
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No human activity, including science, including computer modeling, is truly
objective. Far more than modelers are willing to recognize, their personalities
are interwoven with every phase of their modeling activity, from the choice of
method and research question, through the writing of equations, to the mode
of interacting with the client and presenting the results. Each model is a subtle
reflection not only of the insights, experiences, and technical expertise of its
makers, but also of their biases and worldviews, fears, repressions, loves and
hates. Computer modeling, like science, policymaking, and business, is a very
human drama.
That fact is a cause for dismay only if one fails to recognize it, and only if one
needs to hold to the view of social systems as objectively knowable and
controllable. By recognizing their humanity instead of denying it, computer
modelers can release their energy from trying to produce something that is not
possible-Dbjective, comprehensive understanding-and turn instead to what
can be produced-a human sharing of perceptions that can lead to deeper
insight about why people do what they do, value what they value, and resist
what they resist.
To explore that territory requires venturing far beyond the boundaries of
what science has labelled as legitimate. It requires treading into two areas
where scientists have been trained to be most skeptical and uncomfortable.
One is the soft and slippery fields of psychology, psychotherapy, religion,
philosophy, and the 'consciousness' or 'human potential' movements. The
other is self-examination, being willing to watch one's own experience more
carefully and to feel one's own intuitions and emotions more fully. Nothing
could be more difficult for a well-trained scientist. And yet these processes,
which are viewed as antithetical to physical science, are absolutely necessary to
social science, where the investigator is not and can never be fully distinct from
the system under investigation. To make the tool of the scientific method
applicable to social systems, the scientist must release it from the unexamined
beliefs and unrecognized emotions in which it is embedded.
Modelers are human, not detached, machine-like, infallible, or unfeeling
objects. They make mistakes, from which they learn and change. They do not
always work with quality, but they can recognize quality when they see it. They
create, innovate, seek to overcome their limitations, and cling desperately to
their old habits. Each one has moments of brilliant insight and apathetic
dullness, selfish distrust and loving contribution. To the extent that modelers
can recognize their own miraculous complexity, they will be able to recognize it
in others, including their clients and the masses who make up the systems they
model. To that extent modeling will become more accurate, more useful, and
more used.
Modelers are themselves in the system, as is everyone. Their models reflect
and feed back the paradigms they themselves were raised and trained in. They
are constrained by the limits of their own experience, mental categories, and
imaginations. Modelers influence each other, sensing each others' approval or
disapproval, responding to their system's information streams, rewards, and
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punishments. They can transcend the system's structure only by seeing clearly
how the system includes and influences them.
Modelers need each other, as all people need each other, to sort out
particular, partially correct viewpoints from whatever globally enduring truths
there may be, and to pool very different talents, disciplines, and methods. The
models themselves emphasize the fact that no individual or economic sector or
company or nation can succeed through the failure of others, but each can
blossom through the support of others.
And above all, modelers, like all human beings, care. The currently accepted
ways for modern human beings to look at themselves do not make it easy to
acknowledge or express their actual deep interest in the welfare of the planet
and of all who live on it. But the caring is there. We have perceived it in all the
modelers described in this book; indeed in all the modelers we have known. It
is hard to imagine why anyone would enter such a demanding and often tedious
field in the first place, if not propelled by some vision of a world that is very
much better, by some commitment to that vision, and by a belief that computer
modeling can help to achieve it.
The job is to balance a more rigorous scientific self-image with a more
permissive human one. It is a classic divergent problem-a problem of
reconciling what our culture usually views as incompatible opposites. Holding
onto both opposites at the same time can strengthen each of them, as Eastern
thinkers, who practice the art of balancing dualities, know. For Westerners,
Robert M. Pirsig has expressed the possibility and the potential of blending the
human capabilities of rational thinking and of caring. The following
compilation of his words is slightly paraphrased so that the discussion is about
modeling instead of motorcycle mechanics:
In the past our common universe of reason has been in the process of escaping,
rejecting the romantic, irrational world of prehistoric man. It's been necessary
since before the time of Socrates to reject the passions, the emotions, in order to
free the rational mind for an understanding of nature's order. Now it's time to
further an understanding of nature's order by reassimilating those passions. The
passions, the emotions, the affective domain of man's consciousness, are a part of
nature's order too.
The difference between a good modeler and a bad one is precisely the ability to
select the good facts from the bad ones on the basis of quality. He has to care! This is
an ability about which formal traditional scientific method has nothing to say. To
put it in more concrete terms: Ifyou want to build a model or fix a motorcycle or set
a nation right, then classical, structural, dualistic subject-object knowledge,
although necessary, isn't enough. You have to have some feeling for the quality of
the work. You have to have a sense of what's good. That is what carries you
forward.
We think that if we are going to reform the world and make it a better place to
live in, the way to do it is not with talk about relationships of a political nature,
which are inevitably dualistic, full of subjects and objects and their relationship to
one another; or with programs full of things for other people to do. We think that
kind of approach starts at the end and presumes the end is the beginning. Programs
of a political nature are important end products of social quality that can be
effective only if the underlying structure of social values is right. The social values
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are right only if the individual values are right. The place to improve the world is
first in one's own heart and head and hands, and then work outward from there. I?
Modelers can see themselves as well-meaning but basically powerless pawns
in the system of political shoving, at the mercy of clients and funders who are
bent on trivial purposes and who are not likely to follow any advice that is
different from what they already thought. They can see themselves as
removed, objective, purified by the truth as revealed within social statistics and
high R2 values. They can believe themselves to be more knowledgeable about
the system than anyone else, and regard knowledge as necessary for action and
mistakes as proof of incompetence. They can consider that their major
contributions to society are their quantitative tools and the precise-appearing
numbers they generate. It is not hard to imagine what kind of structure and
behavior are bound to emerge from this way of seeing-it is the field of system
analysis depicted in this book.
Or modelers can see themselves as responsible not to parochial, short-term
interests, but to all humankind. They can see themselves as simplifiers,
clarifiers, and fellow-explorers. They can listen more than they talk, ask the
questions people really want asked, draw forth visions, designs, and
experiments. They can be comfortable with the fact that they have glands,
hearts, values, beliefs, moral stands, and blind spots. They can be willing to be
wrong, vulnerable, caring, and idealistic. They can hold the highest intellectual
standards of scientific hypothesis-formation and disproof, along with the
highest human standards of integrity, compassion, and truthfulness. We can
imagine what kind of system of modeling such a self-image might bring forth. It
would be a transformation.
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Epilogue
The computer as oracle is a natural image, a modern twist of an ancient thread,
an expression of the continuing desire to know the future as a way of making
wise decisions in the present. But even in the earliest forms of human society
there were sources of wisdom very different from the oracles. There were sages
and masters, much less flashy, less popular at court, who denied both the
possibility and the utility of knowing the future. They focused attention not on
the crystal-ball but on the being who gazed into it. Instead of predicting, they:
• Questioned how it is we know what we think we know.
• Exposed false assumptions.
• Put daily affairs in a larger perspective.
• Showed the interconnectedness of all things.
• Pointed to the wisdom each person can find within.
The oracles gave down-to-earth, practical-sounding messages that seemed
compelling at the time. Most of them are forgotten now, and the few that are
remembered are not notable for their accuracy or usefulness. But the sages,
who talked more about the present than the future, and more about acceptance
than about manipulation, gave messages that are still quoted, pondered, and
used, even thousands of years later. For example:
To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven. A
time to be born and a time to die, a time to plant and a time to pluck up that which is
planted. A time to kill and a time to heal, a time to break down and a time to build
up. A time to cast away stones and a time to gather stones together, a time to
embrace and a time to refrain from embracing.
Ecclesiastes
All actions take place in time by the interweaving of the forces of nature, but the
man lost in selfish delusion thinks that he himself is the actor. But the man who
knows the relation between the forces of nature and actions, sees how some forces
of nature work upon other forces of nature, and becomes not their slave.
Bhagavad Gita
Disputation is a proof of not seeing clearly.
Chuang Tzu
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Any path is only a path, and there is no affront, to oneself or to others, in dropping
it if that is what your heart tells you ... Look at every path closely and deliberately.
Try it as many times as you think necessary. Then ask yourself, and yourself alone,
one question ... Does this path have a heart? If it does, the path is good; if it
doesn't it is of no use.
Don Juan in Carlos Castaneda,
The Teachings of Don Juan
[am not at all concerned with appearing to be consistent. [n my pursuit after truth [
have discarded many ideas and learnt many new things ... What [ am concerned
with is my readiness to obey the call of truth.
The opinions I have formed and the conclusions I have arrived at are not final. [
may change them tomorrow ... All [ have done is to try experiments ... on as vast a
scale as I could do.
Gandhi
The more laws and restriction there are,
The poorer people become.
The sharper men's weapons,
The more trouble in the land.
The more ingenious and clever men are,
The more strange things happen.
The more rules and regulations,
The more thieves and robbers.
Therefore the sage says:
I take no action and people are reformed.
I enjoy peace and people become honest.
I do nothing and people become rich.
[ have no desires and people return to the good and simple life.
Lao Tzu,
Tao Teh Ching
Man is describing himself when he thinks that he is describing others ...
When he says: 'This teaching is sublime,' he means: 'This appears to suit me.'
But we might have wanted to know something about the teaching, not how he
thinks it influences him.
In order to know the nature of the teaching, we would have to know the nature of
the person upon whom it has acted. The ordinary person cannot know this: all he
can know is what that person assumes to be an effect upon himself-and he has no
coherent picture of what 'himself' is ...
While this situation still obtains, there will generally be an equal number of
people saying; 'This is marvelous,' as are saying: 'This is ridiculous'. This is
ridiculous really means: 'This is ridiculous to me,' and this is marvelous means:
'This is marvelous to me'.
Would you like to be able to test what is really ridiculous or marvelous, or
anything in between?
You can do it, but not ... in the midst of being quite uncertain as to what it is you
are and why you like or dislike anything.
When you have found yourself, you can have knowledge. Until then you can only
have opinions.
You have not met yourself yet. The only advantage of meeting others in the
meantime is that one of them may present you to yourself ...
When you do meet yourself, you come into a permanent endowment and
bequest of knowledge that is like no other experience on earth.
Tariqavi retold by [dries Shah!
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We have been in the process of writing this book for a long time. It took so
long because we chose to let our other activities take up much ofour time. Most
of those activities were in the modeling world-teaching about models, making
them, working with clients successfully and unsuccessfully, attending
conferences in which modelers talked about their work with varying degrees of
honesty, watching how policymakers used, did not use, or misused models.
Our own perceptions about modeling have developed considerably over this
period, necessitating the rewriting of sections of this book we thought we had
finished. The primary shift we have experienced is, as the sages have always
advised, a decreasing interest in the hardware, the techniques, the data and
apparatus of modeling, and an increasing interest in the persons using the
apparatus.
While we were learning and changing, the field of modeling was also
developing. The stories of the nine models are still unfolding, especially their
effects on the world. And in the process those modelers, and most others we
have encountered, have been developing as persons. The rewriting we have
had to do has primarily been to excise our most cynical and hopeless sentences.
We have seen many modelers become less mechanical and more human, less
intellectually rigid and more open, less apparently omniscient and more willing
to discuss humbly what they do and do not know. The literature reflects this
change, with interesting new articles about the philosophy of knowledge, about
human relations, about ethics and paradigms.2 Modelers are beginning to
view themselves less as objective technicians and more as well-meaning but
very fallible participants in a social system where everyone is fallible in some
way or another, but also where everyone has something unique to contribute.
We believe that this trend toward humanization of modeling is not an
accident, but is an inevitable consequence of the process of modeling itself. The
computer is not and will never be a reliable oracle. But it can be an unrelenting,
merciless guru. It demands complete precision, consistency, and explicitness,
and it delivers back the logical results of one's statements about the world with
no tactful allowance for what the modeler might have expected or hoped.
Modeling forces the modeler to look at interconnections and to see that the
separations of disciplines and politics are artifacts of the human mind, not
characteristics of the real world. The clash of modeling paradigms awakens
one's interest in the very existence of paradigms and alerts one to how mental
models shape the world. Any modeler wrestling with the representation of a
social system in the demanding language of the computer must come to terms
with uncertainty, with the inadequacy of social data, and with the annoying
tendency of interconnected elements not to behave in the way he or she
thought they would. Modelers may enter their profession in hopes of becoming
oracles, of knowing all there is to know and of seeing clearly into the future.
But if they let it do so, the profession itself will nudge them in the direction of
becoming sages, questioning conventional wisdom, examining the ultimate
purposes that should guide decisions, and shaping the future rather than
predicting it.
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We have said that computer modeling can add five important qualities to
human understanding beyond what can be achieved by the mind alone:
1. Precision.
2. Comprehensiveness.
3. Logic.
4. Explicitness.
5. Flexibility.
The great problems that threaten modern social systems-poverty and
hunger, armaments and terrorism, environmental destruction and resource
depletion---eertainly would be helped if these five qualities became regular
elements in human decision-making. But we have also said that these qualities
cannot be realized unless modelers become compassionate, humble,
open-minded, responsible, self-insightful, and committed. If those qualities
became regular elements in human decision-making, the problems of the globe
would certainly be solved.
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This book describes the state of the art of social-system modeling, especially at
the level of national planning. In an unusually clear and understandable language
it approaches the controversial and often confused debate in the use of computer
models in social decision making from an entirely new direction. By looking at the
entire subject-including the political and philosophical environments around
the models, as well as the models themselves-from an objective and know-
ledgeable viewpoint, the authors show how computer modeling is a powerful but
limited tool.
Written from an insider's viewpoint, with an outsider's scepticism, this book is
of continuing relevance and too important not to publish.
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